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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the personalisation of mediated political communication and 
contributes to the personalisation scholarship by adding to it a non-Western 
perspective. Specifically, that from the communist and post-communist societies, by 
using Croatia, the latest member of the European Union, and its communist 
predecessor Yugoslavia, as a case study. The thesis starts from the premise that 
the political communication is more personalized, i.e. focused on individual political 
actors and their personae, in communist and post-communist societies, than in 
Western ones with which personalisation scholarship dominantly deals with. It is 
also hypothesized that it may have graver consequences than in the West. For 
example, it may weaken political institutions, sustain authoritarianism, lead to 
manipulation and deceit of public etc. Accordingly, main research question asked in 
this thesis is: What are the similarities and differences in the ways in which the 
personalisation of mediated political communication develops over time in a 
communist non-democratic system, a post-communist new democracy, and an 
established Western democracy? The question is answered through a longitudinal 
content analysis of Yugoslav/Croatian daily newspapers and fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis. The empirical analyses revealed that the personalized 
political communication indeed develops in a different way, and is connected to 
different conditions, in the transitional society, than is the case in established 
Western democracies. The most important finding of this study is that the mediated 
political communication was, unlike in Western democracies, de-personalized over 
time. The theoretical discussion of the possible causes and effects of 
personalisation in communist and post-communist societies contributes to the 
development of personalisation theory, and the empirical study provides original 
evidence of how and why mediated political communication was personalized in 
non-Western contexts. Furthermore, two new theories are formed that may help 
explain the personalisation trends in transitional societies. These are continuation 
theory and democratization theory.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Communist leader Josip Broz Tito, who ruled Yugoslavia for 35 years 
following the Second World War, died more than three decades ago. Many things 
have changed since his death. His Yugoslavia dissolved during the 1990s, 
successor countries went through the process of democratic transition, some of 
them even joined the European Union; their media systems were deregulated and 
commercialized, civil society took roots, and a plethora of political leaders 
commanded the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, one thing does 
not seem to have changed – the media interest in the personality of the communist 
leader. The fact that Tito was, and still is, a topic attractive to the media was 
exemplified by the media’s reaction to the death of his widow Jovanka Broz on 20th 
October 2013. All major media outlets in Croatia, the country that only several 
months before became the 28th member state of the European Union, reported 
news of her death. The death of a woman whose husband was political leader of 
this country 33 years ago was not regular news; it was the main news in all 
mainstream media. Her pictures dominated all internet news portals: there were 
detailed reports of how and where she died, and even more detailed articles 
reminiscing about her marriage to the political leader. The stories of her falling in 
love with him, her jealousy, his mistresses, their final years together, the effects that 
their marriage had on the political developments in the country, were once again 
being brought to public view. Given the attention that Tito’s wife’s death has 
attracted, and the consequent reporting of their private lives, it seems that not only 
his political persona is what (still) interests the media, but rather the private one as 
well.  
One of the questions that this raises is, if his wife’s death was such huge 
news in the 2010s, how prominent was Tito in media reporting, and political 
communication in general, during his time in power? Were the media and other 
political communication actors as centred on him as they appear to be nowadays? 
Or perhaps they were even more so? What was known about his private life and 
marriage problems while he was in office and his communist party controlled the 
media? And what consequences, if any, might this focus on the leader and his 
persona in communism have had for the prominence of leaders in the young post-
communist democracy? In other words, the extent to which communist leaders were 
prominent in the political communication of their countries, the ways in which their 
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images have been constructed, and how this personalized political communication 
continued to develop in the transition to post-communism, are questions that no one 
has answered before.  
The lack of scholarly interest in the personalized political communication in 
authoritarian and transitional societies is surprising, given the negative 
consequences that this phenomenon might have for democratic and societal 
processes. They may be even more pronounced than in established Western 
democracies1, with which most of personalisation scholarship deals with (for 
overviews of personalisation theory and research see Maier & Adam, 2010 and Van 
Aelst et al., 2011). Specifically, the focus on individual political actors at the expense 
of political collectives and institutions in authoritarian and transitional societies may 
position political leaders as the greatest authorities in a society and consequently, 
may void political institutions of significance and legitimacy (Schöpflin, 1993). This 
development may lead to the rise of the clientelistic society, inhibit the development 
of strong institutions and party system, and threaten the process of democratic 
transition. Similarly, mostly negative implications are associated with the focus on 
political leaders’ personae. It is suggested that the emphasis on leaders’ lives and 
qualities can trivialize political communication, lead to the “dumbing down” of 
politics, distract the public from important political issues and provide voters with 
irrelevant information based on which they might be inclined to make their electoral 
decisions (Curran, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Meyer, 2002; Pakulski & Higley, 2008). In 
authoritarian and transitional societies in which the political elite exerts significant 
influence over media, these issues are even more important since the politicians are 
able to control the mediated information about themselves, and hence, project a 
manufactured image to the public (Apor et al., 2004). In this way the public may be 
seen as not only distracted from important political issues, but there is also potential 
for the public to be deceived and manipulated by false information about their 
leaders.  
The main aim of this thesis is to fill this gap in personalisation scholarship by 
examining the characteristics of personalized political communication in 
authoritarian systems and to explore how, if at all, this phenomenon changes during 
the process of democratic transition. Given that the majority of personalisation 
                                                 
1
 The term established Western democracies is used in this thesis for refering to the US and countries 
of Western Europe. These countries are also refered to as „modern democracies“ (Poguntke & Webb, 
2005), „established democracies“ (Swanson & Mancini, 1996), „advanced industrial democracies“ 
(Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000) etc. The term established Western democracies is in this thesis chosen 
because it most narrowly captures specifically the US and Western Europe, since by using other terms 
such as modern or advanced industrial democracies countries such as Japan or South Korea would be 
included, and these are not prominent in personalisation research.   
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literature focuses on this phenomenon in established Western democracies, the 
analysis of how personalized political communication develops in authoritarian and 
transitional systems, for what reasons and with what effects, will enrich 
personalisation scholarship and broaden the context in which it can be studied 
beyond the Western world. I believe that it is important to add to the personalisation 
theory this perspective from authoritarian and transitional societies since political 
communication may be even more personalized, and with graver consequences, 
than in established Western democracies. Whether or not political communication 
was actually personalized to the extent suggested by theories is unknown since 
there is hardly any empirical evidence to back up the claims made in literature 
concerned with communist and post-communist regimes. A rare piece of empirical 
evidence comes from Hermans and Vergeer's (2012) study of candidates’ 
communication strategies in 2009 European parliament elections. They found that 
politicians from post-communist countries pursued the most personalized 
communication, manifested in the extent to which they revealed information about 
their work in politics, family life and private preferences. Politicians in European 
Western democracies were found to personalize their communication to a far lesser 
extent. However, this study represents a rare glimpse at the similarities and 
differences between the ways in which political communication is personalized in 
different contexts, rather than a comprehensive and definite proof. Consequently, 
the main research question to be asked in this thesis is: What are the similarities 
and differences in the ways in which the personalisation of mediated political 
communication develops over time in a communist non-democratic system, a post-
communist new democracy, and an established Western democracy? The main 
hypothesis is that mediated political communication is more personalized in a 
communist system than in any other, and that this high degree of personalized 
political communication has continued into the post-communist era. This would 
indicate that the personalisation of mediated political communication in these 
systems developed in a different way and for different reasons than in established 
Western democracies, and that personalisation scholarship is limited and needs to 
be expanded with theories that can help explain how and why personalisation trends 
develop in these non-Western contexts. The answer to the main research question 
and the discussions that will be presented in this thesis might be of interest not only 
to scholars specializing in personalisation, but also to those interested in political 
communication and mediatisation of politics in general. In addition, given that the 
thesis explores personalisation from the perspective of communist and post-
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communist societies, it may also be of interest to scholars of communist and 
transitional studies. 
Before explaining in greater detail the reasoning behind putting the focus of 
this study on communist and post-communist societies, and due to multiple 
understandings of political communication as a field, and personalisation of political 
communication in particular, certain definitions and concepts need to be made clear.  
 
1.1. Definitions 
 
This thesis follows the definition of the field of political communication 
advanced by McNair (2011: 4) which states that political communication 
incorporates: 
“ 1 All forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political 
actors for the purpose of specific objectives. 
2 Communication addressed to these actors by non-politicians such as 
voters and newspaper columnists. 
3 Communication about these actors and their activities, as contained in 
news reports, editorials, and other forms of media discussion of politics.” 
In short, McNair’s definition is based on the premise that political 
communication is communication about political actors and politics between three 
actors (political actors, media, and the audiences/voters). It follows from this that 
political communication can be manifested in political actors’ behaviour, media 
reporting, and voters’ behaviour, and consequently it can be seen as a field in which 
political science, media studies and political psychology come together. Similarly, 
Maier and Adam (2010), who in my view offer one of the most comprehensive 
overviews of personalisation theory and research, see personalisation as 
manifested in three areas: political actors’ campaign strategies, media reporting and 
voting behaviour. It should be noted that in the context of personalisation theory and 
research, political actors are usually defined in a narrow way, i.e. as politicians and 
political parties, although, as McNair (2011) emphasizes, public organizations, 
pressure groups, terrorist organizations, even media themselves, can also 
sometimes be seen as political actors. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that existing 
research on personalisation in political actors’ behaviour is mostly centred on 
election campaigns (see Hermans & Vergeer, 2012; Maier & Adam, 2010; Poguntke 
& Webb, 2005; Scammell & Langer, 2006), in this thesis a broader view of political 
actors’ behaviour is taken in order to capture not only campaign communication 
strategies, but also routine, everyday political actors’ behaviour. Consequently, 
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personalisation of political communication is in this thesis defined as a phenomenon 
manifested in the focus that is put on politicians as individuals, and their personae, 
by political communication actors.  
This thesis focuses on the personalisation of mediated political 
communication, which will be examined through the analysis of personalisation in 
media reporting and mediated leaders’ communication. Although the analysis of 
personalisation in mediated leaders’ communication, i.e. political leaders’ 
statements as reported in the media, will not fully disclose the extent to which, and 
ways in which political actors (strategically) personalize their communication; it will 
point to the perception that they might create in the mediated public discourse. The 
analysis of personalisation in mediated political communication will also not be able 
to provide answers to questions about the audiences/voters reception of mediated 
messages about political leaders and their parties, nor the influence that 
personalization of mediated political communication might have on voters’ choices. 
However, this is not to say that revealing the extent to which, and ways in which, the 
media and political actors emphasize individual political actors and create their 
images in mediated public discourse is a subject not worth studying. In the first 
place, although the effects that the mediated information has on its audiences are 
far from conclusive (Street, 2011), it is widely acknowledged that the public receives 
the majority of political information through the use of mass media (Meyer, 2002; 
Schramm & Roberts, 1971; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). This is not only true for the 
established Western democracies; early research on primary sources of information 
in European communist countries confirmed this fact as well (Welsh, 1980). Hence, 
although this study can not reveal what the communist and post-communist 
audiences do with the mediated information, it can enhance our understanding of 
the extent and content of mediated information about political leaders. In the second 
place, the extent to which, and ways in which, political communication actors 
emphasize individuals and their personae might influence the communication 
practices of other political communication actors. In other words, it is suggested that 
the personalized media reporting might lead to the increase in the personalisation in 
politicians’ communication, and vice versa. Therefore, this study will shed light on 
how, if at all, media and political actors interact and react to each others 
communication practices. This thesis will deal with the question of whether political 
actors are those that dictate the trends in mediated political communication and the 
media adapts to them; whether the media is the actor that has the potential to 
change the ways in which politicians communicate politics; or is the relationship 
between the two actors more complicated and less straightforward? 
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1.2. The conceptual model  
 
If there are as many definitions of personalisation as there are scholars 
studying it, there is almost as equal number of different ways in which 
personalisation is conceptualized. However, in recent years there is a growing 
consensus that the personalisation phenomenon can be seen as having at least two 
main dimensions. The concept of personalisation that is used in this thesis draws on 
the conceptualizations offered by Maier and Adam (2010) and Van Aelst, Sheafer 
and Stanyer (2011). However, the concept is slightly modified to allow for a more 
detailed examination of references to politicians’ personae, and in that way, a better 
understanding of elements on which politicians’ public images are based.  
The personalisation of political communication is conceptualized as having 
two main dimensions: a person- and a persona-centred dimension. Person-centred 
political communication refers to the focus that is put on individual political actors as 
opposed to that put on collective political actors, such as parties or governments. 
Persona-centred political communication manifests in the emphasis that is put on 
the persona of an individual political actor, or specifically, on a politician’s political 
and private life and qualities. In this project “persona” is primarily understood as a 
person’s perceived personality, a politician’s image as it is presented in the public 
sphere. Hence, in order for the reference to a leader to also be a reference to 
his/her persona, some part of a leader’s personality, life or qualities, must be 
mentioned. In other words, only those references to a leader which mention him/her 
in relation to something he/she does or fails to do, thinks, says, how he/she is, which 
skills he/she has, are considered to be references to a leader’s persona. This 
dimension can be further broken down into two sub-dimensions, namely political and 
private persona-centred political communication. The political persona-centred 
political communication is manifested in the emphasis on a politician’s political life 
and qualities. That is to say, those actions, traits and skills that are mostly related to 
his/her political role. On the other hand, the private persona-centred political 
communication is manifested in the focus on a politician’s private life and qualities, 
specifically those actions, traits and skills which are related to roles usually 
associated to ones’ private sphere, e.g. husband/wife, father/mother, daughter/son, 
friend, lover, sports enthusiast, member of a religious group etc.  
Although persona-centred political communication defined in this way is a 
very broad dimension, I argue that there is value in this kind of conceptualization. 
Firstly, by only looking at the prominence of either a politician’s life (e.g. Stanyer, 
2013) or qualities (Reinemann & Wilke, 2007; Sigelman & Bullock, 1991; Wilke & 
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Reinemann, 2001), it is possible to get only a partial understanding of how 
politicians are discussed. Only by examining the prominence of all parts of their 
personae is it possible to fully understand how their public images have been 
formed and on what elements they are based. Secondly, by only focusing on the 
prominence of a politician’s private life and/or qualities, as was done in several 
previous studies (e.g. Langer, 2011; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007; Stanyer, 2013), much 
valuable information is lost, since arguably most of the information that is 
communicated about them is in the political, rather than the private context. In 
addition, by not examining the extent to which a politician’s political persona is 
prominent in mediated discourse, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about the 
significance of the visibility of his/her private persona. Specifically, only by 
comparing the extent to which a politician’s political and private personae are visible, 
and the trends related to them, is it possible to determine the implications of private 
persona visibility. For example, the mediated visibility of politicians’ private personae 
might have increased over the past few decades, but this information has different 
implications if the visibility of politicians’ political personae has also increased, or 
indeed if it had decreased. If both political and private personae visibilities have 
increased, the private persona-centred communication can be seen as a part of a 
larger trend in the increase in the persona-centred communication, and it could be 
understood as supplementing rather than replacing the political persona-centred 
communication. However, if the extent of the political persona-centred 
communication has decreased over time, the increased visibility of private persona-
related information might be seen as a new trend in political communication, and 
private information as replacing political information in public discourse.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Dimensions of the personalisation of political communication 
Personalisation of 
political 
communication 
Person-centred  
political 
communication 
Persona-centred  
political 
communication 
Political persona-
centred 
communication 
Private persona-
centred 
communication 
 18
 
The further value of this conceptual model lies in the fact that by making the 
distinction between the person- and persona-centred political communication, it is 
possible to pinpoint dimension-specific effects, causes and trends of personalisation 
of political communication. In other words, these dimensions of personalisation can 
be seen as having different effects (chapter 2); can be caused by different factors 
(chapters 3, 4 and 7); and have different degrees and experience different trends 
over time (chapters 5 and 6).  
 
1.3. Theoretical and empirical focus: The (post)communist perspective 
 
This thesis will examine the personalisation phenomenon in the communist 
and post-communist context, using the newest member of the European Union, 
young post-communist democracy Croatia, and its predecessor, communist 
Yugoslavia, as a case study. The motivation for examining the personalisation 
phenomenon from this perspective comes from the theories advocated by the 
communist leadership cult literature and that concerned with democratic transitions. 
Specifically, this literature suggests that in these systems the focus in politics and 
political communication was always on the leader, and perhaps even on his/her 
persona (Apor et al., 2004; Apor, 2004; Davies, 2004; Eatwell, 2006; Jović & 
Lamont, 2010; Kitschelt, 1995; Leese, 2014; Lewis, 2000; Plamper, 2004). 
Mainstream personalisation scholarship suggests that in the past few decades 
political communication actors have shifted their focus from communicating issues 
and collectives, such as parties and governments, to communicating information 
about individual political actors and their personae, especially their private life and 
qualities. Given that in communist and post-communist systems the focus was 
arguably always on the leader, mainstream personalisation scholarship seems to 
lack the power to explain effects, causes and trends of the personalisation of 
political communication in a communist and post-communist context. In other words, 
the existing personalisation scholarship does not account for personalized political 
communication, its causes, effects and trends over time, in systems in which the 
focus was arguably on individuals and their personae from the very start, examples 
of which are communist and post-communist systems.  
The scholarship concerned with communist regimes usually describes the 
ways in which politics was conducted and communicated by the term “leadership 
cult” or “personality cult”, which can be defined as a “god-like glorification of a 
modern political leader with mass medial techniques” (Plamper, 2004: 33). All 
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leaders of European communist countries after the World War II developed 
personality cults, but to differing degrees (Leese, 2014). The underlying logic behind 
the leadership cult theory is that the leader was the central actor in political 
communication, and politics in general, of a communist regime. The centrality of a 
leader in the new system was considered a necessity since it was the only way of 
legitimizing the new system given than the party was not yet organized and 
established (Ake, 1966). In line with what the communist party saw as its main 
purposes in the society, education and socialization, the leader was also used as a 
means of simplifying values, beliefs and behaviours for the, in large part, 
uneducated public. The leader was to set the example of how people should 
behave, what they should value and what their interests should be. Given that the 
aim of building a communist leader’s personality cult was to “centre loyalties and 
emotions in the persona of the leader” (Leese, 2014: 342-343), i.e. convince the 
citizens of his greatness and provide an identifiable role model, the leader’s persona 
as it was projected to the public was to a large extent constructed or manufactured 
(Apor et al., 2004). In short, according to the leadership cult literature, all political 
communication actors were focused on the leader and his persona in a communist 
system. 
 According to some scholars, post-communist politicians’ behaviour was in its 
early period also leader-centred (Lewis, 2000), representing a continuation from the 
communist era. Some of the reasons why political actors decided to keep the focus 
on the individuals at the expense of the collectives may have been the weakness of 
the newly formed parties, low party identification, uncertainty about voters’ needs 
and interests, institutional designs that granted more power to individuals etc. 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Lewis, 2000; Tomšič & Prijon, 2010). Furthermore, it is argued that 
in most post-communist countries the political elite retained control over, at least 
some, media, and was able to use the media as an unobstructed channel of 
communication to the voters (Gross, 2004; Splichal, 2001). Hence, it might be 
expected that if the political elite was pursuing personalized communication, media 
reporting was personalized as well. However, during the transitional process the 
media in most Central and East European post-communist countries gained some 
level of autonomy from political influence (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013; Gross, 2004). 
Consequently, it can be speculated that with the transitional processes that resulted 
in the rise of autonomous media, spread of entertainment media, institutional 
changes aimed to de-centralization of power, development of civil society, and 
increased significance of international relations, the extent to which political 
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communication is personalized, and the factors contributing to it, might become 
more similar to the developments in established Western democracies.  
Since the main aim of this project is to closely examine the trends of 
personalisation of mediated political communication and factors which influence it in 
a communist and post-communist system, the Republic of Croatia, newest member 
state of the European Union, represents an interesting testing ground for this kind of 
exploratory study, given that its political and media system have changed 
significantly in the past 50 years. This changing environment is suitable for testing 
the hypotheses of continuation and change in the degrees and drivers of 
personalisation(s).  
The Yugoslavian/Croatian case is also interesting because the Yugoslav 
leader, Tito, might represent an ideal example of the extreme form of the 
personalisation of mediated leadership. It is widely held that he alone was the glue 
that kept the multi-national Yugoslavia together (Kolář, 2014; Pavlowitch, 1992; 
Velikonja, 2008; Zaninovich, 1983). As Carmichael (2010: 1045) writes: “His 
personal charm and political intuition helped to inspire a huge personality cult which 
still survives in pockets across the region.” Hence, the strength of his cult is 
exemplified by fact that even today, more than three decades after his death, 
“everywhere in the former-Yugoslav republics, Josip Broz Tito seems to continue to 
embody Yugoslavia that many people remember in a positive light” (Volčič, 2007: 
30; see also Velikonja, 2008). Combined with the assumption that communist 
leaders dominated political communication in their countries (Apor et al., 2004) and 
that in the case of Tito this was for an unusually long time2, research into the 
personalisation of mediated political communication in Yugoslavia has great 
potential to reveal the unique features of the ways in which mediated leadership was 
personalized in a communist era.  
Furthermore, unlike other post-communist countries of Central Europe, 
Croatia, one of the Republics formed after the break-up of Yugoslavia, showed in 
the early post-communist period a preference for institutional arrangements which 
increase the focus on individual political actors (Easter, 1997). In addition, the first 
post-communist period is said to have been marked by the presidency of Franjo 
Tuđman. Jović and Lamont (2010: 1613) nicely capture Tuđman's domination over 
Croatia in 1990s by stating that „not only did Franjo Tuđman effectively control all 
state institutions and organisations, but he intervened in civil society, kept the media 
under firm control, and even shaped popular culture“. Hence, in the early post-
                                                 
2
 Tito was the Yugoslav head executive from 1945 until his death in 1980. The only European 
communist leader which ruled longer than Tito was Albanian Enver Hoxha.  
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communist period certain continuities from the communist era can be observed with 
regard to the centrality of political leaders to political processes and communication.  
However, in the second decade following the transition, Croatia introduced 
institutional arrangements which decreased the degree of personalized power 
(parliamentary political system and proportional electoral system) (Ilišin, 2001), the 
indexes of press freedom showed that the country’s media moved towards being 
more autonomous (Freedom House, 2013), and none of the post-2000 leaders were 
considered to have been “fathers” of the nation, as Tito and Tuđman were (Udovičić, 
2011). Hence, I believe these continuities and changes make Croatia a good testing 
ground for exploring topics pursued in this project.  
An obvious limitation of a case study approach is that the findings from this 
empirical study will not be easily generalizable across communist and post-
communist systems. Although Central and Eastern European post-communist 
countries can be seen as sharing certain characteristics, they have entered the 
transition from different starting points, developed in distinctive ways, and have 
evolved different media and political systems. Hence, there seem to be “multiple 
post-communisms” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008: 25), and not just one. However, 
given that this project is primarily an exploratory study that aims to examine in depth 
the extent to which mediated political communication was personalized in 
communism, and also how and why the trend developed during the process of 
democratic transition, a case study approach seems the most appropriate. Although 
the empirical investigation will not reveal the characteristics of the personalisation 
phenomenon in all communist and post-communist societies, this study will be the 
first step in exploring the ways in which the personalisation of political 
communication developed in these systems. It will enhance our understanding of 
how and why the phenomenon might develop in a non-Western system, and offer 
some explanations of why political communication is, or is not, personalized, in 
different periods of transition. 
The theoretical discussion of the possible effects and causes of 
personalisation of political communication in a Western, communist and post-
communist system will address the issue of personalisation in these systems more 
generally.  It will be argued that there are some distinctive effects that different 
dimensions of personalisation can have in a communist and post-communist 
context, which are not usually considered in the personalisation literature (chapter 
2). And furthermore, that there are some causal conditions that can lead to an 
increase or decrease in the degree of personalisation in these contexts that were 
previously not acknowledged by scholars studying personalisation (chapters 3 and 
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4). Hence, these theoretical discussions will inform the personalisation scholarship 
more broadly and contribute to better understanding of this phenomenon in 
communist and post-communist societies in general.  
The theoretical chapters (2-4) are centred on potential causes and effects of 
the personalized political communication in order to demonstrate in greater detail 
why personalized communication might matter, especially in communist and post-
communist societies, and why the examined contexts might be seen as particularly 
conducive to the development of this phenomenon. Specifically, chapter 2 that 
focuses on potential effects of personalized political communication is designed to 
give insight into reasons why personalisation is a phenomenon which is important to 
study in communist and post-communist societies. It examines theories suggesting 
that the emphasis on individual political actors and their personae in authoritarian 
and transitional societies may have graver consequences for democratic and 
societal processes than is the case in established Western democracies. 
Furthermore, chapters 3 and 4 focus on elements of communist, post-communist, 
and Western contexts, which are thought of as making these societies favourable to 
the development of personalized political communication. In other words, these 
chapters aim to establish why personalized political communication is considered to 
have particularly fertile ground in which to develop, by examining politically- and 
media-related factors that might contribute to its development. The reasons why 
political communication in communist and post-communist societies is believed to 
be personalized will be discussed there.  
Distinguishing between the cause and effect in media studies is a 
challenging task, which usually comes down to the “chicken or the egg” problem. On 
the example of personalized political communication, we can ask whether media’s 
focus on politicians instead of parties have led to the decline in party identification, 
or rather have the weakened party loyalties made media put the emphasis on 
politicians since the parties have lost public trust? Given that there is hardly any 
research which deals with the causes and effects of personalized political 
communication, it is still impossible to draw robust conclusions about the contexts in 
which personalisation develops and the effects it has. And also, it is difficult to 
establish whether personalisation causes certain changes, or is itself a product of 
these changes and could be reinforcing them. However, this should not be a reason 
for neglecting these issues, but rather to deal with them in more depth. That is 
exactly what the next three chapters of this thesis are designed to do.  
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2. Debating the debate: What can personalized political 
communication do? 
 
This chapter aims to provide further arguments for the conceptual framework 
of personalisation used in this thesis by presenting theories that person- and 
persona-centred political communication are seen as the main cause, or one of 
contributors to, different effects and have distinct implications for democratic and 
societal processes. More specifically, in this chapter I discuss why personalisation of 
politics matters, and furthermore, how it might matter in different contexts.  
Hence, this chapter will inform this thesis in several ways. Firstly, it will 
provide the reasons why personalisation of political communication is a subject 
worth studying. Secondly, it will provide additional arguments for the 
conceptualization of personalized political communication as it is used in this thesis. 
Thirdly, it will show that the effects of personalisation of political communication are 
not only dimension-specific, but also context-specific, and that caution is needed 
when making generalizations about the personalisation effects across different 
systems. In other words, although the implications of the personalisation of political 
communication tend to centre on the effects that this phenomenon might have on 
democratic processes in established Western democracies, I argue that 
personalisation of political communication can have different, yet important, 
consequences in communist and post-communist societies.  
Although the list of possible effects is a long one, many of them are 
speculative, given that there is very little evidence that personalisation of political 
communication actually leads to any of them. In addition, it is often unclear whether 
personalisation is considered to be the main cause of a certain development, or it is 
just contributing to it. Also, sometimes personalisation’s effects can be seen as 
indirect, in cases when personalisation is seen as causally connected with a process 
that can have a specific effect. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Introduction, there 
is a “cause and effect” problem evident with almost all theories looking into how and 
why personalisation developed and what kind of influences it has on processes that 
are connected to it. In spite of these limitations, I believe it is important to discuss 
possible effects since they point to the significance of examining the personalisation 
phenomenon and contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which trends in 
political communication are seen to be connected to democratic and societal 
processes.  
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This chapter has two parts, each concerned with different dimension of 
personalisation of political communication. In addition, each of these parts looks at 
the effects of a specific dimension in three different contexts, Western, post-
communist and communist one. I argue that it is important to distinguish between 
the personalisation effects in different contexts since this leads to a better 
understanding of how and why certain processes and developments occur in 
diverse environments. If context-specific effects are not taken into account, the role 
that personalisation of political communication plays in causing or contributing to a 
process might be exaggerated, diminished or misunderstood.  
 
2.1.  Person-centred political communication 
 
As was outlined in the Introduction, person-centred political communication is 
a dimension of the personalisation of political communication that is manifested in 
the focus which political communication actors put on individual political actors 
instead of collectives, such as parties and governments. Although larger focus on 
individuals in political communication does not necessarily indicate that individuals 
have more power than collectives, it points to the fact that the political 
communication actors perceive them as more important and powerful than 
collectives. Hence, person-centred political communication is concerned with issues 
of power. The questions that are usually asked with regard to this dimension are: 
“Who is perceived as the most powerful and important political actor?” and “How can 
this perception of power holders influence democratic and societal processes?”. In 
the first part of the discussion that follows it is argued that the most commonly 
reproduced argument in a Western context is that the increased focus on individuals 
weakens the institutions and leads to a crisis of representative democracy. In the 
following two parts the possible effects of person-centred political communication 
are discussed in the context of communist and post-communist systems. It is argued 
that instead of weakening institutions, the person-centred communication might in 
these contexts lock already weak institutions in a cycle of irrelevance, and 
consequently inhibit the process of democratic transition.  
 
2.1.1. West: A logical development? 
The discussion of the effects of person-centred political communication is in 
Western parliamentary systems mostly focused on the increased emphasis that is 
put upon Prime Ministers as heads of the executive. One of the most frequently 
raised issues with regard to the perceived increased power of Prime Ministers in 
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parliamentary democracies is related to the core principles of this type of political 
system. Since one of the main aims of a parliamentary system is to prevent the 
concentration of power in one person, leader-centred governments in parliamentary 
systems are seen to lead to an unbalanced distribution of power. It is often argued, 
especially with regard to the United Kingdom, that parliamentary democracies 
increasingly resemble presidential systems with regard to the power that their head 
executive exercises (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Therefore, the person-centred 
executive is seen as changing the checks and balances of parliamentary systems 
which are set to disperse the power among political actors. Although these 
implications are seen as a far greater threat to democratic processes in 
parliamentary systems, similar developments can also be detected in presidential 
systems. Here too the chief executive, in this case the president, can informally 
obtain more decisional power than rival branches of government (for example, the 
Congress) and in this way challenge the formal institutional arrangements of the 
system (Langer, 2011; Poguntke & Webb, 2005).  
Moreover, person-centred political actors’ behaviour is often criticized by the 
advocates of the party democracy type of representative government. If the parties 
and the functions they perform in the democracy, such as the aggregation and 
articulation of public interests, recruiting political elite, and competing for public 
office, are seen as central for representative democracy, then a person- rather than 
party-centred system seems as a threat. The general idea is that the increased 
importance of individuals weakens the role of parties and consequently leads to the 
crisis of representative government.  
In the first place, leaders are increasingly put in the centre of electoral 
campaigns and seen as the party’s main electoral asset. A leader who gets to a 
position of power in this way can be inclined to claim a popular rather than party 
mandate and govern past his/her party (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). In addition, 
autonomous leaders might surround themselves with appointed advisors and 
consultants, rather than elected representatives, who may have a great influence on 
decision-making. In this way it can happen that the country is led by people who 
have no legitimacy, which results in the loss of democratic accountability and 
policies lacking legitimacy (Helms, 2008; Langer, 2011).  
Secondly, some leaders today try to make direct, personal bonds with voters 
which mean that the parties might lose their connection to the electorate. As will be 
argued in greater depth in the next chapter, parties have lost a considerable number 
of their supporters and now find it more difficult to relate to voters due to the 
changes in society, media and politics (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). Given that the 
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leaders are today trying harder then ever to form bonds with voters, if successful 
they can be less responsive to the party because they do not feel that they owe their 
public office to it. This further weakens the party.  
And thirdly, given that leaders are in this new environment considered crucial 
for electoral success, parties are usually not willing to challenge the personalizing 
practices of their leaders (Helms, 2008). This reinforces the leader’s autonomy and 
silences the possible opposition within the party (Langer, 2011).  
 However, the parties are not the only ones which can be weakened by the 
person- centred political actors’ behaviour. According to some scholars, leaders can 
be weakened by this phenomenon too. If they claim a popular mandate and govern 
past their parties, they are assuming most of the democratic accountability and 
responsibility for the outcomes of their decisions. This can easily backfire on them 
as they can be blamed for failed policies or bad judgments as individuals. In 
addition, the reliance on popular rather than party support is a double-edged sword. 
As Poguntke and Webb (2005: 22) picturesquely put it: “As long as they can ride the 
tiger of an increasingly fickle public opinion, they can “go it alone”; once public 
support starts to dwindle, however, they are left with few allies.” Furthermore, Helms 
(2008: 54) argues that personalized decision-making on the part of a leader may 
“provoke serious opposition and dissent” among members of the executive and 
parliament who are left out of the decision-making process what can ultimately lead 
to “legislative gridlock and government instability”. Finally, person-centred 
government can also prove to be less effective than a collegial one. Given that the 
conventions of leadership have been “stretched out of recognition”, in the sense that 
the leader is the central figure of political and electoral processes, and media 
coverage of politics as well, the quality of a leader’s performance in all these areas 
can be expected to fall (Foley, 2008: 54). There is only as much as one person can 
do at a time.  
 There is, however, a more positive view of the person-centred political actors’ 
behaviour, although not as prominent as the negative one outlined above, based 
mostly on the works of Bernard Manin. Manin (1997) argues that the increased 
importance of individuals in the political processes does not represent a crisis of 
representative government, but rather only a crisis of a certain type of representative 
government – party democracy. He also points to the fact that the focus on the 
individual is not peculiar to democratic processes, given that a person-centred 
system preceded the party democracy3. He makes a convincing case for the 
                                                 
3
 Manin (1997: 202) calls this type of representative government „parliamentarism“ and describes it as 
a system in which „the successful candidates were individuals who inspired the trust of their 
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prominence of individuals in the modern context, arguing argues that it is more 
logical today to put the individual at the focus of political processes, given that the 
modern environment is increasingly complex and the problems that leaders face are 
more and more unpredictable. In this context, it does not make sense for leaders to 
promote detailed programs which will soon be outdated. Consequently, leaders 
need to be assigned more discretionary power in order to be able to react to the 
changing and unpredictable environment (Manin, 1997; van Zoonen et al., 2011), 
while policy and issue-based politics at whose heart was party democracy do not 
seem to be the best type of system for this kind of context. Bjerling (2012: 223) goes 
a step further and advocates this new system in a straightforward way by saying that 
“a party-centred model for the steering of society should gradually be replaced by an 
individual-oriented model for the handling of the unforeseen”. 
 In addition, the enhanced importance of individual political actors in a context in 
which citizens are increasingly distrustful of political parties seems quite logical. 
Given that political parties have lost the trust of their electorate and have problems 
connecting with the voters, it seems logical that they adapted by putting the focus on 
individuals. Individual political actors may be better able to bond with voters, revive 
their interest in politics, and mobilize them to participate in political processes 
(Mazzoleni, 2000). If they are able to do so, person-centred political actors’ 
behaviour can perhaps be seen as increasing the quality of democracy, rather than 
lowering it. 
 The effects of person-centred media reporting are also mainly interpreted in a 
negative light. It is suggested that politicians have felt compelled to pursue a more 
person-centred communication mainly because the media have put them under the 
spotlight. For reasons that will be detailed in the next two chapters, the media is 
considered to increasingly report politics with the focus on individuals at the expense 
of collectives (parties, governments) and issues. Some authors argue that politicians 
have had to adapt their practices because of the perceived power of the media 
(Jamieson, 1988; Meyer, 2002). Therefore, person-centred media reporting can 
change the ways in which politics is conducted and communicated by shifting the 
focus from parties to individual political actors. Individuals are perceived as being 
more powerful, but also as more responsible. Finally, probably the most troubling 
effect of person-centred media reporting is the framing of politics as a struggle of 
power-seeking individuals. For the advocates of party democracy, this is a negative 
effect since it undermines the principles of this system. By media focusing on 
                                                                                                                                          
constituents as a result of their network of local connections, their social prominence, or by the 
deference they provoked“.  
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individual actors instead of parties and issues, parties are denied power and 
significance, which removes them from the centre of political processes.  
 However, as Bjerling (2012: 222) points out, there seem to be “good grounds to 
suggest that the news media ought to be more concerned with individual political 
actors” because they have become more important in political systems. As was 
discussed before, in a complex environment characterized with uncertainty, 
individuals (leaders) are increasingly important because they need to be able to 
effectively react to unpredictable situations (Manin, 1997). Hence, it seems logical 
that in this context media too focuses on individual actors given their importance in 
political processes. This is an argument that extends to the area of voters’ 
behaviour.  
  In the early days of voters’ behaviour research, voters who were making their 
decisions based on their evaluations of individual candidates instead of, for 
example, party promoted issues, were considered irrational. Illustratively, Sears 
(1969: 366) wrote that this kind of voting behaviour is an “immature way of dealing 
with political stimuli”. Therefore, political psychologists who were dealing with voters’ 
behaviour tended to look at person-centred voting as an irrational way of 
participating in political processes. However, there is a different school of rational 
theory scholars who claim that voters are actually behaving rationally when they 
focus on individuals because they use individual political actors as a shortcut in 
reaching their electoral decisions (Page, 1978; Popkin, 1991). In other words, given 
the demands of the modern lifestyle, the complexity of political matters, and the 
proliferation of political actors competing for power, for these scholars it seems only 
rational for voters to reduce their costs of reaching an electoral decision (time, 
information gathering etc.) by focusing on individuals who are more easily evaluated 
then their often abstract and complex policies. Since people feel skilled in judging 
other people, an activity they do often in their everyday life, focusing on individual 
political actors in voting process seems as a least complicated strategy of reaching 
a decision (Garzia, 2011; Pakulski & Higley, 2008). In addition, given the challenges 
of modern environments, it might seem reasonable that the voters are deciding 
which individual is better able to act in uncertain contexts rather than which party’s 
policies should be implemented (Popkin, 1991). By this view, it should also be 
logical that media reporting is more person-centred, because the leaders are the 
most important actors in the political system and the voters seem to need 
information about them in order to reach an informed electoral decision (Bjerling, 
2012).  
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2.1.2. Post-communism: Individuals versus institutions 
 The discussion of the implications of person-centred political communication in a 
Western context has showed that the main issues of concern are unbalanced 
distribution of power, weakening of political parties, and irrationality of voters’ 
choices. The challenging of institutional checks and balances is a serious concern of 
person-centred political communication in post-communist systems too. However, 
the main effects are in this context seem to relate to the development of democratic 
institutions and the institutionalisation of party system.  
 Alongside the problematic informal increase in the power of Prime Ministers in 
governments, which was discussed in the Western context, post-communist 
societies face another problem which can cause an unbalanced distribution of 
power. Specifically, most post-communist countries are characterized by “dual 
leadership”, meaning that their political systems have both the positions of a Prime 
Minister and a President (Baylis, 1996). However, their powers vary according to the 
political system that was introduced. In post-communist parliamentary systems 
Presidents usually have little formal power, but nonetheless their informal power and 
prestige is often great (Baylis, 2007). They are more popular than Prime Ministers, 
citizens trust them more than any other political institution (Mishler & Rose, 1997), 
and in most cases they derive their legitimacy from direct elections (Baylis, 2007). 
The discrepancy between a President’s weak formal powers and the strong support 
among citizens can easily lead to tensions and conflicts with other branches of 
government. Many post-communist Presidents have tried to exercise more power 
than they were constitutionally given and even change the institutional 
arrangements to formally gain more power (Baylis, 1996). Their interventions in 
areas of prime ministerial authority have often led to conflicts with Prime Ministers 
and weakened their roles in political processes. In other words, Presidents who try 
to exercise more power than they are given usually go hand in hand with weak 
Prime Ministers, what leads to an unbalanced distribution of power, ineffective 
government and reduces the legitimacy of the governments’ policies (Baylis, 1996, 
2007).  
 Although this represents a serious obstacle to democratic consolidation, even 
greater threats to the quality of democracy are under-developed political institutions 
which may be locked in the cycle of irrelevance by person-centred political 
communication, although the effect is indirect at best. In the first place, because of 
the experiences of a former regime, citizens tend to trust more in individual political 
actors than in institutions. Schöpflin (1993: 268) captures it nicely by saying: “Almost 
hypnotically, people turned to personalities, virtually without regard to their political 
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programmes, as a repository for society’s hopes and desires in particular, because 
persons were felt to be more reliable, more authentic and thus more likely to 
embody what the individual wanted.” Research into the levels of trust that citizens in 
post-communist societies have in different political actors and institutions confirms 
this thesis. Mishler and Rose (1997) looked at the levels of trust in political 
institutions in nine post-communist countries at the beginning of the transitional 
period and found that the institution of a President, the only one that is personalized 
(as opposed to parties, governments and parliaments), was the one that citizens 
trusted most. Therefore, citizens tended to invest individual political actors with 
authority and power, not institutions. Furthermore, it seems that the political 
processes were also revolving around individuals given that party leaders are said to 
have dominated over their parties in the early transition period (King, 2002; Lewis, 
2000). And consequently, it might be expected that the media too framed the 
political processes as a personal struggle for power what could have made citizens 
perceive political institutions as nothing more than “facades hiding different personal 
interests” (Schöpflin, 1993: 276). It is suggested that all these developments might 
have contributed to the under-development of political institutions and hindered their 
ability to acquire legitimacy and inspire trust. Hence, the focus that post-communist 
political actors have arguably put on individuals, instead of collectives and 
institutions, might have inhibited the institutionalization processes, and indirectly 
contributed to the effects that the under-developed political institutions had for the 
consolidation of democracy.  
 For example, this direct influence of weak and under-developed institutions, and 
the possibly indirect influence of person-centred political communication, might be 
manifested in the  increased reliance on informal practices of governing (e.g. 
clientelistic networks, patronage politics, corruption), and unsanctioned abuse of 
power. Some authors go as far as to argue that the main democratic deficit in post-
communist societies comes from the behaviour of the irresponsible political elite 
which abuses institutions and power (Fish, 2001; Gallina, 2010; Ledeneva, 2006). 
Weak institutions are not able to provide distance between the individual and power 
and ensure that the individuals do not abuse power, so its exercise becomes 
arbitrary (Schöpflin, 1993). In addition, institutions serve as a base for constructing 
identities. If they are not able to perform that function, then the society is structured 
through other elements, such as ethnicity or religion, what can easily be 
manipulated and can provoke conflicts between opposing groups (ibid.).  
 Another implication of person-centred political communication in post-communist 
societies might be the under-institutionalisation of party systems. Mainwaring (1999) 
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describes weakly institutionalized party systems as those in which politics is 
dominated by individuals, not parties; levels of party identification are low; voters’ 
volatility is high and person-centred voting is more common than the one based on 
parties and issues. All these features are usually ascribed to post-communist party 
systems (Colton, 2002; Kitschelt, 1995; Lewis, 2000; O’Dwyer & Kovalčik, 2005) and 
they can be directly or indirectly related to person-centred political communication. 
As was mentioned above, parties are often dominated by their leaders. The person-
centred parties are less likely to support the development of programmatic party 
competition which is favored by the advocates of party democracies. Rather, these 
parties are often charismatic or clientelistic and favour patronage-oriented politics 
(Kitschelt, 1995), often putting leaders at the centre of their activities and 
communication efforts.  
 By contributing to the rise of patronage-oriented politics, the person-centred 
post-communist political communication might be seen as indirectly related to the 
negative effects that this kind of politics usually produces. For example, patronage-
oriented politics have often led to the rise of massive state bureaucracies in post-
communist periods. Clientelistic and charismatic parties, once in power, have 
tended to return the favour to their supporters by employing them in state institutions 
and in this way strengthening their clientelistic networks. This leads to ineffective 
governance and state bureaucracy since most of the employed are not qualified for 
the positions they get (O’Dwyer, 2004). Another problem with these practices is that 
they result in the weakening of mechanisms of democratic accountability. Given that 
the parties and their leaders are able to win elections and exercise power by relying 
on informal practices, such as corruption and clientelism, their accountability to 
voters is weakened (Ledeneva, 2006; Mainwaring, 1999). Also, strong party leaders 
tend to rule their parties in an authoritarian style, silencing opposition voices and 
centralizing the decision-making processes (Kasapović, 2001b; Lewis, 2000). 
Furthermore, low levels of party identification and high volatility often result in 
changes of the ruling party. The changes in policies that may follow from this 
dynamic threaten the continuity of reforms and realization of long-term policy goals 
(Mainwaring, 1999).  
 On the other hand, some authors suggest that under-institutionalized party 
systems can have positive effects on post-communist democracies. The domination 
of party leaders on the political scene is seen as logical, given that the parties were 
in the beginning of post-communist period lacking clear programmes and policy 
initiatives (Kitschelt, 1995). Therefore, since it was not possible to instantly form a 
strong party without roots in the society and faithful supporters, it seems logical that 
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individuals assumed a central place in politics (King, 2002). In addition, given the 
voters’ distrust of institutions, especially parties, and the confidence they have put in 
persons (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Schöpflin, 1993), the prominence of individual 
political actors seems unsurprising. If the politicians have used the trust of citizens to 
connect with them, promote political participation and democratic values, the 
person-centred political actors’ behaviour might have increased the quality of post-
communist democracy. Finally, O’Dwyer and Kovalčik (2005) suggest that there is 
another advantage of an under-institutionalized party system. They argue that it is 
easier in weakly institutionalized party systems for governments to undertake radical 
reforms because of the unorganized and fragmented opposition. In other words, 
without coherent opposition it is easier to implement reforms and policies, which 
increases the political stability of the government and the efficiency of its policies.  
 Equally, there are perhaps good grounds to declare person-centred voting of 
post-communist voters rational, rather than irrational. Given the context – leader-
dominated parties without clear policy stands and weak political institutions – it 
appears more rational to base electoral decision on the evaluation of a party leader 
than the party or issues it represents, if any. Although, this environment can also 
promote populism among political actors who want to appear in line with citizens’ 
anti-party sentiments and help them disguise a bid for personal power (Mainwaring, 
1999; Schöpflin, 1993).  
 According to the same logic pursued above, person-centred media reporting can 
also be considered as having a positive impact on the quality of democracy. If the 
individuals dominate the political scene and the voters invest them, rather than 
institutions, with authority, it makes sense that the media are too pursuing this 
dynamic. The media in this context actually needs to focus on individuals to show 
who is responsible for political decisions, who has the power and who the voters 
should hold accountable. In person-centred political systems, those are the 
individual political actors, and arguably they need to be in the focus of media 
reporting.  
 However, the media that at the same time reveals the hidden dynamics of the 
political world, such as the informal practices of corruption, clientelism and 
patronage, can have a sobering effect on citizens. By showing citizens that the 
institutions are nothing more than structures used by individual actors for their own 
personal agenda, citizens might perceive politics as nothing more than a struggle for 
personal gain. This triggers cynicism and further distrust, makes citizens think 
nothing can be done to strengthen institutions and stop the power-seeking 
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individuals. Consequently this development can lead to lower electoral turnouts, and 
this in turn decreases the legitimacy of elected representatives.  
 To summarize, while the main criticism of a person-centred political 
communication in the West is that it can contribute to a crisis of a party democracy, 
in post-communist systems the main fear is that it might hinder the development of a 
(party) democracy in the first place. Although there might be good arguments for the 
dominance of individuals in political communication in the early transition period, it is 
possible that in the long run this practice can pose a serious threat to democratic 
consolidation. 
 
2.1.3. Communism: Individuals above institutions 
 The final part that deals with the potential effects of person-centred political 
communication will examine the possible influences of this dimension of 
personalisation in a communist context. It should be noted that when examining the 
implications of person-centred political communication in communist systems it is 
not only important to focus on the immediate effects on these societies, but also on 
more long-term effects which might have had the potential to influence democratic 
processes in young post-communist democracies.  
 In the first place it is important to note that although the Communist party was 
among the most important institutions in communist societies, it is argued that the 
politics was nevertheless person-centred. The party was powerful and dominated 
political and social life, but the authority of its leader and members was not derived 
primarily from the institution they represented, but rather from them as individuals. 
This was possible because the communist elite created weak institutions and 
showed little or no desire to strengthen their legitimacy and power (Plamper, 2004). 
For example, communist countries had parliaments, but they rarely convened; they 
had elections, but there was rarely a possibility to choose among candidates; there 
was a constitution, but the systems of separation of power were not institutionalized 
and there were usually no formalized systems of succession. 
 The person-centred political actors’ behaviour can therefore be seen as directly 
causing or contributing to the under-development of institutions, and indirectly 
contributing to the negative effects that under-developed institutions had for the 
functioning of communist systems, but also for post-communist politics. Institutions 
locked in the cycle of weakness allow political elite to practice politics in an informal 
way, by using clientelism, patronage and corruption, without fear of sanctions. They 
can also routinize the legitimization through a person rather than an institution, and 
create the perception among the public that institutions are not powerful, but rather it 
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is the people that control them (Schöpflin, 1993). In this situation, the public might 
be inclined to put personal loyalties above those to institutions, which can result in 
low respect for rules that are set by institutions (e.g. legal, administrative, political 
etc). For example, if citizens are aware that the police commissioner can exercise 
his power in an arbitrary and unsanctioned ways, then they will know that they can 
end up in prison even if they have not broken any formal law. The respect for laws is 
therefore weak or nonexistent.  
 The effects of under-developed institutions in communism can also be traced to 
post-communist systems. As was argued in the former section, citizens transferred 
their distrust towards institutions from communist to post-communist systems, while 
the political elite in many post-communist countries did little or nothing to strengthen 
them. Therefore, while it should be expected that institutions in democratic societies 
provide a buffer between the individual and power, serve as a base for constructing 
identities, derive legitimacy from their ability to sanction those who do not follow 
rules etc., post-communist institutions were in the first transitional period rarely seen 
as serving these functions. This might have enabled the political elite to continue 
with its informal practices. Also, it might not have motivated citizens to start trusting 
institutions, but rather to continue relying on personal loyalties.  
 Another implication of person-centred political actors’ behaviour in communist 
systems is the conservation of authoritarianism in the society. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, communist regimes had put the focus on the leader mainly to 
legitimate the system and socialize its citizens (Ake, 1966; Butler, 2000; Eatwell, 
2006). The political elite tried to motivate its citizens to understand politics through 
the person of a leader who was to embody society’s values and interests (Apor et 
al., 2004). Given the low levels of education in communist countries, this technique 
was used in order to simplify complex political and social matters for uneducated 
citizens, mostly peasants (S. Davies, 2004). A consequence of this strategy of the 
communist political elite was that the people were socialized to understand politics 
in a personalized way, which might have made it harder in post-communist period 
for political institutions to gain legitimacy and citizens’ trust. People were also 
expected to follow a leader’s cues uncritically which could have sustained high 
levels of authoritarianism throughout communist period and prevented the 
development of critical thought and rational discussion about issues of public 
interest. In addition, the authoritarianism presents a serious threat to the democratic 
consolidation in post-communist countries given that people socialized in 
communism might tend to favour strong leaders over democratic institutions (Rose 
& Mishler, 1996).   
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 Another possible implication of communist person-centred political actors’ 
behaviour is related to succession. Given that a communist system was deriving its 
legitimacy from a leader and tying society’s values and beliefs to him, there was a 
state of political and social crisis after his death or removal from office4. The death of 
a leader who was presented as a father of the nation, the only person who can rule 
the country, the individual in which all hopes and trust have been put, leads to a 
crisis in the society (McCauley & Carter, 1986). On the one hand, the legitimacy of 
the country is brought into question. On the other hand, people who are socialized to 
consider the leader their role-model and to rely heavily on him for political guidance 
are left in a state of uncertainty and confusion.  
 Person-centred media reporting might also be seen as legitimizing and 
reinforcing personalized politics and authoritarianism. On the one hand, if politics 
were personalized as suggested and the real power lay with the individuals, not 
institutions (Apor et al., 2004; Furtak, 1986; Luthans et al., 1998; McCauley & 
Carter, 1986; Schöpflin, 1993) , then it might be logical that the media too focused 
on individuals at the expense of institutions in order to present to the public who has 
the power and should be accountable for political decisions. Furthermore, given that 
in elections voters were electing, or better still confirming, individual political actors 
and not parties (Birch, 2005; Furtak, 1986), it might make sense for the media to 
pursue a person-centred approach in reporting politics in order to provide the public 
with information about the candidate(s). Finally, by concentrating on individuals, 
media were able to simplify complex political issues and to offer information in a 
form that an uninformed public can more easily grasp (S. Davies, 2004). On the 
other hand, by assigning all the power and responsibility to individuals, political 
institutions were left with little or no significance and consequently, had problems 
gaining legitimacy and public trust. In addition, simplifying political issues by 
reporting them through a person might have inhibited the development of 
sophisticated, rational thought in society. In other words, citizens’ inability to 
understand political matters might have been reinforced by person-centred 
simplified reporting. A more contextualized, information-rich, balanced reporting 
might have helped to educate citizens to understand complex issues, instead of 
locking them in the cycle of political illiteracy.  
 Finally, given that voters were rarely given the option of choosing among 
candidates, but rather confirming the one candidate (Birch, 2005; Furtak, 1986), the 
                                                 
4
 The strongest communist leaders were in general leaders for life. Once elected, there was 
usually no formal mechanism for their removal from office, although exceptions did exist  
(McCauley & Carter, 1986). 
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discussion about the rationality of voters’ decisions seems inappropriate. Rather, an 
implication of communist person-centred voting might be the socialization of 
communist citizens to understand politics in a personalized way. In combination with 
other factors (e.g. person-centred political actors’ behaviour, person-centred media 
reporting) citizens might have been inclined to ascribe individuals with power and 
accountability, and not institutions, and to transfer those beliefs from communist to 
post-communist system. With the internalized notion of personalized power, citizens 
might have been inclined to seek and accept authority from individual political 
actors, rather than the institutions they represent, even in a democratic system, and 
consequently this might have contributed to hindering of the development of strong 
political institutions which would have increased the quality of democracy in post-
communist systems and eased their transition.  
 In short, person-centred political communication in communist systems 
seems to have been a reasonable choice of political elite given that their aim was to 
legitimate the system and socialize the public. However, by a constant focus on 
individuals the public might not have been motivated to try to understand complex 
political issues in any way other than taking simplified political cues from its leader 
and the media. This could have inhibited political debate based on arguments and 
sustained authoritarianism in the society. But, it should be kept in mind that this line 
of thought, which is dominant in the literature on communist societies, may assume 
a too simplistic view of communist public. In other words, it is difficult to determine 
whether communist people accepted the guidance of their leader because of their 
political ignorance and authoritarian values, or they behaved as they did for 
instrumental reasons, to ensure survival and the benefits of the system in which they 
lived.  
 The first part of this chapter focused on the assumptions about the direct and 
indirect consequences of person-centred political communication. The second part 
of the chapter will examine the implications of the second dimension of personalized 
political communication, persona-centred political communication.  
 
2.2.  Persona-centred political communication 
 
 The persona-centred political communication is defined as the emphasis that 
political communication actors put on politicians’ personae, i.e. his/her political and 
private lives and qualities. Unlike the first dimension, the persona-centred dimension 
of personalisation is less concerned with power and institutions, and more with the 
communication aspect of politics. Therefore, the main implications of this dimension 
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are related to the quality of political information and public discourse, as well as the 
rationality of voters’ decisions. More specifically, the normative basis for the 
evaluation of the effects of a persona-centred political communication is usually 
rational choice theory. Although this theory is mostly used to evaluate the rationality 
of voters’ behaviour, here it is also applied to assess the rationality of the behaviour 
of other political communication actors, i.e. media and political actors.  
 
2.2.1. West: Image over substance? 
 In the context of Western established democracies, most, but not all, of the 
assumed implications of persona-centred political communication are related to the 
rationality of voters’ behaviour, and can be seen as coming out of a rational choice 
theory. However, I argue that there are three different schools of thought within the 
rational choice theory according to which the effects of persona-centred political 
communication can be evaluated.  
 The advocates of the first school of thought can be seen as claiming that the 
emphasis on politicians’ personae in general has negative effects on democratic 
processes. In the first place, persona-centred voting, i.e. voting in which the 
electoral decision has been made primarily on an evaluation of a leader’s persona, 
is considered inferior to other modes of voting. The early analyses of voters’ 
behaviour tended to imply that voting based on a candidate’s persona is based on 
“trivial and politically irrelevant matters” (Shabad and Andersen, 1979: 29), that it is 
inappropriate and superficial (Funk, 1996) and that issue-based voting is superior 
and more sophisticated way of reaching an electoral decision (Carmines and 
Stimson, 1980)5.  
 The same line of thought can be detected in some discussions about the 
possible impact of politicians’ persona-centred communication and media reporting 
on the quality of political information and public discourse. In essence, the idea is 
that the “image has supplanted substance” which has led to the trivialization of 
public discourse and decreasing quality of public debate (Franklin, 2004: 11). In 
other words, focus on politicians’ personae has replaced rational debate in politics 
(ibid.). Both media and political actors are to blame. Firstly, they are seen as putting 
more focus on image, than on issues and policies. It is argued that they turned the 
elections into beauty contents (Curtice & Holmberg, 2005; Pakulski & Higley, 2008), 
                                                 
5
 One of the reasons why persona-centred voting might have been considered so irrational 
can be found in the perception of leaders at the time. According to Pakulski and Higley 
(2008), in the mid 20th century voting based on issues and parties was considered more 
important because leaders were seen merely as implementators of party promoted policies, 
and not autonomous, powerful, political actors. 
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that presentation and style have become more important than substantive issues 
(Franklin, 2004), that politicians’ advisors “script strategies for transferring desired 
qualities into the media image of the candidate” (Meyer, 2002: 68), which results in 
“aestheticization” of politics and motivates voters to focus on “stylishness, image 
[and] presentation” (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999: 210) at the expense of issues and 
policies. Secondly, there is a fear that politician’s image is manufactured, fake, not 
grounded in his/her real persona. Although Gaffney (2001) argues that any 
mediated persona that is presented to the voters is “virtual” because it is the result 
of the negotiations between what politicians want to project and media want to 
report, maybe a more troubling aspect of the image projection is that it can provide 
voters with completely misleading and deceitful information that they might use as a 
base for making voting decisions. As Meyer (2002: 69) warns, a politician’s “qualities 
can be expanded or reconstructed, emphasized or downplayed, exaggerated or 
minimized”, so given the opportunities for manipulation and deceit, voters are 
considered better off focusing on issues of substance, and not on a politician’s 
persona. The persona-centred media reporting in this view is providing voters with 
trivial and politically irrelevant information, and by giving importance to a politician’s 
persona, motivating voters to consider it relevant and change their evaluative criteria 
(Garzia, 2011).  
 The second school of thought within rational choice theory tends to make its 
evaluations of persona-centred political communication based on the distinction 
between politically relevant and irrelevant parts of a persona. Miller and Levitin 
(1976: 45) were among the first ones to call for a differentiation between two sides 
of a persona. They wrote: 
 
When attributes of social status such as religion or income, past 
achievements such as military record or government experience, 
personal styles such as wit and “folksiness”, and “deeper” motives 
such as the need for power are indiscriminately termed “personal 
attributes”, chaos results on the theoretical or conceptual level. … 
These problems will doubtless continue until the personal 
attributes of candidates are no longer lumped into a residual or 
catchall category containing whatever seems unrelated to issues 
or to party. 
 
 Shabad and Andersen (1979: 26) followed this cue and suggested a 
differentiation between candidate’s attributes with “explicit political content”, and 
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those “with little or no explicit political content”. They argue that it is not 
“unreasonable to evaluate presidential contenders on the basis of their perceived 
honesty, competence, experience, or leadership abilities” (ibid., 26), in other words, 
their political persona. However, if voters’ judgments are made on the base of a 
candidate’s attractiveness, family background, age or religious affiliation, this can be 
seen as superficial and irrational. Comparison of several voter studies that relied on 
such or similarly defined dichotomies shows that voters’ inclination to judge 
politicians’ persona based on personality traits such as competence, integrity and 
reliability is usually seen as rational and in line with civic norms, while judgments 
based on charisma, warmth or other, simply named, personal attributes, are 
proclaimed irrational (Funk, 1996; Miller et al., 1986; Ohr & Oscarsson, 2003; Shabad 
& Andersen, 1979). 
 Similar trends can be observed in the evaluations of persona-centred media 
reporting. Researchers who looked into how politicians’ personae were presented in 
the media tend to differentiate between two dimensions of a persona. Although they 
usually label these dimensions in distinct ways6, there is a tendency to consider 
attributes related to a politician’s political sphere as forming part of one dimension of 
a persona, and those related to a politician’s private sphere as the other dimension 
of a persona. The reporting of a politician’s private persona is what seems to be 
alarming critics the most. They argue that media is trivializing public discourse by 
reporting politicians’ private matters, which is distracting the public from relevant 
political issues. In some countries, such as the UK and the US, media often reveal 
scandalous private information about politicians (Stanyer, 2013; Thompson, 2000), 
which can be seen as a violation of their right to privacy and lead to the shrinking of 
what is considered to be one’s private sphere (Langer, 2011). Furthermore, this kind 
of media reporting can lead to growing public hostility towards the media in cases 
when the public sympathizes with politicians whose privacy has been violated, or it 
can lead to an increasing cynicism and distrust on the part of a public which is 
disenchanted with the behaviour of its representatives. The intrusive and aggressive 
media focus on politicians’ private matters can also affect the elite recruitment and 
the quality of representation (Spitzer, 2000). Some capable individuals might not be 
willing to take up political positions because of the fear that they will have to sacrifice 
their privacy for it (Helms, 2008; Sabato, 1991). Also, those individuals who perform 
well in the political sphere, but are not comfortable and skilled in revealing their 
                                                 
6
 For example, Wilke and Reinemann (2001) differentiate between candidate's attributes with or without 
an obvious political dimension, Grbeša (2008) writes about political and private profiles, Maier & Adam 
(2010) use the terms political and non-political traits, Langer (2011) distinguishes between leadership 
and personal qualities etc.  
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private one, might not be seen as fit to govern in the private persona-centred media 
environment (Langer, 2011; van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000). 
 The advocates of the third rational choice theory’s school of thought argue 
that the effects of the persona-centred political communication should be viewed in 
a more positive light. In other words, media, political actors and voters can all be 
seen as behaving rationally when focusing on a politician’s persona, and in that way 
actually increase the quality of democracy.  
 In the first place, authors such as Page (1978), Popkin (1991), Pakulski and 
Higley (2008) and Garzia (2011) suggest that voting on the basis of any dimension 
of a candidate’s persona can be seen as rational. The argument here is that since 
the voters are better skilled in judging candidate’s persona than his/her policies, and 
given the complexity and uncertainty of the modern environment, it is quite rational 
that voters evaluate a candidate’s persona using it as a shortcut to estimating 
candidate’s policy preferences and abilities. Popkin (1991: 65) sums it by saying that 
voters “estimate public morality and character from private morality and character, 
assuming in the absence of better information that candidates treat their 
constituents like they treat their own spouses and children”.  
 Following this logic, it may also be possible to look at persona-centred media 
reporting as a positive thing. By providing citizens with information about a 
candidate’s both political and private persona they enable voters to gather 
information which they consider relevant and helpful in the evaluation of a candidate 
and making of electoral decisions. Also, by revealing their hypocrisy (e.g. 
inconsistencies between political stands and private behaviour) they are helping 
voters to “unpackage” politicians’ images and reduce the possibility of manipulation 
and deceit. In that way, persona-centred media reporting can be seen as performing 
their role as watchdogs in a democracy. In general, the more important politicians’ 
personae are for democratic processes and voters behaviour, the more sense it 
might make that media focus on their personae too.  
 There is also a growing number of scholars in political communication who 
argue that politicians’ persona-centred communication, especially the focus on 
private persona, has serious potential to bring citizens back to the political arena by 
increasing their political participation and making them feel better represented. In 
the first place, citizens in Western democracies are seen as wanting their 
representatives not only to be extraordinary, but also ordinary, similar to them 
(Coleman, 2006; Finlayson, 2002; Langer, 2011; Scammell & Langer, 2006). 
Humanizing their image by presenting their private personae is seen as one of the 
most functional techniques of achieving this (Grbeša, 2008; Holtz-Bacha, 2004; 
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Langer, 2011). Therefore, politicians’ private persona-centred communication can 
be interpreted as a fulfilment of their voters’ desires and perhaps lead to voters 
feeling better represented. Furthermore, by communicating their private information 
politicians can reach different target audiences and present themselves even to 
those less or not interested in politics (Kuhn, 2004). Given that such communication 
usually takes place in a more entertainment rather than politics-based media 
formats, politicians can by participating in, for example, talk shows, and by revealing 
some of their private sphere, transmit their message to those politically uninterested 
and perhaps motivate them to politically participate. At the heart of those who see 
these behaviours as rational is the notion that emotions and rationality are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. For example, Marcus (2002: 7) 
argues that “emotions enable rationality” because emotions motivate citizens to 
gather information, analyze it, to participate in political processes etc. (see also 
Marcus et al., 2000). From that point of view, politicians are able to form emotional 
bonds with voters by communicating their private persona which creates a feeling of 
intimacy between them (Keeter, 1987; Meyrowitz, 1985). Consequently, these 
emotional bonds can make citizens feel better represented and motivated to 
participate in politics, what is seen as a development which increases the quality of 
democracy (Mazzoleni, 2000). Similarly, Corner and Pels (2003) suggest that there 
is more to politics than rationality, and argue that the value of aesthetics and political 
style in political representation should not be overlooked. They claim that the politics 
was re-styled in the past few decades, since both the media and political actors 
started focusing more on politicians’ style, appearance, language, qualities etc. 
Moreover, they suggest that this should not be looked at as a negative development 
since “aesthetic stylisation is inherent and inevitable feature of mass politics” and 
these aesthetic politics “may generate democratic effects, by expanding the 
platforms for engagement and citizenship, and by offering forms of popular appeal 
and emotional identification” (ibid., 9-10).  
 In summary, although the fears of the critics that the focus on politicians’ 
personae might trivialize public discourse, lower the quality of political information, 
affect the recruitment of political elite and distract voters from “real” political issues, 
seem reasonable, the possible advantages of persona-centred communication can 
not be disregarded. This kind of information has the potential to make politics more 
accessible for citizens and bring them back to political arena. Therefore, instead of 
looking at this phenomenon as “dumbing down” of politics, it can be understood as 
democratizing politics by making it more understandable and attractive to wider 
public (Curran, 2002).  
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2.2.2. Post-communism: Kompromat wars 
 While the biggest fear of critics of persona-centred political communication in 
the West is that it trivializes political discourse and leads to irrational voter 
behaviour, in the context of post-communist countries the question is not so much 
whether revealing persona-related information trivializes communication, but rather 
whether the information related to a politician’s persona is manufactured or not. 
Also, whether it is used solely as a weapon in a political struggle, or also aimed at 
informing the public of their representatives’ actions, values, qualities etc. In spite of 
this difference in emphasis, the possible effects that persona-centred 
communication might have on the rationality of political communication actors in a 
post-communist context is again the primary concern of its critics. This is, however, 
not to say that the post-communist persona-centred communication can not be seen 
as a rational choice of the political communication actors that practice it.  
 The politicians’ persona-centred communication can be seen as rational for 
several reasons. Firstly, in the early post-communist period newly created parties 
were weak, lacking clear issue stands and therefore hard to differentiate based on 
the policies they propose, issues they promote or interests they represent (Bielasiak, 
2002; Lewis, 2000; Tomšič & Prijon, 2010). Therefore, it seems rational that in this 
situation parties relied on their leaders’ personae as an element that differentiates 
them from other parties (King, 2002). Secondly, it was difficult for most people living 
in post-communist countries to quickly grasp all the complexities of the processes 
that were happening around them, such as the development of democracy and 
democratic institutions, free market, civil society etc. Putting the focus on leaders’ 
personae instead of the complex, and to a part of the public, incomprehensible 
issues, seems a rational way of making politics more accessible to citizens. Thirdly, 
communicating politics through the persona of the leader “resonated with cultural 
predispositions” of post-communist people who were socialized in a system which 
put significant emphasis on the persona of its leader (Colton, 2002: 187). In this way 
too, it can be argued that politics was presented to the people in a way they were 
accustomed to understanding it, and hence, better enabled them to grasp the 
developments in the new political environment. Fourthly, in a time when post-
communist countries were being formed, the world was already characterized by 
high levels of complexity and uncertainty, so it seems reasonable that more focus 
was put on the leader and his/her persona due to the importance of leaders in 
national and international politics. Finally, politicians’ persona-centred 
communication in post-communist societies is seen as a technique for creating party 
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identification (Colton, 2002; Grbeša, 2008; King, 2002). In other words, instead of 
leaders’ evaluations being influenced by party identification, it is argued that 
evaluations of a leader’s persona “help give rise to party identifications: stable, 
enduring attachments to particular political parties” (King, 2002: 39). Given that 
higher levels of party identification are usually associated with stable, 
institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring, 1999), this development can be seen as 
having potential to increase the quality of democracy in new democracies.  
 However rational and whatever potentially positive effects politicians’ 
persona-centred communication might represent, the negative effects should not be 
overlooked. Focus on leaders’ personae might have been beneficial in the early 
post-communist period, but it might have also inhibited the development of a 
programmatic party system in which parties compete on their programs and policy 
initiatives (Kitschelt, 1995). This can be seen as hurtful for democratic consolidation 
given that programmatic parties are usually considered more in line with democratic 
values than those revolving around leaders (Kitschelt, 1995; Kreuzer & Pettai, 
2004). In addition, the danger posed by “packaged” politics (Franklin, 2004) and the 
manufactured personae of a leader (Gaffney, 2001; Kuhn, 2004; Langer, 2011) is 
perhaps even more pronounced in post-communist than Western democracies. 
Voters untrained in judging policies and evaluating issues might rely more on 
leaders’ personae in making political judgments, so the quality of information about 
leaders’ personae seems of great importance. And the quality of this information is 
often questionable. On the one hand, it is suggested that post-communist political 
elite still exercises considerable influence on the media (Gross, 2003; Mihelj et al., 
2009; O’Neil, 1997; Örnebring, 2012), so it should be easier than in Western 
democracies for them to manipulate the information and present via media a 
manufactured personae. On the other hand, to the extent that post-communist 
politics revolves around politicians’ personae, political struggle is conducted around 
the persona. In other words, instead of fighting each others policies and ideas, 
politicians often engage in personal fights and attack each others persona (Gross, 
2003; Ledeneva, 2006), while political issues stand neglected. Often revelations of 
compromising material (kompromat) about politicians can increase the distrust of 
citizens in politicians and political institutions and lead to a cynical view of politics. 
Given the already low levels of party identification, electoral turnout and distrust in 
political institutions, “kompromat wars” in which political struggles are led by 
revealing compromising information about political opponents (Ledeneva, 2006) can 
further alienate people from politics and negatively affect the democratic 
consolidation.   
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 With regard to the persona-centred media reporting and voters’ behaviour, it 
might also be seen as rational that media and voters focus on politicians’ personae if 
the politics is centred on them. If politicians’ personae are seen as the most 
important electoral assets, and in the absence of policy and issue discussions, it 
seems reasonable that the media provides voters with information based on which 
they might be able to make electoral decisions. However, the quality of this 
information in questionable. In the first place, the information about politicians’ 
personae can be largely seen as false or exaggerated in post-communist media. On 
the one side, those that are able to influence media can use it to promote their 
manufactured images. On the other side, compromising material that is published is 
mostly considered manufactured too. The truthfulness of the information is rarely of 
relevance in publishing kompromat, so media can not be seen, as in the West, as 
revealing a politician’s true face when publishing negative information (Örnebring, 
2012). Furthermore, simply because politicians are not discussing important political 
issues does not mean that media shouldn’t either. Constant simplification of political 
issues by their presentation through the persona of a politician does not help the 
development of political debates in post-communist societies. In other words, 
although at a first glance it might seem reasonable that political communication 
revolves around politicians’ personae, in the long run this kind of focus might be 
detrimental to democratic consolidation because voters are not being given the 
option to discuss political issues. They are presented with false information about 
politicians’ personae and not being given enough information about political issues, 
so their electoral decisions can be seen as being uninformed. In this way voters are 
locked in a cycle of political ignorance, and the media are not educating them as to 
how to understand and evaluate political information. They can also be seen as 
excluded from political processes, because if the majority of political information 
they receive are related to politicians’ personae, that means that real politics is 
happening behind closed doors and that voters have little or no say in it.  
 There is also space to consider the effects of a persona-centred political 
communication through the middle school of rational choice theory, i.e. by making 
the distinction between private and political persona. However, the implications are 
very much the same as in the Western context, so repeating them here seems 
redundant.  
 In summary, although persona-centred political communication might seem 
as a rational choice in the early post-communist period, it does not necessarily 
mean it is a positive development. The persona-centred communication was (and 
perhaps is) in some post-communist societies used as a tool to simplify political 
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issues, attack and discredit political opponents, and distract the public from political, 
economic and societal problems. Where it is used to engage citizens with politics 
and help them understand complex issues, it can be seen as having positive effects. 
Unfortunately, most of the evidence suggests that public discourse is dominated by 
manufactured information that aims to “trick” the voters and secure political self-
preservation.  
 
2.2.3. Communism: Manufactured extraordinariness  
 The origins of the practice of communicating manufactured persona 
information can partly be traced back to the communist era. However, I argue that 
this continuous presentation of the leaders’ manufactured personae to the public 
had limited potential to make voters’ choices in communism irrational.  
 Given that all elections in European communist countries were majoritarian, 
and that all candidates were representing the same party, it might be logical to 
assume that communist voters were casting their ballots based on their evaluations 
of candidates’ personae as it was one of the rare elements of differentiation. In a 
given situation, it might be the only rational thing to do. However, I argue that the 
possible effects of this persona-centred voting can be considered insignificant 
because voters actually rarely practiced this kind of voting. In the first place, voters 
rarely had the opportunity to choose between multiple candidates, since only in 
Hungary and Poland was it mandatory to have multiple candidates competing for the 
same post in elections (Furtak, 1986). Hence, there was usually no need to evaluate 
anything in order to reach an electoral decision since there was only one candidate 
running whom voters needed to confirm, rather than elect. In addition, in some 
countries voters didn’t even elect directly their representatives in parliaments, but 
rather they elected delegates who then appointed representatives (ibid.). In other 
words, voters were not evaluating candidates’ personae. Finally, leaders, be that the 
party’s general secretary or the formal head of state, were in general appointed by 
some political body, and not elected by voters (ibid.). So, again, voters were not 
evaluating leaders personae. However, this is not to say that they had no 
opportunities to learn about and evaluate politicians’ personae. The literature related 
to communist leader’s cults suggests quite the opposite. 
 It is argued that communist leaders were presented to their people as an 
embodiment of society’s values, beliefs, history (Apor et al., 2004). This has several 
possible implications for the quality of information in public discourse and the 
socialization patterns of communist, and also post-communist, political 
communication actors. In the first place, the leader’s persona, as it was presented to 
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the public, was to a large extent manufactured. Leader’s qualities were created so 
they would be in line with society’s values and beliefs, and personal stories were 
invented to present a leader’s biography as a mirror image of a country’s history 
(Apor, 2004; S. Davies, 2004; Sretenovic & Puto, 2004; von Klimo, 2004). Beside 
the fact that the public may have been deceived by the false image of its leader, 
there are other implications for the exaggeration of a leader’s persona. In the first 
place, leader was presented as a unique person with extraordinary qualities. This 
might have created very high expectations of leadership which were hard to achieve 
in a post-communist context where the leader could not use the media as in 
communism to uncritically promote a desired image. Post-communist citizens that 
were socialized with the notion of extraordinary leaders might have easily been 
disappointed with the not so extraordinary attributes of post-communist leaders. This 
might have lessened their support for the development of democracy and increased 
their backing of individuals whose leadership was more similar to those of 
communist leaders (Luthans et al., 1998).  
 Secondly, since the main aim of mediating a leader’s persona seemed to be 
the simplification of issues for an uneducated public and providing them with a role-
model (S. Davies, 2004), continuous focus on a persona can be interpreted as 
making politics more accessible for citizens, but also as a way of preventing citizens 
from developing a deeper understanding of political issues. With continuous 
simplifications in this manner people might not have been motivated to understand 
complex issues in a more sophisticated way, arguably because they were more 
easily controlled and manipulated if politically ignorant.  
 Thirdly, unlike in Western democracies where leaders’ attempts to humanize 
their image by communicating private information might be seen as reactions to their 
citizens desire for more “ordinariness” in their leaders, in communist countries there 
seems to have been a more “top-down” approach to creating culturally valued 
qualities. It is suggested that the political elite decided what qualities and behaviours 
should be valued and presented them via their leader as a role model, while the 
public was expected to imitate them (Apor et al., 2004; Butler, 2000; Cavalli, 1998). 
This is yet another example of how communist societies were managed by an elite, 
and the public was provided with little opportunity to influence societal and political 
processes.   
 Finally, some authors, such as Apor (2004) and Davies (2004), argue that 
the leader’s private persona was almost completely politicized in media reporting. In 
other words, there was information about a communist leader’s private life and 
qualities in public discourse, but it was usually presented in a political context. This 
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might have created the perception that everything about the leader was political, his 
family relations, holidays, life-style, upbringing etc. It could also have led to a 
routinisation of politicization of private persona, and motivated journalists that even 
in post-communist era present politicians’ private personae in a political context. The 
consequence of this might be the already discussed shrinking of one’s private 
sphere and frequent violations of the right to privacy in post-communism.  
 In addition, the leader’s “real” private persona was usually kept hidden, even 
in situations when leader’s private matters made him incapable of governing. For 
example, some of the Soviet Union leaders’ physical and mental incapacities were 
not made public (McCauley & Carter, 1986), as well as the Yugoslav leader Tito’s 
serious health problems. In other words, while the public was fed with information 
about a leader’s fictive attributes, a leader’s “real” persona was hidden from the 
eyes of the public even when it was crucial that the public knows about it.  
 All these effects should be ascribed not only to politicians’ persona-centred 
communications, but also to media reporting, since it is argued that these two 
political communication actors in communist countries communicated basically the 
same messages (O’Neil, 1997). Media was seen as an extended arm of the political 
elite and not able to function autonomously, and hence, it could be speculated that it 
was not able to create independent effects.  
 In summary, it is argued that a communist leader’s persona, as it was 
communicated to the public, was to a large extent manufactured and politicized. 
This means that there were constant attempts to manipulate and deceive the 
communist public, although it is difficult to estimate to what extent the public actually 
believed the information provided by media and political actors. For example, Coban 
(2013: vii) argues that people living in European communist countries were “able to 
identify and avoid the propaganda oriented message of media output” and hence, 
that the “negotiated and oppositional decoding was used very widely”. Although this 
assumption is intriguing and perhaps is a more convincing illustration of communist 
audiences to advocates of active audiences, there is limited evidence that would 
support this claim. On the other hand, the evidence from communist era is usually 
considered unreliable because it is believed that research participants were not 
comfortable with expressing opinions that were not in line with party policies (Welsh, 
1980). Hence, the impact of persona-centred communication in communist countries 
remains inconclusive and based on speculation. However, among the most likely 
effects of a persona-centred political communication in communist societies were 
manipulations of public, simplification of political issues, suppression of political 
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debate, creating unrealistic expectations of leadership and imposition of cultural 
values.  
 
2.3.  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has had several aims. Firstly, it aimed to demonstrate that 
personalisation of political communication may have serious consequences for 
democratic and societal processes and that it is, therefore, a subject worth studying. 
It has been shown that the implications of personalized political communication 
include a wide range of both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, 
personalized political communication might make governance more effective and 
stable, individuals more accountable to their voters, politics more accessible to wider 
public, provide strong leadership in turbulent transition times, help legitimate political 
systems etc. On the negative side, personalisation of political communication can 
have consequences such as the unbalanced distribution of power, under-
development of political institutions and party systems, trivialization of public 
discourse, manipulation of public, and weakening of political parties. 
 Secondly, this chapter aimed to provide additional evidence in favour of the 
differentiation between dimensions of personalisation of political communication. By 
separating the assumed consequences of person-centred and persona-centred 
political communication it was suggested that different dimensions of personalized 
political communication might have quite different effects. For example, person-
centred political communication might contribute to the under-development of strong 
institutions, but also help the development of democracy by providing voters with 
clear choices in weak party systems. The persona-centred political communication 
might be used as a tool to deceive and manipulate the public, or it can help simplify 
complex political matters for wider public and in that way make politics more 
accessible. Therefore, instead of condemning personalisation of political 
communication in general for all the negative effects it can produce, a more 
nuanced approach such as this one can help pinpoint specific developments that 
directly or indirectly contributed to certain effects and in that way enhance our 
understanding of both the cause and the effect.  
 The third aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that all effects of 
personalized political communication are not applicable to every context, but rather 
that most of the implications are context-specific. In the case of Western, communist 
and post-communist countries, I argued that different dimensions of personalisation 
of political communication can have quite different effects. For example, person-
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centred political communication in Western democracies can weaken political 
parties; in post-communist countries it can inhibit the development of an 
institutionalized party system, while in communist system it can lead to the rise of 
importance of informal practices such as corruption and patronage over formal ones. 
The consequence of a persona-centred political communication in Western context 
can be the revelation of a politician’s hypocrisy, while in post-communist context it is 
more likely that it will inhibit the development of a programmatic party system, and in 
communist system that it will be used to deceit and manipulate the public. This is 
just to name but a few examples.  
 Finally, this chapter has shown that personalisation of political 
communication should not be seen, per se, as either a positive or negative 
phenomenon. To borrow from the sociological vocabulary, the effects of 
personalisation of political communication can perhaps best be seen as dependent 
on the ways in which the agents use the structures within which they operate. It may 
be argued that because of the strong institutions and checks and balances in 
established Western democracies, their agents have fewer opportunities, and 
perhaps less desire, to abuse the structures and consequently contribute to negative 
effects. In communist systems, structures are created by the agents so they can 
maximally use them to their own advantage. Therefore, structures are not so much 
limiting arbitrary behaviour as enabling it in communist contexts. Consequently, this 
can perhaps be looked at as a more fertile environment for personalisation 
producing or contributing to more negative effects. The case of post-communist 
countries is probably most complex. Although the structures, which are often 
modeled upon Western counterparts, provide certain limitations for actors’ 
behaviour, they are not as strong as in the West in restricting actors’ arbitrary 
behaviour. Weak institutions, under-institutionalized party systems, and unclear 
distribution of power better enable those individuals that are keen to exploit 
personalisation of political communication in a negative way, to do so. However, 
post-communist countries in theory have the instruments to empower the structures 
and limit the actions of its agents, so negative consequences that personalisation of 
political communication might contribute to in these societies can perhaps be 
reversed.  
 After examining the possible effects of personalisation of political 
communication in different contexts in this chapter, the next two chapters will focus 
on factors which have the potential to cause or contribute to the personalisation of 
political communication. More specifically, the next chapter will discuss politically-
related factors that may increase personalisation of political communication, while 
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the fourth chapter will examine the media-related factors that might do the same. 
Starting from the premise that Western, communist and post-communist contexts 
are suitable for the development of personalized political communication, the aim of 
the next two chapters is to establish which elements of these systems make them 
favourable for the development of this phenomenon. The examination of these 
elements/factors will shed light on why these three contexts might be seen as 
conducive for experiencing personalized political communication, and reveal what is 
known and unknown about how and why this phenomenon might have developed. 
Consequently, these discussions will help in the formation of research questions and 
hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis.  
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3. Politics always come first: Politically-driven approaches to 
personalisation 
 
There are two main theories that might explain how and why the 
personalisation of mediated political communication develops. One of them 
suggests that modern trends in political communication, one of which is 
personalisation, developed in the United States, and from there they have been 
disseminated around the world. This theory is called “Americanization”, and it 
postulates that the US is the origin of modern trends in political communication, 
while other countries in which the political communication is also personalized, have 
imported this trend from the US (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). In relation to 
personalized political communication, it is argued that American style of 
campaigning, in which the political actors put themselves and their personae at the 
forefront of election campaigns, have been imitated around the world (Baines et al., 
2001; de la Torre & Conaghan, 2009; Mergel, 2009; Nord, 2006; Porto & Hallin, 
2009). In addition, it is suggested that the American media initiated the trend of 
personalisation in media reporting, and this reporting style was later transferred to 
other countries which adopted it (Schulz & Zeh, 2005; Swanson & Mancini, 1996; 
Uğur, 2012).  
“Americanization” theory has been heavily criticized, primarily because the 
structural changes which are thought as influencing the development of modern 
trends in political communication, such as the changes in society, party systems and 
media systems, have not been observed only in the US, but around the world (Nord, 
2006). Hence, the other main theory which aims to explain how and why modern 
trends in political communication develop is “modernization” theory which suggests 
that the similar changes in countries around the world result in the resemblance of 
their political communication practices, personalisation being one of them (Asp & 
Esaiasson, 1996; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Plasser (2002: 17) sums the 
modernization process nicely by saying that “structural changes on the macro-level 
(media, technologies, social structures) lead to an adaptive behaviour on the micro-
level (parties, candidates and journalists), resulting in gradual modifications of 
traditional styles and strategies of political communication”. Hence, according to this 
theory, political and media actors did not start putting the focus on politicians and 
their personae by imitating the practices from the US, but rather because they 
reacted to changes occurring in their environment.   
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There are also more nuanced approaches that take into account both the 
modernization and Americanization theory, such as the “hybridization” of political 
communication, or “shopping model” (ibid.). They suggest that the media and 
political actors combine country-specific communication practices with those that 
they consider efficient from other contexts, not necessarily the US. Hence, these 
approaches would consider both internal and external conditions relevant for the 
development of personalisation of mediated political communication.   
American, or foreign influences in general, do not seem likely to have been 
able to contribute to personalisation in European communist countries given that 
these societies usually tried to prevent the penetration of Western influences which 
they considered to be destructive (Coban, 2013). On the other hand, Western 
influence, especially from the US, is said to play a pivotal role in the development of 
political communication practices in European post-communist democracies 
(Doolan, 2008; Slavko Splichal, 2001; Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2002). However, 
there is little empirical evidence to back up these claims. Hence, before jumping to 
conclusions about the relevance or irrelevance of the “Americanization” theory in 
communist and post-communist context, the context-specific factors that can be 
identified as contributing to personalisation in these societies need to be examined 
and compared to those in established Western democracies. Only in this way will it 
be possible to determine the similarities and differences in the potential ways in 
which personalisation developed in these three contexts, and based on this, 
speculate about the most appropriate theories to explain this development.  
Based on the context-specific factors that are speculated to be able to 
influence personalisation, two main approaches to the development of 
personalisation can be identified in the existing scholarship: media- and politically-
driven approach to personalisation. As Ryfe (2001) observed, political 
communication scholars most frequently explain changes in the field by reference to 
developments related to media. They start from the idea of a “usable past”, the 
notion that politics and public discourse worsened in the past few decades due to 
the changes in media. However, there is an emerging current which refutes the idea 
of media as the main cause of personalisation. These scholars argue that it was the 
change in politically-related factors that led to the rise of the personalisation of 
political communication. As Wolfsfeld (2004: 31) argues, based on his observation 
of the interplay between the media and political actors, “it is not a chicken and an 
egg problem, politics almost always comes first”. He asserts that “the influence of 
the news media is best seen in terms of a cycle in which changes in the political 
environment lead to changes in media performance that often lead to further 
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changes in the political environment” (ibid., 31). In short, advocates of the politics-
focused theories claim that politically-related factors are those that have the largest 
potential to cause or contribute to an increase in the personalisation of political 
communication. 
The aim of this chapter is to unpack the politically-driven approach, and 
explore alternative theories to the mainstream ones by taking into account the 
specific political, cultural, social and historical circumstances of communist and post-
communist societies. This theoretical exploration of existing scholarship will inform 
this thesis on several levels. Firstly, on a theoretical level, this chapter will offer 
additional theories of, and explanations for, the personalisation phenomenon. 
Specifically, this chapter will focus on the politically-related elements of communist 
and post-communist contexts with an aim to establish which, if any, political factors 
made these contexts conducive to the development of personalized political 
communication. Secondly, the identification of possible politically-driven causes of 
personalisation in both democracies and (post) communist societies will inform the 
empirical research on this topic. One of the aims of this thesis is to try to explain 
personalisation, or in other words, to identify the sets of factors which contribute to 
it. This chapter will identify possible political factors that will be tested in the 
empirical analysis in chapter 7. And finally, information presented in this chapter, as 
well as the one related to the media-driven approach that will be discussed in the 
next chapter, will be crucial for the interpretation of cross-temporal, as well as cross-
national, empirical analysis. The aim of these analyses is to examine the similarities 
and differences between the ways in which personalized political communication 
developed in established Western democracies, communist and post-communist 
societies, and this chapter will provide information which will enable the researcher 
to understand and contextualize the findings.  
Given that this thesis looks at personalized political communication as a 
multi-faceted phenomenon, the additional value of this discussion is in making 
distinctions between the political influences on different dimensions of personalized 
political communication. Since personalisation has only in the past decade been 
seen as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, most of its causes and effects have been 
ascribed to personalisation in general. One of the aims of this chapter is to connect 
specific, politically-related factors with person- and/or persona-centred political 
communication in order to gain a better and more detailed understanding of how 
these different dimensions of this phenomenon might have developed both in 
established Western democracies and in communist and post-communist contexts.   
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Specific emphasis is put on factors such as the characteristics of voters and 
voters' behaviour, institutional settings, legal frameworks, characteristics of political 
actors and political actors' behaviour. These are the most frequently mentioned 
politically-related factors in existing scholarship. 
   
3.1.  Political characteristics of voters and voters’ behaviour 
 
The first group of politically-related factors that will be discussed in this 
chapter are the political characteristics of voters. In established Western 
democracies, societies have undergone a process of modernization in the second 
half of the 20th century, and this process is said to have changed some 
characteristics of voters and consequently their behaviour. The most important 
attribute of modernization in this sense is the fragmentation of identities and life 
spaces which resulted in the weakening of social and political cleavages, and 
consequently the ties between citizens and the groups with which they identified. 
Fragmentation of identities meant that individuals were no longer strongly identified 
with traditional social systems, such as the Church or class, but rather they 
developed multiple identities. This eventually led to a weakening of ties with their 
communities and decline in general of group-based politics (Dalton & Wattenberg, 
2000; Dalton, 2002; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). 
 The second distinguishing feature of modernization at the micro-level is the 
individualization of society based on increased levels of education, greater 
geographical and social mobility, and enhanced access to information which stems 
from the rise of commercial and non-partisan media (Thomassen, 2005). Dalton 
(2002: 201) argues that the increased availability of political information and 
education “led to a process of cognitive mobilization, whereby citizens feel better 
able to make the decisions affecting their lives without habitual reliance on external 
cues”. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000: 11) further advance this hypothesis by 
claiming that the rise of these new, autonomous and independent individuals 
changed the role of citizenry in Western democracies making them “self-sufficient in 
politics” which means they are less likely to “defer to party elites or to support a 
party simply out of habit”. On the contrary, these politically “self-sufficient” citizens, 
not bound by social and political cleavages and without strong connections with 
groups, such as parties, religion or class communities, are more likely to question 
the actions of political elites and make their electoral decisions based on some short 
term factors, one of which might be the evaluation of candidates running for office. 
Voting based on the preference for a candidate or even his/her persona would lead 
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to an increase in the person and perhaps persona-centred voting behaviour. This 
phenomenon is called the “personal vote” (Cain et al., 1984; Carey & Shugart, 
1995), “candidate-centred politics” (Wattenberg, 1991), “leadership effect” (Bean & 
Mughan, 1989) etc.  
 Post-materialism is another feature of the process of modernization 
manifested in the transformation of citizens’ values and interests. Thomassen (2005) 
writes that materialist values, such as security and economic wellbeing were 
characteristic of generations socialized during the great economic depression of the 
1930s and Second World War. Later generations, who were raised in a time of 
economic development and the welfare state, constructed their values around post-
materialist issues, such as environment protection, life-style choices, consumer 
rights, self-expression, and quality of life. Politicization of these post-materialist 
values and interests broadened the boundaries of politics (Dalton & Wattenberg, 
2000) which opened the space for other actors to enter the political scene, namely 
specialized interest groups. As Swanson and Mancini (1996: 8) frame it, social 
complexity was increased by the creation of new structures, “specialized to satisfy 
increasing demands of particular sectors of society and groups of citizens”. In other 
words, there is a growing number of interest groups and citizens’ movements and 
organizations, that gather individuals with common values and interests, which 
weakened the role of political parties in the articulation of citizens’ interests. 
Specialized groups did not lose their influence even when mass political parties 
transformed into “catch-all” parties with an aim to represent diverse interests and 
attract voters with different values and identities. Citizens can advance their various 
interests by participating in a wide range of interest groups and benefit from all of 
them through their specialized knowledge and expertise. Some of these groups 
even have strong connections with the governing bodies and are, therefore, able to 
advance their agenda in the policy-making process. In addition, given that some 
party systems have not yet internalized many post-materialist values, specialized 
interest groups sometimes represent the only institution citizens can turn to in this 
matter. Because post-materialist values and the issues associated with them to 
some party systems “seem antithetical to the disciplined partisan politics that once 
were common in many Western democracies” (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000: 11), 
citizens turn to specialized groups which can advance these values and interests.  
The rise of politically self-sufficient voters who decreasingly find parties 
representing their interests and values can be seen as having two major influences 
on the personalisation of political communication. Firstly, the changes are seen to 
contribute to the rise of personalisation in voters’ behaviour. And secondly, these 
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changes indirectly, and the personalized voters’ behaviour directly, are seen as 
having the potential to contribute to the increase in the personalisation in political 
actors’ communication.  
In the first place, a direct impact of this change in voters’ characteristics 
might be expected in the area of voters’ behaviour. This new electorate might be 
more inclined to vote based on its evaluation of the candidate and his/her persona, 
and less based on its social background or party identification. Several studies have 
found this to be happening in some established Western democracies (Dalton & 
Wattenberg, 2000; Ohr & Oscarsson, 2003; Wattenberg, 1991). For example, 
Wattenberg (1991) argues in favor of the growing importance of candidates’ images 
on the vote. He found that the presidential elections in the US are less and less 
decided by voters’ identification with the presidential candidate’s party, while the 
significance of the presidential candidate’s image becomes more central in making 
an electoral choice. Bean and Mughan (1989) showed that candidates are 
increasingly important, not only in presidential systems where voters cast their vote 
directly for a candidate, but also in parliamentary systems where voters officially 
choose between parties. Their analysis of British and Australian general elections of 
the 1980s showed that the effect of party leaders on the vote was around 5%. In 
spite of the fact that most studies of electoral behaviour in Western democracies 
indicate that the importance of long term factors (i.e. party identification, class, age 
etc.) on the electoral choices is decreasing, the results are not so straightforward in 
regard to the increasing relevance of short term factors, candidate-based or 
personalized voting being part of it. Based on the comparative study of voting 
behaviour in West European democracies, Thomassen (2005: 263) concludes that 
no evidence is found “in support of the hypothesis that the effects of these [short-
term] factors on party choice would increase over time”.  
In the second place, changes in society and voters’ characteristics, as well 
as the personalisation in voters’ behaviour, might have contributed to the 
personalisation in political actors’ communication. In societies which are not divided 
across traditional cleavages, in which there is a “fair amount of agreement in regard 
to fundamental values and directions of future development” (Šiber, 2007: 65; see 
also Kuhn, 2004), party leaders might rise as “brand differentiators” or in other 
words parties “unique selling points” (Langer, 2011: 47). Since parties can not 
mobilize voters by their unique policies alone, they are arguably turning to their 
leaders to act as the differentiators in the party system and form bonds with voters. 
Leaders are most commonly differentiated by their performance in party and/or 
political office, their personalities, personal qualities and skills, but sometimes even 
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based on the choices they make in their private sphere. Similarly, the increase in 
personalized voting might also contribute to the personalisation in political actors’ 
communication. Given the decrease in the party identification, political parties need 
new ways of connecting with voters, and it is suggested that many political parties 
find it easiest to try to re-connect with voters through their leaders who are expected 
to form emotional connections with the electorate (Garzia, 2011; Mazzoleni, 2000). 
Therefore, in Western democracies characterized by these developments political 
actors’ communication may be person and persona-centred.  
 
3.1.1. (Post)Communism: Authoritarianism and external guidance 
Changes in society and voters’ characteristics connected with the Western 
democracies, such as the weakening of cleavages, the rise of politically self-
sufficient citizen or the increased importance of post-materialist values, were not 
observed in the communist and post-communist societies. However, this is not to 
say that the characteristics of these societies and its voters’ did not have the 
potential to contribute to the increase in personalized political communication. On 
the contrary, there are certain long-lasting characteristics of the society and voters’ 
in these countries which have been transferred from communist to post-communist 
societies (Evans, 2006; Kreuzer & Pettai, 2004; Šiber, 2007) and might be 
discussed in the context of increasing personalisation of political communication, or 
at least some of its dimensions. These characteristics were considered to be a 
precondition for the acceptance of the centrality of the leader in communism, two of 
them being most frequently emphasized in the literature. The first one is the 
prominence of authoritarian personalities, and the second is related to citizens’ 
political dependence upon external cues due to the lack of the necessary education.  
Authoritarianism is usually considered to be characterized by a preference 
for strong leaders and uncritical submission to a superior, but at the same time 
exercise of power over one’s subordinate (Šiber, 2007). It is suggested that it had a 
fertile ground for developing in the European communist societies since they were 
mostly formed in the traditional, rural areas where there was no or little tradition of 
civil society. Šiber (2007: 148) argues, drawing on the findings from a comparative 
study of personal attitudes in the communist and Western societies, that people who 
were living in communist societies expressed higher levels of authoritarianism in 
their uncritical acceptance of authority. This authority was most commonly expected 
to come in the form of a strong leader, since authoritarianism was manifested in the 
“deep-rooted longing for a strong leader” (Eatwell, 2006: 149, see also Plamper, 
2004) and in some cases, a long authoritarian tradition which generated habits of 
 58
worshiping the leader (S. Davies, 2004). In addition, strong patriarchal elements, 
visible in the high respect given to elders, further contributed to the easier 
acceptance of leaders whose images were often built on the premise that they are 
the “fathers of the nations” (Rees, 2004). These elements of the pre-communist 
societies were further reinforced in the communist regime with the practices which 
positioned the leader as the highest authority.  
Although many scholars of leaders’ cults emphasize the charismatic authority 
on which some cults were based and the true devotion that people had for these 
authorities (e.g. Ake, 1966; Cavalli, 1998; Eatwell, 2006; Gentile, 1998), Plamper 
(2004) argues that there is an alternative explanation for the acceptance of the 
leader’s cult and participation in its creating. He argues that “the makers and 
recipients” of the cults were sometimes “not guided by sincere feelings, but by 
utilitarian considerations” (ibid., 41). They can therefore be considered to be rational 
actors who adapted their behaviour, possibly only in public, in order to gain material 
and/or social benefits from participation in the building of the cult. For example, 
Plamper writes that “writers, artists and composers produced their sycophantic 
eulogies of Stalin not out of sincere belief, but because they were afraid of the 
consequences of not doing so, because they wanted to gain an advantage, however 
small, in everyday life, or simply because everyone around them was doing so” 
(ibid., 41). This practice shows that some parts of communist societies were not 
blindly respectful of authority and the “great leader”. However, in a sense of 
socialization patterns, it points to the fact that people may have been socialized to 
make use of clientelistic networks and charismatic leadership. They might also have 
learned practices which they were able to use in the post-communist systems as 
well. 
 In short, high degrees of authoritarianism in communist societies might have 
influenced the public to put the focus on the leader instead of on the political 
collective. In addition, this preference for strong leaders might have also contributed 
to the increase in the person-centred political actors’ behaviour because the political 
actors arguably wanted to communicate information in line with cultural values of 
their people.   
Another characteristic of society and voters which was transferred from the 
pre-communist system to the communist one, where it was reinforced and 
subsequently might have influenced voters’ behaviour in the post-communist 
systems, was the heavy reliance on the political authority in making political 
decisions. People who lived in areas where communism was established after the 
Second World War were mostly peasants with little or no formal education, unable to 
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comprehend complex political matters and, therefore, used to accepting guidance 
about political matters from sources they considered reliable and legitimate (Eatwell, 
2006; Plamper, 2004; Šiber, 2007). The communist leaders were apparently aware 
of these “limitations” of the part of the society and an important reason for making 
the leader’s cults was to simplify political ideas in order for the uneducated masses 
to understand them. For example, Davies (2004: 37) writes that Stalin maintained 
that his leader cult is “necessary for mobilizing a poorly educated population” and 
tolerated it “for the sake of the masses who were accustomed to worshipping the 
tsar”.  
The making of the leader cult went beyond positioning the leader as the 
highest political authority in society. Eatwell (2006: 151) argues that “people have a 
need to understand complex events, and often find it easiest to come to terms with 
complexity through the image of a single person who is held to be special, but in 
some way accountable”. The leader cult was therefore created on the basis that the 
leader is an “embodiment” of the ideas and values that were considered necessary 
by the communist regime in order to reduce the complexity of issues and present 
ideas (Plamper, 2004). This “embodiment” principle on which leader cults were most 
frequently based is most visible in the leaders’ official biographies in which leaders 
lives and personalities and parties histories were so heavily interconnected that they 
often looked like “personalized representations of nation’s history” (Apor, 2004: 65). 
Although the communist regime eventually increased the level of education in 
society, people may have still depended upon the leader’s cues to act politically 
since they were socialized to do so.  
In short, authoritarianism and the need for external control were two major 
political characteristics of communist, and in some cases post-communist, societies 
that might have contributed to the rise of personalized political communication. On 
the one hand, the preference for strong leaders can be seen as contributing to the 
public’s focus on individual political actors and also to the communist political elite’s 
decision to focus on the leader instead of a collective in its communication. The 
need for external guidance might have alongside the increase in the person-centred 
politicians’ communication and voters’ behaviour, also influenced the persona-
centred communication. If the public was used to understanding politics through the 
persona of the leader, the political elite might have been inclined to communicate 
political information in this way to resonate with people’s preferences.  
 
3.1.2. Post-communism: Similarities based on differences 
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Alongside these unique characteristics of (post)communist societies and 
voters that might have contributed to the increase in personalized political 
communication, there are also new developments in post-communist societies, and 
consequently voters’ behaviour, that might have increased the degree of 
personalized political communication. Evidence from East and Central European 
countries suggests that the voters’ behaviour of post-communist countries has some 
resemblance to trends observed in established Western democracies. However, it 
should be taken into account that the origins of these political communication trends 
are different in the two systems. Some of the characteristics that post-communist 
and Western democracies’ seem to share in relation to voters’ behaviour are 
electoral volatility, low party identification and weak impact of cleavages on the vote.  
For instance, electoral volatility in the post-communist societies is among the 
highest in the world. Volatility indices are not only higher than those of Western 
democracies, but also of those countries of the third wave of democratization which 
have moved earlier than communist ones from authoritarian to democratic regimes 
(e.g. Latin American countries, Spain, Portugal). Although the differences in volatility 
between post-communist and Western societies are considerable, the systems 
share the trend in electoral behaviour characterized by shifting voters’ allegiances 
between elections (Bielasiak, 2002; Lewis, 2000; Rose, 1995).  
Moreover, this electoral volatility can partly be explained by the low party 
identification and general distrust of political parties which is a characteristic of all 
post-communist societies. Political parties are often the least trusted of all the 
institutions in the society (Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996; Rose, 1995; Tomšič & Prijon, 
2010), just as is the case in West European countries (Grbeša, 2008), but the levels 
of party identification are usually even lower than in Western democracies (Lewis, 
2000).  
Finally, the pattern of social cleavages and their impact on electoral choices 
are remarkably similar in Western and post-communist societies. Although the 
overall impact of social cleavages on the vote is in general not very great, both 
groups of societies are politically divided along the lines of religion and class. The 
only significant difference is in the impact of age on the political preferences of the 
electorate. As compared to trends in Western democracies, in post-communist 
societies the older generations socialized in the former regime position themselves 
on the “left” side of the political spectrum and have nostalgic memories of 
communist times, while younger generations belong to the political right, often 
having nationalist tendencies and little or no support for the old regime (Evans, 
2006; McAllister & White, 2007).  
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Although this data indicates that the “patterns of party representation” in 
post-communist societies are quite similar to those observed in the West, “the 
trajectory of party development is nevertheless different and, while parties may 
share characteristics and seem to occupy similar positions within a political system, 
this may be for very different reasons” (Lewis, 2000: 160). In line with this, quite 
strong antiparty, reflected in the low levels of trust in the parties, is considered to be 
a legacy of “prolonged one-party rule” which has “fostered an underlying distrust of 
all party-like structures” (Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996: 257). In addition, citizens who 
were made by the former regime to express their party identification and participate 
in party activities, often just for securing material and social benefit and not because 
of any strong ties with the party, decided to practice their new right to be politically 
independent of any party affiliation (Rose, 1995; Šiber, 2007). Bielasiak (2002: 207) 
similarly writes that the difficulty of forming strong party identification in the new 
regime is a consequence of “severed party-constituency linkages” which make it 
harder for parties of the new regimes to “reconstruct the ties that bind citizens to 
specific political organizations”.  
These trends that characterize voters’ behaviour of post-communist 
societies, namely high electoral volatility, low party identification, distrust of political 
parties and weak influence of cleavages on the vote, could be seen as setting the 
ground for personalized voting. Indeed, in a climate of general distrust of parties, low 
party identification, and especially in the early democratic period, uncertainty as to 
what each party represents and whether it can deliver the promises it makes, it 
could be speculated that voters were more inclined to make electoral decisions 
based on their evaluations of leaders and perhaps even their personas. Voters 
socialized in communism might have been accustomed to candidate-centred voting 
given that all the candidates running for public office were from the same party, and 
they presumably used the familiar technique of reaching a voting decision in the new 
system as well, at least until the rules of the new game in town, democracy and 
multi-party system, became more transparent and known.  
One of the reasons why political actors might have pursued a persona-
centred communication strategy might be, as in Western democracies, the state of 
social and ideological cleavages in the society, but in post-communist societies 
these feature in a different way. The inability of parties to differentiate according to 
social cleavages was not due to a lessening of cleavages, but rather because of the 
uncertainty about them in the early democratic period. Political actors were not 
aware of the needs and interests of their citizens, partly because they had little or no 
connection with their potential voters, and partly because voters themselves were 
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just trying to define their interests (Lewis, 2000). In this situation, it seems logical to 
try to use the leaders as “brand differentiators” (Kuhn, 2004; Langer, 2011) and 
mobilize the voters around a leader, and not issues. 
In summary, there seem to be some context-specific characteristics of 
communist and early post-communist societies that have the potential to increase 
the personalisation in voters’ behaviour and leaders’ communication. Although high 
degree of authoritarianism and low educational levels are considered to continue 
into the post-communist era, if eventually these societies became less authoritarian 
and the levels of education grew, it might be speculated that the personalisation in 
leaders’ communication and voters’ behaviour decreased. With regard to the 
possible influences of the personalisation in voting behaviour on other actors, it is 
also possible only to speculate since there is no empirical evidence on the topic. It 
might be expected that the personalized voting would increase both political actors 
and media’s focus on politicians and their personae, since both of these political 
communication actors might be inclined to provide the voters with the type of 
information that they consider relevant when reaching electoral decisions.  
 
3.2. Institutional characteristics 
 
 Alongside the changes in the political characteristics of voters and voters’ 
behaviour, other politically-related factors that may be able to cause or contribute to 
the increase in the personalisation of political communication are a country’s 
institutional settings. As Karvonen (2010: 23) nicely sums it up: „A certain set of 
institutional constraints may enhance collective actions, whereas another 
institutional set-up may encourage individual actors to go it alone.” Among the most 
frequently mentioned institutional characteristics in this regard are the type of a 
political and electoral system, as well as candidate and leader selection methods.  
According to existing research, the type of a political system can be seen as 
connected to increased person-centred political communication. Dalton and 
Wattenberg (2000) investigated whether there is an increased focus on leaders 
versus parties in the US, France, the UK, Austria and Canada in media reporting. 
They analyzed the newspaper campaign coverage from the 1950s to 1990s, 
comparing the ratio of candidate and party mentions cross-temporally and cross-
nationally. This analysis revealed that over time the number of candidates mentions 
outnumbered those of their parties in all countries, but with significant differences 
between presidential and parliamentary systems. Specifically, in presidential 
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systems, such as in the US and France, the ratio of candidate to party mentions was 
four times higher than in parliamentary systems (the UK, Austria and Canada)7.  
The same conclusion about the contribution of political system to the degree 
of person-centred political communication can be drawn based on research on 
voting behaviour. The Dalton and Wattenberg study also researched the voting 
behaviour patterns of the two major party voters in presidential and parliamentary 
democracies. They wanted to examine whether voters have a candidate and/or a 
party preference and how these preferences influenced their voting decisions. The 
study showed that in the 1990s two-thirds of voters in the US and France cast their 
vote on the basis of their candidate preference in a situation of inconsistent 
candidate and party preference, while only one third did so in the parliamentary 
democracies (Canada, Germany, Australia). This indicates that voters are more 
inclined to cast their ballot based on their evaluation of the candidates in systems 
where an individual is vested with most power. In addition, it can be observed, 
based on the longitudinal data for Germany and Canada, that voters in 
parliamentary democracies are over time more inclined to focus on candidates than 
parties. However, even these increased degrees of person-centred voting in 
parliamentary democracies “fail to display anything close to the degree of 
dominance of candidates over parties that clearly exists in presidential systems” 
(ibid., 54). 
With regard to person-centred political actors’ behaviour, there is hardly any 
comparative and/or longitudinal studies that even tackled the question of the extent 
to which their communication is focused on individuals (Maier & Adam, 2010), let 
alone what role the type of political system plays in the process. However, as with 
the other two political communication actors, it might be speculated that in 
presidential systems the political actors are more inclined to put the focus on 
themselves, since they are the ones who are vested with power, make decisions 
and are responsible for them.  
Since persona-centred political communication research has only recently 
begun, national studies are rare, with hardly any cross-national (Maier & Adam, 
2010). One of these rare studies is Stanyer’s analysis of the extent to which 
politicians’ private lives are media visible in seven European democracies and the 
reasons why there are variations in their mediated visibility (2013). He tested the 
influence of the type of political system as a causal condition in the fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis, and found that the presidential political system can 
                                                 
7
 In the mid-1990s the ratio for the US and France was 5,6 while for the UK and Austria was 1,3 and for 
Canada 1,6. (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000: 52) 
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be seen as contributing, among other factors, to an increase in the degree to which 
leaders’ private lives are mediated, but not in all cases. Similarly, this study found 
that the parliamentary political system is connected with lower degrees of this 
phenomenon, but also not in all cases. Hence, the type of political system can be 
seen as having the potential to contribute to the persona-centred media reporting, 
and it might be speculated on other political communication actors as well. It can 
perhaps be expected that in systems centred on individuals all political 
communication actors will tend to put more focus not only on candidates but also on 
their personas, personal qualities and life. However, this development should be 
more likely if there is a fair amount of agreement in the society about the course of 
its development and its main issues (Kuhn, 2004; Langer, 2011; Šiber, 2007), and 
not dependent solely on the type of political system.   
Another important institutional characteristic that may have an influence on 
the personalisation of political communication is the type of the electoral system, 
especially its main design – majoritarian, proportional, or mixed. In general, the 
introduction of proportional electoral systems in which voters are casting ballots for 
parties, not individuals, is seen as having the potential to decrease the focus on 
individual political actors. Mixed and especially majoritarian systems are considered 
to potentially contribute to higher emphasis on individuals because voters choose 
among candidates, not parties (Mergel, 2009; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Given 
that in the majoritarian elections the emphasis is on the individual political actors, it 
might be speculated that all political communication actors are more focused on the 
candidates than on political collectives which would result in higher degrees of 
person-centred political communication.  
Finally, it is speculated that the candidate and leader selection methods 
might contribute to the personalisation of political communication. For example, 
primary elections represent a candidate selection method in which candidates who 
will run for office are not chosen by the party leadership but rather by smaller or 
larger number of party members. It is argued that the introduction of primaries can 
lead to higher degree of person-centred politicians’ behaviour since the candidates 
campaign for themselves within the same party and therefore put individuals at the 
focus of both campaign strategies and electors’ attention, and possibly even the 
media’s (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Rahat and Sheafer (2007) showed with the 
example of Israel that the introduction of primaries triggered other dimensions of 
personalisation. More specifically, the growth of the electorate that participates in 
the candidates’ selections was the first impetus which led to increased person-
centred political communication in the media and in politicians’ communication. If 
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there is a fair amount of consensus among the candidates about the party’s policies 
and course of development, there is a good chance that primaries could lead also to 
the increase in persona-centred political communication since the differentiation 
between the candidates would be based on their personal qualities and life.  
 To summarize, it is suggested that a country’s institutional settings which 
grant more power to an individual at the expense of the collective can contribute to 
an increase in the personalisation of political communication. Specifically, 
presidential political systems, majoritarian electoral systems and primaries are seen 
as those elements that have the potential to make political actors’, media and 
voters, focus more on individual political actors than on collectives, i.e. contribute to 
the person-centred political communication, and in some cases even to the persona-
centred political communication.  
 
3.2.1. Communism: Concentrated power  
If institutional characteristics really can contribute to the increase in the 
personalisation of political communication, then the institutional settings of 
communist systems might represent an ideal context for this development. 
Specifically, early European communist systems’ constitutions concentrated political 
power in the hands of an individual. In the first years following the Second World 
War when most of Central and Eastern European communist systems were created, 
these countries were without exception ruled by strong leaders who held almost all 
political power (Furtak, 1986). In the later communist period, starting from late 
1950s, there was a shift from vesting one individual with this amount of power to a 
dual leadership. The political power was in these later stages of communist systems 
divided between the party leader, usually called the general secretary and the formal 
head executive, who most frequently held the position of a Prime Minister or a 
President (Blondel, 1992). Since it is argued that all important decisions were made 
in the party, and that the role of state institutions was primarily to “put the party’s 
decisions into effect” (Furtak, 1986: 10), it would be logical to assume that the 
general secretary of the communist party had more power than the other leader, the 
formal head of state (McCauley & Carter, 1986). However, this move towards dual 
leadership can be indicative of communist’s desire to distribute the power rather 
than concentrate it, only in countries where the two positions were not allowed to be 
held by the same person. In the cases of Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, the 
head of state was at the same time the party leader so the power was still very 
concentrated and the political system relied on an individual (Blondel, 1992). 
Consequently it does not come as a surprise that the leaders of mentioned 
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countries, Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito, Albania’s Enver Hoxha and Romania’s 
Nicolae Ceauşescu, had the strongest and most enduring leadership cults (Leese, 
2014).  
In addition, one of the reasons why the political leader was so central to the 
system, although communist systems officially had all three branches of government 
(executive, legislative and judicial), was that there was no system of check and 
balances in these countries (Butler, 2000). Furtak (1986: 13) analyzed political 
systems of communist countries and concluded that “the constitutions do not 
regulate the relationship between single branches of government” and that “the 
executive and judicial branches of government are not part of an institutionalised 
system of separation of powers”. What this meant is that the person or body that 
was in power was not restrained by other political institutions, such as parliaments 
or judicial bodies in democracies. Furthermore, Luthans et al. (1998: 193) write that 
the “absence of an established legislative, judicial and regulatory infrastructure, 
which is not as common in Western societies, made the personal power of leaders 
in the communist system a substitute for the institutional infrastructure and 
ideological vacuum”.  
Hence, if a presidential political system in established Western democracies 
has the potential to make political communication actors focus on the individual who 
is vested with the most power, at the expense of political collectives, the ways in 
which communist political systems were set might contribute even more strongly to 
person-centred political communication.  
Furthermore, given that all communist countries had majoritarian electoral 
systems (Birch, 2005), it could be expected that the electoral system might also 
contribute to an increase in the personalisation of political communication. However, 
as was already mentioned in the previous chapter, voters rarely had the opportunity 
to choose among candidates in communist elections, and political leaders were 
mostly appointed, not elected, so the extent to which the type of electoral system 
can influence personalisation, especially person-centred political communication, 
remains ambiguous. It might be speculated that these majoritarian elections have 
socialized the public to understand politics in a personalized way. If their only 
contact with the political world was voting for an individual at the elections, they 
might have seen politics as a world of powerful individuals and not collective actions 
and decisions. 
While the type of political and electoral system in communist countries seem 
to have been favorable to the increase in the personalisation of political 
communication, the candidate and leader selection methods do not. These 
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processes were in communist countries centralized and exclusive. The party leader 
was either elected by a party congress, or appointed by the party elite (Furtak, 
1986). The formal head of state, if different from the party leader, was in general 
appointed by the legislative body or some party organ (ibid.). In some countries the 
right to nominate candidates for elections had local party organizations and social 
organizations, but the decision of who will ultimately be a candidate was again left to 
a centralized and exclusive party organ (Furtak, 1986). Hence, the primary elections 
do not seem to have been an important institutional factor that might have increased 
the personalisation of political communication in European communist countries.  
 
3.2.2. Post-communism: Personal competition over team spirit 
In the first post-communist period there were continuities from the communist 
era. The choice of institutional design in the post-communist system largely 
depended upon the model of transition, which in turn depended upon the legacies of 
the former system (type of regime, level of industrialization, former experiences with 
democratic regimes etc.). In the end the choice of institutional design was decided 
on the basis of the power relationship between the communist elite and their 
opposition8. In the countries where the communist elite retained control over the 
power resources in the transition period, it was able to determine the institutional 
design of the new system without negotiations with the opposition forces. The 
communist elite which was consolidated in this way and which thought that it would 
“have the most to gain by limiting the access of others to state’s power resources” 
opted for the presidential political systems which represented the continuation of the 
focus on individual political actors from the former regime (Easter, 1997: 211). Since 
presidential systems promoted “a concentration of power on charismatic individuals” 
and dominance of “personal competition” over “team spirit” (Kitschelt, 1995: 452), 
they were the first choice of communist elites that were leading the transition 
because they expected to benefit from the “name recognition of local and national 
leaders and clientelist networks” (ibid., 453). The presidential political systems were 
the most common institutional choice of post-communist countries, primarily 
because of the large number of post-Soviet republics which opted for it (Easter, 
1997).  
                                                 
8
 This explanation of the reasons why certain institutional designs were adopted is similar to what Frye 
(1997) calls „electoral bargaining approach“. Although Frye considers this approach as one of the most 
important ones, he emphasized that there are alternative approaches that might explain how post-
communist countries chose their insitutitional designs, namely cultural, economic, political and societal 
approaches.  
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Meanwhile, the prevailing political system choice of post-communist 
countries of Central Europe was either the parliamentary system or the mixed, semi-
presidential one. The parliamentary system was the most common outcome of the 
transitions in which the opposition forces gained considerable power while the 
communist elites lost much of their power following internal fragmentation (Eatwell, 
2006). Since neither of the elites was confident in securing enough public support 
for autonomous rule, they opted for a system in which neither option would be able 
to control all power resources if it were to be elected. A parliamentary system was 
also a way of preventing the rise of a new strong leader, a technique often used in 
establishing new Western democracies after the Second World War (Cavalli, 1998). 
Finally, a rather rare choice was the introduction of the semi-presidential system. 
Kitschelt (1995) argues it was the choice of the struggle of communist elite which 
lost certain amount of power, but was still able to negotiate with opposition forces. 
By introducing a semi-presidential system, the communist elite was able to partly 
secure the continuation of person-centred politics, but since it was forced to 
negotiate with the opposition, it had to comply with some of the opposition’s 
demands, which were usually connected with the introduction of the elements which 
decrease the focus on individual political actors and enhance the power of 
collectives.   
With regard to the choices of electoral system in post-communist countries,  
Renwick's analysis of electoral systems in ten post-communist systems showed that 
“all but one of the post-communist countries in the sample chose systems allowing 
voters at least some opportunity to vote for individual candidates” (2011: 474-475). 
Therefore, even if the country opted for a parliamentary system, and possibly a 
proportional electoral system, there were other ways to make political 
communication actors focus on individuals instead on collectives. Most prominent 
among these techniques is the direct elections for a President who has no or little 
executive power (the so called “ficus” presidents) and the direct elections of mayors. 
Even if the executive power was given to the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet, 
post-communist countries kept the institution of the President whose role is most 
frequently only ceremonial but he/she is nevertheless in general chosen by the 
direct vote9. Additionally, the direct elections of mayors at the local level are the 
most common technique for electing local governments in post-communist 
                                                 
9
 Presidents in parliamentary post-communist democracies can be appointed, like in Germany or 
Hungary, or populary elected, like in Slovakia, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia etc. (Baylis, 2007) 
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countries10. These techniques might contribute to the increased person-centred 
political communication since they “periodically serve to place parties in the 
background and leaders at the centre of media attention” (Van Biezen & Hopkin, 
2005: 282), and it might be supposed voters’ behaviour and leaders’ 
communication. Hence, this development might be seen as undermining the role of 
the parties and making it more acceptable and perhaps desirable for the electorate, 
media and political actors to focus on individuals instead on the collectives.  
In summary, since in most of the cases there was a tendency among post-
communist countries to adopt institutional designs which put the focus on individual 
political actors instead of collectives, it can be concluded that, in general, communist 
system showed some continuity with the new system when it comes to institutional 
characteristics. These elements of post-communist institutional designs might have 
kept voters focused on individuals rather than parties, and could have also made 
political actors focus their communication strategies on party leaders.  
 
3.3. Legal framework 
 
Another politically-related factor that needs to be taken into account when 
examining the variables that have the potential to contribute to the personalisation of 
political communication is a country's legal framework. The most commonly 
discussed legal provision in this regard is the way in which one's right to privacy is 
legally protected (Stanyer & Wring, 2004; Stanyer, 2013). This factor is mostly tied 
to the rise in the private persona-centred media reporting.  
 Stanyer (2012) argues that there are two main types of country with regard 
to the ways in which politicians’ privacy is protected legally – the ones practicing 
common law and the civil law countries. In the common law countries, such as the 
US, the UK or Australia, there are no statutory privacy laws that would protect 
politicians’ privacy from media intrusion. Furthermore, the politician is the one who 
has to prove that the media outlet that published information about his/her private 
life had known that the mediated information is untrue. This makes it easier for the 
media to intrude into a politician's privacy and report about his/her private life, given 
that it is highly unlikely that there will be any legal consequences of this action. In 
some cases politicians' use libel law to act legally against media outlets, but this has 
been shown to attract more publicity so they rarely do it. On the other hand, in civil 
                                                 
10
 Mayors are directly elected in Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia nad Hercegovina, Serbia, Russia, 
Poland Romania, Slovakia etc., while for example Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus are among the 
exceptions.  
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law countries, such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain, a politician's privacy is 
regularly protected by statute which makes media intrusion into politician's private 
life the subject of legal penalty. Partly as a consequence of this, these countries' 
media outlets rarely publish scandalous information about their politicians’ private 
matters. Stanyer (ibid.) has shown, based on his analysis of mediated politicians’ 
infidelity across seven Western democracies, that there is a clear divide between 
the amount of this kind of coverage in the US and the UK on the one side, and 
Germany, Italy, France and Spain on the other side. For the period 2000-2009 the 
biggest difference in this regard was between the US and France. While the media 
in the US revealed around 30 cases of politicians’ infidelity, the French media 
revealed none.  
In summary, countries differ according to the ways in which political actors’ 
privacy is legally protected, and a country's legal framework might contribute to 
lower or higher degrees of politicians' private personae visibility in the media.  
 
3.3.1. Communism: Protection of privacy without a right to privacy 
 The right to privacy as it is understood in the established Western 
democracies, i.e. the right for one's personal and family life to be legally protected 
from intrusion, did not exist in the majority of constitutions of the European 
communist countries (R. Errera, 1996). Most of these countries did not have 
anything similar to a privacy right in their early post-1945 constitutions, but in the 
later period, especially since 1960s, there was a shift towards including more 
citizens' rights into the main legal framework (Simons, 1980). However, the right to 
privacy that was proclaimed in these later communist constitutions did not usually 
protect the privacy of one's personal and family life, but rather communist rights to 
privacy more commonly proclaimed the protection against searches of the home 
and the privacy of personal communication (ibid.). However, it was clear from these 
constitutions that the authorities had the right to violate one's privacy if they thought 
there was a need to (R. Errera, 1996; Simons, 1980). In spite of the relative lack of 
the legal framework that would protect media intrustion into leaders' privacy, it does 
not seem that in communist countries this legal provision had significant impact on 
the degree to which the media reported leaders' private personae. Given the high 
level of political control over the media (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008; Lauk, 2008; 
Novak, 2005), it seems rather unlikely that the communist media would intrude into 
their leader's privacy just so they would have a juicy story to report. According to the 
censorship systems that were implemented in most communist countries, journalists 
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would either not dare even pursue that kind of story, or the story would be allowed to 
be reported only if it would be approved by the political elite (Apor et al., 2004).  
Hence, the degree to which one's privacy is legally protected in communism 
does not seem to have the same potential to contribute to the degree of the private 
persona-centred media reporting as in the established Western democracies.  
 
3.3.2. (Post)Communism: Powerless privacy and powerful libel laws 
 With the introduction of democracy, most of Central and Eastern European 
post-communist countries introduced to their constitutions the right to privacy based 
on the legal protection of one's personal and family life (Errera, 1996; Privacy 
International, 2012). In addition, the majority of these countries eventually signed the 
European convention on human rights whose Article 8 proclaims a right to privacy 
(“European Convention on Human Rights - Impact in 47 countries,” n.d.). Hence, it 
seems that one's right to privacy is quite strongly protected in European post-
communist countries. If the laws are properly implemented it might be expected that 
the private persona-centred media reporting is affected by the legal protection of 
privacy in a similar way as in the West. However, post-communist countries are 
(in)famous for their problems with implementing laws (Galligan & Kurkchiyan, 2003). 
If there are problems with law implementation, the situation is less clear and the 
outcome might depend on the power holders in the specific country. In other words, 
if the media believe they can get away with publishing private information about 
politicians, they might pursue this kind of reporting. However, if the members of the 
political elite have some other legal means they can use for retribution, that might 
inhibit media's willingness to infringe their privacy.  
One of those legal means that might prevent the media from reporting 
politicians' private information are libel laws and laws protecting the publication of 
unflattering information, i.e. insult laws. They are not usually discussed in the 
context of possible influences on personalisation in media reporting, but I argue that 
they can be seen as potential inhibitors of private persona-centred reporting in these 
contexts. Specifically, it is known that there were legal provisions in communist 
countries that prevented the media from criticizing political leaders and publishing 
information that might hurt their reputation (Coban, 2013; Jergović, 2003; V. K. Rao, 
2007). In the communist era, that legal provision was another factor that might have 
inhibited reporting of not only embarrassing private information about leaders, but 
negative information in general. A similar legal framework continued in some post-
communist countries even after the introduction of a democratic system (Jergović, 
2003; Splichal, 2001). Libel is still in some post-communist countries a criminal 
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offense, sometimes punishable by imprisonment (Article 19, n.d.). However, there is 
a general trend towards the decriminalization of libel (ibid.). In those countries and 
periods of transition in which the publication of unflattering information and/or 
defamation was criminalized, the media might have been less inclined to report 
embarrassing private information about political leaders, especially if there were no 
sources they could use to back up their stories.  
Hence, libel and insult laws can be seen as context-specific legal provisions 
that may need to be taken into account when examining the factors that might 
influence private persona-centred media reporting in communist and post-
communist systems.  
 
3.4. Political actors and their communication strategies 
 
Up until now I have discussed how different politically-related factors can 
contribute to the increase in the personalisation of political communication, 
specifically personalisation in voters' behaviour, media reporting and political actors' 
communication. I also considered how the personalisation in voters' behaviour might 
influence the personalisation in other political communication actors, i.e. media and 
political actors. This final part of the chapter looks into how characteristics of political 
actors might impact the personalisation of political communication and also, how 
personalisation in political actors' communication might contribute to the increase in 
the personalisation related to the other two political communication actors, i.e. 
media and voters' behaviour. As was already mentioned, public organizations, 
pressure and interest groups, terrorist organizations, even media, might be seen as 
political actors (McNair, 2011), but when we discuss the characteristics and 
communication strategies of political actors it is primarily meant those of political 
parties and individual politicians.  
 Firstly, there are several characteristics of political parties and party systems 
that might contribute to the personalisation of political communication. As was 
indicated in the first part of this chapter, in established Western democracies, 
characterized by decline in party identification and weakening of ideological 
cleavages, parties might be inclined to put the focus on the leader and his/her 
persona in order to differentiate themselves in the political market and re-connect 
with voters. However, even in societies that are not characterized by these 
developments there are parties that have lower and higher degrees of support 
(measured by, for example, party identification levels or party membership), and 
those that are closer and more distant from the ideological centre. Hence, the extent 
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to which a party in any society may strategically decide to emphasize its leader and 
his/her persona in its communication might partly depend not on the system-related 
variables, but rather those specific to a party. If a party has significant public support 
and/or promotes extreme ideological positions, it may not be inclined to pursue 
person- and persona-centred communication, even if it operates in a system usually 
characterized by the decline in party identification and weakening of cleavages.  
 In addition, Swanson and Mancini (1996) hypothesize that some 
characteristics of a party system may also contribute to the personalisation of 
political communication. Specifically, they suggest that personalisation in political 
actors’ communication might be more prominent in two-party systems usually 
dominated by catch-all parties who find it easier to differentiate based on their 
leaders than ideologies and policies. On the other hand, in multiparty systems 
parties can differentiate based on their ideologies and policies, what might hinder 
their intention to put the focus on the leader and his/her persona since they have 
alternative basis for differentiation in political market.  
 In the second place, some of the characteristics of individual political actors, 
such as politicians’ personality, age, political experience, and gender, may 
contribute to the increase in the personalisation of political communication. For 
example, the extent of a leader’s prominence in a party’s communication strategies 
is seen as strongly dependent upon the personality of the leader (Holtz-Bacha, 
2004; Langer, 2011). There are those who wish to have more power than they are 
institutionally ascribed in both their parties and public office, which can be seen as a 
desire for increased personal power (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). On the other hand, 
there are those who are most comfortable with collective power and responsibility 
and do not wish to put themselves above the collective. Additionally, not all leaders 
are willing to disclose their private sphere in public communication. Some of them 
are quite comfortable and skilful in presenting private information so it looks natural 
and boosts their political image (e.g. Tony Blair, Barack Obama), while others wish 
to preserve their privacy and/or are not able to communicate private information 
effectively (e.g. Gordon Brown). In a society in which some level of politicians’ 
private disclosure is seen as necessary, the latter approach might be a serious 
political disadvantage. Van Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha (2000: 55) stress that 
“politicians need to be able to operate smoothly in personal discourse in order to 
construct themselves as likeable individuals which is a necessary part of the political 
persona”.  
Two other personal characteristics of politicians may be able to influence the 
rise in the private persona-centred political communication. Stanyer (2013) argues 
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that the politicians’ age might influence the degree to which the media is interested 
in their private life. However, the basis of this argument is that politicians born after 
1945, members of the so called “baby boom” generation, might feel more 
comfortable in communicating private information since they were raised during a 
period in which “many Western democracies witnessed an informalizing process in 
which much conduct that had been forbidden was permitted, and ways of behaving 
in public changed fundamentally” (ibid., 63). Hence, I agree that the politicians’ age 
might be important for the rise of private persona-centred communication, but not so 
much in media reporting, as in politicians’ communication. In addition, the time that a 
politician has spent in politics before running for high office might also be able to 
contribute to the persona-centred, and especially private persona-centred politicians’ 
communication, and also media reporting. Politicians who do not have significant 
political experience, especially those who recently entered politics from another 
profession, might be more inclined to communicate information about their 
personae, and especially emphasize information from their private sphere, in order 
to attract media attention and explain to voters who they are (Langer, 2011; Stanyer, 
2013). Given that they usually don’t have much politically-related information to 
provide, they might be more inclined to focus on their personae. Similarly, the media 
might report more private information about them, since there is little to be said 
about their political personae.  
The politicians’ gender is also seen as playing a role to the extent to which 
political communication is personalized. Specifically, it is suggested that the 
prominence of female politicians in political processes might increase the 
personalisation in media reporting, but at the same time decrease it in political 
actors’ communication. To clarify, the research on media representation of women 
in politics has revealed similar findings across Western democracies, and they all 
show that the coverage of female politicians in the media is usually centred on their 
private persona, especially their appearance, lifestyle, fashion sense, family life, 
maternal and marital status etc. (Everitt, 2003; Mavin et al., 2010; Wasburn & 
Wasburn, 2011; Van Zoonen, 2006). This would suggest that the presence of 
women in politics, especially those running for high office, might increase 
personalisation in the media, particularly the visibility of political actors’ private 
sphere. On the other hand, as Muir (2005: 58) observes, women in politics “have 
always struggled to be judged on their performance, their achievements and their 
substance rather than their appearance”. The reason for this might be that their 
private persona is often presented in a political context. In other words, information 
from their private sphere is politicized, and their appearance and marital status are 
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often connected with their competence to perform public duties, mostly in a negative 
way (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Mavin et al., 2010; Muir, 2005; Wasburn & 
Wasburn, 2011). Given that the media is more likely to report women’s private 
sphere, and that this information tends to harm their political image, women are 
considered to be less willing to use their private sphere in political communication. 
For example, Van Zoonen (2006: 295) argues, based on her analysis of European 
female leaders Angela Merkel and Tarja Harlonen’s communication strategies, that 
“they both present a thoroughly political and professional persona to the public and 
rigidly conceal their private lives”. These communication strategies of female 
politicians would lead to a decrease in the visibility of a politician’s private persona in 
public discourse, or at least in political actors’ communication strategies. The 
conclusion that Van Zoonen (ibid., 299) draws from this development is that “women 
– willingly or not – may end as the last keepers of traditional modernist ideas of 
politics as a separate sphere in which rational actors and representatives publicly 
deliberate and decide on the course of society”.  
Alongside the fact that some characteristics of political actors can lead to 
higher or lower degrees of personalisation of political communication, it is also 
argued that the increase in the personalisation in political actors’ communication can 
contribute to increased emphasis on individual political actors and their personae in 
another area – media reporting. More specifically, it is argued that once political 
actors decide to personalize their communication, this then leads to an increase in 
the personalisation in media reporting. In other words, political actors firstly 
personalize their communication, and then media react to this by increasing the 
focus on the politicians and their personae.  
In Germany for example, research has found that there was a rise in the 
person-centred media reporting from 1990 to 2002, and the researchers argue that 
the initiative did not come from the media but rather that the media reacted to the 
parties’ person-centred campaigns and consequently put more focus on party 
leaders in reporting (Schulz and Zeh, 2005). France is an example of a country in 
which the emphasis on a politician’s private sphere in public discourse is believed to 
have been triggered by the actions of politicians. The French media was not 
comfortable in revealing information about a politician’s private life in the past. It is 
argued this was due to strong privacy laws and the lack of a tabloid media culture 
(Kuhn, 2004). However, neither privacy laws nor the lack of strong tabloid sector 
prevented the rise of private sphere prominence in public discourse after French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy, who came to power in 2007, put significant emphasis on 
private information in political communication. Due to these new “fair game” areas, 
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the French media quickly became accustomed to reporting his love life, hobbies, 
vacations, family, insecurities etc. (Campus, 2010). A similar development might be 
observed in the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom is (in)famous for its 
strong tabloid sector and has no right to privacy in common law (Deacon, 2004) 
which would prevent media from invading a politician’s private sphere, media 
became more concerned with the private qualities and lives of its leaders only in the 
past two decades (Langer, 2011). Langer has traced the origins of this change to 
the leaders’ political strategies and concluded that it was them that triggered the 
trend, while the media’s role was mostly reactive. In addition, the findings from an 
analysis of the 1992 General Election campaign coverage also illustrate the reactive 
nature of British media in the pre-Blair era, but this time related to the person-
centred political communication. Semetko et al. (1994) found that party leaders were 
the most prominent political actors in both press and television election coverage, 
largely due to the parties’ leader-oriented campaign communication strategies. 
To summarize, the characteristics of political actors seem to be mostly tied to 
the increase in the personalisation in politicians’ communication, although some 
variables, such as the leader’s previous time spent in politics, might also contribute 
to the increase in the private persona-centred media reporting. In addition, there 
seems to be evidence suggesting that the personalisation in leaders’ 
communication, especially leaders’ willingness to disclose private information, may 
contribute to the rise in the personalisation in media reporting.  
 
3.4.1. Communism: Irrelevance of personal characteristics? 
 Several points need to be emphasized with regard to the possible influences 
that characteristics of political actors might have had for the personalisation of 
political communication in communism. Given that in these countries the ruling party 
was promoting extreme ideological views, and that it had strong support among the 
public, or at least there was a perception of this support, it could be expected that 
the political actors did not pursue personalized political communication. At least not 
for these reasons. The fact that the communist party was the only political force in 
the country might have made politicians competing for the same political office to 
communicate more persona-related information. They were arguably promoting the 
same, party-approved, policies and therefore needed another base to differentiate 
themselves.  
In addition to this, leadership cult literature suggests that the political actors 
intentionally put the focus on the political leader, and his persona, due to the 
weakness of the party in the early periods, and to accomplish the two main party’s 
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role, as they saw it: education and socialization of citizens. The focus on the political 
leader was at the beginning of communist period considered necessary since it was 
the only way of legitimizing the new system given than the party was not yet 
organized and established (Ake, 1966). The purpose of the strong leader was to 
unite different groups in the society by reshaping rituals and myths in order to create 
common goals for society as a whole to pursue (Cavalli, 1998; Šiber, 2007). The 
focus on the individual instead of the collective was therefore a political decision 
adopted for two main reasons: to legitimize the new system and to simplify the 
education and socialization of the people. Legitimization was based on the premise 
of the leader’s greatness and extraordinariness: the message that was 
communicated to the public was that there was no other person who might run the 
country except for the leader. In line with what the communist party saw as one of its 
main purposes in the society, education and socialization, the leader was used also 
as a means of simplifying values, beliefs and behaviours for the, in large part 
uneducated, public. The leader was to set the example of how people should 
behave, what they should value and what their interests should be.  
If the communist political actors really intentionally and strategically put the 
focus on the leader in their communication, and consequently in media reporting 
that they had control over, the characteristics of the leader might not have played an 
important role in the increase in the personalisation of political communication. In 
other words, the characteristics of the leader discussed in the context of established 
Western democracies, such as their personality, age, or previous political 
experience, might not have been as important as in the West when it comes to 
contributing to the persona- and private persona-centred leaders' communication 
and media reporting.  
In regard to the influence of female politicians on personalisation of political 
communication, there is hardly any evidence of how women politicians were 
represented in communist media, but some literature suggests that the 
presentational style was similar to that in Western media systems with regard to the 
media visibility of private persona and its politicization, but with an important 
difference in the evaluative tendency (Havelková, 1999; Ibroscheva, 2008). 
Apparently, the politicization of female politicians’ private personae was usually 
done in a positive context. For example, Ibroscheva (2008) writes that the Bulgarian 
press was full of “articles about young women, embarking on political careers at the 
local and regional governmental level, while at the same time, attending their family 
and social responsibilities”. It seems as though the representation of female 
politicians in the media was quite didactic and its purpose was to propagate the 
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ideal communist woman, the one that supports the goals of the Party, is active in the 
community, contributes to the economy, but at the same time does not neglect her 
private sphere. However, the only part of a woman politician’s private sphere that 
was media visible was her role as a mother, because women were, unlike in the 
West, “devoid of any playfulness and coquetry”, “dressed in conservative clothes, 
lacking any fashion sense and appearing utterly asexual” (ibid.). Given that it might 
be the case that communist journalists shared their Western colleagues’ tendency to 
report women politicians with an emphasis on their private sphere, it can be 
expected that this led to an increase in persona-centred media reporting. However, 
this presentation of female politicians in communist media should be regarded as a 
reproduction of an ideological construct designed by the political elite, rather than a 
preferred reporting style. 
 
3.4.2. Post-communism: Charismatic parties and influential political actors 
With the introduction of democracy, multi-party systems were formed in 
European post-communist countries, so it could have been expected that the 
characteristics of political actors might have started to contribute to the 
personalisation of political communication as in established Western democracies. 
However, this does not seem to have been the case, at least in the early post-
communist periods. It is argued that the post-communist political actors decided to 
keep the focus on the individuals at the expense of the collectives (e.g. parties) 
partly due to the nature of the newly formed party systems. Scholars mostly agree 
that the new parties that emerged after the introduction of multi-party systems were, 
at least in the beginning, poorly organized, without roots in the society which would 
help them make ties with the citizens, lacking clearly defined identities since there 
was a high level of uncertainty about the needs and interests of the electorate, and 
also, except for the reformed communist parties, the new parties had little or no 
experience in either political or democratic environments (Kitschelt, 1995; Lewis, 
2000; Tomšič & Prijon, 2010). Since these weak parties were not able to attract and 
mobilize voters, party systems were often characterized by “the dominance of 
individuals and political leaders over party structures” (Lewis, 2000: 154).  
In addition, the type of political party seems to be particularly important for 
the personalisation of political communication in post-communist countries. Kitschelt 
(1995) argues that, in some cases, transitional circumstances11 were not favourable 
                                                 
11
 Type of former communist regime (patrimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian, national), mode of 
transition to democratic governance (implosion of the old elites, inter-elite negotiations, preventive 
reform by elite), institutional arrangements introduced with democracy etc. (Kitschelt, 1995) 
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to the development of programmatic parties (i.e. those that are organized around 
political and social cleavages and citizens’ interests and values), but rather that 
parties were organized around charismatic leaders. Transition led by the reformed 
communist elite, or where it was negotiated between communists and opposition, 
often produced charismatic and/or clientelistic parties in the new system, 
demonstrating a perception of continuation of the person-centred politics from the 
communist system. Kitschelt (ibid., 449) defines charismatic parties as “not much 
more than an unstructured mass of people rallying around a leader”, but because of 
this, a party’s destiny is closely connected with the popularity of the party leader and 
eventually with the benefits it can provide to its followers. In short, it seems that, 
even when multi-party parliamentary systems were introduced, parties were weak 
and unorganized and therefore dependent upon their leaders and clientelistic 
networks. This presumably made political actors focus on leaders in their 
communication.  
 The characteristics of politicians, such as personality, former political 
experience and age might in post-communist societies be speculated to contribute 
to the personalisation of political communication as in the established democracies.  
With regard to the influence of female politicians on personalisation of 
political communication, there is not significantly more empirical evidence on how 
the media report women in politics or about female politicians’ communication 
strategies in post-communist countries than in communist ones. However, there is 
some indication that post-communist media might portray female politicians in the 
same manner as their Western counterparts. In one of the rare studies that 
examines the media representation of female politicians in the media, Danova 
(2006: 130) concluded, based on a content analysis of the Bulgarian press, that the 
media favors female politicians’ “private images over their images as public figures”. 
Furthermore, again on the case of Bulgaria, Ibroscheva (2008) claims that female 
politicians reinforced this trend, rather than condemned it. According to her 
observations, women in politics often try to use media interest in their private lives to 
their advantage so they actively promote their private sphere in order to gain 
publicity. However, Ibroscheva does not provide any empirical evidence to support 
this claim. By contrast, there are female politicians in post-communist countries who, 
like their colleagues in the West, condemn the media for focusing on their private 
personas rather than on their political achievements. For example, former Croatian 
Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor often complained that the media were more 
interested in her fashion style than her policies. In short, more research is needed to 
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reveal what kind of information female politicians communicate and how the media 
portrays them in post-communist countries.  
It is also possible only to speculate how the personalisation in politicians’ 
communication might have, if at all, impacted personalisation in voters’ behaviour 
and media reporting in post-communist countries, since there is no empirical 
evidence on this topic. Given that it is usually suggested that the political elite 
remained in control of media, at least in the first post-communist period, it could be 
expected that if the political elite decided to focus on individuals in their 
communication, and perhaps their personae, it had the power to make media report 
in a similar way as well. However, the extent to which the political elite was able to 
control the media varied among post-communist countries, and across different 
periods of transition. Hence, it can be expected that even if the political actors were 
able to make media personalize their reporting in some post-communist countries 
and periods, their influence might have decreased with the rise in the autonomy of 
media, institutionalization of party system, rise of civil society etc.  
While the fact that politicians pursued personalized communication strategies 
in the early post-communist period is yet to be empirically established, there is 
evidence to suggest that post-communist politicians in the late consolidation period 
are quite willing to communicate information about themselves. Hermans and 
Vergeer (2012) analyzed the type of information that the candidates for 2009 
European parliament elections shared on their personal websites in 17 EU 
countries, six of which were post-communist countries. They found that politicians 
from post-communist countries share the most personal information about 
themselves. Specifically, they revealed most information related to their work in 
politics, but also family life and private preferences, compared to politicians from 
other EU countries. As one of possible explanations of this finding, authors 
emphasized that “the former communist, authoritarian countries have a history of 
glorifying political leaders. Maybe practices of presenting professional feats are still 
engrained in post-communist cultures.” (ibid., 12). Although in the late consolidation 
period political actors in most post-communist countries had limited ability to 
influence media reporting, their personalized communication still might have 
contributed to the personalisation in media reporting. As was discussed in the case 
of Western democracies, once the politicians start revealing information about 
themselves, sometimes the media follows and media reporting also becomes more 
personalized. In addition, if most of the political information that the voters were 
receiving was related to individual politicians, they might also have been motivated 
to make their electoral decisions based on evaluations of individual political actors. 
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In summary, the characteristics of communist political actors and the 
possible influence of their personalizing practices on other political communication 
actors seem quite different than in established Western democracies. Although 
there is little known about the post-communist political actors, their communication 
strategies, and influence on other actors, they seem at times more similar to that of 
communist political actors, than Western ones.  However, as the country moves 
away from its communist past, it can be speculated that they and their possible 
influences started to increasingly resemble their Western counterparts.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the politically-related factors 
that may contribute to the personalisation of political communication, or at least 
some of its dimensions, and to offer alternative theories of how and why 
personalisation might have developed in a communist and post-communist context 
by taking into account the political, cultural, social and historical circumstances of 
these societies. Specific emphasis was put on the factors related to political 
characteristics of voters and their behaviour, institutional designs, legal frameworks, 
and the characteristics of political actors and their communication strategies.  
The discussion showed that there are some similarities between established 
Western democracies and communist and post-communist countries with regard to 
possible political influences on the personalisation of political communication. 
However, the origins of these seemingly similar factors are quite different. For 
example, one of the reasons why Western political parties might have decided to 
focus their communication on leaders is the weakening of societal cleavages which 
led to the weakening of parties. Similarly, one of the possible reasons why 
communist and post-communist political actors decided to pursue person-centred 
communication might also have been the weakness of their parties. However, post-
communist parties were arguably weak and unorganized, lacking enough knowledge 
of their voters’ needs and interests, from the beginning, i.e. the introduction of the 
multi-party systems. Hence, although political actors in all three systems might have 
decided to pursue person-centred communication due to the weakness of parties, 
there are different origins of this (parties') weakness.  
Alongside the similarities, there are also important differences in the ways in 
which some politically-related factors might have influenced personalisation of 
political communication in an established Western democracy and communist and 
post-communist societies. For example, some characteristics of voters, such as the 
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rise of politically self-sufficient voters or those relying on post-modernist values, 
legal provisions, such as the protection of privacy, or characteristics of political 
actors, such as politicians' age, political experience or personality, do not seem to 
have the same explanatory power when their potential contribution is examined in 
the context of communist societies. Given the limited extent to which factors 
identified in existing literature can help explain the development of this phenomenon 
in a communist and post-communist context, the examination of literature concerned 
with communist leadership cults and systems, and transitional studies, showed that 
there are some context-specific factors that need to be taken into account when 
analyzing the political factors that have the potential to cause or contribute to the 
personalisation of political communication in these contexts. Specifically, the degree 
of authoritarianism in the society, educational levels of public, and legal 
proscriptions against libel, are some of the factors speculated to have an influence 
on the personalisation of political communication in these systems, but have not 
previously been discussed in the personalisation literature.  
Finally, the discussion presented in this chapter has showed that although 
the politically-related factors are usually seen as having the potential to influence the 
personalisation of political communication in general, some of them can be seen as 
contributing solely or mostly to a specific dimension of personalisation. For example, 
the type of political and electoral system, and the degree of autohoritarianism in the 
society, seem to have the most potential to contribute to the person-centred political 
communication, while only limited influence on persona-centred communication. 
Similarly, politician's age, political experience, and ideological position, seem mostly 
connected to the persona-centred communication, and privacy laws to the private 
persona-centred communication.  
By examining the potential politically-related factors in this nuanced way, i.e. 
by examining the politically-related variables in a context-specific and dimensions-
specific way, it will be possible to contextualize the findings from the empirical 
analysis of mediated political communication (chapters 5 and 6), and also analyze 
the contribution of these factors with relation to different dimensions and areas of 
personalisation (chapter 7). Specifically, the discussion presented in this chapter will 
inform the empirical analyses in this thesis, especially those that aim to answer the 
questions of why and how personalisation of mediated political communication 
developed in a communist and post-communist system, and what are the similarities 
and differences in the factors that contribute to the personalisation in these two 
systems and established Western democracies? The next chapter, which will put the 
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focus on the media-driven approaches to personalisation, will also contribute to 
answering these questions.  
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4. “It’s the media, stupid”: Media-driven approaches to 
personalisation 
 
The previous chapter examined politically-related factors that have the 
potential to increase the personalisation of political communication, or at least some 
of its dimensions, based mostly on the „modernization“ approach to the 
development of personalisation. The aim of this chapter is to explore the second 
perspective on how and why the personalisation of political communication 
developed, in both Western and (post)communist societies. This second group of 
theories can be seen as a “media-driven approach” to personalisation, given that the 
emphasis is on the role that the mass media had in the development of 
personalisation. Scholars who study personalisation tend to rely upon what Ryfe 
(2001) calls the “usable past” to assign value to their research. The main premise of 
this “usable past” is that “in the twentieth century, politics and public life 
progressively worsened, and the mass media have been a primary culprit” (ibid., 
211). And indeed, the main hypothesis of many scholars in this field is to see the 
development of the personalisation of political communication in the Western 
societies as part of the “narrative of decline” in which the past broadly represents 
strong party systems in which parties defended the interests of their voters, informed 
voters made rational decisions based on their evaluations of parties and issues, and 
media discussed political issues and policies in order to inform citizens and enhance 
the quality of public debate. The present is, on the other hand, characterized by the 
decline of parties, a dealigned electorate which is cynical and does not trust political 
institutions, and media reports which are more focused on politicians’ private lives 
than on “real” politics. The personalisation of political communication is in this 
narrative usually regarded as one of the “bad” outcomes of the rise of mass media. 
The exploration of media-related factors that might have the potential to 
influence the degree to which political communication is personalized will inform this 
thesis in several ways. Firstly, by examining the media-related elements of the 
Western, communist and post-communist societies it will be possible to establish 
why, if at all, these contexts are well suited for the development of personalized 
political communication. In addition, given that the media factors will be examined in 
a Western context, but also in a communist and post-communist one, this chapter 
will present alternative theories of what might have caused or contributed to 
personalisation to those usually reproduced with regard to media influence on 
personalisation. In order to explore the ways in which media might have influenced 
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personalisation in (post)communist systems, this chapter will draw on literature 
related to the leadership cult and transition studies. By borrowing from these areas, 
this chapter will aim to reconstruct the ways in which and reasons why the 
personalisation might have developed in these systems. This will enrich the existing 
personalisation scholarship which has not yet dealt with this issue. Secondly, the 
identification of media-related factors, together with the politically-related factors that 
were identified in the previous chapter, will help contextualize findings from empirical 
analyses of mediated political communication in chapters 5 and 6, and inform the 
empirical analysis that will aim to explain how and why the personalisation of 
political communication developed in different contexts. Specifically, the ability of the 
media-related factors identified in this chapter to contribute to the development of 
personalized political communication will be tested in Chapter 7.  
The media-related factors whose influence is examined in this chapter are 
news values, the changes in media technology, especially the rise of television; 
media commercialization; the nature of journalistic culture; and the personalisation 
in media reporting. Similarly, as in the previous chapter, their influence is examined 
with relation to specific dimensions of the personalisation of political communication 
and the specific context. In other words, I examine which media-related factor is 
considered to be connected with the person-, and which to persona-centred political 
communication, and which media factors seem most important in Western, 
communist and post-communist systems.  
 
4.1.  News values and presentational styles 
 
The first media-related factor that is seen to influence the personalisation of 
political communication are news values. Richardson (2005) describes news values 
as “the crystallized reflection of, or ‘ground rules’ for deciding, what an identified 
audience is interested in reading or watching”. In other words, news values are 
considered as criteria according to which an event becomes news. Galtung and 
Ruge (1965) published one of the first studies of news values, and they claimed that 
the media’s focus on individuals, as opposed to structures and processes, is one of 
the main criteria that journalists in Western countries employ when deciding which 
event will get into the media. Although there were many other lists of news values 
produced after this seminal study, the focus that the media puts on individual 
political actors, and sometimes even their personae, at the expense of collectives 
and structures, is often considered one of the news values (Campus, 2010; Kriesi, 
2011; Mazzoleni, 1987; Stromback, 2008; Takens et al., 2013).  
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Putting the focus on individuals seems logical from a media perspective 
since it fits with the preferences of the audience. People not only prefer to read 
about other individuals instead of abstract issues and institutions (Mazzoleni, 2000), 
but they also more easily understand narratives which are centred on persons 
(Brants & Neijens, 1998). This is especially the case with political issues which are 
often complicated, and which typical news consumers cannot understand if they are 
articulated in an abstract and overly formal way (Campbell et al., 1960; Graber, 
1988; Jantol, 2004). In addition to this need to be informed about complex political 
issues in a simplified and reader-friendly manner, people are also “more willing to 
associate political power and authority with a readily identifiable political personality 
than with abstract institution or political ideal” (McAllister, 1996: 287). With regard to 
these audience needs and preferences, the media’s focus on individuals can be 
seen as an adaptation to the needs of their consumers. Hence, favouring individuals 
over collectives and issues can be seen as both a news value and a presentational 
style. It is argued that media give more attention to events which feature prominent 
individuals because it considers them newsworthy and it also tends to present 
information through the experiences of individuals to make a story more interesting 
and engaging. In regard to political information, politicians are often presented as a 
personification of their party’s program, values, and issue stands, as a strategy for 
clarifying and simplifying political information (Brants & Neijens, 1998; Karvonen, 
2010; Mazzoleni, 2000; Meyer, 2002).  
 
4.1.1. Communism: Structural or personalized reporting style? 
Galtung and Ruge (1965) contrasted personalized news reporting found in 
Western countries with a “structural” style of presenting news which is 
characterized, they argue, by the emphasis on social forces while “the names of the 
actors” simply disappear (ibid., 68). They suggest that this news value might be 
more common in communist countries, such as the Soviet Union, than in Western 
media systems. And indeed, there are some studies that indicate that communist 
media reporting was, unlike in the West, more strongly based on structural rather 
than person-centred style. For example, Gerbner analyzed the coverage of the 1960 
General Assembly meeting in the New York Times and Hungarian newspapers. His 
study showed that the New York Times named individuals in around every line and 
a half, while Hungarian newspapers did so in every eight line. This suggests that the 
Times was using a more person-centred presentational style, while the communist 
Hungarian paper presented the meeting in a more structural way (cited in Robinson, 
1977: 167-168). Two studies comparing Yugoslav and American news coverage, 
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done by Robinson (1977) at the beginning of 1960s, further reinforced this 
hypothesis. One study showed that the Associated Press put the emphasis on 
individuals in 30% of its news items, while the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug did so 
in 23%. The difference is not great but it does point to a more structural 
presentational style practiced by the communist news agency. The other study 
examined the same two agencies’ coverage of the Vietnam war. Here, the 
Associated Press put the focus on individuals in 70% of its news items, while only 
25% of Tanjug’s reports were person-centred. Robinson (ibid., 170) concludes that 
the Yugoslav reader acquires “a more structural explication of the issues involved”. 
On the other hand, Martensson’s study of three major Soviet newspapers in 1964 
found that Soviet newspapers pursued quite person-centred, rather than structural 
reporting style (cited in Galtung & Ruge, 1965: 87).  
This finding from the Soviet Union is more in line with the hypotheses set by 
the second camp of scholarship that speaks of the news values and reporting style 
in communist systems. According to the leadership cult literature, communist 
systems are considered to have been centred on leaders, whose cults were built by 
the extensive use of mass media (Eatwell, 2006; Janjetović, 2009; Plamper, 2004; 
Rees, 2004). As Lauk (2008: 199) writes: “the primary task of news presentation in 
former communist bloc journalism was not to chronicle daily events, but to glorify the 
Communist Party and its leaders”. Given that the politics and political actors’ 
communication strategies were arguably centred on a leader, whose cult was 
communicated mainly through the mass media, it could be expected that the 
individuals, not structures, were considered news values and hence, that the media 
practiced more person-centred than structural way of reporting. And furthermore, 
since the leader was set to impersonate society’s history and values, it might also be 
expected, as some literature already suggests (Apor, 2004; Eatwell, 2006; 
Janjetović, 2009; Sretenovic & Puto, 2004), that this reporting was also persona-
centred, i.e. focused on leaders life and qualities.  
These two competing theories – one arguing that communist media practiced 
a structural, and the other suggesting it was a person-centred news presentation 
style – make it difficult to reach any sound conclusions about the style of reporting in 
communist societies. In addition, more and more authors emphasize the differences, 
rather than similarities across European communist media systems, pointing to the 
fact that it is problematic to generalize in this context (Coban, 2013; James Curran & 
Park, 2000; Lauk, 2008; Oates, 2012; Tworzecki, 2012). Therefore, the real extent 
to which the mediated political communication was centred on individuals, especially 
on political leaders, in communist systems, remains ambiguous.  
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However, what both of these theories indicate is that the news values and  
presentation style in communist countries was to a large degree dependent upon 
the needs and instructions of the political elite. The structural presentation style can 
be seen to accord with the communist ideological thesis that the society and its 
structures are more important than individuals (Coban, 2013), while the person-
centred style may be the result of the political elite’s decision to build leaders’ cults 
(Apor et al., 2004). Although the level of control that the political elite exercised over 
media content varied from one communist system to the other, scholars mostly 
agree that the political elite strongly controlled the mediation of political content 
(Coban, 2013; Robinson, 1977). In other words, even if journalists were free to 
report as they wish about some topics (culture, sports etc.), political topics were as a 
rule covered in a party-desired way. Hence, it might be speculated that whichever 
news presentational style communist media followed, it was the product of news 
values which were imposed by the political elite.  
 
4.1.2. Post-communism: Shift or continuation? 
How, if at all, the news values and presentation style changed during the 
democratic transition from a communist to a post-communist system, is unclear. The 
literature concerned with media developments in European post-communist 
countries is mostly concerned with media’s freedom and independence, 
deregulation of media markets, and the nature of interactions between political elite 
and journalists. Little is known about the news values and presentation style, 
although it is frequently suggested that the post-communist media have after the 
introduction of democracy started publishing sensationalist, trivialized and 
personalized news (Gulyas, 1998; Lauk, 2008; Slavko Splichal, 2001; Voltmer & 
Schmitt-Beck, 2002). There is, however, little empirical evidence that would support 
these claims. In spite of this, the focus on individuals, and perhaps even their 
personae, can be examined through the theories of continuation, modernization and 
Americanization.   
In the first place, the focus on individuals as a news value in the post-
communist media might be seen as a continuation of personalized reporting from 
the communist era. That is, if the reporting was personalized in communism. 
Journalists educated and socialized in the communist system did not start working in 
the new system as a tabula rasa but rather they transferred their news values and 
reporting styles from the former system. Most frequently mentioned in this context 
are tendencies toward propagandistic writing, commentary instead of facts, and 
advocacy as opposed to objective journalism (Coman, 2000; Lauk, 2008). What is, 
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however, more important is the possible continuity in the focus on the leader as an 
individual and his/her persona, if the communist media were pursuing this 
personalized rather than structural news values and presentational style. If the 
journalists were, as some literature indicates, emphasizing the leader and his 
persona, then it might be expected that they transferred this presentational style to 
post-communist period, at least in its early days.  
 In the second place, if the communist media considered structures and 
processes as news values, and they changed towards seeing persons as more 
newsworthy in the post-communist period, this development might be seen as a 
result of changes in the country’s media and political system. If the changes in the 
news values and presentational style were caused by conditions such as the 
introduction of the free market, media deregulation, rise of commercial media etc., 
which arguably made media focus on individuals to be more competitive, then the 
consequent increase in personalisation in media reporting can be seen as an 
outcome of modernization processes. In other words, the increased media focus on 
individual political actors and their personae can be seen as an outcome of the 
changes which the societies have gone through. Hence, it might be argued that 
once post-communist societies experienced changes in their media and political 
systems, the political communication actors started pursuing the same 
communication practices as their Western counterparts. That is, they started 
considering individuals to be important and newsworthy actors, and consequently 
they started personalizing their communication.  
 Finally, as was outlined at the beginning of previous chapter, some scholars 
suggest that the personalized reporting style did not develop in post-communist 
countries as a result of modernization processes, but rather that these countries 
“adopted ‘Americanized’ style of reporting (Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2002: 21). In 
this way the rise of importance of individuals as a news value is seen as a trend 
imported from Western countries, among which the United States is most frequently 
mentioned as a centre from which modern trends in political communication are 
disseminated (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Therefore, the “Americanization” 
hypothesis in this context would suggest that the news values and trends in media 
reporting of post-communist countries have been imported from the US, i.e. that the 
post-communist media started pursuing personalized reporting by imitating news 
values and practices from the US.  
A more nuanced approach to this export-import model is that which 
considers national political communication trends to be a combination of trends 
imported from other countries, not necessarily the US, and traditional 
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communication practices. Examples of these models are “hybrid” and “shopping” 
models (Plasser, 2000, 2002). Hence, according to these theories, the rise in 
importance of persons as a news value in post-communist countries would be seen 
as the full or adapted imitation of news values and practices from other, mostly 
Western, countries. However, which news values post-communist media followed, 
how they affected their reporting styles, and which theory is best suited to explain 
the development of news values in this context, remains unclear.  
  
4.2. The role of television  
 
 Although news values seem as an important factor that might contribute to 
the increase in the personalisation of political communication, a more frequently 
mentioned causal condition are the technological developments related to media. 
Specifically, in the political communication, and especially personalisation literature, 
the increase in the personalisation of political communication is most frequently 
connected to the rise of electronic media, primarily television (e.g. Jamieson, 1988; 
McAllister, 2007; Meyrowitz, 1985; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Ryfe, 2001). Since it 
may be argued that Western media were even before the television era focused on 
individuals due to its media logic, the role of television can perhaps be better seen 
as enhancing an already present trend. A common hypothesis is that the technology 
of television has a great impact on the focus on individuals, and especially their 
personae (Karvonen, 2010; Keeter, 1987; Meyrowitz, 1985).  
In the first place, television is a visual medium, hence it mostly 
communicates information though visuals, videos and pictures. Information about 
complex and abstract issues and institutions is difficult to present with visuals, so it 
is more convenient to communicate such information through a person (McAllister, 
1996, 2007). For example, if the story is about the reconstruction of a government, 
the television news will probably cover it with recordings of the Prime Minister, old 
and new cabinet members, and sound-bytes of important political actors, than by a 
recording of the government headquarters and documents detailing the process of 
reconstruction. In this way the abstract and complex issue of government 
reconstruction is explained through the main actors in the process.   
Another reason why individuals came to be the leading actors in television 
news lies also in the fact that viewers tend to forget most of the information from the 
television news, but not that related to persons. For example, Gunter’s (1987) 
research showed that television is not an efficient medium for increasing viewers’ 
knowledge of issues since an average television viewer remembers only two or 
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three of 15 television news items. However, television viewers more easily 
remember people they see on the news and information about their personas 
(Graber, 1988). Hence, telling a story through a person in television news might 
increase the extent to which viewers remember the news.   
Finally, due to the dimensions of the television screen and the quality of the 
image, television uses close-ups which give a “more detailed look at our leaders 
than we have of most of our friends” (Jamieson, 1988: 62; see also Meyrowitz, 
1985). This intimate look at leaders that television allows creates an intimacy 
between the viewer and the leader. It makes viewers believe that they saw the 
leader as a real person since they have the impression they received the image of 
the leader without journalistic interpretation; they saw it for themselves how he/she 
really was (Jamieson, 1988; Keeter, 1987).  
This feeling of intimacy is furthermore emphasized by the fact that visuals of 
leaders often reveal information which was in the pre-television era considered 
private, and was mostly hidden from the public. Meyrowitz (1985: 271) writes that 
“the television camera invades politicians’ personal spheres like a spy (…) It 
watches them sweat, sees them grimace at their own ill-phrased remarks”. This 
dimension of television, communicating information about a leader’s persona 
through visuals, is the one which might be seen as enhancing persona-centred 
media reporting the most. Meyrowitz argues that even if the journalist and/or the 
politician speaks about impersonal matters, such as collective bodies, policies and 
issues, television will still communicate personal information, such as a politician’s 
tone, attitude, grimace etc. For these reasons, media research which looks only at 
how leaders are portrayed in the spoken parts of television coverage might be 
misleading. For example, Semetko et al. (1994) analyzed the television coverage of 
party leaders in the 1992 UK General Elections. They found that references to 
leaders’ traits in the spoken parts of the coverage were extremely rare, based on 
which it can be argued that mediated political communication was not persona-
centred. However, they also found that leaders were the most visible political actors 
in the news, appearing in every fifth BBC news item on elections and in every fourth 
on ITV. If we depart from the premise that “image bites” increase persona-centred 
media reporting because they transmit personal cues (Meyrowitz, 1985) and give 
voters “firsthand knowledge about political actors” (Bucy & Grabe, 2007: 669), then 
it appears as though the television coverage of 1992 UK General Elections was 
actually quite focused on party leaders’ personae.  
In addition, it is suggested that the personalized style of reporting on 
television can lead to an increase in the personalisation in other media outlets, 
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mainly newspapers. Meyrowitz (1985: 178) claims that „one indication of the 
dominance of television in our society is the fact that print media now often emulate 
the type and form of information that television provides“. Hence, it is argued that 
since television put the focus on politicians' personae in its reporting, this has led to 
a spillover effect into print media. In other words, the increase in persona, and 
especially private-persona centred television reporting might also contribute to print 
media pursuing this type of reporting by putting more focus on politicians' political 
and private personae.  
In sum, the rise of television is considered to be able to increase the 
personalisation in media reporting, especially by enhancing the focus on politicians’ 
personae, and their private personae in particular.  
Furthermore, the extent to which television communicates information about 
a leader’s persona might contribute to the personalisation in voters’ behaviour for 
two reasons. Firstly, viewers tend to focus more on the visual than on the audio and 
remember the visual better, faster and longer (Gunter, 1987). And secondly, the kind 
of information about a leader’s persona which is communicated by visuals is the 
type of information viewers are accustomed to evaluate since they are evaluating 
people based on their personas in everyday life (Meyrowitz, 1985). Hence, television 
is considered to encourage voters to cast their votes based on their evaluation of 
leader’s persona, which would lead to an increase in the persona-centred voters’ 
behaviour. Research in the US showed that the importance of leaders’ qualities in 
structuring voters’ choices has grown for television viewers since 1964 (Keeter, 
1987), which seems to support this thesis.  
Due to the alleged influence television has on the formation of voters’ 
choices, the importance of it as a source of information, and its ability to reach a 
wide and diverse audience, it has also become strategically important for political 
actors. On the one hand, political actors can reach politically less interested 
audience and transmit their message via television. On the other hand, since the 
number of floating voters who decide based on information gathered from the 
campaign has been on the rise for the past few decades in Western democracies, 
and that television is considered the main source of information, political actors try to 
influence the information communicated by television to their advantage (Keeter, 
1987; Meyer, 2002; Schulz & Zeh, 2005). This might result in the increased 
persona-centred political actors’ communication.  
Specifically, it is argued that politicians started pursuing more persona-, and 
especially private persona-centred communication, due to the rise of television. The 
intimacy between the viewer and the politician which was created by the electronic 
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media is considered to have altered the extent to which private information is 
communicated not only through visuals, but also through spoken communication 
(Meyrowitz, 1985). Hence, in order to be in line with this new communication 
practice, the politicians needed to start disclosing their private information which 
created a “new eloquence in an electronic age” (Jamieson, 1988). For example, 
Jamieson (ibid.) writes that in the pre-television era American presidents did not 
mention their families, pets or anecdotes from childhood in their presidential 
speeches. That changed dramatically with the introduction of television. For 
instance, Richard Nixon famously used his dog Checkers in a political ad, but long 
before that, while he was still a senator in 1952, he mentioned the dog in a televised 
speech which was named by the media the “Checkers speech”. This persona-
centred political communication which emphasizes elements from a politician’s 
private sphere is said to have become routine in politicians’ communication because 
in the television era communication “without such intimate revelations (…) seem 
stuffy and unrealistic” (Meyrowitz, 1985: 179).  
In short, the rise of television seems to have the potential to increase the 
emphasis that all three political communication actors put on leaders’ personae, and 
especially their private lives and qualities. In other words, it is assumed that the 
more widespread the television use is in the society, the higher the degrees of 
persona- and private-persona centred media reporting, politicians’ communication 
and voters’ behaviour.  
 
4.2.1. Communism: The ambiguous case of television 
Television was popular in communist countries as well and it reached 
significant proportions of the population (Dunnett, 1990; Oates, 2012; Tworzecki, 
2012). Research points to the fact that on average between 60 and 70% of people 
living in communist countries in 1970s had access to television. The penetration 
rates were lower in less developed countries, such as Bulgaria, and were usually 
lower in rural areas than in urban ones (Welsh, 1980). However, in most communist 
countries by 1970s the television was one of the main sources of information and 
one of the main leisure time activities (ibid.). In comparison, more than 90% of 
households had a television set in the UK during 1970s, while the average for G7 
countries12 was around 85% (Nationmaster, n.d.). Hence, although television was 
quite popular in communist countries, it wasn’t as prevalent as in the established 
Western democracies.  
                                                 
12
 A group of advanced economies, namely the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, Italy, France and United 
Kingdom.  
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It might be speculated that even if the reporting style on communist television 
was structural, the rise of television might have increased the persona-centred 
media reporting in these systems as well as in Western ones, simply because of the 
rules of television as a medium, i.e. it tends to communicate information through 
people, because abstract issues and collectives are difficult to cover with visuals. 
Hence, even if the narrative in the news report was based on structures, the visuals 
might have communicated information about politicians’ personae, even private 
personae. However, even if the television increased persona-centred television 
reporting simply by the ways in which it operates, it is difficult to establish what kind 
of influence, if any, this had on the ways in which other media reported. If the 
preferred presentational style was a structural one, it might be expected that 
personalized television reporting did not have a major influence on the change 
towards more persona-centred reporting in print. Also, it is unclear how, if at all, the 
personalized television coverage might have contributed to the personalisation in 
political actors’ communication. Given that politicians were exercising either direct 
(e.g. media content could not be published unless it was checked by appointed 
political body) or indirect control (e.g. appointing media personnel, self-censorship) 
over the media content, they were arguably not inclined to change their 
communication strategies towards those more television-friendly, i.e. personalized 
ones, because they did not need to adapt in order to secure favourable coverage. 
However, this might not have been the case with less-known politicians or those 
wanting to get public opinion on their side for some issue. If they weren’t powerful 
enough to use the media to their advantage, they might have adopted more 
personalized communication style in order to secure coverage.  
 
4.2.2. Post-communism: Delayed technological development 
In the first post-communist period the political elite tried to remain in control 
over the media, especially broadcast media. In most European post-communist 
countries the ruling elite firstly deregulated the print media market, while they stalled 
with the deregulation of broadcast market and usually remained in control over the 
state or public service broadcasting (Splichal, 2001). However, by the end of the first 
decade of post-communism, most Central European countries have deregulated 
their broadcast markets (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013) and television reached more 
than 90% of the population (Nationmaster, n.d.). Hence, although television was 
introduced decades ago, the television market only became as competitive, 
diversified and widespread in 1990s European post-communist countries as it was 
in the 1970s in some established Western democracies. Consequently, it might be 
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speculated that the rise of television in young post-communist democracies could 
have influenced the personalisation of political communication in similar ways as it 
may have impacted political communication actors during its rise in established 
Western democracies several decades ago. In other words, the rise of television 
during transitional period might have influenced the personalisation of political 
communication, most probably the increase in the persona-, and especially private 
persona-centred, reporting in other media outlets, politicians’ communication and 
voters’ behaviour.  
In short, the rise of television had the potential to increase persona-, and 
especially private persona-centred media reporting, in the context of established 
Western democracies. It is also suggested that it might contribute to increased 
persona-centred communication of political actors and voters. The same 
speculations might be said of the impact of television in young post-communist 
democracies which underwent similar changes with regard to the development of 
television as established Western ones, but several decades later. However, the 
potential of television to contribute to above mentioned processes in a European 
communist society remains ambiguous, mainly because of the political control over 
the media and not fully developed broadcast market, which might have hindered the 
potential of television to influence personalisation of political communication.  
 
4.3. Commercialization and tabloidization of media systems 
 
In spite of television’s “natural” focus on individuals and their personas, Hallin 
and Mancini's (2004) analysis of Western media systems showed that 
personalisation of political communication is common to commercial media in 
general, and not only television. The rise of commercial media is considered to be 
particularly able to contribute to the increase of persona-centred political 
communication, more specifically on the visibility of information from politicians’ 
private spheres (Holtz-Bacha, 2004; Kuhn, 2004; Roncarolo, 2004; Sanders & 
Canel, 2004). Commercialization, or deregulation of the media market, has led to 
the multiplication of media outlets which consequently meant that there is more 
media space to fill with new content. Given that the variety of choices offered to the 
audience led to its fragmentation, that the media market in some countries became 
highly competitive, and that the primary goal of these new commercial media was to 
make money (Curran et al., 2009), media outlets in this new environment needed to 
attract advertisers, primarily by attracting their target audiences. To attract the 
audience and consequently the advertisers, media broadened the scope of political 
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topics it covered and changed the style of reporting politics (Kuhn, 2004; U. Rao, 
2008).  
With regard to the thematic transformation, coverage of politics was mainly 
broadened by topics connected to post-materialist interests, such as environmental 
issues, life-style choices or consumer rights. This seems a logical development 
given that politics itself in the past decades broadened its scope to include these 
post-materialist interests which increasingly matter to voters (Verstraeten, 2004). In 
addition, a topic of political reporting increasingly became the personae of 
politicians, specifically the information about their private sphere, which is closely 
related to the second transformation, the change in the style of reporting politics. As 
Stanyer and Wring (2004) noticed, media adopted a style of reporting politics that 
increasingly became connected with entertainment. Reporting became 
sensationalist and dramatized, in order to become more “interesting, engaging and 
reader friendly” (Rao, 2008: 3).  
This new presentational style in reporting politics led to the penetration of 
political information in entertainment forms (e.g. Barack Obama appearing on the 
Oprah Show) and to the penetration of entertainment information in traditionally 
informative forms (e.g. a story about a dog that skis in the news) (Brants, 1998). The 
connection between entertainment/popular culture and political discourse can be 
seen as an extension of trends already triggered by the rise of electronic media and 
politicians’ “new eloquence”. The intimacy which television created between the 
viewers and the leaders made reporting politicians’ private sphere more acceptable, 
not only for television, but also for other media. Politicians who acted according to 
this new communication environment reinforced the logic of using elements from 
private sphere in public discourse and their private sphere consequently became 
“fair game” for the media (Esser, 1999; Meyrowitz, 1985; Seaton, 2003). For 
example, the British Sunday Times in 1992 “argued that the publication of stories 
about politicians’ private lives was a legitimate matter to bring into the public 
domain, especially in an age when politicians are eager to promote their ‘happy 
family’ image to curry favour with voters” (Esser, 1999: 314). However, as Seaton 
(2003: 181) points out, one of the main reasons why commercial media are 
interested in reporting politicians’ private spheres lies in the fact that “private 
misdemeanors make better stories than politics”. In other words, given the intense 
competition on the market, media outlets need to provide the audience with 
interesting and attention-grabbing news to attract them and in this sense shocking 
and sensational news about politicians private lives are better “sellers” than 
complicated and abstract political news (ibid.).   
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These kinds of infotainment stories are most common to the tabloid press 
and commercial television (Stanyer & Wring, 2004). In other words, it is suggested 
that the private persona-centred reporting has better grounds of developing in a 
country with a strong tabloid sector. There is some evidence of this. Stanyer (2013) 
used fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to investigate whether the strength 
of a tabloid sector is connected with higher exposure of politicians’ private lives in 
the media. He found that in the US and the UK strong tabloid sectors are connected 
to the higher degree of mediatization of politicians’ private lives, but also that in 
some countries, such as France, politicians private lives can be quite media visible 
even without a strong tabloid sector.  
The importance of a strong tabloid sector for the private persona-centred 
media reporting goes beyond the fact that tabloids would be more willing to publish 
stories about politicians’ private personae. As Stanyer (ibid., 66) claims: “the tabloid 
media normalize the focus on personal lives of those in the public eye, it becomes 
mainstream, a taken-for-granted part of reporting for the whole system”. Hence, a 
strong tabloid sector may lead to a process of tabloidization of the media system, 
meaning that even the quality press and public television may start reporting 
politicians’ private issues as a reaction to the changes happening on the media 
market. Schulz and Zeh (2005) report that German public television followed trends 
in the programming of commercial television stations whose news were 
characterized by drama, negativity, sensationalism and personalisation. Given that 
the audience showed a preference for this kind of news, public television needed to 
adapt its programming to attract viewers (ibid.). Kriesi (2010) writes about a similar 
development in Swedish newspapers. There was an apparent shift towards more 
dramatization in the ways in which the leaders are portrayed in the quality press, 
which can be seen as an adoption of trends characteristic of the tabloid press, in an 
attempt by the quality press to boost their circulations. Tabloidization of news 
content was used as a successful method of increasing circulation in the case of 
British quality papers as well, but it is not a strategy that works in every context. In 
the German case, research showed that papers which decided to “go tabloid” did 
not increase their circulation, arguably because of the reading preferences of a 
German public which values hard news, such as business news and political 
commentary (Esser, 1999).  
Although most Western countries had deregulated their media markets by 
the end of 20th century, these trends (tabloidization, infotainment, emphasis on 
politicians’ private spheres) are not equally developed in all of them. As Street 
(2011: 75) noted: “It may be true that the mass media are obsessively interested in 
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the minutiae of campaign tactics, or in the private lives of political leaders, but this is 
not some sort of universal media fact. It is the product of a system of news reporting, 
itself shaped by commercial, political, professional and other factors.“  
In short, it is suggested that the media focus more on individual political 
actors, and their political and private life and qualities, in media systems 
characterized by a high degree of commercialization. In addition, in these 
commercialized systems in which tabloid media is strong, the media might be more 
willing to report politicians’ private personae, but it is also common that politicians 
communicate information about their private personae in order to appear 
newsworthy and attract media attention. Hence, increase in all dimensions of 
personalisation in media reporting, and also private-persona centred politicians’ 
communication, is seen as connected with the commercialization of media market. 
Furthermore, strong tabloid sector may be associated with a private persona-
centred media reporting and leaders’ communication.  
 
4.3.1. Communism: Politically allowed entertainment 
 The possible influence of entertainment programming on the personalisation 
of political communication in communist systems is, similar to that of television, 
rather ambiguous. Stronger emphasis on politicians’ private persona, especially 
private misdemeanors, was in the context of Western democracies discussed with 
relation to the rise of the tabloid media and the competitive market. It was argued 
that, in the media systems characterized by an intense market competition, the 
media started putting more emphasis on entertainment content and changed the 
ways of reporting politics in order to attract audiences and advertisers. However, the 
link between the commercial media operating in an intense market and 
entertainment-oriented programming can not be easily found in the communist 
systems. There were no commercial media in communist countries, but rather all the 
media were state- or publicly-owned (Mihelj, 2011; Oates, 2012; Tworzecki, 2012). It 
is also frequently claimed that communist media programming was heavily focused 
on political and educational content, while more entertainment programming was 
allowed only from the 1980s when most of the communist societies started their 
liberalization processes (e.g. Coman, 2000; Dunnett, 1990; Gulyas, 1998, 2003). A 
known exception to this was Yugoslavia whose audience had been receiving a 
significant amount of entertainment content since the 1950s, when media started 
being financed through subscriptions and license fees, instead of state subsidies. 
This caused media to revise their programming in order to attract more audiences 
(Robinson, 1977). As Mihelj (2011: 518) writes of Yugoslavia, “both leisure and 
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entertainment were considered legitimate and necessary”. There is, however, 
evidence that entertainment programming was not unusual even in other European 
communist countries. Oates (2012: 462), for example, maintains that “within the 
constraints of the Soviet system, entertainment and high professional standards of 
cinema still could flourish, as Soviet citizens enjoyed classic films, games shows, 
sports, and professional news productions that were careful to showcase the best 
aspects of the Soviet system.” Similarly, in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and East 
Germany, the audience was not only able to watch programming of Western 
neighbours, but a significant amount of programming on the domestic communist 
television was imported Western content, especially in the form of movies (Mihelj, 
2011; Tworzecki, 2012).  
Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that the entertainment-based content 
had its limitations, which might be seen as especially relevant with regard to its 
possible influence on the increase in personalisation of political communication. 
Entertainment programming was allowed as long as it was reinforcing the state’s 
ideology and values and not harming the party or the members of the political elite 
(Mihelj, 2011; Oates, 2012). It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that communist media 
would pursue scandalous persona-centred reporting, which is sometimes the case 
with Western entertainment media. However, in countries such as Yugoslavia, and 
perhaps Poland and Hungary, where there was an audience accustomed to 
receiving “tabloid-style coverage” of popular culture, characterized by the focus on 
celebrities’ private lives (Mihelj, 2011), both the political elite and the media might 
have been more inclined to sometimes use this kind of communication to their 
advantage. On the one hand, communist politicians sometimes engaged with 
popular culture to “boost their standing abroad and attract popular support at home” 
(Mihelj, 2011: 326), just as their colleagues in the West. For example, Yugoslav 
leader Tito’s relationships with famous Hollywood stars were frequently reported in 
the media. It was reported that Hollywood stars expressed “admiration for Tito’s 
personality” when they met him in Los Angeles. Richard Burton’s comments about 
Tito’s heroism were mentioned etc. (ibid.). On the other hand, the media was 
apparently willing to pursue stories about a leader’s private life, to the extent 
approved by the political elite, in order to sell more papers or attract a larger 
audience (Apor, 2004). Even though these examples show that this kind of persona-
centred reporting was not completely absent from some communist systems, it is 
still unclear as to whether it was a normal feature of communist political 
communication, or only practiced occasionally and in special circumstances.  
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In short, it might be supposed that in those communist media systems in 
which the media at least to an extent relied on advertisers and the audience for its 
funding, the spread of entertainment-based content might have been connected to 
the increase in the personalisation in media reporting and leaders’ communication, 
just as in Western countries.  
 
4.3.2. Post-communism: The curious case of tabloids 
With the introduction of democracy and the free-market, the state in the post-
communist era stopped funding most media, public television being the exception to 
the rule, and opened the market for private investors. Without state subsidies and 
with the tidal wave of new media outlets, media from the former system was forced 
to adapt their content in order to attract audiences, and arguably to start reporting in 
a more Westernized style, that in which news values are scandal, sensation, 
entertainment, public figures’ private lives etc. (Coman, 2000; Gulyas, 1998, 2003; 
Lauk, 2008). It is further argued that these trends were reinforced by the entrance of 
foreign, mostly West European investors into these new markets. Their primary goal 
was to make a profit so they invested almost exclusively in the tabloid sector which 
showed the biggest growth. Accordingly, they pursued aggressive commercial 
policies (Lauk, 2008). These changes were firstly manifested in the print since the 
state remained in control of public television and usually delayed with deregulation 
of television market. However, changes in news values and presentation styles on 
public television eventually followed in order not to lose its audience, especially after 
the commercial networks entered the market (Gross, 2004; Splichal, 2001).  
Hence, it might be expected that the deregulation of the media market that 
led to the commercialization of the post-communist media system could have 
contributed to a greater personalisation in media reporting, since the media were 
arguably, in their desire to attract audiences and make profit, pursuing person- and 
persona-centred reporting. If media reporting was already personalized in 
communism, then post-communist personalized reporting can be seen more as a 
continuation than a change in media reporting, although arguably the reasons why 
media personalized their reporting in post-communism might have been different. 
While it is suggested that media reported according to political logic in communism, 
the person- and persona-centred reporting in post-communism can be seen as a 
result of the media logic, be that triggered by modernization or “Americanization” 
processes. From a modernization perspective, the post-communist media 
personalized their reporting because they recognized that this type of reporting 
would attract audiences and advertisers in the increasingly competitive market 
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created by deregulation. Hence, the editors and journalists reacted to the changes in 
the media system by pursuing personalized reporting that would secure their 
media’s survival. From an “Americanization” perspective, the journalists and editors 
started imitating the Western style of reporting because it was considered a role 
model for successful media, or perhaps because foreign media owners transferred 
the reporting style from that practiced in their Western media outlets.  
Given the strong growth of tabloid sectors in post-communist countries, and 
the dominance of foreign ownership, it might be expected that post-communist 
politicians’ private personae were increasingly being put under the media spotlight, 
but this did not seem to happen. This was partly due to the reluctance of foreign 
media owners to interfere with the world of post-communist politics. Tabloid 
journalism in post-communist countries was seen as a way of participating in the 
media market without engaging in the possibly dangerous reporting of conflicting 
political powers (Splichal, 2001). This escape into entertainment in order to avoid 
confrontation with political powers was common to the media in Latin American 
military dictatorships as well (Voltmer, 2008). Hence, the growth of the tabloid sector 
might not be as connected to the rise of the private persona-centred reporting in 
post-communist countries as it is in established Western ones.  
In summary, the commercialization of media markets is said to be connected 
with the increase in the personalisation in media reporting in established 
democracies. In addition, in those systems also characterized by a strong tabloid 
sector it can be expected that both the media and political actors might be more 
willing to communicate information about politicians' private matters. 
Commercialization can be seen as having the same effect on personalisation in 
post-communist systems as well, although it can be speculated that the rise of 
tabloid sector does not significantly contribute to private persona-centred media 
reporting and politicians' communication because it is argued that that post-
communist tabloids are reluctant to engage with the world of politics. Finally, the 
potential influence of entertainment-based media in communist systems is rather 
ambiguous, although it might be speculated that it could have contributed to 
persona-centred media reporting and politicians' communication if the media relied 
on advertisers and audience for funding and politicians felt they need to engage in 
this kind of communication to boost their image.  
 
4.4. Journalistic culture 
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The final element that will be discussed in the context of the assumed mass 
media influence on the personalisation of political communication will be the 
country's journalistic culture. Several authors have emphasized the relevance of the 
journalistic culture for the personalisation phenomenon in established Western 
democracies, especially in relation to the media visibility of politician's private 
persona (Kuhn, 2007; Mavin et al.,  2010; Sabato, 1991; Sanders & Canel, 2004; 
Splichal & Garrison, 2000; Stanyer, 2012; Stanyer & Wring, 2004; Wasburn & 
Wasburn, 2011; Wojdynski & Riffe, 2011).  
 Stanyer and Wring (2004) distinguish between “laissez-faire” journalistic 
cultures and more “conservative” ones. In laissez-faire ones journalists may be seen 
as pursuing investigative, attack journalism, putting their “watchdog” role ahead of 
others. One of the main motivations for revealing, especially scandalous, information 
about politicians’ private lives is the exposure of politicians’ hypocrisy. The authors 
note that in these journalistic cultures “politicians’ private lives are seen by many 
journalists as fair game, especially where politicians have used their personal lives 
for publicity purposes” (ibid., 6). Furthermore, the intrusion into politicians’ privacy is 
often justified by public interest, or in other words, the right of the people to know. It 
is frequently argued by journalists and their editors that the public has the right to 
know about what kind of a person a politician is privately because it “allows the 
public to make judgments about politicians’ authenticity, trustworthiness and 
competence to govern” (ibid., p.6). Other studies have also shown that the US and 
the UK editors tend to decide on whether to publish a story about a politician’s 
private life based on the perceived link between the private information and a 
politician’s public persona (behaviour, actions, values, policies etc.). For example, 
one of the findings of the Garrison and Splichal (1994) study of US newspaper 
editors’ attitudes toward publishing information about politicians’ private lives was 
that editors are far more likely to publish a story about an extramarital affair if the 
politician promotes family values. Around one third of editors were willing to disclose 
it anyway, but with the hypocrisy element the percentage of editors willing to 
disclose this information rose to around 85%. Similarly, more than two thirds of 
editors were likely to report on the abortion of an anti-abortion politician. Almost 
identical results were found in the follow-up study conducted in 1999 (Splichal & 
Garrison, 2000).  
UK editors share their American colleagues’ tendency to base a decision on 
whether to publish a story on the connection between politician’s private and political 
persona. Stanyer (2012) ascribes the increase in the number of publicized cases of 
British politicians’ infidelity in the 1990s to the journalists’ reaction to the John 
 103
Major’s “back to basics” speech. According to Stanyer, the Prime Minister’s 
emphasis on the family values made British journalists more willing to reveal 
politicians’ sex scandals in order to expose their hypocrisy. However, it was a 
practice that existed even before the famous 1993 speech. In 1992 The Sunday 
Times argued that politicians’ private lives are “fair game” since the politicians 
themselves use them to gain political points (Esser, 1999).  
These examples show that the journalists and editors in this type of 
journalistic culture are to a lesser extent willing to simply publicize private 
information. They tend to politicize it, or in other words, connect the politicians’ 
private matters with his/her political role. This may be seen as an argument against 
the view that the focus on politicians’ private persona in the media necessarily leads 
to the trivialization of public discourse. Given that authenticity is one of the qualities 
voters value most in politicians (Finlayson, 2002; Kuhn, 2007), it seems relevant, 
and not trivial, that media provide information that reveals the real person hidden 
behind the image promoted to voters.  
Finally, it should also be noted that not all media outlets operating in the 
laissez-faire journalistic culture are equally willing to pursue a story about a 
politician’s private life. Stanyer (2012: 86) argues that broadcast news and the 
serious press are less likely to run these kinds of stories if there is no “strong public-
interest reason”, although this trend seems to be shifting. On the one hand, 
journalists in serious media apparently want to distance themselves from the tabloid-
like sensation pursuing journalists. But on the other hand, given the competition in 
the media market and the fact that in the UK and the US, the main representatives 
of the laissez-faire journalistic culture, reporting politicians’ private personas is 
normalized, even the serious media outlets nowadays feel the need to cover such 
stories once they emerge.  
On the other side of the continuum from the laissez-faire journalistic culture 
sits a “conservative” one. It is characterized by a deferential media and journalists 
reticent to report politicians’ private matters, “even if they are widely known about 
amongst the journalistic community” (Stanyer & Wring, 2004). Stanyer (2012: 83) 
argues that in countries such as Germany, France or Spain it is “ethically 
inappropriate amongst a large section of media professionals” to report politicians’ 
private matters. He sees this ethical consensus as a distinctive element of this 
journalistic culture and warns of the consequences of breaching, what was once 
called in the US a “gentlemen’s agreement” (Sabato, 1991). “Journalists who step 
outside this consensus and violate the codified norms surrounding exposure of 
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private lives may find themselves isolated within the press corps” (Stanyer, 2012: 
84). 
State controls and privacy laws offer only partial explanation of why this 
journalistic culture “appears less comfortable about intruding into politicians’ 
personal affairs” (Stanyer & Wring, 2004: 6). There is some evidence that, for 
example, in Germany and France, “attack” journalism was hindered due to close 
personal relationship between politicians and journalists, and a not very competitive 
media market. In a situation where the politician is a journalist’s friend and the media 
are not engaged in a fierce battle for audiences, there is a better chance that a 
politician’s private matters will remain private (Esser, 1999; Holtz-Bacha, 2004; 
Kuhn, 2004). However, this implies that a change in these elements might lead to a 
change in journalistic practices, as was noticed in France with the growth of 
competitiveness in the media market (Kuhn, 2007), and the weakening of ties in the 
2000s between German politicians and journalists (Holtz-Bacha, 2004).  
Analysis of Spanish media gives another reason for the low media profile of 
politicians’ private personas. According to Sanders and Canel (2004), Spanish 
media, unlike the US and the UK ones, do not consider hypocrisy a justification for 
revealing private information about politicians. They note that “there is no debate 
about whether private morality has a bearing on public morality. The question posed 
about Britain’s disgraced minister, David Mellor – if he lied to his wife, would he lie to 
the country? – simply does not arise for the Spanish media” (ibid., 207). Stanyer 
(2012) suggests this is the case in most continental European democracies.  
In sum, Western laissez-faire journalistic cultures are seen as those 
contributing to the persona-centred media reporting, with special emphasis on 
publicizing and politicizing politicians’ private lives. On the other hand, in those 
journalistic cultures that are more “conservative”, there is evidence that the media 
pays less attention to politicians’ private personae.  
 
4.4.1. Autonomous v. Deferential media  
While it is suggested that in established Western democracies it is the 
autonomous, non-deferential media that might tend to pursue a persona-centred 
communication and reveal details from politicians’ private sphere, I would argue that 
in communist and post-communist systems the deferential media can be seen as an 
important factor in these developments as well. Specifically, journalists in a 
deferential journalistic culture in communist and post-communist systems might put 
the focus on a leader and his/her political and/or private persona, if they are 
instructed to do so by the political elite that exerts influence over them.  
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Communist journalistic culture should be seen as highly deferential and 
dependent upon the instructions and decisions of the political elite, at least as far as 
reporting politics and political leaders is concerned. As was already stated, 
communist media systems varied according to the level of freedom they had in 
reporting news. However, even if the political elite gave the journalists more 
freedoms in reporting certain type of news, such as culture or sports, it remained in 
control over the presentation of home and foreign politics, the party and its 
members, especially the leader. State propaganda bodies usually made clear 
strategies of how the leader will be presented in the media. For instance, the 
Hungarian Politburo had clearly stated what articles popularising their leader Rakosi 
needed to look like. They needed to „include a picture of the leader in question, a 
short biography and a brief description of his current political activity“ (Apor, 2004: 
67). In other words, the descriptions and references to leader’s persona were mainly 
designed by the political elite, while the role of the media was mostly to implement 
this personalized media reporting and communicate the leader’s image as it was 
constructed by the political elite (Apor, 2004; Rees, 2004).  
With the introduction of democracy the political elite did not immediately let 
hold of the media. One of the common characteristics of the media freedom 
development at the beginning of the post-communist period were the attempts of the 
political elite in almost all countries to remain in control of the media, especially 
broadcast media. Gross (2003: 79) noted that “during the first five years of the post-
Communist era, the control and influence exercised by political parties, politicians, 
political systems, and politics on the news media, particularly television, was greater 
than on any other institutions”. Although Western, liberal media systems were set as 
role-models according to which post-communist media systems should be 
transformed (Gross, 2004; Lauk, 2009), the new more liberal media regulation often 
had loopholes that the ruling party was able to use to remain in control of the media 
(Splichal, 2001), and the implementation of new laws and regulations was in general 
deficient (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013; Lani, 2013).  
It is argued that the turbulent 1990s ended on a more positive note. Gross 
(2003, 2004) claims that by the end of the 1990s media started fighting for more 
independence and power, and political control over the media eventually weakened. 
However, some scholars emphasize that those media outlets that became more 
independent from political influences were mostly privately owned media (Gross, 
2004; Lašas, 2013; Wyka, 2006), often also in hands of foreign owners (Slavko 
Splichal, 2001). Hence, while it might be true that privately owned media has 
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become less susceptible to political influences, this may not have been the case 
with the state owned or public service media.  
What these developments point to is that the continuing political control over 
the media made journalists continue with their old practices of deferential attitudes 
towards the political elite, while investigative and attack journalism was largely 
absent from post-communist journalistic cultures. This continuous deferential 
attitude towards the elite meant that the media was unwilling to dig around and 
expose private information about politicians (Mihelj et al., 2009; Oates, 2012; 
Pfetsch & Voltmer, 2012; White & Mcallister, 2006), and that the journalists might 
have been putting the focus on leaders and their personae if that was in line with the 
desires of the (new) political elite, at least in the early post-communist period. 
However, with the rise of media’s freedom in the later transitional period, post-
communist journalistic culture might have became more autonomous and less 
deferential. It might be suggested that the journalists in this new autonomous 
journalistic culture were free to report in line with media logic, i.e. put the focus on 
the individual political actors and their personae. Again, from a modernization 
perspective, non-deferential media would pursue personalized reporting because it 
is in line with the needs and preferences of their audience, while “Americanization” 
approach would suggest that post-communist autonomous media reported in a 
personalized way because it adopted a reporting style from countries that were its 
role models – established Western democracies.  
In short, in communist and post-communist system both autonomous and 
deferential journalistic culture can be seen as contributing to the personalisation in 
media reporting, albeit for different reasons. In addition, political actors that were 
once able to influence the extent to which and ways in which they were represented 
in the media, might have needed to adapt their communication practices with the 
rise of autonomous media. For example, politicians might have become more 
inclined to put more focus on themselves than their parties in order to be more in 
line with media logic and in that way be newsworthy and get into the news. 
 
4.4.2. Hypocracy v. Kompromat 
The second important difference between established Western democracies 
and communist and post-communist journalistic cultures is related to speculations 
about motivations that the media have for disclosing information about politicians’ 
political, and especially private, personae. It was argued that in Western 
democracies, such as the UK and the US, the most common argument for 
disclosing this kind of information is the right of the public to know what kind of 
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people their leaders are, especially if the mediated information reveals their 
hypocrisy. In the context of communist media it was suggested that the media 
served as a tool for the implementation of the leader's image as it was created by 
the political elite. Hence, in communist systems it can be supposed that the media 
published information about leader's persona primarily because they were instructed 
to do so.  
The leadership cult literature suggests that there was plenty of mediated 
information about the leader’s life-style, education, social background, upbringing, 
family and so on, which would in the Western view be information connected with 
one’s private sphere (Langer, 2011; Van Aelst et al., 2011). However, it seems that 
this information was mainly politicized or presented in a completely political context. 
Given that communist leaders were meant to impersonate society’s values and 
desirable behaviour, most references to their qualities and lives were connected with 
communist history and ideology, since the ideal person was expected to be “totally 
dedicated to the idea of communism” (Apor, 2004: 77). As an illustration, Davies 
(2004) reports that Stalin was reluctant to allow the publication of articles which 
were focused on him as an individual or true stories from his private life, such as 
those about his children or his own childhood. However, he found it acceptable, 
even desirable, to present his qualities and life stories (real or constructed) as a 
“personification of the cause” (ibid., 77). Hence, it seems as though it was 
acceptable to publish information from leader’s private sphere, or invent it, as long 
as the information was presented in a political context and served in a function of 
legitimizing the order or educating and socializing the public. This practice was 
especially evident in leaders’ biographies. Apor (2004) and Davies (2004) argue that 
the presentation of leader’s life and qualities as personalized narrative of society’s 
history and values led to production of a largely impersonal image of a leader who 
was stripped of any private features. Hence, non-exposure of the communist 
leader’s private persona should not be seen as a consequence of some kind of 
“gentleman’s agreement” between journalists and politicians such as once existed in 
some Western countries. Rather, journalists did not have an actual choice of 
whether to report private information about the leader or not. In other words, it would 
be very surprising if communist journalists were able to justify the exposure of 
politicians’ private matters with the hypocrisy factor given that the political elite 
controlled political content in the media and could have easily stopped the mediation 
of undesirable information.  
Although it might be expected that it was the political elite that pushed leader 
stories into the media, it seems as though journalists themselves were sometimes 
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competing over who would portray the leader in a more glorious way. Davies (2004: 
40) reports how Stalin himself tuned down some of the reports which exaggerated 
his adulation by, for example, eliminating from the report the sentence “great was 
the joy of the people who had the happiness of seeing their own Stalin”. Similarly, 
one of many Rakosi’s biographies, which exaggerated his qualities, stating among 
other things that he was in his youth “a handsome young Hungarian lad with sleek 
black hair who made the girls’ hearts beat whenever he danced”, was not allowed to 
be published (Apor, 2004). On the one hand, these glorifications might have been a 
reflection of writers’ true admiration for the leader. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that for some writers building a leader’s cult was more of a career choice 
than an expression of true devotion. Those who were not participating in the 
glorification of the leader were in jeopardy of being called enemies of the state, while 
participation usually ensured authors with public prestige, access to political elites, 
material benefits etc (Sretenovic & Puto, 2004; von Klimo, 2004). In other words, 
writing favorably about the leader seemed a very rewarding job. Hence, even if the 
journalists pursued personalized reporting due to their own interests, they can still 
be seen as practicing this reporting style because they considered it to be in line 
with the reporting approved by the communist political elite.   
Similarly, it is argued that in post-communist systems the media discloses 
information about politicians’ personae because they are instructed to do so or paid 
to do so by members of the political elite. In other words, analyses of the 
relationships between the journalists and politicians point to the fact that the post-
communist “media are complicit in the informal clientelistic exchanges” (Örnebring, 
2012: 509).  
Specifically, the practice of media publication of “kompromat”, compromising 
material about a politician, paid and ordered by their political opponents, is one of 
the most prominent elements of post-communist journalistic culture (Ledeneva, 
2006; Oates, 2012; Örnebring, 2012; Pfetsch & Voltmer, 2012). It has a direct 
influence on the increase in the personalisation of media reporting, given that the 
compromising material is often related to a politician’s persona, especially his/her 
private life. Ledeneva (2006) claims that kompromat is often related to a politician’s 
spending habits, sexual orientation and behaviour, cultural and religious practices, 
health, age, family life etc. The mediation of negative information about a politician’s 
persona is sometimes used as a weapon for destroying opponent’s image in 
elections, but it can also be used in elite-to-elite communication. Örnebring (2012: 
509) suggests that kompromat techniques are a constant feature of post-communist 
political communication since they are regularly used with an aim of “promotion 
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within the network hierarchy”, for “ensuring the appointment of clientelistic allies to 
key positions”, and for “ensuring preferential treatment for allied companies”.  
This practice of publishing negative information about a politician’s persona 
differs in several ways from the exposure of scandalous information about a 
politician in established Western countries. Firstly, in these democracies the 
revelation of scandalous information is sometimes leaked to journalists, but 
sometimes it is also the product of investigative journalism. In post-communist 
countries, especially in the early transitional period, journalists were publishing 
kompromat after it was leaked to them, or they were paid for publishing it. 
Investigative journalism was, and in most post-communist countries still is, very 
fragile. Secondly, Western editors often claim that they publish scandalous 
information because it is in public interest (Sabato, 1991; Splichal & Garrison, 2000; 
Stanyer, 2012). Ledeneva (2006) cautions that the publication of kompromat should 
not be seen as reporting in the public interest given that journalists’ are publishing it 
to support their patrons or because they get paid for doing so. Thirdly, Western 
editors tend to emphasize that they run scandalous stories mostly if they can be 
proven to be true (Stanyer, 2013), while the truth seems completely irrelevant when 
publicizing kompromat. It is considered that the compromising material mediated in 
post-communist countries is “sometimes loosely based on fact but often simply 
fabricated” (Oates, 2012: 466). Finally, while the increase in the amount of mediated 
scandalous information about politicians’ private persona is in Western democracies 
partly connected with the rise of autonomous, investigative journalism and tabloid 
media, in post-communist countries the publication of kompromat is usually seen as 
a continuation of “practices of informal politics tried and tested by the previous 
regime” (Ledeneva, 2006: 88). In other words, it is argued that the political elite even 
in the post-communist period tends to see the media in similar ways to their 
communist predecessors – as an instrument of control and an attribute of political 
power (Mihelj et al., 2009; Oates, 2012; Tworzecki, 2012), and that media’s attitudes 
towards the political elite have not significantly changed from communist days.  
In short, journalists' motivations to report leaders' personae in communist 
and post-communist systems seem to differ from those in established Western 
democracies. Specifically, in communist and post-communist systems the media 
discloses information about politicians’ personae because they are instructed to do 
so or paid to do so by members of the political elite. Also, this information is often 
false or manufactured, and hence, does not aim to informing the public, but rather 
for discreditation of political opponents.  
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4.5. Personalisation in media reporting  
 
 The final media-related factor has the potential to influence the 
personalisation of political communication is personalized media reporting. This 
chapter has until now focused on the media-related factors that are most frequently 
seen as contributing to personalisation in media reporting, political actors’ behaviour 
and voters’ behaviour. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter with 
relation to the influence of personalized voting and personalized political actors’ 
behaviour, personalized media reporting can also be seen not only as an outcome 
of various processes, but also as a factor influencing them. This chapter ends with 
the examination of the ways in which personalized media reporting may contribute 
to the personalisation in two other political communication actors, i.e. political actors 
and voters.  
 As was already briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, the media is considered to 
have a significant impact on how politicians behave and communicate. Various 
theories have been designed to account for the changes in political actors’ 
behaviour that are said to have been triggered by the media, such as colonization of 
politics, media democracy (Meyer, 2002), mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999; Stromback, 2008) etc. At the centre of all these theories is the idea 
that the political actors adapted their behaviour and communication in line with 
media logic, i.e. its news values and presentation style, in order to more effectively 
communicate not only with media actors, but also with voters/audiences that 
became accustomed to receiving information in a media designed way. In other 
words, it is argued that the politicians adapted to media logic, or even adopted it, i.e. 
internalized it, in order to get into the news and be able to communicate information 
to voters in a way they understand best (Stromback, 2008). Given that 
personalisation, manifested in a focus on individuals and their personae, is 
considered to be one of the most important elements of media logic (Kriesi, 2011; 
Mazzoleni, 1987; Stromback, 2008; Takens et al., 2013), politicians may have 
started pursuing personalized communication partly because the media was 
reporting in a personalized way. Specifically, it is suggested that politicians started 
putting the focus on themselves rather than their parties because the media have 
put them under the spotlight (Stromback, 2008). Similarly, it is argued that that 
politicians started disclosing more information about their personae, especially 
private one, because the media imposed this kind of communication and made it 
part of the regular discourse (Jamieson, 1988; Meyrowitz, 1985). Hence, 
personalized media reporting is considered to be able to significantly contribute to 
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the personalisation in political actors’ behaviour by changing the ways in which 
politicians communicate and the type of information they share.  
In spite of these strong claims, there is little empirical evidence that the 
politicians’ communication has become more personalized over time, or that 
personalized media reporting is what caused the change. Maier and Adam (2010) in 
their state of the field analysis found only a few studies which looked into the 
changes in the extent to which political actors have put the focus on individuals and 
their personae in their communication, and established that only rare analyses 
showed a trend towards a more person-centred politicians’ communication in 
established Western democracies. However, the fact that they were triggered or 
caused by the personalized media reporting remains a speculation.  
With regard to the possible influence of personalized media reporting on 
personalisation in voters’ behaviour, there is again little empirical evidence that the 
two are causally connected; although it is feared by critics of personalized reporting 
that they might be, as was already mentioned in Chapter 2. Specifically, it is 
suggested that the media’s focus on individual political actors instead on institutions 
and issues might motivate voters to understand politics as a struggle of power-
seeking individuals, what might make parties and political institutions less powerful 
and significant in the political processes (Karvonen, 2010). In addition, the persona-
centred media reporting, especially the focus on politicians’ private personae, is by 
some scholars seen as distracting voters from important political issues and 
providing them with trivial and politically irrelevant information based on which they 
might be inclined to reach their electoral decision (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; 
Garzia, 2011). Hence, personalized media reporting is considered to be able to 
motivate voters to understand politics in a personalized way, and perhaps even 
contribute to them making voting decisions based on the evaluations of politicians’ 
personae. These are again mainly speculations, since there is little empirical 
evidence that would support any of these claims. 
 
4.5.1. (Post)communism: The dominance of political influences? 
 While in established Western democracies it is widely held that the media 
can impose its logic upon political actors, the same can not be claimed for the 
former European communist countries. In this context it is more frequently argued 
that it is not political actors that had to adapt to media logic, but rather that media 
had to adapt to political logic given the control that the political elite exercised over 
the media (Coban, 2013). Hence, in a communist context it seems much less likely 
that personalized media reporting has contributed significantly to the personalisation 
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in political actors’ behaviour. On the contrary, as was already mentioned, it is 
suggested that communist media’s reporting style and content were determined by 
political actors (Apor et al., 2004; Coban, 2013; Lauk, 2008), so even if political 
actors communicated in a similar way to media, this would not mean that they 
adapted to media logic.  
 The same may be true for the early post-communist period in which the 
political elite tried to remain in control over media (Gross, 2003, 2004; Splichal, 
2001). However, with the deregulation of the media system and the rise of media’s 
autonomy, it might be speculated that the more autonomous media started reporting 
according to its own logic. Once the media reached this, as Stromback (2008) calls 
it, second phase of mediatization, in which it became mostly free from political 
influences and started following media, rather than political logic, it could be 
expected that the political actors started paying more attention to media logic as 
well. In other words, it can be speculated that the more freedom media gained in the 
post-communist period, it pursued more personalized reporting which is in line with 
media logic, and consequently, might have, as in established Western democracies, 
contributed to the changes in political actors’ communication. Kunac and Lalić's 
(2005) comparison of 1995 and 2003 political campaigns for Croatian Parliament 
provides some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Authors claim that one of the 
main differences of campaigns led in the early post-communist period (1995) and 
the consolidation period (2003) is the fact that the political actors have in the 
consolidated period started significantly adapting to media logic. Specifically, 
compared to the 1995 campaign, political parties have designed their campaigns 
and promotional materials to be more newsworthy and in line with the ways in which 
audiences became accustomed to receiving information. Apparently, personalizing 
campaigns by presenting party leaders as personifications of parties and their 
values was one of these techniques by which political parties adapted to media logic 
(ibid., p. 111).  
In addition, unlike with the case of the personalized media reporting 
influence on political actors’ behaviour, it seems that the personalized media 
reporting can be speculated to have had similar influence on voters’ behaviour in 
established democracies, communist systems and post-communist ones. In other 
words, in communist and post-communist systems personalized media reporting 
can also be seen as potentially contributing to voters’ focus on individuals and their 
personae, although it remains unclear how important was and is this influence.  
 In short, personalisation of media reporting is in the context of established 
Western democracies seen as able to contribute to the personalisation in political 
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actors’ and voters’ behaviour, although the empirical evidence on the topic is scarce 
at best. On the other hand, in communism and some periods of post-communism, 
personalized media reporting might not have been able to influence political actors’ 
behaviour because arguably media were following political logic, and not the other 
way around. However, with the rise in media’s independence from political 
influences, the post-communist media can be speculated of having similar 
influences on political actors as is the case in the West. 
  
4.6. Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to examine the most frequently discussed 
media-related factors that are speculated to have the potential to influence 
personalisation of political communication. As in the previous chapter, alongside 
those media-related factors that are commonly mentioned in the context of 
established Western democracies, this chapter also looked at other, not yet 
acknowledged, communist and post-communist context-specific media-related 
factors that could have contributed to personalisation of political communication in 
these systems. By examining media-related elements of these three systems, the 
intention was to establish why these contexts might be considered as favourable for 
the development of personalized political communication, and to create hypotheses 
of how and why this phenomenon may have developed cross-culturally.  
 In the first place, the discussion showed that there might be significant 
similarities between the media-related factors that may contribute to personalisation 
in established Western and consolidated post-communist democracies. Specifically, 
the trends related to the rise of television, commercialization of media system, or the 
influence that the personalized media reporting might have on personalisation 
related to other political communication actors, seem to have the similar potential to 
contribute to personalisation of political communication in the established and 
consolidated new democracies. However, these trends developed in post-
communist democracies decades after some established Western democracies 
have experienced them.  
 Also, there seem to be significant differences between the communist 
system on the one side and established and consolidated post-communist 
democracies on the other side. Illustratively, communist reporting is argued to have 
been led by political logic, while that in established democracies is said to be led by 
media logic, and perhaps that in new post-communist democracies as well. 
Similarly, the influence that the personalized media reporting has over the political 
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actors’ behaviour also seems different. It was suggested that personalized media 
reporting did not have a great potential to influence personalisation in communist 
politicians’ communication since political elite was controlling the media and 
imposing reporting styles. On the other hand, it is frequently suggested in the 
context of Western democracies that personalized reporting can contribute to 
personalisation in politicians’ communication, and the same can seen to be 
happening in post-communist democracies once the media started gaining 
independence.   
However, it was argued that there are at least two main differences between 
the media-related influences on the personalisation in Western and (post)communist 
systems. One is related to the influence of journalistic culture and it was suggested 
that unlike in Western systems where autonomous, non-deferential media are those 
that might tend to pursue a person-centred communication and reveal details from 
politicians’ private sphere, in communist and post-communist systems the 
deferential media can be an important factor in these developments as well. It was 
suggested that deferential media in communist and post-communist systems might 
put the focus on a leader and his/her political and/or private persona, if they are 
instructed to do so by the political elite that exerts influence over them. Hence, in 
communist and post-communist system both autonomous and deferential 
journalistic culture can be seen as potentially contributing to the same degree of 
personalized political communication. The second difference is related to 
speculations about motivations that the media have for disclosing information about 
politicians’ political, and especially private, personae. In Western democracies, such 
as the UK and the US, the most common argument for disclosing this kind of 
information is the right of the public to know what kind of people their leaders are, 
especially if the mediated information reveals their hypocrisy. On the other hand, it is 
argued that in communist and post-communist systems the media discloses 
information about politicians’ personae because they are instructed to do so or paid 
to do so by members of the political elite. Also, this information is often false or 
manufactured, and hence, does not aim to informing the public, but rather for 
discreditation of political opponents.  
Finally, the discussions presented in this chapter also revealed that certain 
media-related factors seem better able to influence some, rather than all dimensions 
of personalisation. While factors such as commercialization of media system, or in 
the case of (post)communist societies, the nature of journalistic culture (i.e. 
deferential or autonomous), might be seen as potentially contributing to both person- 
and persona-centred political communication, other media-related factors seem 
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particularly connected to  specific dimensions. For instance, it was suggested that 
the rise of television might be particularly connected to the rise of persona-, and 
especially private persona-centred communication, given the personal nature of 
information that the television discloses. Also, the rise of the tabloid sector is seen 
as potentially contributing to the increase in the private persona-centred 
communication, and not so much to person-centred communication.  
Past two chapters have shown that there are plenty of assumptions and 
speculations about what makes Western, communist and post-communist contexts 
conducive to personalized political communication. However, there is little, if any, 
evidence that political communication was or is personalized in these contexts, let 
alone which factors contributed to it most, in the communist and post-communist 
societies. It can be hypothesized based on the examined literature that mediated 
political communication in communism was personalized to a high degree, 
particularly due to these systems’ institutional settings, political elite’s aims and 
practices, high degree of authoritarianism, low educational levels, and deferential 
journalistic culture. Furthermore, it can also be hypothesized that this personalized 
mediated political communication continued in the early post-communist system, 
primarily where the institutional settings were designed to concentrate power, 
parties were organized around charismatic personalities, television reach grew 
substantially, media systems were deregulated, and the journalists participated in 
kompromat battles by publishing compromising personal information about 
politicians.  
Literature review presented in the past two chapters seems to have opened 
more questions than it answered, and the empirical analyses in the next four 
chapters will aim to give answers to these open questions about how and why 
personalisation of mediated political communication developed in communist and 
post-communist societies. Specifically, the empirical analyses will try to give 
answers to following questions: 
Was the preferred reporting style in communism structural or personalized?  
How, if at all, did it change during the transitional period?  
To what extent did media and political actors personalize their 
communication in the transition from communism to post-communism?  
How, if at all, did their communication practices change?  
Did the personalisation in media reporting have any influence on 
personalisation in politicians' mediated communication, or were it the politicians who 
set trends?  
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Did the relationship between these two political communication actors 
change during the transitional process?  
How can the extent to which the media and political actors have personalized 
their communication be explained?  
Were politically-related factors more important than media-related ones?  
Did the most important factors contributing to personalisation of mediated 
political communication change during the transition?  
And finally, which theory is best suited to explain how the personalisation of 
mediated political communication developed in communist and post-communist 
societies – modernization, „americanization“, or perhaps continuation?  
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5. Personalisation in media reporting 
 
This first empirical chapter addresses the issue of personalisation in media 
reporting. More specifically, the main aim of this chapter is to explore the degrees of 
Yugoslav and Croatian political leaders’ visibility in the national press and the ways 
in which their personae have been presented to the public over time. Consequently, 
the main question that this chapter is designed to answer is: Which continuities and 
changes can be observed with regard to the ways in which leadership was 
personalized in communist and post-communist media reporting?  
After the methodology and research design are presented in the first section 
of this chapter, the subsequent section reports on the analysis of person-centred 
media reporting. This part of the chapter aims to explore whether the leaders were 
represented in the media as the communist leader’s cult narratives suggest, and did 
post-communist media reporting revolve around individuals as much as some 
theories suggest? In addition, the leaders’ prominence and the importance that the 
media accords them by reporting them are examined in relation to the visibility of 
their parties, in order to get a better understanding of the place that individual and 
collective political actors had in communist and post-communist political 
communication. The relevance of this information was discussed in Chapter 2 when 
the possible effects of person-centred media reporting were examined in the 
communist and post-communist context. In short, one of the most important effects 
that the media focus on individual political actors in these systems might have is 
inhibiting the development of strong institutions in the society. Institutions may be 
weakened since the media by this kind of reporting can create the image of 
individuals more powerful than the institutions they head. Since post-communist 
systems are considered to be characterized by weak institutions controlled by 
individuals (Schöpflin, 1993), uninstitutionalized party systems dominated by 
charismatic leaders (King, 2002; Lewis, 2000), and high levels of public distrust in 
political bodies (Mishler & Rose, 1997), person-centred media reporting might show 
to audiences who are the real power holders in the country, but might also lock the 
institutions in the cycle of irrelevance. In addition, these processes might make it 
easier for individual political actors to abuse power and have the potential to inhibit 
the transition to democracy.  
The analysis of persona-centred media reporting is presented in the last part 
of the chapter. The specific aim of this is to explore the ways in which a leader’s 
media image is created by references to his/her persona. The findings from this 
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analysis are important for getting a more accurate account of the role of media in the 
development of political communication in the examined systems. It was claimed in 
Chapter 2 that the focus on a leader’s persona in media reporting might lead to the 
promotion of the politics of image rather than substance, that this kind of information 
might distract the public from what some consider more important political issues 
(Franklin, 2004), that it may provide voters with manufactured and deceitful 
information about leaders on which to base their electoral decisions (Meyer, 2002), 
that a long-term simplification of political issues by presenting them through a 
persona of the leader can inhibit the development of critical thinking among 
members of the public etc. Hence, this part of the chapter will analyze the ways in 
which the media report a leader’s persona and try to establish whether there are any 
grounds for worrying about the effects of such reporting. In other words, if the media 
did not put a significant focus on leaders’ personae, especially private personae, 
there may not be reasons to worry about the trivialisation and simplification of 
political communication.   
 
5.1.  Methodology 
 
Given that the main aim of this analysis is to determine the extent to which 
media reporting is person- and persona-centred, quantitative content analysis was a 
logical choice since it is the method most suited to detecting the frequency of 
references to certain content and identifying recurrent patterns (Berger, 2011; 
Deacon, 2007). A more qualitative approach, such as discourse analysis, was 
considered in order to get a more nuanced understanding of the context in which 
leaders’ personae were mentioned. However, I decided against this, since discourse 
analysis is a tool better suited for revealing underlying motives and ideologies 
(Hesmondalgh, 2006; Smith & Bell, 2007), which was not within the scope of this 
analysis. Also, given that the aim of this analysis was to determine trends over time 
in the leaders’ media visibility, it was important to use a method which would allow 
certain generalizations from the data. Qualitative methods are not suited to making 
generalizations, while content analysis is considered to be the best quantitative 
textual method that allows for generalized conclusions (Berger, 2011; Hesmondalgh, 
2006). In addition, two pilot studies carried out on a sample of British and Croatian 
newspapers confirmed that the context in which the references to persona have 
been made and their nuanced study can be analysed with the content analysis 
method. Furthermore, studies looking to establish the extent to which media focuses 
on individual political actors usually employ content analysis (e.g. Bjerling, 2012; 
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Grbeša, 2008; Langer, 2011; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007; Reinemann & Wilke, 2007; 
Wilke & Reinemann, 2001), so it will be easier to compare the findings from this 
study with that from other countries by gathering the data through content analysis.  
It should also be noted that the findings from this study are based on the 
manifest meaning of media text, since content analysis is not well suited to the 
analysis of latent, hidden meanings (Hesmondalgh, 2006). In addition, given that 
content analysis is limited to providing descriptive information about media texts, this 
study will not be able to reveal why the media reported in a particular way, i.e. reveal 
their intentions, nor how the audiences received the messages from the media  
(Berger, 2011) 
 The analysis covers a time frame from 1974 to 2013, providing data for all 
Yugoslav and Croatian political leaders who had executive power and stayed in 
office for more than three years. In total, the analysis includes four Presidents and 
six Prime Ministers. Croatia had a semi-presidential political system in the 1990s 
which means that executive power was divided between the President and the 
Prime Minister (Ilišin, 2001). Since 2000, Croatia has had a parliamentary political 
system and according to the Constitution the head executive is the Prime Minister. 
However, the President kept some of the executive powers, such as the right to co-
create foreign policy, appoint ambassadors, command army etc. (ibid.), and also,  
Presidents are considered the most influential and popular political figures in the 
society (Baylis, 2007). Therefore, I decided to look at both the semi-presidential and 
parliamentary system in Croatia as having “dual leaderships” in which there are 
differing levels of power between Presidents and Prime Ministers. In a semi-
presidential system the President can be seen as having more power, but the Prime 
Minister is also a powerful executive figure. In a parliamentary system more formal 
power is given to the Prime Minister, but the President is still an important part of the 
executive. In short, given that both Presidents and Prime Ministers can be seen as 
having executive power, I decided to include them both in the analysis. 
 
5.1.1. Material 
The main material for this analysis is the national daily newspaper Večernji 
list, which is the only existing mass media outlet that dates back to the communist 
era with a full archive that is readily available. Editions of Večernji list are taken as a 
main source and included in analyses of coverage of every President and Prime 
Minister. Two other dailies are used to supplement the findings from the Večernji list. 
The first one is Vjesnik which ceased to exist in April 2012 so it was not used for the 
third year of Milanović’s analysis. The other is 24sata which was established in 
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2005, so it was used only for analyses of Kosor, Josipović and Milanović. Therefore, 
there are at least two sources used in the analysis of every President and Prime 
Minister’s coverage with an aim to avoid relying on only one source, to increase the 
validity of findings, and enhance the ability to generalize. These three dailies 
represent an interesting mix of different types of daily newspapers operating in the 
Croatian news market. Vjesnik was established as a communist publication and was 
not privatized in the democratic era (Novak, 2005). Therefore, it is an excellent 
example of a state-owned media. Also, in the commercial media market of 
democratic Croatia it was considered to be the daily that was closest to being a 
quality paper (Jergović, 2004). Večernji list was privatized at the end of 1990s and 
can be seen as a representative of a daily that was transformed from a state-owned 
to a commercial daily (Malović, 2004; Tuđen, 2007). Also, according to its content 
and format, it is usually characterized as a semi-tabloid (Kanižaj, 2006). Therefore, 
its ownership, content and format are different from Vjesnik’s. Finally, 24sata is 
considered to be the only real tabloid in the Croatian market (Car & Andrijašević, 
2012). It was established and is still owned by a private media conglomerate (ibid.). 
Therefore, 24sata represents a third type of daily in the Croatian newspaper market: 
a daily established in a democracy, by private owners, with tabloid characteristics. 
Unfortunately, only in the analyses of Kosor and Josipović is the coverage of all 
three dailies included. In total, 392 daily newspapers were analyzed (175 editions of 
Večernji list, 168 editions of Vjesnik and 49 editions of 24sata).  
 The unit of analysis is an article, defined as a totality of words, pictures and 
illustrations that form an independent part of a newspaper and whose elements 
usually revolve around the same topic.  
 
5.1.2. Sampling and time frame 
The time frame was defined by taking into account two main elements. The 
first one is the availability of archives. Večernji list's archive dates back to 1959 
when the daily was established, so in order to have at least one consistent source 
the start of the analysis had to be after 1959. Secondly, the first year of analysis of 
each leader’s coverage needed to be the one representative of intense political 
coverage, since this analysis also aims to discover whether the personalisation of 
media reporting is a general characteristic of political communication in these 
systems, or perhaps the focus on the leader and his/her personae is enhanced in 
intense political periods such as elections or appointments. Given that communist 
leader Josip Broz Tito was several times appointed President, the decision to take 
the 1974 appointment as a starting point for analysis was based on the fact that at 
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that time Tito was declared President for life, so more intense coverage than in a 
case of regular appointment can be expected. In addition, in 1974 there are two 
sources available for analysis, so the findings from the main source were able to be 
“tested” against the other source what enhances the validity of findings and ability to 
make more generalized conclusions.  
The sample included every news story that referred to each of the Presidents 
and Prime Ministers (either by name or post) and/or their respective parties in the 
week preceding their election/appointment to office, and any news story that 
mentioned the President/Prime Minister during two weeks in March spread across 
their second and third year in office. 
The aim was to obtain a sample of articles that was representative of both 
the intense political coverage and the ‘normal’ coverage of the Presidents and Prime 
Ministers, and also to be as comparable as possible. Therefore, the first week of 
analysis is aimed to capture intense coverage and is usually the one preceding the 
election in which the President/Prime Minister came to power. However, in three 
cases (Josip Broz Tito, Nikica Valentić and Jadranka Kosor) the leader came to 
power by appointment, so the first analyzed week is the one preceding appointment. 
I believe that is the period of the most intense coverage of the leaders and in that 
way comparable with campaign coverage. In order to find articles representative of 
‘normal’ periods I decided to focus on March since it is the only month in which there 
were no elections (presidential, parliamentary, or local) throughout the examined 
period. Also, the focus is on either the first or the second week in March to avoid the 
Easter holidays. Exceptions were made in cases of Josip Broz Tito and Franjo 
Tuđman whose first years in office were not included in the analysis. In the case of 
Tito, the exception was made not to include the first years in office since the material 
(newspapers archive) was not available for these years (1945-1948). Instead, the 
year in which Tito was appointed President for the last time (1974) was chosen as 
the first year of analysis, for the reasons listed above. The second exception was 
made in relation to Franjo Tuđman who acted as the President of Croatia after 1990, 
but Croatia did not formally declare independence until 1991, so the 1992 
presidential elections can be seen as the first formal elections in the independent 
state. Therefore, I decided to include the last week of the 1992 presidential 
campaign as representative of Tuđman’s first year in office.  
Finally, the sample consists of articles mentioning the leader and/or the party 
in the first examined week, and only the leader in the second and third week. The 
ratio of leader to party mentions is usually used as an indicator of person-centred 
media reporting. In short, if there are more articles mentioning the leader than there 
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are those mentioning their party, media reporting can be seen as more person- than 
party-centred. However, since the introduction of a parliamentary system in 2000, 
Croatian Presidents need to resign from their party membership once they are 
elected. Therefore, they act as party candidates in the presidential elections which 
are captured in the first examined week. However, in the second and third examined 
week they are non-party actors, and hence, there is no party whose media visibility 
their own media prominence might be compared to. Because of this, the decision 
was made that in all cases only in the first week does the sample consist of articles 
mentioning the leader, his/her party, or both of them, and only the leader in the 
second and third week.  
 
5.1.3. Research design 
The code sheet is divided into four sections. The first section was designed 
to capture structural details, the second section was constructed to examine the 
presence or absence of references to the leader and his/her party, the third section 
focused on the dominant topic,  and context (political, private, mixed) in which a 
leader’s persona was mentioned, while the final section was designed to capture the 
extent to which specific features of a leader’s persona are visible, and the context 
(political, private, mixed) in which they are reported. 
In the first section articles were coded for the newspapers they come from, 
year of publication, and week of analysis (first, second, third).  
In the second section articles were coded for the presence or absence of 
references to the leader and their party in the first examined week, and 
consequently only for the presence of the reference to the leader. If an article 
mentioned both the leader and his/her party in the first week, it was coded for both.  
The main aim of the third section was to determine the dominance of certain 
contents in the article. The first variable in this section coded for the main topic of 
the article. In order to simplify the comparison across the newspapers which have 
historically and comparatively different sections, only three coding values were 
created. One relates to the political content and includes topic such as national, 
international, and regional political news, economy etc.; the other relates to the non-
political content, for example arts, fashion, celebrity, sports etc. The final code value 
was designed for articles not clearly pertaining to any of these topics. The second 
variable in this section coded for the pre-dominant context in which a leader’s 
persona was mentioned, the three main code values being political, private and 
political/private (mixed) context. These distinctions were based on the differences 
between private and political persona as suggested by Corner (2000), Van Aelst et 
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al. (2011) and van Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha (2000). If the features of a leader’s 
persona were mentioned pre-dominantly in relation to him/her as a person who is 
performing a political role, the political context value was to be chosen. If they were 
mentioned dominantly in relation to the leader as a person performing roles that are 
usually associated with private sphere (father, spouse, sports enthusiast etc.), the 
private context value was to be chosen. Finally, if the article referred equally to the 
features of a leader’s persona in both contexts, and/or it made explicit connections 
between a leader’s political and private persona, the value political/private was 
offered.  
The final section of this coding sheet was created to examine the references 
to a leader’s persona in a more detailed, nuanced way. The leader’s persona was 
for the purposes of this study operationalized as consisting of the leader’s personal 
qualities, i.e. traits and skills, and his/her performances or actions in different areas 
of life, by drawing on the work of Corner (2000), Van Aelst et al. (2011) and van 
Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha (2000). In other words, features of a leader’s persona 
whose media visibility is researched in this study are leader’s personal traits and 
skills and his/her personal life. Leader’s persona was operationalized as consisting 
of seven personality traits (openness, extroversion, conscientiousness, niceness, 
emotional stability and temper, intellect and assertiveness) by drawing on the “big 
five” model of personality traits which was developed in psychology and lexical 
research with an aim to group all human personality traits in several broad factors13 
(Goldberg, 1992; Hofstee, Kiers, de Raad, Goldberg, & Ostendorf, 1997; John & 
Sristava, 1999; Peabody & De Raad, 2002). Also, three skills were included in the 
analysis - people skills, skills in data gathering and processing, and skills in dealing 
with things and tools variables, drawing upon Fine’s “things-data-people” skills sets 
typology which was created to categorize skills needed for performing different jobs 
(Fine & Cronshaw, 1999). The list of different life areas and activities was made by 
drawing upon variables used in previous similar research (C. Errera, 2006; Langer, 
2006; Stanyer, 2013; Van Aelst et al., 2011) and supplemented with the category to 
code for references to a leader’s professional life (work), given that work and 
activities related to it represent a vital part of ones persona, though often neglected 
in personalisation research. The final personal life index consisted of ten variables: 
work, youth, education, family life, love life, appearance, life-style, religion, feelings, 
                                                 
13
 The big five model is based on the first five above mentioned variables, but two pilot studies 
conducted on the British and Croatian newspapers revealed that it is useful to split the original 
Openness and Conscientiousness variables into two, because of the large number of quite different 
traits that were lumped together in them. 
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personal relationships, health and finances. A detailed account of which traits, skills 
and activities were coded under which variable is available in the Appendix 1.  
Unlike in other similar studies (C. Errera, 2006; Grbeša, 2008; Langer, 2011; 
Stanyer, 2013; Wilke & Reinemann, 2001), the affiliation of any of the leader’s 
qualities or life areas is not predetermined to be either political or private. The pilot 
study conducted on the sample of 285 articles from British newspapers tried out a 
technique proposed by Van Aelst et al. (2011) which allows for personal qualities to 
be coded as presented in either a political or private context. This was applied to 
both qualities and life areas. The pilot study revealed that not predetermining what is 
political and what is private provides a more accurate and nuanced picture of the 
mediated leader’s persona and media’s framing of political and private spheres. 
However, it also showed that some cases are not easily categorized as either 
political or private, but they are rather a combination of both. In other words, the 
political and private are sometimes connected, most often the private is being 
politicized (e.g. he lied to his wife, so he will lie to his voters too), so a third code 
value was introduced in order to account for this mixed context – political/private 
context. In sum, every personality trait, skill and life aspect had a possibility of being 
coded as presented in either political, private or mixed, political/private context.   
Final sample consists of 3133 articles. Inter-coder reliability test was 
conducted with another coder who coded 300 randomly chosen articles (9,6% of the 
sample). Average reliability score calculated using Holsti’s method of agreement14 
across all categories was 0.96, with individual variable scores ranging from 0.82 to 
1. Detailed results for each category can be found in the Appendix 2.  
  
5.2.  Person-centred media reporting 
 
This part of the chapter examines trends related to the person-centred media 
reporting which is characterized by the media’s focus on individual political actors, 
especially leaders. This is often evaluated by the focus that the media puts on 
collective political actors, such as parties or governments. Hence, the first analyses 
reveal the leaders’ media visibility over time and the comparison of their media 
prominence to that of their parties. 
The specific research questions are: 
                                                 
14
 Holsti's (1969) method of agreement is calculated as 2A/ (N1+N2) whereas A is the number of units 
in which coders agree and N1 and N2 are the number of units coded by each of the coders. 
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1. Is there merit to leadership cult theories which seem to suggest that 
communist media were pursuing person-centred reporting by putting significant 
focus on the leader, or was communist reporting rather more structural in style? 
2. How does, if at all, the reporting style change during the transitional period? 
3. Who are the political actors that are most prominent in media reporting? 
4. Is person-centred reporting a general characteristic of political 
communication, or rather do the media focus more on individual political actors in 
certain periods (e.g. intense political periods such as elections)? 
Four different indicators were designed in order to help answer these questions. 
The first indicator is based on the overall visibility of leaders in media coverage and 
is measured by the average number of articles that a newspaper publishes about a 
leader per week.  
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Figure 2. Average number of articles mentioning the Prime Ministers and Presidents 
per week (trend line related to heads of the executive, i.e. Presidents until 2000, PMs 
afterwards) 
 
Given that the newspapers have over time varied in size and therefore in the 
number of articles they publish per week, the second indicator is designed to 
account for these changes. Hence, the degree of person-centred media reporting is 
also presented as the number of articles mentioning each political leader 
standardized by the total number of articles published in a newspaper.  
 
 126
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1974 1992 1993 1995 2000 2003 2009 2010 2011
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f a
rt
ic
le
s
president
PM
Linear (HOE)
r= -0,88
 
Figure 3. Percentage of all articles in analyzed newspapers mentioning Presidents and 
Prime Ministers (trend line related to heads of the executive, i.e. Presidents until 2000, 
PMs afterwards) 
 
The third indicator addresses the relationship between media prominence of 
leaders and their parties. The number of articles mentioning leaders is compared to 
the number of articles mentioning their parties, resulting in a ratio of leader to party 
mentions. Ratios higher than 1 indicate that the leader is more prominent in media 
reporting than his party, while those lower than 1 show that the relationship is 
opposite.  
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Figure 4. Ratio of President to party mentions compared to ratios of Prime Minister to 
party mentions (trend line related to heads of the executive, i.e. Presidents until 2000, 
PMs afterwards) 
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Finally, the fourth indicator is designed to further deconstruct the content of 
references to leaders and their parties. More specifically, it explores whether the 
leader and party are mentioned on their own, together, or a party is mentioned 
alongside some party official other than its leader.  
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of articles mentioning political leader and/or his/her party that 
refer only to leader (leader), only to party (party), party and leader (both) or party and 
some other party member (other) 
 
5.2.1. Communist leader – one and only 
It was argued in Chapter 4 that there are two competing theories of 
communist media reporting styles – one that claims that communist media reporting 
had a structural style of presenting news in which societal forces were put ahead of 
people (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Robinson, 1977), and the other that suggests that 
the reporting was more person-centred given that it was focused on building a 
leader’s personality cult (Eatwell, 2006; Janjetović, 2009; Plamper, 2004; Rees, 
2004). Specifically, the literature on communist leadership cults suggests that the 
leader was the central actor in communist political communication, and that his cult 
was built by an extensive use of mass media. The analysis of Yugoslav media 
seems to support the theories advocated in this literature, since all four indicators 
show that communist media reporting should be seen as more person-centred than 
structural in style. However, I argue that the leadership cult theories can be seen 
only partly justified by this data, since Tito’s media prominence does not seem to be 
as extensive as the literature on communist leaders' cult would suggest.  
Specifically, as is evident from Figure 2, Tito was on average mentioned in 
51 articles per week, which makes him the second most frequently reported leader 
among those examined in this study. However, once this average number of 
 128
mentions is standardized by the total number of articles published by newspapers, it 
becomes clear that Tito was the most media prominent political leader. As Figure 3 
shows, Tito was mentioned in 6,3% of all articles published by communist 
newspapers, and no leader in post-communist period was close to reaching his level 
of mediated visibility. Furthermore, even when his media visibility is compared to 
that of his party, The League of Communist of Yugoslavia, which was the only party 
in Yugoslavia and was considered central to all aspects of life (Furtak, 1986), Tito 
still remains the most media prominent political actor in communist media. As is 
evident from Figure 4, the ratio of leader to party mentions is in Tito’s case 1,2, 
which means that he was more frequently mentioned in newspaper coverage than 
his party. Finally, a more detailed analysis of these references to him and/or his 
party, as is shown in Figure 5, also reveals that he was as an individual the most 
visible political actor in communist reporting. Of the articles that mentioned him 
and/or his party, Tito was on his own mentioned in the vast majority of articles 
(42,6%). In addition, he was mentioned in the majority of articles that mentioned the 
party (27,8%). Hence, according to Tito’s media visibility, it seems that there might 
be merit to claims made in the leadership cult literature that the communist leader 
was the single most important political actor in these systems. Whether the media 
was reflecting power relations in the country, or they were constructing a perception 
of them (Hughes, 2007), perhaps as instructed by the political elite who controlled 
them, the degree of the communist leader’s media prominence suggests that there 
indeed might have been in place a cult-building process and that the communist 
leader might have been the central figure in the political communication of this 
system.  
In spite of this, I think it is questionable whether this data completely justifies 
the hypothesis of leader’s centrality to communist mediated communication. Tito 
might have been mentioned twice as much as most of post-communist leaders, but 
he was still mentioned in only 6,3% of articles. Also, he was mentioned more 
frequently than his party, but the ratio of 1,2 points to the fact that the party was not 
that significantly less visible than he was. Hence, the extent to which communist 
media put the focus on the leader does suggest that he was the most important 
political actor, but the amount of this attention does not seem to be as significant as 
would be expected from the leadership cult literature. However, what this data does 
show is that, relative to reporting in most post-communist periods, reporting in 
communism is quite leader-centred.  
 
5.2.2. Leadership cult dies hard 
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 In order to answer the question of how, if at all, the reporting style changed 
during the transitional period we need to look at the similarities and differences 
between the reporting in communism and different periods of post-communism. 
Based on the literature concerned with post-communist media and transitional 
studies, which suggests that there may be considerable similarities between 
communist and early post-communist periods, one of the hypotheses proposed in 
this thesis was that person-centred reporting was transferred from a communist to a 
post-communist system. In other words, it was hypothesized that post-communist 
reporting was as personalized as that in communism, and that a possible 
explanation for this might be found in the theory of continuation. The data from the 
empirical analysis of communist and post-communist newspapers points to the fact 
that there are significant similarities in the person-centred reporting in communist 
and post-communist period, but the theory of continuation of communist reporting 
style seems valid only for the early post-communist period.  
 Specifically, all four indicators point to the fact that person-centred reporting 
related to communist leader Tito is quite similar to the reporting of the first Croatian 
President Franjo Tuđman, who was the head executive during the 1990s. According 
to Figure 2, Tuđman was on average mentioned in a slightly larger number of 
articles per week than Tito. Given that only Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in mid 2000s 
was prominent to the same level, communist and early post-communist periods can 
generally be considered the most leader-centred periods of the ones observed. 
Furthermore, continuity can also be observed between the communist and early 
post-communist period with regard to the percentage of articles in which leaders 
were mentioned. There is a significant drop from Tito (6,3%) to Tuđman (4,5%), but 
no other leader after them received the same or higher levels of media attention. In 
addition, Figure 4 shows that these two leaders were reported similarly in relation to 
their parties. While Tito’s ratio of leader to party mentions was 1,2, Tuđman’s was 1. 
Although the two Presidents who succeeded Tuđman scored higher, i.e. they were 
more media visible than their parties, they were not head executives. In other words, 
of all head executives, only Tito and Tuđman were as media visible or more visible 
than their parties. Finally, a more detailed analysis of references to leader and/or 
party points to the same conclusions in the case of Tuđman, as it did in the case of 
Tito. As is evident from Figure 5, Tito and Tuđman are most similar with regard to 
the amount of media attention they got in relation to their parties and the extent to 
which articles mentioning their parties were dominated by references to them as 
leaders. Specifically, while Tito is on his own around 2,5 times more media visible 
than his party on its own, there were also more than 2 times more articles 
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mentioning only Tuđman than those mentioning only his party, the Croatian 
Democratic Union. Also, the majority of articles that mentioned Tito’s party also 
mentioned him, which is the case with Tuđman and Croatian Democratic Union as 
well.  
 The similarities between the ways in which Tito and Tuđman were reported 
in the media can be seen as reinforcing the theories which suggest that there are 
significant similarities between these two leaders, the ways in which they ruled, and 
controlled their parties. Tito was considered to be the most important person that 
marked the communist era in Yugoslavia, while the early post-communist period in 
Croatia is claimed to have been marked first and foremost by Tuđman’s charismatic 
presidency (Boduszynski, 2010). In addition, it is suggested that Tuđman has, 
similarly to Tito, ruled in an authoritarian way, centralized the power in his hands, 
and not tolerated opposition or dissent. It is argued that Tito strongly controlled his 
party and party purges followed whenever someone opposed him, a practice which 
Tuđman often employed as well (Jović & Lamont, 2010; Radoš, 2005; Tuđen, 2007). 
Finally, both of them seemed central to the survival of their parties. The League of 
Communist of Yugoslavia rested on Tito’s authority as a great leader, the winner of 
the Second World War and the unifier of Yugoslav nations. Similarly, Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) depended on Tuđman to keep the party members together 
and secure electoral victory. The HDZ was established as a party that brought 
together various political interests gathered around a single idea – Croatian 
independence. The party did not lie on strong programmatic principles so it began 
revolving around Tuđman from its very start. He was a person who was able to bring 
together this heterogeneous group of people and keep them in check (Radoš, 
2005). This is further confirmed with the developments after Tuđman’s death, when 
several fractions separated from the party and founded new parties, and intra-party 
struggles continued for years. Furthermore, HDZ was “reliant upon Tuđman’s 
charisma for electoral success” since Tuđman as an individual enjoyed greater 
popularity and public support than HDZ (Lamont, 2010: 71). In the 1992 Presidential 
elections Tuđman won 56,73% of votes, while in the parliamentary elections held in 
the same year HDZ won around 10% less votes (44,71%). The difference was even 
greater in later elections. In the 1995 parliamentary elections HDZ won 45,23% 
while in the 1997 Presidential elections Tuđman won 61,41% of the votes (“Arhiva 
izbora,” n.d.). Also, according to a study by the Faculty of political science in Zagreb, 
26,8% of HDZ voters voted for this party in 1992, mostly because of Tuđman, while 
in the 1995 elections Tuđman’s contribution was even greater – 57% (Vučković, 
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2010). In other words, more than half of HDZ voters voted for the party because 
Tuđman led it.  
In short, the similarities between the amount of media attention given to Tito 
and Tuđman, and the differences between Tuđman and other post-communist 
leaders, point to the fact that there might be more similarities between communist 
and early post-communist era than between post-communist leaders.  
 
5.2.3. De-personalisation of media reporting 
 In spite of the similarities between the extent to which leaders and political 
parties were media visible in communism and early post-communist period, overall 
all four indicators show that the media’s focus on the most powerful political actors, 
i.e. heads of the executive, has significantly decreased since the communist era. In 
other words, when the trends over time are looked at in relation to media 
prominence of head executives, it becomes evident that the most powerful 
politicians have over time became decreasingly media visible, and this has resulted 
in a de-personalisation of media reporting. The trend lines in Figures 2-5 show 
trends over time related to the reporting of heads of the executive. That is to say, the 
trends are based on the data connected to Presidents until 2000 and after 2000 to 
Prime Ministers. They all point to negative direction of development in person-
centred reporting, although their trajectories are not linear. 
 With regard to the first indicator, the average number of articles mentioning 
head executives per week, there is a weak negative trend visible, with Pearson’s’ 
coefficient of -0,55. Specifically, while Tito was in the 1970s on average mentioned 
in 51 articles per week, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović who came to power in 2011 
was on average mentioned in 21 articles per week. Similarly, the percentage of 
articles mentioning leaders has dropped from 6,3% (Tito) to 2,6% (Milanović), with 
quite a strong negative trend evident in Pearson’s coefficient of -0,88. The negative 
trend is strong also in relation to the ratio of leader to party mentions (r=-0,77), since 
the ratio has decreased from 1,2 (Tito) to 0,6 (Milanović). Furthermore, from the 
sample of articles mentioning the leader and/or his party, the percentage of articles 
mentioning solely the leader dropped from 42,6% (Tito) to 22,5% (Milanović), 
Pearson’s coefficient being -0,72. In short, all data related to the person-centred 
media reporting of head executives points to the fact that the media coverage is 
decreasingly focusing on the most important and powerful politicians in the country.  
  While most powerful politicians have during the transitional period lost a 
significant amount of media attention, there is evidence to suggest that political 
parties are increasingly being given media attention. Specifically, in the post-2000 
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period no head of the executive was more media visible than his/her party, with ratio 
of leader to party mentions varying between 0,5 and 0,8 (Figure 4). However, while 
the number of articles mentioning solely the leader, i.e. leader-centred reporting, 
continually decreased over time, the party-centred reporting measured as the 
percentage of articles in which the party is mentioned on its own, does not show any 
significant trend (Figure 6). If Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor is excluded from the 
analysis, and according to some indicators her case can be seen as exceptional 
among the post-2000 leaders15, there is a positive trend visible (r=0,75), 
demonstrating that the media are increasingly giving more attention to parties as 
collective bodies, independent of their members. This positive trend in party-centred 
reporting, and negative in leader-centred one, has led to parties becoming more 
media prominent on their own than their leaders are as individual actors in the post-
2000 period (with the exception of Kosor). In other words, since 2000 there were 
more articles that mentioned just the ruling party, than those mentioning only the 
head executive. In summary, according to the media attention different political 
actors got in the late post-communist period, ruling parties might be seen as more 
important political actors than the individual political actors who were given most 
executive power. 
In spite of these trends, Figure 5 also shows that the references to parties 
are in all cases dominated by references to individual political actors, leaders or 
other party officials. This points to the fact that although parties are in general quite 
prominent in media reporting, they are continually seen as almost inseparable from 
their members. As is suggested in the literature concerning post-communist party 
systems, individual political actors, especially leaders, dominate parties (Lewis, 
2000) and parties are often defined by their leaders and not the other way around, 
as is the case in Western democracies (Grbeša, 2008; King, 2002). The strength of 
connection between leaders and their parties is visible from this analysis too. In the 
case of all post-communist leaders who were also leaders of their parties (Tuđman, 
Račan, Sanader, Kosor, Milanović), the party is mostly mentioned with connection to 
them, and less in connection to other party members. At the same time, the party on 
its own receives the least media attention if the political leader is not also the party 
leader (Valentić, Mateša, Mesić, Josipović). This reinforces the hypothesis that 
parties are mostly defined by their leaders and less by other party officials, or at 
                                                 
15
 Kosor is the most media prominent post-2000 leader according to the percentage of articles she was 
mentioned in. Also, among post-2000 heads of executive she has the highest ratio of leader to party 
mentions.  
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least this is what can be inferred based on the ways in which they are presented in 
the media.  
Parties continued to be largely defined by their leaders throughout the post-
communist period, but if the analysis is narrowed down only to head executives it 
becomes evident that the parties are in media reporting increasingly being 
connected with party members other than the leader. Figure 6 shows that the 
amount of reporting in which the ruling party is mentioned alongside a party member 
other than the head of the executive has grown over time (r=0,73). This points to the 
fact leader might be seen, based on media reporting, as the most important or 
powerful person in the party, but after Tuđman in the 1990s other party officials 
started getting more space. In this way the media might have contributed to creating 
a public perception of a more democratic party system in which parties are not 
solely means that leaders’ use to accomplish personal goals, but rather 
organizations in which different interests and ideas can be shared and advocated.  
 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of articles mentioning head of the executive and/or his/her party 
that refer only to head of the executive (leader), only to party (party), party and head of 
the executive (both) or party with some other party member (other) 
 
5.2.4. Differences between actors 
 The analyses of person-centred media reporting also revealed that the 
position that the political actor has in the system, the type of political system, and 
perhaps even the type of political party a politician is a member of, might be 
connected to the degree to which political leader is media visible.  
 With regard to the position that a political actor holds, all four indicators show 
that Presidents who were heads of the executive (Tito and Tuđman) were more 
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media visible than Prime Ministers who were head executives (Račan, Sanader, 
Kosor and Milanović). Specifically, Presidents who were head executives were 
mentioned in a larger number of articles per week (Figure 2), in a larger percentage 
of all published articles (Figure 3), contrary to Prime Ministers they were as visible or 
more visible than their parties (Figure 4), and they were mentioned on their own in 
more articles than Prime Ministers who were heads of the executive (Figure 5 and 
6).  
It might be tempting to ascribe these differences to the nature of the political 
systems in which these leaders ruled. In other words, Presidents in presidential 
systems might be more media visible than Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems 
since they as individuals might be considered more important and powerful than the 
collectives they head. However, other factors should not be overlooked. In the case 
of Tito, there are indications that communist journalists were often instructed to 
report the leader's activities (Plamper, 2004). This would mean that Tito's high 
visibility was not due only to his newsworthiness but was also partly an outcome of 
political strategy. In addition, he was the leader of the only party in the country, so 
his party leader role might have enhanced his prominence in the papers. Also, his 
powers and jurisdictions were almost infinite. Since his role was not restricted to, for 
example, foreign policy and army issues as is the case with post-2000 Presidents, 
he was shown as the voice of authority on all issues. Some of these factors might 
have influenced the prominence given to Tuđman too. In the first place, his 
presidency is considered to be „super-Presidential“ and not semi-Presidential as 
was officially proclaimed (Jović & Lamont, 2010). In other words, as with Tito, 
Tuđman was considered to have authority over everything from foreign policy to 
music, sports and culture. This wide remit might have enhanced his visibility in the 
media. Also, again similarly to Tito, he was the leader of the most powerful political 
party during the 1990s – the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Therefore, he did 
not appear in the papers only as the President, but also as the leader of the party 
that had the majority in parliament. It should also be noted that later Presidents 
Mesić and Josipović were not party leaders and had to resign from party duties once 
elected to office, which might have contributed to their lower levels of visibility. 
Finally, the first years of Tuđman's presidency were characterized by war in which 
the President had even greater powers than in peace and was the central figure in 
negotiations, international peace conferences etc. Hence, the context surrounding 
his presidency might have also contributed to the high degree of his media visibility.  
Furthermore, the reporting of Presidents and Prime Ministers developed in 
different ways in the transition from communism to post-communism. While the 
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Presidents lost a significant amount of media attention, the Prime Ministers had 
gained it. The data shows that the number of articles mentioning Presidents per 
week has continually decreased over time (r=-0,74), while the number of articles 
mentioning Prime Ministers has slightly increased (r=0,5). Similarly, the percentage 
of articles mentioning Presidents decreased linearly (r=-0,99), while Prime Ministers 
experienced a positive trend (r=0,79). In addition, both of these analyses show that 
Prime Ministers became more media visible than Presidents in the post-2000 period. 
This is an important fact since the parliamentary system replaced a semi-
presidential one in 2000, so it appears as though the media might have, by shifting 
the focus to Prime Ministers, depicted the new constitutionally set balance of power 
in the country. The amount of attention that different political actors received from 
the media while the semi-presidential system was in force during the 1990s also 
suggest that media reporting reflects the balance of power in the system. 
Specifically, the 1990s Prime Ministers Nikica Valentić and Zlatko Mateša were 
significantly less media visible than President Tuđman (Figures 1 and 2). The media 
(in)visibility of the 1990s Prime Ministers and the prominence of the President 
seems to have accurately depicted the power holders in the young Croatian 
democracy in which President Tuđman ruled in a centralized and authoritarian way.  
Finally, all four indicators of person-centred reporting point to the fact that the 
type of political party of which the leaders are members might also be an important 
factor contributing to the extent to which they are media visible. Specifically, the 
heads of the executive who were least media visible, on their own and in relation to 
their parties, are Ivica Račan and Zoran Milanović, leaders of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), a party of reformed communists. On the other hand, those leaders who 
were most media visible in the post-communist period were all leaders of the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Also, according to Figure 5, the highest levels of 
party-centred reporting were noted in 2000, 2003 and 2011, years when the SDP 
either won parliamentary elections, or was acting as incumbent. This fact might be 
relevant for explaining different degrees of party- and person-centred media 
reporting. The HDZ since Tuđman has been a centralized, charismatic party focused 
on its leader, while the SDP is mostly seen as a programmatic party with 
decentralized and democratic party structures (Lamont, 2010; Šiber, 2003). Hence, 
it appears as though the type of party might be connected to the ways in which the 
party and its leaders are presented in the media. In the case of charismatic parties 
the media might focus its coverage on the leader since the party revolves around 
him/her and not around issues or programs, so there is limited information about 
party’s policies that might be reported. On the other hand, programmatic parties’ 
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which promote specific policies and interests could be covered in a more party-
centred way since they are providing the media with the kind of information that the 
media can then use to frame the coverage of politics.    
 
5.2.5. Normal v. intense political reporting 
To address the final question, i.e. whether person-centred reporting is a 
general characteristic of mediated political communication, or rather the media focus 
more on individual political actors in certain periods, we need to compare the extent 
to which leaders were media visible in intense and normal political periods. A 
hypothesis here was that there would be more articles about leaders in intense 
political periods than in normal ones because events such as elections or 
appointments focus media attention on political actors. As can be seen from Figures 
7 and 8, this is not always the case. When the cumulative average number of 
articles published weekly is compared to the average number of articles published in 
normal political periods, it is evident that intensive political coverage increased the 
cumulative average for some leaders, but not for all (Figure 7). The same is the 
case with the comparison of average percentage of articles mentioning leaders and 
the percentage of articles mentioning leaders in normal political periods (Figure 8). 
Specifically, most Prime Ministers were actually more visible in normal political 
periods than at election time. However, the analysis of post-communist Presidents’ 
mediated visibility shows that they are more prominent at times of elections and that 
they lose media attention once they come to power. The most extreme is the case of 
the 2010s President Josipović. If only normal political coverage was included in the 
analysis, the visibility of Josipović would be cut in half.  
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Figure 7. Cumulative average number of articles mentioning political leaders per week 
compared to the average number of articles mentioning political leaders in normal 
political periods 
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Figure 8. Percentage of all articles in analyzed newspapers mentioning political 
leaders compared to the percentage of articles published in normal political period in 
analyzed newspapers mentioning political leaders 
 
The fact that Presidents are more media visible in intense, and Prime 
Ministers in normal political periods, in both semi-presidential and parliamentary 
political system, might indicate that the politically-related factors that influence this 
development might be related to the type of electoral system by which these political 
actors are elected. All Croatian Presidents were elected by majoritarian voting 
system, while Prime Ministers have from 2000 competed in a proportional voting 
system (Kasapović, 2001a). Hence, it is possible to speculate that the media focus 
on Presidents more during elections because the electoral race is personalized, it is 
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led between candidates not parties, and the voters vote for individuals. On the other 
hand, during parliamentary elections in which the competition is led between parties 
for whom voters cast their ballot, the media might not be as inclined to focus on 
individual political actors, since parties are at the centre of electoral process. 
However, once Prime Ministers are in office and start making executive decisions, 
they, as individuals who have these executive powers, might become more 
interesting for media and consequently fare more prominently in media coverage.  
In summary, although there are significant similarities between leaders’ 
prominence in communist and early post-communist era, political leaders have lost 
a significant amount of media attention in the process of democratic transition. What 
might be inferred from media reporting of political actors in transitional period is that 
individual political actors are slowly loosing relevance in post-communist politics, 
while parties as collectives are gaining importance. However, in spite of these trends 
parties' media images are still dominated by individuals, especially their leaders. If 
parties continue to grow stronger, as these trends suggest, a perception of a more 
decentralized, democratic party system might emerge. Therefore, there seems to be 
evidence that Croatia is moving from being portrayed as a  leader-centred system to 
a party-centred system, but the transition is far from being  finished.  
 
5.3.  Persona-centred media reporting 
 
This part of the chapter examines the references to leaders by focusing on 
the ways in which leaders’ personae are mentioned. Specifically, while the previous 
section discussed data related to person-centred media reporting, this section 
focuses on persona-centred media reporting, which refers to the media focus on the 
leader’s life and qualities, be those presented in a political, private or mixed, 
political/private context.  
Research questions that this section addresses are: 
1. Is there merit to theories advocated by the leadership cult literature which 
suggest that the communist leader’s cult was created by extensive mediation 
of leaders’ life and qualities? 
2. What type of information is mediated about leaders? 
3. To what extent and in what ways are leaders’ private personae mediated? 
The sample consisted of 2393 articles mentioning leaders, out of which 1837 
contained a reference to the leaders’ personae.  
 
5.3.1. (Communist) Leader’s cult – name that lends legitimacy 
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According to the literature on communist leader’s cults, those cults are a 
product of  extensive reporting about leader’s activities and virtues (e.g. Apor et al., 
2004; Eatwell, 2006; Plamper, 2004). If this is so, it would be logical to assume that 
the leader’s persona was very prominent in communism. This analysis shows the 
contrary. Of all the examined leaders, the only persona that is less media visible 
than Tito’s (70,6%) is that of the 1990s Prime Minister Valentić (70,5%). Hence, 
almost third of all articles that mentioned Tito did not mention his persona. Although 
these articles in which the persona was not mentioned were not further analyzed 
through content analysis, their closer examination reveals several most common 
ways in which Tito’s name was used without mention of his persona. Firstly, there is 
a large number of articles about all kinds of activities (company meetings, cultural 
manifestations, sports events, political meetings etc.) that end with a note that the 
participants have sent a greeting telegram to Tito. For example, out of 21 articles 
that mentioned Tito in Vjesnik on 5th May 1974, 12 did not mention his persona, and 
in half of those (n=6) the only mention of Tito was in the sentence that reported the 
greeting telegram that was sent to him. It seems as though sending a greeting 
telegram to Tito and reporting about it was meant to create the perception of the all-
seeing and all-knowing leader who was informed about all that is happening in the 
country, but most of all that the people themselves wanted to inform him of their 
activities. In this way, it could be argued, the devotion of the people to Tito and his 
importance not only in political, but also to all other matters, might have been 
communicated through media reporting. In addition, there is a substantial number of 
articles in which different social groups demonstrate support for Tito with regard to 
various issues. For example, when Italian irredentism became an issue in 1974, the 
media reported how different groups – academics, sportsmen, pensioners, climbers 
etc. – expressed support for Tito and asked him to protect Yugoslav interests. It 
seems that in this way the media might have wanted to create the perception of 
unity in society, general support for Tito, and also a bottom-up way of decision-
making since from the press it appears as though the people are asking Tito to act. 
Another way in which Tito’s name was mentioned without a reference to his persona 
was in cases when events, places, things etc. were named after him. This is unusual 
for a living person. However, during Tito’s rule many things were named after him, 
or at least were associated with him – Tito’s square, Tito’s cup, Tito’s fund, Tito’s 
street etc. By being associated with Tito’s name it was easier to increase the 
prestige and popularity of the event/place/thing etc., and at the same time to make 
Tito seem more important and omnipresent. All these practices can be seen as 
techniques of cult building (Velikonja, 2008). Hence, it seems that there was indeed 
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a Tito cult building process in place, but in contrast to what the theory suggests, the 
cult was to a significant extent built by references to Tito as an object (a person to 
whom the telegrams are sent, support showed etc.) and by associating various 
things/places/events with him. In this way it was possible to create the perception of 
Tito’s omnipresence and great importance in the society, without having to report 
him in great depth.  
 The technique of mentioning a leader’s name to lend legitimacy or increase 
importance of someone or something continued until the mid 2000s. Officials were 
sometimes mentioned in the media as President Tuđman’s advisors or delegates, 
as if in that way they became more important or powerful. For instance, in a short 
article about the health minister Andrija Hebrang, he is twice referred to as 
Tuđman’s representative (Vjesnik, 28.7.1992.), suggesting that his association with 
Tuđman is of greater importance and better illustrates his relevance than his 
ministerial job. Račan’s case was similar to Tuđman’s because the majority of 
articles in which his persona was not mentioned were those about his deputy, Goran 
Granić. He was referred to as Račan’s or the Prime Minister’s deputy, by which 
Granić, the representative of the second most important party in the coalition led by 
Račan, was portrayed as the second most important and powerful person in the 
country.  
In the case of later Prime Ministers there seems to be a growing trend 
towards calling the collective bodies they headed by their names – e.g. Sanader’s 
government, Kosor’s party, Milanović’s team etc. Although this topic was not 
systematically pursued, the impression is that when these leaders’ personae were 
not mentioned they were most often associated with their parties and governments. 
As Langer (2011) points out, this might mean that in the view of the media, Prime 
Ministers have gained more power and significance in collective bodies. 
In general, the extent to which leaders’ personae have been referred to in 
the articles mentioning leaders varies between 70,5% (Valentić) and 84,1% (Mesić). 
There is a weak positive trend visible (r=0,58) indicating that the leaders’ personae 
have become over time more prominent in articles that mention leaders. If only 
heads of executive are included in the analysis, the trend does not change much, 
although it is somewhat stronger (r=0,67). In spite of the overall positive trend, if we 
look only at the period from 2000, there is actually a negative trend in place (r=-0,4), 
meaning that the references to personae stopped increasing during Mesić’s 
presidency, but the average of the 2000s and 2010s remains higher than for the 
periods before.  
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In addition, the comparison of Presidents and Prime Ministers reveals two 
quite different trends. With regard to Presidents, there is a strong positive trend 
(r=0,89) which supports the fact that the personae of Presidents have become more 
prominent in media reporting. On the other hand, there doesn’t seem to be any trend 
in relation to Prime Ministers, where there is a low Pearson’s coefficient (r=0,38). 
Presidents Mesić and Josipović had the most prominent personae after 2000, when 
the Presidents were no longer heads of the executive. I would suggest that one of 
the main reasons for this development is their loss of power and significance. More 
specifically, once they stopped being the most powerful and influential political 
actors, there was less inclination to associate their name with other people, groups, 
places, events, things etc. because they could no longer to the same extent as 
before increase the popularity or importance of these elements. This then led to a 
more persona-centred reporting because when they were reported it was mostly in 
regard to their actions or personalities.  
In sum, it seems as though the explanation for higher and lower degrees of 
persona-centred media reporting are very complex, and they will be further 
examined in Chapter 7. At this point it is interesting to note that one of the factors 
that might influence lower degrees of persona-centred reporting is the amount of 
power. In other words, media reporting might be less persona-centred in cases of 
the most powerful political leaders.  
 
5.3.2. Dominance of political information, but rise in politicization of private 
 Having established the degree of persona-centred reporting, it is now time to 
deconstruct the structure of a leader’s persona as it was mentioned in articles. That 
is, this section of the chapter will provide a more detailed account of the type of 
information that is revealed about a leader’s persona. As outlined in the 
methodology section of this chapter, a leader’s persona was operationalized as 
consisting of political, private and political/private part. Accordingly, this analysis 
reveals the pre-dominant context in which leaders’ personae have been reported 
over time. In other words, even if there were references to leaders private or 
political/private personae, if there were more and more prominent references to 
political persona, the article was coded as being pre-dominantly about their political 
persona.  
 Figure 9 shows that political persona is the dominant part of all leaders’ 
mediated personae. More specifically, the great majority of references to leaders’ 
personae have been made in a political context, mentioning their political life and/or 
qualities. Most of these references were mentions of what a leader does in his/her 
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political function (work-related references), but there were also other areas of 
leaders’ lives that were mentioned in a political context. For example, President 
Tuđman’s lifestyle was mentioned in a political context when the journalist reported 
about his busy schedule. The article read: “Torn between his presidential obligations 
and election campaign, dr. Tuđman is left with little free time for other engagements. 
This is the reason why he couldn’t talk with reporters individually, so a collective 
interview needed to be organized.” (Vjesnik, 30.7.1992.). Similarly, President 
Josipović’s relationship with religion, specifically Catholic Church in Croatia, was 
reported in a political context in the sentence: “Kaptol doesn’t know anything about 
Ivo Josipović, except that he was the first to knock on the door of cardinal Bozanić, 
even before the campaign has started”. (Večernji list, 2.1.2010.). In other words, 
although it may be expected that references to areas such as lifestyle and religion 
are references to leaders’ private personae, in most occasions these life areas were 
actually mentioned in relation to a leader’s political role. Alongside life areas, the 
majority of references to leaders’ qualities were also made in a political context16. To 
illustrate, Prime Minister Sanader’s emotional stability and temper were mentioned 
in a political context in this quote: “It became evident that Sanader gets nervous and 
cannot control his behavior if someone hits his nerve. Provoked by Račan’s claim 
that he is trying to be the new Tuđman, Sanader started yelling at the Prime Minister 
that his UDBA had been killing Croats for 45 years.” (Vjesnik, 21.11.2003.). 
 
Figure 9. Structure of a leader's persona references presented as percentage of all 
articles mentioning a leader 
 
                                                 
16
 In the sample of articles that contain a reference to a head of the executive's quality, the percentage 
of articles in which these references were made pre-dominantly in a political context ranges from 93% 
(Sanader) to 100% (Tito, Račan, Milanović). 
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In half of the cases the references to a leader’s political persona take more 
than 95% of all persona references, with communist leader Tito being the leader 
whose media image relied most heavily on his political persona (pre-dominant in 
99,1% of all persona articles). This information is in line with a theory proposed in 
the leadership cult literature which suggests that the communist leader was 
presented to the public as a completely political being, one totally dedicated to the 
idea of communism and serving his country and his people (Apor, 2004; Davies, 
2004). Hence, communist leader’s private life and qualities did not contribute to his 
media image, and they were mostly hidden from the public, while the image that was 
communicated was that of a leader completely focused on his political role, and 
living political life.  
The only two leaders whose political personae were pre-dominant in less 
than 90% of all articles that mentioned their personae were the 1990s Prime 
Minister Nikica Valentić and 2010s President Ivo Josipović. In other words, only in 
the cases of these two leaders their private personae could be seen as partly 
contributing to their media images. Given that the private information that was 
communicated about them was to a larger extent politicized, rather than only 
publicized, it could be argued that their private life and qualities played an important 
role in the formation of their political image, i.e. the private information might have 
contributed to forming impressions about them as politicians. Given that in all other 
cases the leaders’ private personae were not significantly visible in media reporting, 
and that these two leaders held different positions in different political system during 
different time periods, the reason for why so much of their private information was 
mediated might be related to them as individuals. Specifically, I would suggest that 
one of the most important similarities between these two leaders, that might have 
contributed to an increase in the visibility of their private personae, is the fact that 
they both had established careers outside politics at the time they were 
appointed/elected. Before becoming Prime Minister, Valentić was a famous 
economist and the head of the Croatian oil company, while Josipović was a 
university professor and a composer. Hence, their prominent backgrounds outside 
politics and short time spent in the political world before taking up executive political 
positions might have influenced the degree to which their private personae were 
media visible.   
Mediated information about leaders’ private lives has in all cases been 
politicized to a larger extent than just published. In other words, when it comes to 
revealing leaders’ private information, it is more common to find this type of 
information in the media tied to leaders’  political roles, than simply reported in 
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private context. An example of a leader’s private matter being published without 
politicization can be found in the following paragraph from Večernji list: “Kosor was 
born in Pakrac 56 years ago, and when she was two and a half years old, her father 
left her and her mother. She never saw him again. (…) In a way, her mother – 
Croatian language teacher - left her as well. When Jadranka was six months old, her 
mother and father got a job in Čakovec and moved, so Jadranka was raised by her 
grandmother until she was seven years old. Although she now lives with her mother, 
it is hard to resist the impression that her most important relationship was with her 
grandmother. They made cookies together and lived idyllically.” (3.7.2009.). 
Similarly, Josipović’s family life was mentioned in a private context without 
politicization when his wife, Tatjana Josipović, was quoted answering the question 
about her husband’s biggest flaw. As reported in Večernji list, Tatjana Josipović 
stated: “I find it difficult to find a serious flaw with him. What makes me most angry is 
when he is late for lunch on Sunday and then everything gets cold.” (8.1.2010.). 
However, there are more examples of leaders’ private matters being politicized, i.e. 
information from a leader’s private sphere is explicitly being tied to his/her political 
roles. To illustrate, Večernji list reported about the mismatch between Prime Minister 
Kosor’s private life and her political convictions in an article that stated: “Kosor, who 
positioned herself as a conservative politician since her entry into politics in 1995, is 
actually a two time divorcee and a single mother.” (3.7.2009.). In like manner, Prime 
Minister Milanović and President Josipović’s private religious beliefs have been 
connected to their political roles by stating that “two public officials will congratulate 
the religious holiday not because of their convictions, but out of respect for the 
catholic majority in the country. They will be President Ivo Josipović and the new 
Prime Minister Zoran Milanović, both non-believers, declared agnostics” (Večernji 
list, 2.12.2011.).  
 Although leaders’ political personae are by far the most important element of 
their media images, while their mediated private personae seem to be particularly 
significant only in two cases, the ways in which the mediation of these parts of 
personae develops over time points to the fact that the private persona is 
increasingly gaining relevance. For the entire examined period there doesn’t seem 
to be any trend related to political persona (r=0,14), however if the post-2000 period 
is isolated it is evident that the political persona-centred reporting has declined (r=-
0,6). At the same time, the political/private persona has grown in the entire period 
(r=0,5), without losing momentum in the post-2000 period. On the contrary, the trend 
is even slightly stronger for the post-2000 period (r=0,52). Given that the private 
persona-centred coverage doesn’t change much over the years (r=0,07), and shows 
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only a weak positive trend in the post-2000 period (r=0,3), the decrease of the 
political persona-centred reporting and the increase of the political/private persona-
centred reporting seem to be the biggest structural changes that happened in the 
observed periods. These trends appear even more important when they are put in 
context. 
 The decrease in the political persona-centred reporting might have led to the 
decrease in the persona-centred reporting, but the trend for persona-centred 
reporting is weaker. This means that the political persona-centred reporting was to 
an extent substituted with reporting about a different part of the persona, mostly a 
political/private one since that one shows the most significant growth. Put simply, 
from 2000 there is less and less information about the leaders’ political life and 
qualities in the articles that mention them, while the public has more information 
about their politicized private lives and qualities. This trend seems particularly 
important for the 2010s given that prior analyses have shown that the number of 
articles published per week, as well as their representation in the overall number of 
articles, have decreased in this period. In other words, newspaper readers in the 
2010s not only have less information available about their leaders, but this 
information is increasingly being related to the leader’s political/private persona. 
Hence, it seems that private information has penetrated the political sphere to a 
significant extent in the past few years, although it is rarely presented in a 
completely private context, but rather it is being politicized. It might be inferred from 
this that the private persona is increasingly being used as a tool in creating a 
politician’s political image. This suggestion is further supported by the fact that all 
articles, in which a leader’s persona was presented predominantly in a 
political/private context, have been published in the politically-oriented sections of 
the newspaper. Given that the percentage of articles that mentioned leaders in non-
politically oriented newspaper sections have been reduced significantly from 2000 
(10,9% Mesić-related articles were published in non-politically oriented sections, 
while only 1,8% of articles that mention Milanović were published there; r=-0,62), 
this too points to the fact that the politicization of private personae and the 
interweaving of political and private information has come to partly replace the 
political information about leaders in the media. That is, in political sections there is 
less exclusively political information about leaders, and there is increasing 
penetration of private information, which is being politicized. For example, Prime 
Minister Kosor’s private issues with appearance have been politicized in this 
statement: “Jadranka Kosor looks like a person who is afraid to make changes to 
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her appearance. Hence, this begs the question how she will be able to make 
changes in the country” (Večernji list, 3.7.2009.). 
According to the debate about the positive and negative effects of persona-
centred political communication, which was presented in Chapter 2, this scenario is 
the one that worries some critics the most. In short, they argue that the focus on 
private information in media reporting might trivialize political discourse, distract the 
public from important political issues and provide voters with irrational base on 
which they might make their electoral decisions (Franklin, 2004; Langer, 2011; 
Thompson, 2000). In addition, in the post-communist context it is argued that a 
special danger comes from abusing private information, which is often 
manufactured, in order to harm political opponents (Ledeneva, 2006; Örnebring, 
2012; Voltmer, 2000), and this is partly what seems to be happening in Croatia. The 
data show that 18,9% of articles in which the political/private persona was dominant 
was presented in a positive context, while 28,4% cases were presented in a 
negative context. That is, when private information is politicized in the media, it more 
often harms a politician’s reputation, than builds it. This is in line with theories about 
the use of kompromat, especially compromising information about politicians’ private 
life, as a form of power struggle between political actors in post-communist societies 
(Ledeneva, 2006). To illustrate, Vjesnik reported that HDZ official Zlatko Canjuga in 
the 1999 campaign for parliamentary elections suggested that SDP’s Ivica Račan 
did not deserve to be Croatia’s Prime Minister because he danced with drug addicts 
at rock concerts (Vjesnik, 29.12.1999.), Večernji list covered Josipović’s attack on 
2009 independent Presidential candidate Milan Bandić’s political morals saying that 
he can not talk about morality because he divorced his wife only to be able to get 
two social apartments (Večernji list, 3.1.2010.) etc.  
With regard to heads of the executive, there are two main findings from Figure 
10. Firstly, the positive trend related to the political/private persona is even stronger 
than when all political leaders are included in the analysis (r=0,82). Although the 
trend is not linear, after 2000 there is no return to pre-2000 values. Secondly, there 
is no decrease in the political persona-centred reporting, which has actually 
increased (r=0,44). Given that the persona-centred reporting also has a positive 
trend (r=0,67), the conclusion which can be drawn from this is that in the case of 
heads of the executive the private information about leaders has not substituted 
political information, but rather that it has supplemented it and led to an increase in 
the persona-centred reporting. This, however, does not change the fact that due to 
the decrease in the number of articles that mention leaders and their representation 
in the overall number of articles, newspaper readers in the 2010s received less 
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information about what their leaders did as politicians, and more about how his/her 
private persona is related to the political one.  
 
 
Figure 10. Structure of a head of the executive persona references presented as 
percentage of all articles mentioning a head of executive 
 
Finally, it is also worth comparing this data for Presidents and Prime Ministers. 
With regard to Presidents, they show very strong trends for both private persona 
(r=0,77) and political/private persona (r=0,82), while political persona remains in all 
cases dominant and without any significant change over time (r=-0,06). In the Prime 
Ministers’ case, the political persona is again dominant, but contrary to the 
Presidents’ case, shows a weak positive trend (r=0,41). Also, as opposed to 
Presidents, private persona has a negative trend (-0,56), while the degree of a 
political/private persona hasn’t changed much over time (r=-0,05).  
This data points to the fact that the politicization of the private and the 
penetration of the private in the Croatian mediated discourse is mostly related to 
Presidents, especially since their executive powers have been reduced, and other 
heads of the executive. It can be speculated, based on this information, that media 
pays more attention to private matters, and considers them important as a tool in 
building politician’s political image, when it comes to the most powerful leaders or 
when the political role that the leader has is personalized. Higher degrees of private 
and political/private persona-centred reporting of post-2000 Presidents might be 
related to their new role which was mostly down to the representation of the country 
at home and abroad. In this situation it becomes less important what a leader thinks 
on political issues, while his private life gets more space in the image building 
processes, as is especially evident in Josipović’s case. The growth in post-2000 
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Presidents’ private and political/private personae can also be seen as a factor in the 
overall increased visibility of these leaders’ personae in the media. It was 
established before that Mesić and Josipović had the most visible personae in the 
post-2000 period, and it seems that the focus on their private sphere has 
significantly contributed to this. Illustratively, if Josipović’s private and 
political/private personae have not been mentioned, his persona would be the least 
visible in the post-2000 period. On the other hand, the increase in the heads of the 
executive’s political/private persona-centred reporting might indicate that the media 
are increasingly trying to present a more complex picture of the leader who is the 
most powerful individual in the country, and this can be seen as a new trend in 
media reporting since it was not evident in Tito’s and Tuđman’s case. From the 
2000s the mediation of leaders’ private information became more common and it 
could have contributed more than in previous decades to the creation of a 
politician’s image, although this mediated private information seems to more 
frequently hurt rather than build it. But that again might be seen as a characteristic 
of a post-communist context in which kompromat is being fed to the journalists as a 
tool in political struggles.  
 
5.4.  Conclusion 
 
 It was stated in the introduction to this chapter that its main aim is to explore 
the continuities and changes between the ways in which leadership was 
personalized in media reporting in communist Yugoslavia and its successor, post-
communist Croatia. These patterns of stability and change were analyzed in relation 
to two dimensions of personalisation of political communication, person- and 
persona-centred media reporting.  
The most important change that is evident from the analysis of person-
centred media reporting is that there seems to be a process of de-personalisation of 
media reporting in place. Specifically, heads of executive, leaders with most power 
in the country, have over time become less prominent in the media according to all 
indicators of person-centred media reporting. There is a continuous decrease in the 
number of articles published about them, these articles represent increasingly 
smaller portions of all published articles, and leaders’ parties have become more 
visible in relation to them. However, these trends are not linear and it seems that 
contextual factors play an important role in the media prominence of all leaders.  
In spite of this de-personalisation trend, there seems to be more similarities 
than differences between communist and early post-communist period, the latter 
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being quite different to the rest of the post-communist period. The narratives about 
communist leader’s cults which suggest that the leader had a significant place in 
media reporting can be seen as confirmed by this analysis. The media mentioned 
Tito in the largest percentage of articles of all examined leaders, and he was also in 
the view of the media much more important political actor than his party. Similar 
things can be said about Tuđman, the first post-communist President and head of 
executive. His dominance over Croatian politics in 1990s was demonstrated by 
reporting similar to Tito’s, but also by making comparisons with Prime Ministers who 
were in power during his presidency. Prime Ministers Valentić and Mateša were in 
comparison to Tuđman almost invisible. According to the ways in which political 
actors were reported, both Tito’s and Tuđman’s parties revolved around them and 
were primarily defined by them, a practice that continued throughout the post-
communist period. However, in the post-2000 period parties’ have grown in 
importance as measured by their media visibility, and there is also evidence that 
they are increasingly being associated with party officials other than the leaders 
which could lead to a perception of decentralization of power in parties. In spite of 
these new trends, and in line with theories that suggest that post-communist politics 
revolve around individuals, this analysis has shown that the most media visible 
political actors are individuals, political leaders. This enduring perception of 
individuals’ power over institutions such as parties might be evidence of the 
continuing weakness of party system that could be perpetuated by constant 
emphasis on individuals.  
The patterns of stability and change are also observable with regard to the 
persona-centred reporting. With regard to similarities between communist and post-
communist contexts, political persona-centred reporting was dominant in all cases 
indicating that media did and do primarily report leaders’ political life and qualities.  
However, there are also certain changes that were observed in persona-
centred media reporting. One of the most important ones is the increase in the 
political/private persona centred reporting, especially in the post-2000 period. In 
other words, leaders’ private matters have been increasingly politicized in media 
reporting since 2000. In addition, since the degree of political persona-centred 
reporting has decreased more than the general degree of persona-centred 
reporting, and given that politicized private information is from the end of 2000s 
published exclusively in politically oriented sections of the papers, it seems that the 
private information has come to replace to an extent the political information about 
leaders. It should also be noted that the media is reporting more of this kind of 
information while at the same time decreasing the amount of coverage dedicated to 
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leaders, but also that politicized private information is more frequently presented in a 
negative than positive context. These trends could be seen as worrying for those 
who consider private information trivial and politically irrelevant, because media 
might be seen as increasingly invading leaders’ private sphere and using private 
information to harm their political images, while at the same time decreasing the 
amount of pure political information about leaders, and the amount of leaders’ 
coverage in general. 
This chapter aimed to explore the personalisation of mediated political 
communication through the lens of media reporting. In the next chapter the focus will 
be put on the ways in which political leaders were reported as personalizing political 
communication.  
 
 151
6. Personalisation in leaders’ mediated communication 
 
The second empirical chapter examines the degree to which political leaders’ 
mediated communication was personalized over time, explores the ways in which 
the leaders were reported as personalizing political communication, and compares 
the features of personalisation in media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication. Hence, two main research questions are posed in this chapter. 
Firstly, what patterns of stability and change can be observed with regard to the 
ways in which political leaders in communism and post-communism were reported 
as personalizing their communication? And secondly, what are the similarities and 
differences in how mediated political communication was personalized in media 
reporting and leaders’ mediated communication? The first part of the chapter will 
elaborate on the methodology used to answer these research questions. 
The subsequent section addresses research questions from the perspective of 
person-centred political communication. Specifically, this part of the chapter looks 
into whether leaders’ communication strategy can be seen as person- or party-
centred, based on their mediated statements. The aim is to explore whether the de-
personalisation trends found in media reporting can also be found in leaders’ 
mediated communication. Similarly to media, the leaders might have increased the 
visibility of their parties and their importance in political communication, and public 
discourse in general, by a greater emphasis on them. On the other hand, if leaders 
have persistently downplayed the role of political parties in the post-communist 
system by not acknowledging them in their mediated communication, and putting 
themselves as individuals at the centre of political communication, this could have 
hindered the institutionalisation of the party system and the development of strong 
parties in general. For the advocates of party democracies this is usually seen as a 
development detrimental to democratic processes.   
The final part of the chapter looks at the persona-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication and aims to explore the extent to which leaders can be seen as 
putting themselves at the centre of their communication; how, if at all, they were 
reported as using information from their private sphere to construct their image; and 
what similarities and differences exist in the ways in which leaders might have been 
seen to use their private personae in different time periods. As Langer (2011:10) 
nicely sums up, the penetration of the private into the public sphere “raises in its 
most concentrated form anxiety at irrationality in politics, as we are invited to judge 
politicians through the prism of mediated intimacy and authenticity rather than 
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through (supposedly) rational judgments of policy, record, and ideology”, while at the 
same time “the process may affect the recruitment of political elites, as it threatens 
the right to privacy and becomes a deterrent to run for public office”. The analysis of 
persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication should shed light on the question 
of which political communication actor initiated certain trends of personalisation. 
Should political leaders be seen as those who have started publicizing and 
politicizing their private sphere, or did the media start revealing this kind of 
information and consequently made political actors adapt to their communication 
strategy and pursue a more personalized communication themselves? Finally, is it 
even possible to discern clear-cut trends? Although the final answer to this question 
will be given in the next chapter, the comparison of persona-centred media reporting 
and leaders’ mediated communication in this chapter will set the ground for that 
discussion. In short, the analysis of persona-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication might give us an indication of who is “to blame” for the penetration of 
the private into Croatian mediated political communication, and also whether there is 
any reason to worry about the infringed politicians’ privacy since the politicians might 
have initiated the process themselves by making their private matters public to a 
greater extent than the media.   
 
6.1.  Methodology 
 
Given that the aims of this analysis are to reveal the extent to which a 
leader’s mediated communication is person- and persona centred, and establish 
recurring patterns in the ways in which leaders are seen to communicate, content 
analysis was deemed the most appropriate research method. Content analysis 
enables the researcher to detect the frequency of references to a particular content 
(Berger, 2011; Deacon, 2007) and it allows the analysis “of a greater number of 
examples of a particular type of text by applying the same criteria to each instance” 
(Davies & Mosdell, 2006: 98), so it is good for establishing the features of leaders’ 
mediated communication in a comparative perspective.  
Following Grbeša (2004: 61) whose research, among other things, examined 
the extent to which Croatian politicians in their mediated statements express 
partisanship as opposed to not mentioning their parties (i.e. person-centred 
communication), the unit of analysis is a mediated statement which is defined as 
“the totality of words within article that was reported as having been said by the 
candidate”. However, it must be born in mind that the analyzed leaders’ 
communication is mediated, which means that it is the result of a journalistic 
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selection processes and is subject to editing. In other words, analysis of leaders’ 
mediated statements might reveal more about what type of leaders’ statements the 
media found newsworthy, than what the leaders aimed to achieve with it. Hence, 
although the ability to infer intention and strategy on behalf of leaders is limited, 
what this analysis can show is how leaders’ communication strategies might have 
been perceived based on their mediated statements. The public mostly receives 
information about leaders from the media (Car & Andrijašević, 2012; Robinson, 
1977), so their mediated communication for the majority of public might be the only 
source of information on how leaders behave and what kind of messages they 
communicate. From this perspective, the analysis of leaders’ mediated statements 
can reveal what kind of image leaders’ might be seen as aiming to construct and 
what kind of communication strategies they could have been perceived to pursue. 
The sample comprises all statements made by Croatian and Yugoslav 
political leaders contained in articles from the sample in Chapter 5. Hence, the time 
span covered by this analysis is from 1974 to 2013 for the reasons explained earlier, 
and the statements are taken from the articles published in national daily 
newspapers Večernji list, Vjesnik and 24sata. The reasons for using the first sample 
to construct the second one are twofold.  
Firstly, by using the first sample to create the second one, this empirical 
investigation represents an even more detailed analysis of media reporting. This can 
reveal in which kinds of leaders’ statements the media is most interested in and to 
what extent are person- or persona-centred statements newsworthy.  
Secondly, the findings related to the personalisation in media reporting and 
personalisation in leaders’ communication that are derived from the same material 
and time period are better suited for comparisons than if this wouldn’t be the case. 
In other words, the comparability of the extent to which media personalize political 
communication and the degree to which leaders are seen to do so is increased by 
using this design. As Lengauer and Winder (2013: 14) point out, “there exists a 
substantial lack of comparative studies contrasting party and media communication 
by applying common conceptual and operational definitions”. Hence, there is a 
limited number of existing research approaches that might have been used for the 
comparison of personalisation in politicians’ communication and media reporting. Of 
studies that have dealt with this issue, Langer (2011) used content analysis to study 
personalisation in media, and historical qualitative analysis to analyze 
personalisation in leaders’ communication. Partly due to the differences in methods 
she was only able to draw some tentative conclusions about the interplay between 
these two political communication actors. Lengauer and Winder  (2013) applied the 
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same method, content analysis, to media reporting and parties’ press releases, to 
determine how the media and political actors personalized political communication. 
In my view this is a better approach since it is easier to make comparisons from data 
gathered by the same method. The fact that they analyzed two types of materials, 
i.e. press releases and media reporting, meant that they were better able to 
determine whether political actors intended to personalize their communication. 
However, the analysis of press releases does not convey how politicians’ strategies 
might have been perceived in the public, since arguably press releases are intended 
for the media and they do not have to be communicated to a larger public in the 
original form. In other words, this approach to studying personalisation in politicians’ 
communication does not reveal how the politicians might have been perceived to 
personalize their communication among public, since it is unclear which information 
from the press releases reached the public. The comparison of media reporting and 
leaders’ mediated statements might be more revealing in this regard. In addition, 
Lengauer and Winder’s analysis focused on a single event (the 2008 Austrian 
parliamentary campaign). Gathering press releases for a longitudinal study in this 
project would be difficult, if not impossible, given that there are no databases that 
might have been used. Hence, because of the extensiveness of research carried out 
in this thesis, creating a sample for the analysis of leaders’ communication by using 
the sample from previous analysis simplifies and facilitates gathering and analysis of 
data.  
 
6.1.1. Research design 
The coding sheet was divided into four sections. The first section focused on 
structural details, the second one was created to code for references to party, the 
third was designed to reveal some general characteristics of the references to 
personae, and the final one was constructed to provide a more nuanced, detailed 
account of the features of persona leaders focus on in their statements.  
 The variables in the first section were designed to code for the newspaper 
that published the statement, the year and week of analysis they were published in, 
and the author of the statement.  
 The second section had only one variable that was constructed to account 
for the presence or absence of the reference to a leader’s party in the statement. 
The variable in the third section was designed to reveal the pre-dominant context in 
which the references to the persona has been made (political, private, 
political/private) based on the same grounds that were explained in the case of 
analysis of media reporting. As in the analysis of media reporting, a leader’s 
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persona was operationalized as consisting of 22 life areas and qualities – work, 
youth, family, love life, appearance, lifestyle, religion, feelings, relationships, health, 
finances, openness, intellect, conscientiousness, extroversion, niceness, 
assertiveness, emotional stability and temper, people skills, data analysis skills and 
skills in use of things and tools. Again, as in the previous analysis, all of these life 
areas, traits and skills had the option of being coded as mentioned in a political, 
private or political/private context. The rationale for using these variables and coding 
for different types of context have been explained in the research design for the 
analysis of media reporting (Chapter 5).  
 In sum, the research questions posed in this chapter are answered through a 
historical quantitative content analysis of Yugoslav and Croatian leaders’ mediated 
statements from 1974 to 2013. The sample comprises 627 statements, including 
every statement reported to have been made by political leaders whose 
communication is analyzed in this thesis in the three examined daily newspapers. A 
trained second coder coded 70 randomly selected statements (11%). Average 
reliability score calculated using Holsti’s method of agreement across all categories 
was 0.96, with individual variable scores ranging from 0.83 to 1. Detailed results for 
each category can be found in the Appendix 4.  
 
6.2.  Person-centred leaders’ mediated communication 
 
 The first analysis is that of the person-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication. It aims to reveal the extent to which leaders in their mediated 
communication focused on themselves as opposed to their parties, given that the 
person-centred dimension is concerned with the focus that is in political 
communication put on the individual political actors, and the strength of this 
emphasis on individuals is usually evaluated against the prominence of collective 
political actors. 
Specific research questions that this section of the chapter aims to answer are: 
1. To what extent can the communist leader be perceived as promoting his 
party by emphasizing it in his mediated statements? 
2. How, if at all, has leaders’ focus on collective political actors changed during 
the transitional period according to their mediated statements? 
3. Which political actors can be seen as attributing most relevance to parties 
according to the amount of attention they gave them in their mediated 
communication? 
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4. What similarities and differences can be observed with regard to the extent 
to which individual and collective political actors were visible in media 
reporting and leaders’ mediated statements, in different periods of transition? 
Two indicators were designed to help answer these questions.  The first one 
is based on the number of references to parties that the leaders made in their 
mediated statements. Specifically, this indicator tells us in what percentage of 
mediated statements the leader mentioned his/her party. In other words, this 
indicator reveals the degree to which leaders' mediated communication might be 
seen as party-centred, and the aim of this analysis is to examine the importance that 
the leaders were perceived to give to a collective political actor in mediated public 
discourse. 
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Figure 11. Party-centred leaders' mediated communication 
 
The second indicator shows us the ratio of leader to party mentions in 
leaders' mediated statements. In other words, it compares the number of statements 
in which the leader made a reference to his/her persona with the number of 
statements in which the leader mentioned his/her party. If in one statement the 
leader mentioned both his/her persona and his/her party, it was counted for both 
variables. For the reasons outlined at the beginning of previous chapter, only those 
statements reported in the first week of analysis are included in this sample. 
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Figure 12. The ratio of leaders' persona to party mentions in leaders' mediated 
statements 
 
 
6.2.1. Communist leader’s mediated communication -  What party? 
The data from the communist era reinforces the findings related to the 
person-centred media reporting. Specifically, the party was as a collective political 
actor as insignificant in leaders’ mediated communication as it was in the media 
reporting. Communist leader Tito barely mentioned the SKJ (The League of 
Communist of Yugoslavia) in his mediated statements; he refers to it in only 11,8% 
of his statements. Also, he mentions his persona 3,5 times more frequently than the 
SKJ. The data from the previous chapter pointed to the fact that Tito was portrayed 
in the media as the most important political actor, mentioned without a reference to 
SKJ 2,5 times more frequently than the party has been mentioned without a 
reference to him or some other party member. Hence, it seems that Tito and the 
media can be seen as pursuing similar, person-centred, styles of communication. 
Consequently, it might be argued that the mediated political communication in 
communism was in general personalized, centred on the leader, while the collective 
political actor, the party, seemed far less important in political processes according 
to the amount of attention that it was given in media reporting and the mediated 
leader’s communication.  
In addition, unlike in the analysis of media reporting, there are no apparent 
similarities between the mediated leaders’ communication in communism and early 
post-communism, i.e. between communist leader Tito and first Croatian President 
Franjo Tuđman. The only leader who pursued a less party-centred communication 
than communist leader Tito was President Ivo Josipović in the 2010s, while the only 
leader whose communication was more party-centred than Tuđman’s was Prime 
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Minister Sanader’s in the 2000s (Figure 11). Furthermore, Tito made a reference to 
his persona 3,5 times more frequently than to his party, while Tuđman actually made 
more references to his party than to his persona (Figure 12). Hence, communist 
leader Tito and the first post-communist leader Tuđman might have been seen as 
pursuing quite different communication styles based on their mediated 
communication. The impression that might have been created by their mediated 
statements was that Tito put all the emphasis on himself and neglected the party, 
while Tuđman could be seen as putting a significant focus on his party as soon as 
the multi-party democratic system was introduced. This shows that although the 
communist and early post-communist leader were reported to a similar extent in 
media, these political leaders might have been perceived as differing greatly in their 
communication. Hence, the similarities between the personalisation of mediated 
political communication in the communist and early post-communist era seem to be 
related only to the ways in which media content was personalized, while the leaders’ 
mediated communication differed to a great extent.  
What is also evident from Figures 11 and 12 is that there is no trend over 
time which would suggest that the leaders have since communism focused more, or 
less, on their parties in their communication, nor are there significant trends related 
to heads of the executive, Presidents or Prime Ministers. In other words, while the 
analysis of media reporting found that the heads of the executive have over time 
became significantly less media visible, with political parties' media visibility growing 
over time, the same trend was not found with regard to leaders' mediated 
communication.  
 
6.2.2. From differences to routinisation 
Although there are no significant trends over time related to person-centred 
mediated leaders' communication, it seems that the positions that a politician has in 
the party and political system can be important factors contributing to his/her 
degrees of person-centred mediated communication. Specifically, in the post-
communist era, all leaders who were heads of the executive and party leaders 
centred more on their parties in their communication, than those who didn't hold 
these positions. And furthermore, those leaders who were not heads of the 
executive and were not party leaders more frequently put the focus in their 
statements on themselves rather than on the parties of which they were members. 
The 1990s head executive and party leader, President Tuđman, was 
reported as pursuing less person-centred communication than his Prime Ministers 
Valentić and Mateša. Similarly, in the post-2000 period, head executives and party 
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leaders, Prime Ministers Račan, Sander, Kosor and Milanović, put greater focus on 
their parties than themselves in comparison to the mediated communication of 
Presidents Mesić and Josipović. Hence, it appears as though those political actors 
that can be seen as emphasizing political collectives and by this perhaps increasing 
the importance of political parties in the system, are party leaders who hold the 
highest executive positions.  
However, even the extent to which these actors were reported as focusing 
on political parties does not seem to have contributed significantly to making parties 
appear more powerful or important in political systems. According to Figure 11 only 
Prime Minister Sanader mentioned his party in more than half of his mediated 
statements, while head executives who succeeded him were reported as referring to 
their parties in less than 20% of their statements (Kosor, Milanović). In addition, only 
party leaders and head executives who might have been seen as putting more focus 
on their parties than on themselves in their communication are President Tuđman 
and Prime Minister Sanader. Their persona to party ratios are 0,9 and 0,7, 
respectively (Figure 12). Hence, although heads of the executive and party leaders 
might have been perceived as giving more importance to parties by mentioning 
them more frequently than other actors, their communication should still not be 
considered party-centred since the references to party did not constitute a major 
part of their mediated communication. Similarly, the findings from the media 
reporting analysis pointed to the fact that the parties were not the most important 
political actors in the mediated political communication according to the amount of 
attention they were given in media reporting, and also that they were in the majority 
of cases mentioned in connection to their leaders. Therefore, it seems that in 
mediated political communication in general the parties appeared secondary to 
leaders and were mostly defined by their leaders, what might have created a 
perception of individuals’ greater importance relative to, and power over, political 
parties. 
The differences between the extent to which different political actors are 
reported to pursue party- or person-centred communication seem to have 
decreased in the late post-communist period. Specifically, since the end of 2000s it 
seems that there was a routinisation of person-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication since the leaders were not reported as differing greatly in their 
degrees of party- and person-centred communication.  
Figures 11 and 12 show that, unlike in the first two decades of post-
communism, the differences between party leaders and heads of the executive and 
those who didn’t hold these positions, are less prominent. Party leaders and head 
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executives Prime Ministers Jadranka Kosor and Zoran Milanović, were reported as 
mentioning their parties as rarely as the President Josipović who was not a party 
leader nor head executive (Kosor in 19,8%, Milanović in 12,5%, and Josipović in 
11,4% of statements). They also more frequently focused on their personae than on 
their parties in their communication (Kosor’s ratio of persona to party mentions is 4, 
Milanović’s is 2,3, and Josipović’s is 6,4). This suggests that in 2010s leaders might 
have been perceived as practicing more person- rather than party-centred 
communication, and that this person-centred communication has become a 
standard feature of leaders’ mediated communication.  
 
6.2.3. Leaders as agents of personalisation 
In order to answer the final research question posed in this section, i.e. what 
are the similarities and differences between person-centred media reporting and 
mediated leaders’ communication, the data related to these two political 
communication actors needs to be compared. What was already established was 
that the de-personalisation trend which was discovered with regard to media 
reporting is not a feature of Croatian mediated political communication in general, 
since there are no de-personalising trends related to leaders’ mediated 
communication. The differences between the ways in which the media and leaders 
can be seen to pursue person-centred communication are further confirmed by the 
comparison of ratios of leader-to-party mentions from the media analysis and 
statement analysis (Figure 13). The data show that while the media have over time 
put more focus on parties at the expense of the heads of the executives, which 
resulted in the de-personalisation of media reporting, the same trend can not be 
observed with regard to leaders’ communication. There are no trends whatsoever 
connected with the person-centred leaders’ mediated communication, not even 
when only heads of the executive, Presidents or Prime Ministers are looked at, 
indicating that the degree to which the leader pursues a person- or party-centred 
communication might be mostly dependent on the leader himself/herself and/or be 
contextual. However, some micro trends could be observed with regard to different 
time periods. Specifically, in the first two decades of post-communism both the 
media and leaders pursued less person-centred and more party-centred 
communication, while in communism and late post-communism (i.e. the 2010s) the 
differences between the degrees of person-centred communication between these 
two political communication actors grew significantly. In other words, this 
comparison reveals that leaders were reported as personalizing political 
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communication to a greater extent than the media at all times, but especially in 
communism and late post-communism.  
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Figure 13. The comparison of person-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication 
Note: the person-centred media reporting was calculated as the ratio of articles mentioning leaders to articles 
mentioning their party. The person-centred leader's communication was calculated as the ratio of leaders' 
statements in which they referred to their personae to statements in which they referred to their party.  Thus, the 
figures for each series refer to different Ns. 
 
 In sum, the analysis of person-centred leaders’ mediated communication 
revealed that the communist leader was rarely reported as mentioning his party, 
while at the same time putting considerable amount of attention on himself. Given 
that the media reporting also focused more on the leader than on the party, the 
conclusion is that political individuals in communism might have been perceived 
much more important than collectives according to the attention they received in 
mediated political communication. Furthermore, the analysis found no trends which 
would suggest that the leaders have over time focused more or less on political 
parties in their mediated communication. However, there are still considerable 
differences in the extent to which their mediated communication was person-
centred, up until the late post-communist period. This points to the fact that the 
reasons why leaders’ mediated communication was person-centred might have 
been quite leader-specific, although it seems that party leaders who were head 
executives tended to be portrayed as mentioning their parties more frequently than 
those who didn’t hold these positions. Finally, leaders in both communism and post-
communism can be seen as pursuing person-centred communication to a far 
greater extent than media. This would mean that political actors are those that could 
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be perceived as raising the importance of individual actors above political institutions 
in the mediated public discourse.  
 
6.3.  Persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication  
 
The persona-centred dimension of personalisation of political communication 
refers to the focus on a leader’s life and qualities, whether those have been 
presented in a political, private or political/private context. This section of the chapter 
reports the analysis of the persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication and 
answers these research questions: 
1. To what extent was the communist leader reported as 
communicating information about himself and how, if at all, did the 
reported leaders’ focus on their personae changed during the 
transitional period? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in the type of information 
that leaders’ are reported to communicate about themselves? 
3. How, if at all, are leaders seen to use the information from their 
private sphere in their communication? 
4. What similarities and differences can be observed with regard to 
the ways in which leaders’ personae were portrayed in media 
reporting and leaders’ mediated statements, in different periods of 
transition? 
In order to establish the extent to which the communist leader was reported 
to focus on himself in his communication, and how, if at all, this style of 
communication changed in the transitional period, the degree of the persona-
centred leaders’ mediated communication was established as a percentage of all 
leader’s statements in which he/she mentioned his/her persona (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14. The persona-centred leaders' mediated communication (the percentage of 
leader’s mediated statements that contain a reference to a leader’s persona) 
 
6.3.1. Differences between dimensions of personalisation 
What this analysis shows is that there are several significant differences in 
the trends related to person- and persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication 
and the factors that might have contributed to it.  
Firstly, it was previously argued that in post-communism those leaders who 
were heads of the executive and party leaders were reported as pursuing less 
person-centred communication than those who did not hold these positions. In 
contrast, the data presented in Figure 14 shows that in the 1990s the head of the 
executive and party leader Franjo Tuđman’s mediated communication was more 
persona-centred than that of his Prime Ministers, Valentić and Mateša, who were 
not heads of the executive and party leaders. However, in the post-2000 period this 
changes. Specifically, since 2000 it seems that those leaders whose mediated 
statements suggest they pursued less person-centred communication, can also be 
seen as putting less focus on their personae in their statements.  
In addition, while there were no trends related to President’s and Prime 
Minister’s person-centred mediated communication, weak positive trends can be 
observed with regard to the persona-centred mediated communication of these 
actors. In other words, both Presidents (r=0,49) and Prime Ministers (r=0,58) have 
over time increased the focus on their personae. And furthermore, Presidents have 
at all times put more emphasis on their personae than Prime Ministers. The fact that 
Presidents were reported as being more willing to emphasize something they did, 
thought, and what they are like etc. might be connected with the fact that Presidents 
are usually seen as those who make decisions independently and as individuals 
might be more powerful than Prime Ministers heading executive collectives. Hence, 
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if as individuals they are responsible for something, it appears as if they make it 
clear in their communication. What is interesting, though, is that the highest degree 
of persona-centred mediated communication is related to two Presidents who were 
not head executives, i.e. they were not powerful enough to make important 
decisions independently. It could be speculated that one of the reasons why 
Presidents Mesić and Josipović were reported as emphasizing their personae to 
such a high extent lies precisely in the fact that they were stripped of many 
executive powers. In other words, once they were no longer the most important 
political actors in the country, they might have been more inclined to put the focus in 
their communication on their actions and qualities, in order to communicate the 
message that they still count in the political system. Prime Ministers were also 
reported as communicating more persona-related information in the post-2000 
period, but a more likely reason for this is the fact that they became head executives 
in this period and consequently, more important and powerful in making executive 
decisions. Hence, once they became head executives it became more important 
what they think, do, and what they are like as individuals, and this is the type of 
information that the media increasingly reported them talking about. In spite of their 
increased persona-centred mediated communication in the post-2000 period, Prime 
Ministers were still reported as putting less emphasis on themselves than 
Presidents, so it does not come as a surprise that the trend related to the head 
executives is a weak negative one (r=-0,42). In other words, the analysis shows that 
the most powerful individuals have over time been reported as decreasing the 
number of references to their personae, and one of the most important reasons for 
this might be the change in the country’s political system in 2000.  
In sum, the positions that political actors have in the political system and 
party can be seen as contributing to the extent to which they are reported to 
communicate in a person- and persona-centred way, but how their positions 
influence their mediated communication and dimensions of personalisation seems to 
depend upon other factors. Being a head executive and party leader might be 
connected with higher degree of persona-centred communication, but lower degree 
of person-centred communication. However, it can also be connected to lower 
degree in both person- and persona-centred communication. In addition, those who 
hold the position of a President seem more likely to be reported as communicating 
in a persona-centred way, but not necessarily in a person-centred way. Hence, it 
appears as though the position in a political system and party might contribute to 
personalisation in leaders’ mediated communication, but its influence depends on 
other factors, some of which might be the type of political system, electoral system, 
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the extent to which the media communicates persona-related information etc. Also, 
this development points to the fact that some factors might influence dimensions of 
personalisation in a different way, i.e. they might contribute to lower degrees of one 
dimension, but higher of the other. 
Secondly, the comparison of trends in person- and persona-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication also suggest that these two dimensions follow different 
trends and it shouldn’t be assumed that just because one dimension became routine 
in political communication, the same will happen with the other one. Specifically, 
while the indicators of person-centred leaders’ communication pointed to the fact 
that person-centred communication became a standard feature of leaders’ mediated 
communication in the 2010s, this is not the case with persona-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication. There are significant differences in the degrees of 
reported emphasis on the personae not only between the President and the Prime 
Ministers, but also among the Prime Ministers in this time period. Specifically, 
President Josipović mentioned his persona in 72,4% of his mediated statements, 
which makes his communication the most persona-centred of all leaders. Prime 
Minister Kosor, who was in power when Josipović was elected in 2010, referred to 
her persona in 57% of her statements, while Prime Minister Milanović who came to 
power in 2011 put the emphasis on his persona in only 37,9% of his statements, 
making 1990s Prime Ministers Valentić and Mateša the only ones who were 
reported as pursuing less persona-centred communication than him. Therefore, it 
seems that the person-centred mediated communication became the standard 
among leaders in the 2010s, but persona-centred did not. In other words, all political 
leaders in late post-communism were reported as putting more focus on themselves 
than on their parties, but they differed greatly in how much emphasis they are seen 
as placing on their personae.  
 
6.3.2. Who is putting the focus on leaders’ personae? 
In order to establish the similarities and differences in the persona-centred 
media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication, it is necessary to compare 
the data related to the two political communication actors. What this comparison 
reveals is that the media reporting was at all times more persona-centred than 
heads of the executives’ mediated communication (and of all leaders in general). 
Specifically, when media reported leaders they more frequently referred to what 
those leaders did, thought, said, felt, and what they were like, than did the leaders 
themselves. Furthermore, while the prominence of leaders’ personae has increased 
over time in the media, it has decreased in the leaders’ mediated communication. 
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These are completely different conclusions to those reached based on the 
comparative analysis of person-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication. It is also interesting to note that those leaders whose personae 
were more visible in the media have been reported as putting less focus on 
themselves in their statements, while those leaders whose personae were less 
prominent in the media could be seen as pursuing more persona-centred 
communication than other leaders. It seems almost as if the leaders were portrayed 
as trying to compensate with their communication for the lack of mediated 
information related to them, while they might not have thought it was necessary to 
put too much focus on themselves if the media was already doing so. However, this 
is just a speculation.  
Finally, what Figure 15 also shows is that the extent of persona-centred 
media reporting was more constant than that related to leaders’ mediated 
communication, which was also the case with person-centred mediated political 
communication. In other words, the degree of persona-centred media reporting differ 
less from one leader to the other than the degree of the persona-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication. This, again, might indicate that the contextual factors play 
a more important role in influencing the extent to which leaders were reported as 
emphasizing their personae than in affecting media reporting. This hypothesis will 
be tested in the next chapter.  
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Figure 15. The comparison of persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication 
Note: the persona-centred media reporting was calculated as number of articles that mentioned a leader's persona 
over total number of articles in which a leader was mentioned. The persona-centred leader's communication was 
calculated as number of statements in which the leader referred to his/her persona over total number of statements 
made by the leader. Thus, the figures for each series refer to different Ns. 
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6.3.3. The dominance of politically-based image 
The next step in this analysis is to determine the content of leaders’ 
references to their personae. In other words, the following analysis will look at the 
type of information that the leaders were reported as revealing about themselves. 
Specifically, this section of the chapter will examine how leaders’ were reported as 
creating their public images and how, if at all, they can be seen as using their private 
sphere in this process.  
 It is evident from Figure 16 that all leaders were pre-dominantly reported as 
talking about their political personae, but also that only three leaders (Mateša, 
Račan and Milanović) communicated information exclusively from their political 
sphere. All other leaders made at least some reference to their private and/or 
political/private sphere. For example, Kosor was reported as revealing information 
about her family life in a private context. Večernji list published her statement: “I feel 
like half of me is missing” as a comment of living without a father, who left her and 
her mother when she was only two years old (3.7.2009.). However, in a larger extent 
of her statements she was reported as politicizing, rather than just revealing 
information from her private sphere. To illustrate, she was reported as saying: “I will 
no longer have time to write my poems due to prime ministerial duties” (24sata, 
5.7.2009.). In this way she was portrayed as making a connection between her 
private lifestyle and political role, i.e. she politicized her private lifestyle. President 
Josipović is the leader who was reported as politicizing his private matters to a 
largest extent. For instance, in an interview for Vjesnik he was reported as saying: “I 
have two independent careers so I am not dependent either upon politics or the 
party” (7.1.2010.). By declaring this, Josipović made direct connections between his 
private careers of a university professor and musician and his work in politics.  
 Alongside Josipović, only President Tuđman, and Prime Ministers Valentić 
and Kosor, were reported as mentioning their private and political/private information 
in more than 10% of their mediated statements in which they referred to their 
personae. Specifically, between 15 and 20% of these leaders’ reported references 
to their personae were dominantly related to their private sphere. The large 
differences between these leaders (i.e. they ruled in different time periods, hold 
different positions in party and the political system, were chosen by different voting 
systems, worked in different media environments etc.) suggest that the leaders’ 
focus on their private spheres is more leader-specific than characteristic of a time 
period or developing continually over time. 
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Figure 16. The structure of persona references in leaders' statements (the percentage 
of all statements in which a leader pre-dominantly referred to his/her political, private 
or political/private persona) 
 
However, the data show that the number of references to leaders’ private 
personae has increased over time, but the increase was not drastic (r=0,33). The 
same can be concluded based on the trend related to the prominence of the 
political/private personae (r=0,24). The trends are similarly weak when only head 
executives are included in the analysis (r=0,3 for private persona, r=-0,1 for 
political/private persona). Two of the latest three leaders are among those who were 
reported as putting the most emphasis on their private matters. However, Prime 
Minister Milanović did not mention his private life or qualities in any of his mediated 
statements, although he succeeded Josipović and Kosor who were reported as 
frequently communicating their private matters. This reinforces the hypothesis that 
the extent to which leaders focus on their private personae in their mediated 
communication are first and foremost leader-specific. Also, this suggests that 
although some leaders are reported as communicating their private matters to a 
significant extent, there is no permanent trend which would follow from their 
communication styles. In other words, the leaders who come after those who are 
seen as communicating their private life and qualities do not seem to be inclined to 
pursue the same communication style as those communicating private matters.  
 Given that there is little evidence to suggest that post-communist leaders are 
increasingly communicating information about their private sphere, and that even 
those head executives who put the most emphasis in their mediated statements on 
their private matters did so in under 10% of their statements, there does not seem to 
be reason to worry that political actors are trivializing political communication. There 
are leaders who do not seem to hesitate to share their private information with the 
public, but these should be viewed more as an exception than a rule. Also, it is 
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important to note that those leaders who do communicate private information do not 
seem to have an impact on how other political actors communicate. Hence, 
revealing private information in communist and post-communist context seems to be 
a leader-specific development which does not influence the communication styles of 
other political actors.  
 
6.3.4. Publicizing and politicizing the private 
In order to answer the final research question posed in this section of the 
chapter, i.e. to establish what similarities and differences can be observed with 
regard to the ways in which leaders’ personae were portrayed in media reporting 
and leaders’ mediated statements, the extent to which media reporting and leaders’ 
mediated statements were pre-dominantly centred on politicians’ private and 
political/private spheres is compared in Figures 17 and 18. As mentioned, four 
leaders can be seen as putting more emphasis on their private sphere in their 
mediated statements than the rest, i.e. Presidents Tuđman and Josipović, and 
Prime Ministers Valentić and Kosor. However, what the comparison of the private 
persona (Figure 17) and political/private persona-centred media reporting and 
mediated leaders’ statements (Figure 18) point to is that only President Tuđman and 
Prime Minister Kosor have publicized and politicized their private life to a greater 
extent than the media.  
It is worth noting that the head executive who politicized and publicized 
his/her private matters the most, even more than the media, was the only Croatian 
female leader, Jadranka Kosor. As van Zoonen argues,  “the prominent attention 
given to the private persona and family life of female politicians runs the risk of 
attracting attention to their non-standard gender choices, which may be the reason 
why so often female politicians tend to retreat within the boundaries of the political 
sphere” (2006: 299). However, according to the way in which Kosor’s statements 
were reported it does not seem that she retreated “within the boundaries of the 
political sphere” (ibid.). Strategic communication of her private matters might be one 
explanation of her reported emphasis on her private personae. Another explanation 
might be that Kosor was mostly responding to the agenda of other political actors 
and the media who put the focus on her private persona. Still, given that the sample 
for this analysis was derived from the media coverage of her communication, a likely 
explanation might also be that the media tended to report statements in which she 
talked about her private issues more than her other statements. By doing this the 
media might have contributed to creating a perception of the only female leader as 
that who most frequently talked about her private life.  
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Figure 17. The comparison of private persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ 
mediated communication 
Note: the private persona-centred media reporting was calculated as number of articles that pre-dominantly focused 
on a leader's private persona over total number of articles in which a leader was mentioned. Private persona-
centred leader's communication was calculated as number of statements in which the leader pre-dominantly 
focused on his/her private persona over total number of statements made by the leader. Thus, the figures for each 
series refer to different Ns. 
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Figure 18. The comparison of political/private persona-centred media reporting and 
leaders' mediated communication 
Note: the political/private persona-centred media reporting was calculated as number of articles that pre-dominantly 
focused on a leader's political/private persona over total number of articles in which a leader was mentioned. 
Political/private persona-centred leader's communication was calculated as number of statements in which the 
leader pre-dominantly focused on his/her political/private persona over total number of statements made by the 
leader. Thus, the figures for each series refer to different Ns. 
 
What is also evident from Figures 17 and 18 is that the media have 
increased their focus on private and political/private personae in reporting leaders 
who came to power immediately after Tuđman and Kosor. In other words, the data 
show that after the leaders were reported as practicing more private and 
political/private persona-centred communication than the media, their successors 
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were reported with an increased emphasis on their private matters. This might point 
to the fact that the perception of greater leaders’ disclosure of private information 
and its politicization consequently make media more comfortable and willing to 
report these personae. However, it is also evident that even if this trend exists it is 
short-lived and easily stopped, given that media’s private and political/private 
persona-centred reporting decreased with subsequent leaders. It should be noted 
that at this point these causal connections are just speculations because this 
analysis was not designed to reveal them. Whether the personalisation of leaders’ 
communication is connected to media reporting, and vice versa, will be examined in 
the next chapter.  
Finally, the comparison of private and political/private persona-centred media 
reporting and leaders’ mediated communication reveals that in the case of the 
heads of the executive media focus on these personae is more constant than 
leaders’. Media’s private persona-centred reporting varied from 0,6% to 1% in the 
1990s and 2000s, indicating a weak positive trend (r=0,4), while at the same time 
only Tuđman and Kosor were reported as making any reference to their private 
personae making the trend over time for leaders’ mediated communication weaker 
than that in the media (r=0,3). The differences are even greater in the case of the 
prominence of the political/private persona. The media visibility of the leaders’ 
political/private persona has grown steadily, but not linearly, from the communist era 
(r=0,83), while the leaders’ reported focus on their political/private personae has 
varied significantly over time, which is also demonstrated by a very low Pearson’s 
coefficient (r=-0,1). This, again, might point to the fact that the factors that influence 
heads of the executive to focus more or less on their private and political/private 
sphere in their communication are more leader-specific and/or contextual, than 
might be the case with media reporting.  
 
6.4.  Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has examined the continuities and changes in the ways in 
which leaders’ were reported of personalizing their communication, and also the 
similarities and differences between the personalisation in media reporting and 
leaders’ mediated communication.  
 While the analysis of personalisation in media reporting revealed that there 
are some strong trends related to the person- and persona-centred media reporting, 
the situation is less clear with personalisation in leaders’ mediated communication. 
Specifically, there are hardly any strong trends over time related to either person- or 
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persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication, and many analyses actually 
showed that the extent to which leaders were reported as personalizing their 
communication and the ways in which they did so were leader-specific. This is 
especially true for the leaders’ person-centred communication, given that the 
analysis showed only some micro-trends (similar degrees of person-centred 
communication of the heads of the executive in the 1990s and 2000s, and of all 
political leaders in the 2010s). In general, it seems that leaders’ reported focus on 
themselves and/or their parties might be mostly dependent on contextual factors, 
since in general it varies considerably from leader to leader.  
With regard to the persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication, the 
situation is a bit different since some patterns of continuity and change can be 
observed. For example, all political leaders were reported as pre-dominantly 
focusing on political rather than private and political/private personae. Hence, it 
could be speculated that leaders’ communication strategies were in general based 
on selective exposure of political persona for the purpose of creating their political 
image. Only certain political leaders might have been seen as revealing information 
from their private sphere, and those who did communicate private information were 
reported as politicizing this information to a greater extent than just making it public. 
In addition, there are some weak positive trends associated with the prominence of 
the private (r=0,33) and political/private personae (r=0,24). However, what these 
Pearson’s coefficients depict is not actually the lack of change but rather 
considerable differences between leaders in the degrees to which they have 
publicized and/or politicized their private matters. Again, the exposure and 
politicization of their private sphere seems mostly to be leader-specific.  
A general conclusion which may be drawn from the many comparisons of 
personalisation in media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication is that the 
personalisation trends in the media tend to be more stable and persistent, while 
there are more differences among the leaders in the ways in which they are reported 
to personalize their communication.  
In addition, many other differences were observed between the 
personalisation in media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication. The 
media reporting was at all times less person-centred than leaders’ mediated 
communication, but at the same time more persona-centred. Furthermore, in most 
cases the leaders exposed their private issues to a greater extent than the media, 
but the media usually politicized leaders’ private matters more than the leaders were 
reported to do so themselves. However, both media and leaders can be seen as 
politicizing leaders’ private lives much more frequently than just publicizing it, 
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indicating that both political communication actors might have strategically used the 
private in order to create (or destroy) leaders’ political image.  
After establishing the extent to which media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication was personalized in communist and post-communist context, the 
next chapter will focus on trying to explain how these different trends developed.  
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7. Explaining personalisation(s) 
 
 The first two empirical chapters reported the findings from the content 
analyses of newspaper articles and mediated leaders’ statements based on what it 
was possible to determine the extent to which media reporting and leaders’ 
mediated communication in Yugoslavia and Croatia were person- and persona-
centred. The aim of this chapter is to examine the ability of a new method in political 
communication, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), to explain how 
and why the trends found in previous chapters occurred, or in other words, which 
factors might have contributed to higher and lower degrees of the person-, persona- 
and private persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication 
in the communist and post-communist context. Given that most of the trends 
detected were not linear, i.e. the degrees to which the media and political actors 
personalized their communication were to an extent leader-specific, it is all the more 
important to determine which factors might have been at play with relation to each 
leader and dimension of personalisation, because it is unlikely that the same factors, 
especially not structural ones, will have the same importance in all cases.   
 Accordingly, the main research question that this chapter aims to answer is: 
How can different degrees of personalisation(s) in media reporting and leaders’ 
mediated communication be explained? More specifically, are personalisation(s) in 
media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication media driven, caused by 
politically-related factors, or rather are the factors that best explain personalisation a 
combination of media- and politically-related ones? And also, does applying fsQCA, 
a method at the moment considered superior to others in tackling these questions 
(Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 2013), allow for reaching conclusive answers to 
them?  
 It is important to analyze the combination of factors that can help explain 
different degrees of personalisation(s), given that explaining personalisation(s) is, 
after establishing the degree to which political communication is personalized, the 
next most important step in personalisation research. There has been a lot of 
scholarly discussion about this question, sometimes framed as who or what is 
“guilty” of personalisation, but only recently has this issue started to be empirically 
addressed. These empirical studies found that usually there is not one but several 
paths to personalized political communication, and also that the personalisation(s) 
are not, as was usually argued, caused solely by either media or political factors, but 
rather by their combination (Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 2013). Given the 
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perception that communist and also post-communist media and politics are 
dominated by political elites, it is interesting to investigate whether politically-related 
factors play a more important role in the personalisation(s) in these contexts, or 
whether the media-related factors play a role as well. If media-related factors can be 
identified as relevant factors in influencing personalisation(s), this would mean that 
the media in communist and post-communist societies is not only an instrument in 
the hands of political elite, but rather an independent actor that is able to contribute 
to shaping trends in mediated political communication.  
 
7.1.  Approaches to explaining personalisation 
 
There are several ways in which scholars have in the past tried to explain 
different degrees of personalisation. One approach to explaining personalisation is 
to look at how personalized communication of one political communication actor 
influences communication of another actor. For example, scholars following this 
approach are trying to determine whether personalisation in the media triggered the 
personalisation in politicians’ communication, or vice versa. Langer (2011) used 
content analysis to determine the extent to which media content in the UK is centred 
on leaders’ private personae, and also historical qualitative analysis to establish the 
extent to which and ways in which the leaders communicated information about 
themselves. By comparing the results of these two analyses, Langer tentatively 
concluded that the politicians might have been those who have started personalizing 
political communication, while the media have followed. Similarly, Rahat and 
Sheafer (2007) used time-series to examine whether the person-centred political 
communication in Israel was triggered by the media, politicians or by institutional 
changes. They applied content analysis to establish the visibility of politicians as 
individuals during election campaigns from 1949 to 2003, i.e. to determine the 
degree of the person-centred media reporting. They measured the “personalisation 
in the behavior of politicians” through the percentage of private member bills passed 
in Israel’s parliaments relative to the number of all laws passed. Finally, the degree 
of the “institutional personalisation” was measured by the degree to which the 
selectorate was included in the creation of candidate lists for General Elections. 
Rahat and Sheafer concluded that the increase in the personalisation was triggered 
by institutional changes. They claim that the opening up of the candidate selection 
process led media to focus more on individual politicians, and consequently 
politicians started acting more individually as a response to these changes. The 
authors also accounted for the introduction of television in Israel’s political 
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communication and based on their regression analysis concluded that the 
penetration of television “may facilitate personalisation”, but “the cause of an 
upsurge in personalisation is mainly institutional” (ibid., 76). Although this kind of 
examination of the causes of personalisation is important, it overly simplifies the 
causes of personalisation. In other words, this approach fails to control for other 
factors that might have contributed to the increase in personalisation(s), many of 
which were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 (e.g. country’s political system, electoral 
system, characteristics of voters and political actors, legal framework, degree of 
commercialisation and tabloidisation of media system etc.).  
Consequently, we can see scholars who look at the causes of 
personalisation as complex combinations of different political and media-related 
factors as those following a second, more nuanced approach to explaining 
personalisation(s). In addition, those who try to understand why personalisation 
occurs by examining its connection to various variables, differ according to the ways 
in which they analyze the connections between the personalisation and relevant 
variables. One group of scholars thinks of variables that are usually identified as 
having a potential to influence personalisation as contextual factors. For example, 
Kriesi (2010), Mayerhöffer and Esmark (2011) and Swanson & Mancini (1996), 
examined whether or not a specific variable was present or absent in contexts in 
which higher or lower degrees of personalisation were observed. Illustratively, 
Mayerhöffer and Esmark (2011) found that although the factors they looked at (type 
of electoral system, degree of party loyalty, degree of media commercialization, type 
of political system and the degree of prime ministerial influence) predicted that the 
perceived personalisation in media reporting would be highest in Spain, it was 
actually highest in Denmark and Finland. This was surprising given that these 
countries were characterized by contextual factors which were assumed to lead to 
lower degrees of personalisation. However, this study has not proven empirically 
that any of the factors actually lead to higher or lower degrees of personalisation. It 
only established that higher degrees of personalisation were not found in contexts 
characterized by some of the factors that the literature suggests increase 
personalisation.  
A more sophisticated approach to explaining personalisation(s) was 
introduced in the Downey and Stanyer's (2010) study which aimed to explain 
different degrees of the personalisation of mediated political communication across 
20 democracies. They applied fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), a 
relatively new method developed by Charles Ragin (Ragin, 2008b), in order to 
establish which combinations of causal conditions can help explain the high degree 
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of personalisation observed in some countries. Stanyer (2013) later used fsQCA to 
explain why the media focus more on leaders’ private lives in some countries more 
than in other, as well as media’s focus on politicians’ sexual misdemeanors and 
preferences. In these analyses he examined a variety of factors that are considered 
to have an influence on personalisation, such as the degree of party identification, 
the strength of a country’s tabloid sector, the type of political system, the degree to 
which campaigns are professionalized, leaders’ ideological positions, age, the 
privacy legislation etc. In all analyses it was claimed that there are several paths or 
causal recipes that may lead to a high degree of personalisation. In other words, 
these authors argued that there are several possible combinations of factors that 
can produce the same result – a high or low degree of personalisation. Hence, the 
authors using this approach to explaining personalisation(s) claim to be able to 
determine what causes personalisation, which can be seen as a step further from 
establishing correlations between personalisation and other variables, and two steps 
further from examining variables that might influence personalisation(s) as 
contextual factors.  
 
7.1.1. Fuzzy sets or fuzzy findings? 
Given that the use of fsQCA seems to be the most advanced approach to 
explaining different degrees of personalisation, this method will be applied in order 
to test factors that might have influenced higher and lower degrees of person, 
persona- and private persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication that were detected in the analyses presented in previous chapters of 
this thesis. Since it is a relatively new method and there have not been many 
application of it in media research, its both potential and limitations are not yet fully 
known. Hence, I will also be examine whether this method is as suitable as has 
been claimed for establishing the causal connections between different factors and 
personalisation(s).  
Ragin and Rihoux explain that fsQCA is “grounded in Boolean algebra – the 
algebra of logic and sets – and thus is ideally suited for identifying key set-theoretic 
relations” (2004a: 4). Furthermore, they claim it was designed to “unravel causal 
complexity by applying set-theoretic methods to cross-case evidence” (ibid., 3). 
Hence, it is a case-oriented method by which it appears possible to examine how 
different sets interact, and consequently, which combinations of, what Ragin calls 
“causal conditions”, i.e. variables that are tested in the analysis, produce the 
researched “outcome” (2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). Given Ragin’s explanations of 
what the method is designed to do, and the method’s vocabulary (causal conditions, 
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causal configurations, outcome etc.), it is evident that fsQCA may be understood as 
a method able to examine causation, or in other words, cause – effect relationships. 
This is also how the pioneers in using this method for personalisation research have 
presented their findings (Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 2013).  
However, Seawright (2004: 16) warns that “inferences in fuzzy-set QCA are 
based on statistical test that measures degree of association”, not causation, and 
hence that “the QCA results must also be associational in nature”. In other words, 
he claims that fsQCA is not able to prove cause – effect relationships, but rather it 
can determine whether or not certain combination of variables is associated with 
another variable. Ragin and Rihoux (2004b) partly accept this criticism of the 
method emphasizing that they consider it well suited for establishing “explicit 
connections” between sets, not necessarily causation. In spite of this, the language 
of fsQCA and claims of its “capacity for analyzing complex causation” (Ragin & 
Rihoux, 2004a: 4) still might trick scholars using this method into thinking that they 
have discovered a causation rather than explicit connection between a combination 
of variables and tested “outcome”. Although I believe that the method’s vocabulary 
is misleading and that it should be changed so as not to connote causality, I will use 
terms such as “causal conditions” and “outcomes” throughout this chapter in order to 
be in line with method’s technical and reference concepts.  
In sum, it does not seem that by applying this method it will be possible to 
completely answer the research questions posed in this chapter. it will not be 
possible to determine what has caused personalisation(s). However, it will be 
possible to empirically prove what combinations of factors are explicitly connected or 
associated with a certain degree of personalisation. In spite of the fact that it will not 
be possible to determine causation, there are several reasons why fsQCA is well 
suited for the analysis of personalisation of media reporting and leaders’ 
communication in this thesis. 
Firstly, this method is well suited for small-N analysis (Ragin & Rihoux, 
2004a). Given that the information about personalisation is related to 10 Yugoslav 
and Croatian political leaders, this means that there are only 10 cases that need to 
be analyzed. Hence, fsQCA as a method which is designed for small-N analysis is 
well suited. 
Secondly, the variables tested through fsQCA are not considered 
independent variables that are additive in their effects. On the contrary, fsQCA 
assumes that variables are interacting with each other rather than having an 
independent influence (Ragin, 2008b). This is important for personalisation research 
since it helps avoid generalisations about the interplay between the media and 
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political system in which personalisation was observed. In other words, it helps 
avoid assuming that the political system is the one influencing the media system, or 
vice versa. Also, fsQCA assumes that the outcome, such as the degree of the 
person-centred media reporting, is not connected to a single variable, but rather a 
combination of variables (Ragin, 2008a, 2008b). In most research that deals with the 
causes of personalisation it is assumed that variables work together to produce a 
certain degree of personalisation, and rarely that there is one single cause (Maier & 
Adam, 2010). Hence, a method which acknowledges that variables interact, and do 
not act independently, is well suited to this research.  
In addition, fsQCA also allows for several different combinations of causal 
conditions, the so-called causal paths, recipes, or solutions, to explain the same 
outcome. In other words, it is possible that one variable is an important causal 
condition in explaining high degree of person-centred media reporting in one case, 
but not the other. This characteristic of fsQCA makes it better suited for studying the 
variables connected to personalisation than using correlational methods, such as 
regression analysis, since correlational methods asses “how well dimensions of 
variation parallel each other across a sample or population” (Ragin, 2008a: 196). 
Hence, the correlational method would be well-suited if there is a certain variable 
that is important in all or most of cases. However, since it can be assumed that 
different combinations of variables will be associated with the same outcome, and 
that there may not be variables that are important in all solutions to an outcome, 
fsQCA seems to be the best option for this research.  
Finally, rather than looking at the presence or absence of a certain variable, 
fsQCA calibrates variables to enable accounting for differences in the degree to 
which a certain condition is present or absent. As Ragin (2009: 90) puts it: “a fuzzy 
set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been purposefully calibrated to 
indicate degree of membership in a well-defined set. Such calibration is possible 
only through the use of theoretical and substantive knowledge”. Specifically, each 
variable is calibrated using values from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating nonmembership in 
the set, 1 indicating that a certain case is a full member of the set, and 0.5 value 
being a cross-over point, that of maximum ambiguity. Those cases whose 
membership is more “in” than “out” of the set will have a score somewhere between 
0.5 and 1, and those whose membership is more “out” than “in” will score between 
0.5 and 0. The variables are calibrated according to external standards which have 
to be based on the social knowledge, scientific knowledge and/or the knowledge 
that the researcher has derived from the study of cases (Ragin, 2008a). Being able 
to calibrate a variable, i.e. account for different degrees to which the variable is 
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present in a certain case, is important for explaining personalisation since previous 
research has shown that only acknowledging the presence or absence of the 
variable does not give conclusive findings (such as in Mayerhöffer & Esmark, 2011). 
In addition, calibration of variables allows the researcher to see the extent to which a 
variable needs to be present in order to be connected to a certain outcome. For 
example, it is possible that the media system does not need to be completely based 
on private ownership in order for this variable to be connected to the media’s focus 
on politicians’ private lives, but rather that it just needs to be more privately than 
state owned.  
 There are also several important limitations of the method that need to be 
taken into account, alongside the fact that fsQCA does not seem able to reveal 
causal connections between variables. In the first place, although Ragin (ibid., 184) 
argues that there should be an agreement about the external standards according to 
which variables are calibrated, he also admits that the existing knowledge base is 
imperfect and that the “agreed-upon standards” are lacking. This leads to different 
scholars setting different benchmarks, i.e. deciding what it takes for a case to be a 
full member of the set, non member, more in that out, or more out than in of the set, 
because the researcher has the autonomy to decide how the variables are 
calibrated as long as there is a reasonable explanation for the benchmarks used in 
the set. Stockemer (2012) emphasizes that slight changes in a variable’s 
benchmarks, which can usually be justified by theoretical knowledge, will give 
different results. Hence, coding sensitivity which can be seen as a result of the 
missing agreed upon external standards for calibrating variables is one of the 
limitations of this method. Ragin and Rihoux (2004a) suggest that at this point the 
best practice is to be transparent about the calibration technique and a variable’s 
benchmarks, and in that way enable other researchers to retest the data.  
 In the second place, Seawright (2004: 16) warns of another limitation of the 
fsQCA, namely its assumption that there are “no causally relevant omitted 
variables”. In other words, the fsQCA software will produce solutions to the tested 
outcome based on the variables that were decided by the researcher to be the most 
relevant for the analysis. It will not recognize the fact that an important, causally 
relevant, variable was not included in the analysis. Ragin and Rihoux (2004b) 
acknowledge this limitation, but suggest that a researcher’s choice of variables 
should be trusted, since it is arguably grounded in theoretical and substantive 
knowledge.  
 And thirdly, Stockemer (2012) argues that a limitation of fsQCA is that it 
tends to produce unique solutions. Its causal paths sometimes help explain only 
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one, or perhaps a few, cases. This can be seen as a problem in an intermediate- or 
large-N comparative analysis, but I argue that this is not an important limitation in 
this project since a small number of cases is analyzed and it is expected that some 
solutions will be unique to certain leaders.  
 
7.1.2. Calibration of variables and outcomes 
 In order to conduct the analysis, the first step is deciding which causal 
conditions will be tested in relation to which outcome. The second step includes 
calibration of both the outcome and causal conditions using fuzzy sets (Ragin, 
2009). Which causal conditions are included in the analysis and why will be 
discussed in the following sections, while the details of their calibration can be found 
in the Appendix 5. The fsQCA will be used in order to examine which combinations 
of causal conditions are explicitly connected to six different outcomes, specifically 
the person-centred media reporting (in the tables that report results this variable is 
marked as “m_person”) and leaders’ communication (“l_person”), persona-centred 
media reporting (“m_persona”) and leaders’ communication (“l_persona”), and 
private persona-centred media reporting (“m_private”) and leaders communication 
(“l_private”). All outcomes are calibrated based on the data collected by content 
analyses of media coverage and leaders’ mediated statements as presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Hence, the outcomes are not calibrated based on theoretical 
knowledge or secondary data, but based on empirical evidence gathered in this 
project.  
Each outcome is tested in relation to seven to nine variables. In Chapters 3 
and 4 the politically- and media-related factors that according to the existing 
literature have the potential to influence different dimensions of personalisation were 
discussed. In addition, the close examination of cases presented in the analyses in 
Chapters 5 and 6 revealed that there are several important causal conditions which 
can be derived from the close knowledge of cases. Given that Ragin and Rihoux 
(2004a) advise that the choice of causal conditions needs not only to be theory-
informed, but also case-informed, the causal conditions tested in this project will be 
a combination of those which can be identified by existing knowledge and those 
derived from the examined cases. In addition, as was argued in Chapters 3 and 4, 
not all factors are relevant for all dimensions of personalisation. In other words, 
variables that are considered causally relevant for person-centred media reporting 
might not be considered important for private persona-centred media reporting or 
leaders’ communication. Hence, a set of causal conditions which is tested in relation 
to a certain outcome is different from outcome to outcome, although some variables 
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are included in more than one analysis. In addition, sometimes one outcome is 
examined as a causal condition in relation to another outcome. Specifically, the 
degree of the person-centred media reporting is included as a causal condition in 
the examination of factors connected to person-centred leaders’ communication, 
and vice versa; the degree of the persona-centred media reporting is tested as a 
causal condition for persona-centred leaders’ communication, and vice versa; and 
the degree of the private persona-centred media reporting is examined as a variable 
potentially connected to the private persona-centred leaders’ communication, and 
vice versa.  
 In total there are 12 politically-related causal conditions and five media-
related causal conditions, but two of the media-related conditions are 
“macrovariables” (Ragin, 2009) which were formed by joining two lower order 
variables in order to reduce the complexity of the analysis. It should be noted that 
gathering comparable data from the 1970s to 2010s to calibrate these variables was 
very demanding. Some variables that were initially considered were not included in 
the analysis because there was little or no available data that could have been used 
for their calibration (e.g. audience media preferences, the degree to which the 
audience is fragmented, the degree to which the selectorate participates in the 
candidate selection process, strength of public service broadcasting, degree of 
media products’ diversification etc.). In addition, given that there are no longitudinal 
and/or reliable data about media ownership, consumption, newspaper circulation, 
and advertising revenues, some of the variables that were considered crucial for 
fsQCA analyses were calibrated using primary data gathered during the analysis of 
media content, which is explained in greater detail in the Appendix 5. Although this 
data represents more an illustration of media trends than a fact, it was used for 
calibration of some media-related variables given that there was no alternative 
source of information for calibration. 
 
Politically-related causal conditions 
First of all, three politically-related variables were case-informed. It was 
observed that those political leaders who were also party leaders were reported in a 
less person-centred way and they were also reported as pursuing less person-
centred communication. Hence, the membership of the set with politicians who are 
party leaders (“party_leader”) was based on whether the politician was a party 
leader (full member) or not (non-member), and this causal condition was tested for 
person-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication outcomes.  
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Furthermore, it was observed that on some occasions Presidents, their 
personae and private personae were more media visible than that of the Prime 
Ministers, and also that some Presidents were reported as pursuing more persona- 
and private persona-centred communication than Prime Ministers. Therefore, the 
membership of the set with politicians who are Presidents (“president”) was based 
on whether the politician was a President (full member) or not (non-member), and 
this causal condition was tested for person, persona- and private persona-centred 
media reporting and leaders’ persona- and private persona-centred mediated 
communication outcomes.  
Finally, it was also observed that the strongest negative trends in the person-
centred media reporting were related to heads of the executive, and that the media 
reported those leaders who were not heads of the executive in a more persona-
centred way than others. Consequently, the membership of the set with politicians 
who are Heads of the Executive (“hoe”) was based on whether the politician was a 
head of the executive (full member) or not (non-member), and this causal condition 
was tested for person and persona-centred media reporting.  
 Another nine politically-related variables were theory-informed. The type of 
political system is the most common variable considered to be a causal condition of 
higher degrees of personalisation (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993; Downey & Stanyer, 
2010; Hanspeter Kriesi, 2010; Maier & Adam, 2010; Mayerhöffer & Esmark, 2011; 
Stanyer, 2013). In essence, it is argued that in a presidential political system where 
executive power is vested in an individual, the President, the media tend to focus 
more on him/her as an individual political actor than on collectives, such as parties 
or governments. As was argued in earlier chapters, political leaders in presidential 
systems may also tend to emphasize themselves more than their parties since they 
are the ones who are given the mandate to govern and they are the ones making 
decisions. Hence, the type of political system is tested as a variable in relation to 
person-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication (“pol_sys”).  
 Another politically-related variable often considered in personalisation 
research is the type of electoral system (Hanspeter Kriesi, 2010; Mayerhöffer & 
Esmark, 2011; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). In short, it is argued that majoritarian 
electoral systems in which voters cast votes for individuals rather than parties 
increase person-centred media reporting and also leaders’ communication, and 
perhaps even make leaders focus more on their personae in order to differentiate 
themselves from other candidates. On the other hand, proportional electoral 
systems, especially those with closed lists, are thought of as having the opposite 
effect. Namely, making media focus on political parties for which the voters vote. 
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Consequently, the type of electoral system was tested as a condition that may be 
connected with person-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication, as well as their persona-centred communication (“elect_syst”).  
 The third causal condition which is theory-informed is “low party 
identification” (“party_id”) which was tested for person-, persona- and private 
persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication. It is argued in the literature that 
low degrees of party identification make leaders focus more on themselves to attract 
voters and act as brand differentiators (Garzia, 2011; Kuhn, 2004; Langer, 2011). In 
addition, these leaders might be more willing to share private information since they 
need alternative ways of bonding with voters, and communicating private 
information is considered to be a good way of doing this  
 Four more politically-related variables deemed relevant as causal conditions 
were also used in Stanyer's (2013) study so they were calibrated in the same way 
because external standards for calibration should be used whenever possible. One 
of these causal conditions is “centrist political leaders” (“centrist”). The literature 
suggests that those political actors who are not ideologically extreme might be more 
willing to put the focus on themselves, their personae, even their private personae, 
in order to act as brand differentiators. In other words, since their parties’ policies 
might not be enough to differentiate them on the political scene, leaders try to 
differentiate based on information about themselves. Hence, this condition was 
tested in relation to person-, persona-, and private persona-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication.   
 Furthermore, it is argued that those leaders who are relatively new to politics 
might be more willing to volunteer information about their political and private 
personae in order to try to bond personally with voters and make voters more 
familiar with them. Also, those who have spent a few years in politics before running 
for high office have more private information to share than political information so it 
can be expected that those leaders focus more on their private personae, but also 
that the media report more about their private life and qualities since there is not 
much to report about their political personae. Hence, the causal condition “short time 
spent in politics before election/appointment” (“years”) was examined in relation to 
persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication and private persona-centred 
media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication. 
 The causal condition “member of the baby boom generation” (“boomer”) was 
case-informed in Stanyer’s study since he observed that leaders whose private lives 
were more media visible were mostly those born after the Second World War. He 
argued this is because “boomer” leaders were more comfortable in talking about 
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themselves and revealing their private spheres. Since there was some indication 
that in the Yugoslav/Croatian case some leaders who were members of the baby 
boom generation might also be more willing to communicate information about their 
personae, especially private personae, this variable was tested as well. However, 
unlike in Stanyer’s project, it was tested for persona-, and private persona-centred 
leaders’ mediated communication, and not media reporting. The variable was 
calibrated using a crisp set; namely, if a leader was born before 1946, he/she was 
considered non-member, and if he/she was born after 1946, he/she was considered 
full member of the set.  
 The final causal condition calibrated according to Stanyer’s standards is 
“weak statutory protection of private lives” (“privacy_law”). It is argued that the 
media in countries where politicians’ private lives are strongly protected by law are 
less willing to intrude into politicians’ privacy and/or report their private lives (Stanyer 
& Wring, 2004). Hence, this causal condition was tested for the private persona-
centred media reporting.  
Another variable connected to law is introduced as a possible causal 
condition that might influence the private persona-centred media reporting, “weak 
statutory protection against libel” (“libel_law”), given that the literature suggests that 
the law against libel in journalism was frequently used in post-communist countries 
to silence reporters and divert them from reporting leaders’ privacy (Badrov, 2007). 
 The final politically-related causal condition is the “high level of 
authoritarianism in the society” (“authoritarian”) which was tested in relation to the 
person-centred leaders’ mediated  communication since the leadership cult literature 
suggests that the communist political elite put the focus on the leader rather than the 
collective, partly due to the high degree of authoritarianism in the society, in the 
sense that the people wanted a strong leader (Apor et al., 2004).  
 
Media-related causal conditions 
 As mentioned, there are five media-related causal conditions tested in this 
project, two of them being “macrovariables” formed by joining the two lower order 
conditions. One of these macrovariables is the “autonomous journalistic culture”  
(“j_culture”) which was formed by joining the causal condition “nondeferential media” 
and “high media independence from political influences” by the “logical or” command 
which forms the higher order variable by taking the maximum of each case 
membership (Ragin, 2009). The logic here was that the more autonomous the 
journalistic culture, the more the media will report in line with media logic, i.e. its 
content will be person-, persona- and private persona-centred in order to attract 
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readers, and consequently, advertisers. Also, the leaders might be more willing to 
pursue a person-centred communication in order to behave in line with media logic 
and get into the news. Hence, this causal condition was tested for all dimensions of 
the personalisation in media reporting, and also person-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication.   
 Another macrovariable is the “commercialized media system” (“commercial”), 
which was also formed using the “logical or” command. The two lower order 
variables were “high degree of private media ownership” and “high degree of 
advertising in the media”. In essence, it is suggested that in a commercialized media 
systems, that can be seen as characterized by high degree of private media 
ownership and advertisers’ influence, the media would act more according to media 
logic and put the focus on leaders, their political and private personae, and the 
leaders might also be more willing to reveal their private information in order to be 
more interesting and newsworthy both to the media and voters. Consequently, this 
variable was tested for all dimensions of personalisation in media reporting, as well 
as for the private persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication outcome. 
 The “strong tabloid sector” (“tabloid”) variable was tested for the private 
persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication since it is 
argued that the stronger the tabloid sector, the more emphasis the media gives to 
leaders’ private affairs, and the leaders might also be more willing to volunteer their 
private information in order to act according to media logic and in that way, make the 
news (Kuhn, 2004; Stanyer & Wring, 2004).  
 The final two media-related variables are linked to television. The “large 
television reach” (“tv_reach”) variable was included since the introduction of 
television is often considered to have increased the media’s focus on leaders’ 
political and private personae (Meyrowitz, 1985). Also, it is argued that the leaders 
have had to adapt to television’s tendency to communicate persona- and private 
persona-related information (Jamieson, 1988; Meyer, 2002). Hence, this causal 
condition was tested for the persona- and private persona-centred media reporting 
and leaders’ mediated communication. 
 The final media-related variable was the “leaders who participated in a 
television debate” (“tv_debate”) given that previous research has revealed that the 
media focuses more on leaders’ personae when they participate in a television 
debate (Reinemann & Wilke, 2007; Tsfati, 2003). Hence, the leaders were 
considered full members of the set if they participated in a television debate prior to 
the elections in which they came to power and full nonmembers if they haven’t. This 
variable was tested in relation to the persona-centred media reporting.  
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 The summary of the outcomes and their related causal conditions, as well as 
the details of variables calibrated using fuzzy sets, can be found in the Appendix 5. 
The analysis was conducted by following the procedure from Ragin (2009) and 
using fsqca 2.0 software. The software is based on counterfactual reasoning, 
meaning that it constructs truth tables in which all possible combinations of causal 
conditions and their relations to the outcome are listed. If there are five causal 
conditions (k) tested, then the number of possible causal recipes/combinations is 32 
(2k). The truth table also reveals which combinations of causal conditions are 
connected with real outcomes, i.e. those entered by the researcher in order to be 
tested, and these are the only combinations which the researcher continues to 
examine. Each combination of conditions is presented with values for consistency 
and coverage, which help the researcher decide which of the combinations are 
empirically relevant. Both of these values range from 0 to 1. As Ragin (ibid., 112) 
frames it, consistency shows “the truth value” of the solution. In other words, it 
shows the degree to which a certain causal recipe is connected to the examined 
outcome (Ragin, 2006). If a certain solution leads to different outcomes, its 
consistency will be low. In all analyses but those examining causal paths to the 
lower degrees of the persona-centred media reporting and higher degrees of the 
private persona-centred reporting, the consistency cut-off value was not lower than 
0,75, as suggested by Ragin (2009). In the two mentioned analyses it was lowered 
to 0,5 in order to establish at least one causal path. The coverage values assess the 
extent to which the solution “accounts for instances of the outcome” (Ragin, 2006: 
292), or put simply, it shows how much of the outcome a certain solution explains. If 
there are many paths to the same outcome, it can be expected that the coverage 
will be small. Also, given that some solutions do not have empirical value on their 
own, i.e. the cases they explain have already been accounted for by other solutions, 
the value of the unique coverage is presented. Those solutions with very low unique 
coverage can be seen as empirically irrelevant (ibid.). In the tables which report the 
findings from the fsQCA (tables 7.1. – 7.12.) the causal paths that are connected 
with a certain outcome are presented with values for consistency and coverage. The 
software calculates these values using complex equations (for more details see 
Ragin, 2009), and presents them as numbers from 0 to 1, correct to six decimal 
places, so this is also the way in which they are presented in the tables.  
 
7.2.  Findings 
 
7.2.1. Outcome: The person-centred media reporting 
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The analysis of causal conditions that are explicitly connected with higher 
degrees of person-centred media reporting revealed two causal paths. The first 
causal recipe suggests that the media reporting is person-centred when journalistic 
culture is autonomous, the politician is a directly elected President but not a party 
leader, and when the leader him/herself is seen as pursuing a person-centred 
communication. In the second causal recipe, having an autonomous media is not 
necessary, rather it is the deferential journalistic culture that is an important media-
related factor. Other associated factors in this solution are presidential political 
system in which the President is the head of the executive, with this President’s 
mediated communication being person-centred. The first path helps explain why 
post-communist presidents Mesić and Josipović were more visible in the media than 
the parties whose members they were, while the second path accounts for why 
communist President Tito was so prominent in media reporting. It is evident from 
these causal recipes that media focuses more on Presidents whose communication 
is person-centred in both communist and post-communist context, but these 
conditions are not sufficient on their own. It is also interesting to note that journalistic 
culture is an important element in both solutions, but as expected, both autonomous 
and deferential journalistic culture is associated with higher degrees of person-
centred media reporting. It can be argued that in communism the deferential media 
put the focus on the political leader by following the cues of the political elite. 
However, in the post-communist period the important condition which is connected 
to the media's focus on individual political actors is the autonomy of the media, 
arguably because independent media operate according to media logic in which 
reporting about individuals is one of the news values.  
 
Table 1. Causal recipes for the person-centred media reporting 
 
   Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                 coverage   coverage      
                                                  -------------    ------------   -----------------    
j_culture*party_leader*president*elect_syst*l_person 0.357143   0.357143   1.000000  
~j_culture*president*hoe*elect_syst*pol_sys*l_person 0.238095   0.238095   0.869565 
 
The fsQCA also allows exploration of causal paths that are connected to 
lower degrees of person-centred media reporting. According to this analysis there is 
only one causal recipe that helps explain the party-centred reporting. Specifically, 
when the journalistic culture is autonomous and the reported politician is a Prime 
Minister and party leader in a parliamentary political system, the media does not 
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pursue person- but rather party-centred reporting. This path accounts for the lower 
degrees of mediated visibility of the post-2000 Prime Ministers Račan, Sanader, 
Kosor and Milanović. This causal path shows that even when the journalistic culture 
is autonomous, the PMs and party leaders in a post-communist parliamentary 
system are still less visible than their parties. It is also interesting to note that while 
higher degrees of leaders' person-centred communication are connected to higher 
degrees of person-centred media reporting, the degree to which leaders personalize 
their communication does not seem to be an important factor in the de-
personalisation of media reporting which was observed in the post-2000 period. In 
other words, the media content was de-personalized, notwithstanding the ways in 
which the politicians were seen to have communicated. Hence, it can be suggested 
that the growth in media autonomy and the change of the political system are 
among the most important factors connected to the de-personalisation of media 
reporting in post-2000 Croatia. The more independent media might be seen as 
(re)acting to institutional changes and putting more focus on political parties 
because they were by the introduction of the parliamentary system given a more 
important and powerful place in the political system.  
 
 
Table 2. Causal recipe for the lack of the person-centred media reporting 
 
   Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                 -------------    ------------   -----------------    
j_culture*party_leader*~president*~pol_sys       0.517241    0.517241    0.750000 
 
7.2.2. Outcome: The person-centred leaders’ mediated communication 
There are three intermediate solutions connected to higher degrees of the 
person-centred leaders’ mediated communication. The first causal recipe suggests 
that leaders are reported as focusing more on themselves than on their parties even 
when their parties have strong support among voters (higher degrees of party 
identification) if they are not ideologically extreme, the society exhibits high degree 
of authoritarianism, and the journalistic culture is autonomous. This path helps 
explain the high degree of person-centred leaders’ mediated communication in the 
case of the political leaders who were in power in the 2010s, Prime Ministers Kosor 
and Milanović, and President Josipović. The second causal recipe suggests that 
leaders who belong to centrist parties and communicate in an autonomous media 
environment, but belong to parties characterized by low party identification, are not 
 190
party leaders, are elected through a majoritarian system and the media focuses 
more on them than on their parties, are also reported as pursuing person-centred 
communication. This causal recipe helps explain the ways in which President 
Mesić’s mediated communication was personalized. Finally, the last causal recipe 
suggests that leaders elected by majoritarian system in a presidential political 
system characterized by a deferential journalistic culture, high degree of 
authoritarianism in the society, and higher degrees of person-centred media 
reporting, put more emphasis on themselves in their communication than on their 
parties. This path accounts for the high degree of Tito's person-centred mediated 
communication. Hence, the first two paths help explain the person-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication in the post-communist system and suggest that necessary 
factors are autonomous media and centrist orientation of leaders’ parties, but these 
conditions are not sufficient on their own17. The most interesting finding from these 
causal paths is that some leaders can be seen as pursuing person-centred 
communication even if the party identification is high. Having in mind that those 
were leaders in power in 2010s, this can mean that the person-centred leaders’ 
mediated communication became normalized in the consolidation period since 
leaders pursue it even though they have strong support among voters.  
 
Table 3. Causal recipes for the person-centred leader's communication 
 
                 Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
j_culture*authoritarian*centrist*~party_id     0.416667    0.333333    0.937500  
~j_culture*authoritarian*elect_syst*pol_sys*m_person 0.138889    0.083333    1.000000  
j_culture*centrist*party_leader*party_id*elect_syst  0.131944    0.104167    1.000000 
*m_person  
 
Table 7.4. reports two paths that are associated with low degrees of leaders' 
person-centred mediated communication. Based on these recipes it can be 
concluded that necessary conditions for  leaders to be portrayed as putting less 
focus on themselves than on their parties are them being party leaders in 
parliamentary political systems, being elected through proportional electoral systems 
and working in an autonomous journalistic culture. However, these conditions are 
                                                 
17
 As necessary conditions are understood those that appear in all solutions to the outcome, while 
sufficient conditions are those that appear in all solutions, but without any other conditions alongside 
them.   
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not sufficient, since this combination of factors needs to be supplemented either by 
a low degree of authoritarianism in the society or by a low level of party 
identification. While the first causal recipe accounts for the low degree of Prime 
Minister Račan's person-centred mediated communication, the second helps explain 
Prime Minister Sanader's mediated communication. It should be noted that while low 
levels of authoritarianism in society act as predicted, i.e. forming conditions for 
political leaders to focus more on institutions and issues than on individuals, the 
connection of lower degrees of party identification to lower degrees of leader's 
person-centred mediated communication is unexpected.   
 
Table 4. Causal recipes for the lack of the person-centred leader's communication 
 
                 Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
j_culture*~authoritarian*~party_leader*~elect_syst* 0.446429    0.160714    0.757576 
~pol_sys*~m_person      
j_culture*~party_leader*party_id*~elect_syst*  0.357143    0.071429    0.833333 
~pol_sys*~m_person            
 
7.2.3. Outcome: The persona-centred media reporting  
The fsQCA yields four combinations of factors that are connected to higher 
degrees of the persona-centred media reporting. However, the third and fourth 
solution have a unique coverage of 0, meaning that the cases they explain have 
already been accounted for in other solutions. In other words, these causal recipes 
should be seen as empirically irrelevant (Ragin, 2006), and so only the first two 
solutions will be discussed. According to these causal paths, necessary conditions 
for higher degrees of persona-centred media reporting are autonomous journalistic 
culture and higher degree of television reach. However, they are not sufficient and 
need to be accompanied by either the fact that the reported leader is not head of the 
executive or the fact that he/she holds the Prime Ministerial position. The first causal 
path helps explain why the media pursued persona-centred reporting when covering 
post-communist Presidents Mesić and Josipović. The second path accounts for the 
high degree of the persona-centred media reporting in the cases of the post-2000 
Prime Ministers Sanader, Kosor and Milanović.  
The analysis of causal paths that are associated with lower degrees of 
persona-centred media reporting resulted in only one solution. Specifically, when 
journalistic culture is deferential, and there is lower television reach, weaker 
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commercial media sector and no television debates, the media pursue less persona-
centred reporting. This solution accounts for lower media visibility of communist 
leader Tito’s persona. However, it should be noted that this causal path has a very 
low consistency (0,5), meaning that this combination of factors is not always 
connected to this outcome.  
 
Table 5. Causal recipe for the persona-centred media reporting 
 
                 Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                       -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
j_culture*tv_reach*~hoe               0.369565    0.021739    1.000000  
j_culture*tv_reach*~president         0.586957    0.141304    0.964286  
j_culture*commercial*tv_reach         0.451087    0.000000    1.000000  
j_culture*tv_reach*l_persona          0.434783    0.000000    1.000000 
 
Table 6. Causal recipe for the lack of the persona-centred media reporting 
 
                 Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                  coverage    coverage      
                                                              -------------    ------------    ------------- 
~j_culture*~commercial*~tv_reach*~tv_debate*~party_id    0.750000    0.750000    0.500000 
 
7.2.4. Outcome: The persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication 
According to this analysis, there are four possible combinations of variables 
connected to high degrees of leaders’ persona-centred mediated communication. 
However, given that the third and fourth recipes have very low unique coverage, i.e. 
the cases they explain have already been explained by other solutions, only the first 
and the second recipe are deemed empirically relevant. Based on these two causal 
paths it can be concluded that the only necessary condition for a higher degree of 
persona-centred leaders’ communication is a high degree of persona-centred media 
reporting. However, this condition is necessary but not sufficient, and in the first 
solution it is important that alongside this factor the leader is a directly elected 
President who has been in political life for a long time. This recipe accounts for the 
high degree of communist leader Tito’s persona-centred mediated communication. 
On the other hand, the high degree of persona-centred media reporting is 
associated with a higher degree of persona-centred leaders’ communication also 
when the leader is new to politics, he/she is a centrist and the television reach is 
substantial. This recipe accounts for the ways in which the Prime Minister Kosor and 
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President Josipović were reported to personalize their communication. The 
conditions which feature in this solution which is connected with leaders in the post-
communist system act as expected. Specifically, larger television reach was thought 
to be connected to the fact that leaders pursue more persona-centred 
communication. Similarly, centrist political ideology was assumed to be associated 
with leaders’ more inclined to communicate information about themselves and in 
that way act as brand differentiators for voters. However, while those with fewer 
years in politics in the post-communist system might consider pursuing more 
persona-centred communication, in the communist system the opposite condition is 
connected to the same outcome. In other words, in combination with other factors, 
the fact that Tito was a long standing figure in Yugoslav politics is also associated 
with his persona-centred mediated communication, which can be seen as a 
communist system peculiarity.  
Of the four intermediate solutions which help explain low degrees of leaders’ 
persona-centred mediated communication, two do not cover any cases on their own 
(i.e. their unique coverage is 0), so they are excluded from further analysis. 
According to the other two empirically relevant paths, there is one necessary 
condition for a low degree of persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication – 
high party identification. This condition is necessary, but not sufficient. Hence in the 
first path it needs to be accompanied by the fact that the leader in question holds a 
Prime Ministerial position and is relatively new to politics. This solution accounts for 
the low degree of persona-centred mediated communication of the 1990s Prime 
Ministers Valentić and Mateša, but also Milanović in the 2010s. The other causal 
path suggests that alongside high party identification, not even the fact that the 
television is quite prevalent makes leader communicate large amount of information 
about themselves if they are ideologically extreme, belong to a pre-boomer 
generation and the commercial media sector is quite weak. This solution helps 
explain the degree to which the first post-communist President Tuđman 
communicated information about himself. It was expected that high party 
identification will be an important variable connected with the fact that leaders 
communicate less information about themselves. However, it is surprising that the 
PMs who are new to politics do not communicate more information about 
themselves. Also, it is important to note that in this solution all the conditions 
connected to a low degree of persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication are 
politically-related. Hence, although there is a path in which the media-related 
variables also play a role, it seems that there are situations in which some leaders 
may not be affected by the media environment. Consequently, it can be suggested 
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that the media in this post-communist context has not “colonized” politics to a 
significant extent, as opposed to what Meyer (2002) argues is the case in some 
Western systems.  
 
Table 7. Causal recipes for the persona-centred leader's mediated communication 
 
                  Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                   coverage   coverage      
                                                        -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
president*elect_syst*~years*m_persona                           0.260870    0.130435    0.888889  
tv_reach*~years*m_persona*centrist                        0.478261    0.347826    0.916667  
president*elect_syst*tv_reach*m_persona*centrist*party_id 0.206522    0.032609    1.000000  
commercial*president*elect_syst*tv_reach*boomer   0.130435    0.086956    1.000000 
*m_persona*centrist      
 
Table 8. Causal recipes for the lack of the persona-centred leader's mediated 
communication 
 
               Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage   coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
~party_id*~president*years    0.703704    0.037037    0.904762  
~party_id*~president*boomer                             0.629630    -0.000000   0.894737  
~party_id*~centrist*years*~boomer*~commercial         0.148148    -0.000000   1.000000  
~party_id*~centrist*~boomer*tv_reach*~commercial      0.222222    0.074074    1.000000 
 
7.2.5. Outcome: The private persona-centred media reporting 
There is a single path that leads to higher degree of the private persona-
centred media reporting, but its consistency is quite low (0,5), meaning that the 
combination of causal conditions from this solution is not always or even in the 
majority of cases associated with the high mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives. 
This causal recipe suggests that when the media are autonomous, television is 
widespread and the leader is new to politics, the media increasingly reports about 
his/her private life. This combination of factors helps explain the high degree of 
media visibility of the private lives of the 1990s Prime Minister Valentić’s and 2010s 
President Josipović.  
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Table 9. Causal recipe for the private persona-centred media reporting 
 
               Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage  coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
j_culture*tv_reach*years         0.933333    0.933333    0.500000 
 
On the other hand, the analysis of low degrees of private persona-centred 
media reporting produced three causal paths. According to these paths, there are 
five necessary conditions for this dimension of personalisation, but they are not 
sufficient on their own. The necessary conditions are the weak tabloid sector and 
weak commercial media sector, strong libel and privacy laws and low degree of the 
private persona-centred leader’s mediated communication. In the first causal path 
these conditions need to be supplemented by a low television reach and a leader 
who has been long in politics, so this solution helps explain the low media visibility of 
communist leader Tito’s private life. The second causal path alongside the 
necessary conditions and the fact that the leader needs to be a long known political 
actor also emphasizes the importance of the autonomous journalistic culture. This 
solution accounts for the low private persona-centred media reporting of Prime 
Minister Račan. Finally, the third causal path suggests that the five necessary 
conditions in combination with the autonomous media are associated with low media 
exposure of a leader’s private life if he/she is a President. This solution helps explain 
why 1990s President Tuđman’s and 2000s President Mesić’s private lives were not 
very media visible.  
 
Table 10. Causal recipes for the lack of the private persona-centred media reporting 
 
                Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
~tabloid*~tv_reach*~libel_law*~privacy_law  0.085714    0.085714    1.000000 
*~commercial*~years*~l_private        
j_culture*~tabloid*~libel_law*~privacy_law*~commercial 0.271429    0.185714    1.000000 
*~years*~l_private        
j_culture*~tabloid*~libel_law*~privacy_law*~commercial 0.185714    0.100000    1.000000 
*president*~l_private      
 
7.2.6. Outcome: The private persona-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication 
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There is a single intermediate solution that helps explain the high degree of 
leaders’ private persona-centred mediated communication, which is not surprising 
given none of the leaders was considered to be a full member of this set, and only 
President Josipović was considered to be “mostly in” the set membership. Hence, 
this single solution helps explain the degree to which he put the focus on his private 
life in his mediated statements. The solution suggests that his reported focus on his 
private life is associated with a fact that he is a centrist and a President who is 
member of the baby boom generation, who was quite new to politics when he came 
to power, and works in a media environment characterized by strong tabloid and 
commercial media sector in which the media put significant focus on his private life.  
 
Table 11. Causal recipe for the private persona-centred leader's mediated 
communication 
 
                Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                 coverage    coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
tabloid*tv_reach*commercial*centrist*president*years 0.272727    0.272727    1.000000 
*boomer*m_private  
 
The analysis of the low degree of leaders’ private persona-centred mediated 
communication resulted in four possible causal combinations, each of which seems 
to be relevant for a particular time period. The combination of weak tabloid and 
commercial media sector, coupled with a low degree of media’s private persona-
centred reporting about a leader who is not new to politics and is a member of the 
pre-boomer generation, is one possible recipe connected to low degree of reported 
leaders’ emphasis on his/her private life. This recipe helps explain why communist 
leader Tito was not reported as communicating information about his private life. 
The other three solutions place high party identification as a necessary condition 
associated with low degree of private persona-centred leaders’ mediated 
communication in a post-communist democracy. But this condition is not sufficient 
on its own. Specifically, the second recipe suggests that those who also hold a 
Prime Ministerial position and more extreme ideological views in a media system 
characterized by weak tabloid sector and low degree of commercialization, are not 
willing to communicate information about their private life. This recipe accounts for 
low degrees of private life mediated revelations of 1990s Prime Ministers Valentić 
and Mateša. Similarly, when the party identification is high, tabloid sector weak, the 
degree of media commercialization low and the leader is not centrist, but he/she is 
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also not a member of the baby boom generation and the media does not report 
about his/her private life, the leader is not reported as revealing private information 
either. This is another recipe that helps explain leaders’ communication in the 
1990s, specifically that of President Tuđman. A somewhat different combination of 
factors account for low degree of private life revelation of the post-2000 leaders. 
Here, the recipe suggests that those leaders whose parties have stronger support 
among the public (higher party identification), hold Prime Ministerial posts and the 
media does not intrude into their privacy to a great extent, also are not reported as 
emphasizing their private sphere. This recipe accounts for the low degree of private 
persona-centred mediated communication in the cases of Prime Ministers Račan 
and Milanović. It is important to note that a high degree of party identification is 
again a significant causal condition that is connected with lower degrees of 
personalisation in leaders’ mediated communication, since the same was observed 
in the case of the persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication.  
 
Table 12. Causal recipes for the lack of the private persona-centred leader's mediated 
communication 
 
               Raw       Unique    Consistency 
                                                coverage    coverage      
                                                      -------------    ------------   ---------------- 
~party_id*~president*~m_private                                   0.435897    0.179487    0.944444  
~tabloid*~commercial*~years*~boomer*~m_private       0.282051    0.076923    1.000000  
~party_id*~tabloid*~commercial*~centrist*~president     0.256410    0.051282    1.000000  
~party_id*~tabloid*~commercial*~centrist*~boomer*  0.230769    0.076923    1.000000 
~m_private   
 
7.3.  Discussion 
 
 Based on the findings from the fsQCA, there are several interesting points 
that need to be discussed in greater detail. Firstly, these analyses can be seen as 
another piece of evidence that suggests that personalisation is neither connected to 
solely media-related nor to politically-related variables. There was one causal path 
which was based solely on politically-related causal conditions, that which helped 
explain why political leaders are reported as not willing to communicate information 
about their personae. However, all other solutions related to both media reporting 
and leaders’ mediated communication, and also related to all examined dimensions 
of personalisation (person-, persona, and private persona-centred communication), 
showed that both higher and lower degrees of personalisation(s) are connected with 
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a combination of media and politically-related factors. This supports the hypotheses 
of those considering personalisation to be a complex phenomenon associated with a 
range of conditions that stem from both the political and media system (e.g. Downey 
& Stanyer, 2010; Maier & Adam, 2010; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Accordingly, 
these findings speak against theories suggesting that either political or media-
related factors should be seen as main drivers of personalisation, since it appears 
as though the answer lies less in the either-or relationship, and more in the 
interaction between these two types of factors. 
Secondly, it seems that the personalisation in leaders’ mediated 
communication is indeed more leader-specific than personalisation in media 
reporting, as was suggested before. Specifically, there are fewer causal paths 
explaining higher and lower degrees of all dimensions of personalisation in media 
reporting than in leaders’ mediated communication. This might mean that conditions 
associated with personalisation in media reporting are more durable or might have 
longer term influences, while different leaders (re)act to certain causal conditions as 
they see fit, and not by following the practices of their predecessors or other leaders 
working in similar conditions as they are.  
 Thirdly, some of the factors that were included based on the review of the 
communist and post-communist literature, such as the degree of authoritarianism in 
the society and the characteristics of a journalistic culture, were shown to be 
important. Specifically, findings revealed that a high degree of authoritarianism is 
connected to the higher degree of leaders’ person-centred communication, in both 
a communist and post-communist setting. In other words, it seems that there is 
some merit to the theory suggesting that leaders tend to put the focus on 
themselves rather than their parties because the society prefers strong leaders over 
strong institutions. In addition, the ways in which the characteristics of journalistic 
culture were connected to different dimensions of personalisation were also as 
expected based on existing theories. Specifically, the findings showed that both 
deferential and autonomous media can be connected to the person-centred media 
reporting and leaders’ mediated communication, arguably because deferential 
media in communism were putting the focus on the leader due to instructions from 
the political elite, and in post-communism because they were following media logic 
which is partly characterized by the focus on individuals rather than abstract 
collectives. Also, the analysis showed that autonomous journalistic culture, that in 
which the media act according to their own logic, are a necessary condition for the 
increased persona-centred media reporting. This means that autonomous media do 
indeed tend to focus more on leaders’ personae, perhaps because they consider 
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them more newsworthy. In addition, it was suggested in Chapter 5 that the media 
focused less on Tito’s persona and more on connecting things/issues/places with 
his name in order to create a perception of Tito’s omnipresence and importance in 
the society, in line with the leadership cult idea. The findings from fsQCA showed 
that deferential media were in communism connected with lower prominence of 
Tito’s persona. Hence, the deferential communist media can again be seen as 
participating in the building of Tito’s leader cult, although being only one of the 
factors that are connected to the degree of his persona-centred media reporting.  
 However, it is interesting to note that not all combinations of variables 
associated with the ways in which media reporting and leaders’ mediated 
communication was personalized in communism and post-communism differ 
significantly. On the contrary, some combinations of factors connected to 
personalisation in communism seem similar to those found in post-communism, or 
at least something that might be expected in democratic systems. For example, the 
low prominence of Tito’s private life in the media was connected to factors such as 
the weak tabloid and commercial sector, strong privacy and libel laws, lower degree 
of television reach etc. Somewhat surprisingly, deferential journalistic culture was 
not connected with this outcome. Hence, although the causal conditions connected 
to the same outcome in communism and post-communism usually differ, they are 
not completely different and the variables associated with personalisation in media 
and leaders’ mediated communication in communism are at times not that different 
from the factors connected to the same outcomes in post-communism.  
 Furthermore, in relation to the person-centred media reporting (i.e. the focus 
that is in the media content put on the leader instead on the collective such as a 
party or a government), this analysis highlighted some important relationships 
between political systems and the actors that work in them. Specifically, while the 
type of the political system is usually considered as one of the most important 
causal conditions contributing to the greater focus on the individual, this analysis 
shows that the political system is important mostly in relation to the position that the 
actor has in the system. In other words, Presidents are usually presented in a more 
person-centred way no matter whether they rule in a parliamentary or a presidential 
system, arguably because they are considered more powerful as individuals who do 
not depend greatly upon their parties. On the other hand, the media visibility of 
Prime Ministers can be seen as depending on the political system in which they 
operate since the analysis showed that party-centred media reporting is associated 
with Prime Ministerial positions only when the Prime Minister rules in a 
parliamentary system, alongside other factors. In sum, this analysis showed that it 
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is important to distinguish between political actors when the degree of person-
centred media reporting in a certain system is measured and explained, especially 
if a system is characterized by dual leadership as many post-communist systems 
are. It also showed that the influence of the type of the political system should not 
be overstated, since it seems relevant only relative to the position that the political 
actor has in the system.  
 With relation to the persona-centred political communication, the often 
discussed influence of television reach was confirmed. Although there seems to be 
an agreement that the introduction of television has increased media’s focus on 
leaders’ personae, both the political and the private (Jamieson, 1988; Langer, 2011; 
Maier & Adam, 2010; Meyer, 2002; Meyrowitz, 1985; Patterson, 1993), television 
reach is surprisingly rarely considered as a factor when explaining personalisation, 
perhaps because studies trying to explain personalisation look only at recent 
decades in which television was already a major media factor in established 
Western democracies. It was possible to examine the influence of television reach 
in this study given that only around 60% of Croatian people watched it in the 1970s 
(Robinson, 1977), so there was a significant growth in television reach. 
Consequently, the analysis showed that the spread of television is a necessary 
factor connected to the increase in persona-centred media reporting. This shows 
support for theories formulated by Meyrowitz (1985) about the influence of 
television on the media exposure of politicians’ personae, and also on other media 
outlets, such as newspapers, that also adopted this kind of communication. Given 
that the solution which explains the causal conditions connected to the higher 
degrees of persona-centred leaders’ mediated communication in post-communism 
also includes widespread television reach, this analysis can be seen as also 
confirming the hypothesis put forward by Jamieson (1988) who claimed that 
politicians needed to adapt to the new media environment and this meant 
increasingly communicating information about their personae.  
 
7.4.  Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to determine the ability of the new method in 
media studies, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, to explain trends in 
personalisation(s) in media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication that 
were observed in communist Yugoslavia and post-communist Croatia.  
 Although fsQCA is claimed to be able to reveal causality (Ragin & Rihoux, 
2004a), its language connotes that the relationship between tested variables is one 
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of cause of effect (i.e. causal conditions, outcomes, causal paths etc.), and its 
findings have been in media studies presented as proving causal connections (in 
Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 2013), the statistical test on which fsQCA is 
based can only prove associations between variables, and not causal relationships. 
This fact was emphasized not only by critics (e.g. Seawright, 2004), but also by 
method’s inventor and its advocates (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004b). Given that this 
method is relatively new and it is still being modified, I would suggest that changing 
the method’s vocabulary and making it clear in method’s explanations that it is a 
technique of establishing associations and explicit connections, without claims to 
revealing causality, might improve it.  
 In spite of the fact that fsQCA is not able to reveal what caused 
personalisation(s), the analyses reported in this chapter did point to some 
interesting conclusions with regard to the combinations of factors that are 
associated with higher and lower degrees of the person-, persona-, and private 
persona-centred media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication. In the first 
place, it was established that there are usually several combinations of factors that 
are associated to the same degree of personalisation. Also, in almost all cases the 
combinations of conditions that were found to be explicitly connected to a certain 
degree of personalisation were not completely media or politically-related, but 
rather a complex interaction between the two types of factors. Hence, this analysis 
confirmed the findings from other studies (e.g. Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 
2013) which found that personalisation can be seen as connected not only to 
politically-related causal conditions, but also media-related ones. It is particularly 
important to note that this complex interplay of media and political factors was 
found in a communist and post-communist context in which political factors are 
usually considered more important and influential than media-related ones.  
 In addition, this study showed that it is important to adapt the variables to the 
context that is being researched. In other words, the variables that were introduced 
based on the knowledge of the communist and post-communist context (e.g. 
authoritarianism in the society, journalistic autonomy) and examination of cases that 
were analyzed (e.g. being a party leader, position in the political system etc.) 
showed at times as more important than the variables tested in other similar studies 
or those which the mainstream personalisation literature identifies as relevant (e.g. 
the strength of tabloid sector, type of political system).  
 Finally, this analysis again showed how important it is to differentiate 
between different dimensions of personalisation and be clear about how these 
dimensions are defined, measured and their causal conditions examined. The 
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complexity of personalisation of political communication was showed not only by 
different paths that lead to the same outcome, but also significant differences 
between conditions that are relevant for different dimensions of personalisation. 
Although there were some differences between conditions tested for each 
dimension of personalisation, it is important to note that those variables tested for 
several dimensions were not found to be equally important for all dimensions. 
Hence, this again speaks to the complex nature of personalisation and conditions 
that are associated with its dimensions, and should act as a warning against 
generalizations and simplifications of issues related to this phenomenon.  
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8. The comparative perspective: the peculiarity of the 
Croatian case 
 
The first three empirical chapters reported findings from analysis of the 
personalisation of political communication in communist Yugoslavia, and one of its 
successors, Croatia. This empirical chapter will examine the personalisation in 
media reporting in a comparative perspective. Namely, it will look at the cross-
national similarities and differences between the trends observed in a communist 
and post-communist context and that revealed by analyses of other, mostly 
Western, countries. There are two main aims of this comparison. First is to examine 
whether the trends found in this case study are in any way extraordinary, i.e. 
counter-intuitive given existing scholarship and trends detected in other contexts. 
The second is to establish whether the findings from Yugoslavia and Croatia can in 
any way inform the scholarship on personalisation, but also political communication 
in general.  
This seems important since, if the person and/or persona-centred media 
reporting trends in a new democracy are somehow different from those suggested 
by the personalisation literature and observed in other countries, it would point to the 
fact that personalisation scholarship has limitations and its explanatory power does 
not go beyond established Western democracies in which this theory has mostly 
been tested. Hence, the personalisation literature would have to be modified or 
supplemented with theories which might explain developments related to the 
mediated visibility of political leaders in contexts other than Western ones. If the 
trends in media’s focus on leaders and their personae, and their origins, are 
significantly different in Croatia from those in established Western democracies it 
might also mean that there are some new trends of political communication and 
theories of their development or diffusion that have not yet been discovered or 
acknowledged. Specifically, this chapter will discuss whether existing theories 
related to the development of modern trends of political communication, namely 
Americanization and modernization, can help explain this case study, and if they can 
not, what are the alternatives.  
In the first part of the chapter the data related to the person-centred media 
reporting in communist Yugoslavia and post-communist Croatia will be examined in 
a comparative perspective, while the second part of the chapter will focus on cross-
national comparison of the data related to the mediation of leaders’ private lives. In 
both parts special emphasis will be put on the comparison of Yugoslav/Croatian 
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data with that from Langer's study (2011) of personalisation in the UK. Given that it 
is difficult to compare data from various studies on personalisation due to 
inconsistencies in the conceptual and methodological approaches to the study of 
personalisation, Langer’s study is the most appropriate for a detailed comparison of 
person-centred media reporting and mediation of leaders’ private lives since it 
conceptualizes personalisation in a similar way to this thesis. There are also 
significant similarities in research designs. More details about the conceptual and 
methodological similarities and differences between the Langer’s study and this 
project are given later on in the chapter.  
 
8.1.  Person-centred media reporting 
 
The longitudinal content analysis of Yugoslav and Croatian daily newspapers 
reported in Chapter 5 revealed that there is a trend of de-personalisation of media 
content evident in the transition period from a communist to a post-communist 
regime. Specifically, all four indicators which were designed to capture the extent to 
which communist and post-communist reporting was person-centred (i.e. centred on 
an individual political actor instead of a collective one) showed de-personalisation 
trends. In addition, these trends were particularly strong when only heads of the 
executive where included in the analysis. To summarize the findings, in the 
transition from communist to a post-communist regime Croatian media have 
decreased the number of articles they published about leaders per week, these 
articles have been taking lesser and lesser proportion of all published articles, and 
the visibility of parties has grown relative to that of leaders to the point that the 
parties were in the 2010s more visible than their leaders. The aim of this part of the 
chapter is to examine the person-centred media reporting in a comparative 
perspective.  
Personalisation theory in general suggests that media reporting has over the 
past few decades become more focused on individual political actors, especially 
political leaders, while the mediated visibility of collective political actors, such as 
political parties and governments, has decreased (e.g. Bjerling, 2012; Langer, 2011; 
Maier & Adam, 2010; McAllister, 2007; Poguntke & Webb, 2005). There is also a 
growing body of evidence that supports this thesis, at least in the Western countries 
in which this kind of research has been carried out. Wilke and Reinemann (2001) 
used content analysis to examine the campaign coverage of German General 
Elections from 1949 to 1998 in the daily newspapers. They found that the 
percentage of campaign-related articles that contained a reference to political 
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candidates increased from 1969 to 1998, although the increase was neither drastic 
nor linear. Langer (2011) used the same method to examine the visibility of British 
Prime Ministers in The Times and the Guardian from 1945 to 2009. She showed that 
British media have over time put increasing focus on political leaders, but as in the 
German case, the trend was not linear. The personalisation thesis can be seen as 
confirmed in the case of the UK, but also in those of the US, France, Canada and 
Austria, by the research done by Dalton and Wattenberg (2000). They examined the 
visibility of political leaders relative to that of their parties in the newspapers’ 
campaign coverage from the 1950s to 1990s in the five above mentioned countries. 
They discovered that in all these countries newspapers in the 1990s focused more 
on political leaders than parties than was the case in the 1950s. In addition, in all 
cases the mediated visibility of individual political actors was greater than that of 
their parties in the 1990s. Rahat and Sheafer (2007) came to a similar conclusion by 
doing research on Israel. They also used content analysis to research the 
prominence of political leaders and their parties in newspaper campaign coverage 
from 1949 until 2003. They reported that since the 1980s the number of articles that 
dominantly focused on the candidates grew significantly, while articles focusing on 
parties and those paying equal attention to the individual and the party, both 
decreased. Based on this evidence it could be suggested that the hypothesis that 
politicians have become increasingly media visible in the past few decades is 
warranted and empirically proven, at least in the case of Western democracies. 
Maier and Adam (2010) reached the same conclusion in their state of the field 
analysis.  
In light of mainstream personalisation theory and the evidence that supports 
the person-centred hypothesis in some Western countries, the findings gathered by 
the examination of the Yugoslav and Croatian media seem counter-intuitive. 
Specifically, while it appears as though politicians are becoming more and more 
media visible in Western democracies, young post-communist democracy 
experienced completely different trends. This has several important implications that 
need to be considered.  
Firstly, it has been hypothesized that post-communist countries have been in 
their transition phases quite susceptible to Western influences, especially those from 
the US, with political communication not being an exception. With regard to the 
Western influences on the media, it is often assumed that post-communist media 
have with the introduction of free market “adopted ‘Americanized’ style of reporting 
that relies heavily on such elements as ‘infotaiment’, personalisation and 
trivialization” (Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2002: 21). Hence, it is frequently suggested 
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that the tabloidisation of media and the trends in post-communist reporting have 
been imported from the West, particularly from the US (Gulyas, 1998; Lauk, 2008; 
Slavko Splichal, 2001). This hypothesis about the transfer of American-style 
communication trends is in line with the “Americanization” theory that suggests that 
modern trends and communication styles are being disseminated from the US 
around the world (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). However, the data gathered in this 
project refutes this hypothesis, at least as far as the adoption of person-centred 
media reporting is concerned. Although it is impossible to generalize and claim that 
all post-communist countries have not imported a person-centred style of reporting 
politics from the US, or Western democracies in general, the evidence from Croatia 
calls for caution in making generalizations about the Western influences on post-
communist countries. It could actually be the case that the post-communist countries 
have not relied as much on the American or Western communication practices as is 
often assumed. The reluctance of post-communist journalists to adopt Western-like 
practices of reporting has been documented in other areas of communication as 
well. For example, it is argued that journalists in post-communist societies retained 
their focus on comment and analysis rather than reporting, i.e. they are described as 
opinionated, interventionist, prone to showing partisanship (Coman, 2000; Hanitzsch 
et al., 2011; Lauk, 2009; Voltmer, 2008). As Gross (2004: 123) puts it: “From 
Albania to Serbia, post-1989 journalism consists of tendentious, opinionated, highly 
politicized, and often inaccurate reporting”. In contrast, “Western journalists are 
generally less supportive of any active promotion of particular values, ideas and 
social change, and they adhere more to universal principles in their ethical 
decisions” (Hanitzsch et al., 2011: 273). Hence, “Americanization” theory might not 
be best at explaining the communication developments in post-communist countries.  
Secondly, as explained in Chapter 3, some of those scholars who question 
the explanatory power of the “Americanization” theory tend to subscribe to the 
“modernization” hypothesis. In essence it suggests that the communication practices 
have been becoming more similar around the world due to the process of 
modernization that these societies have been undergoing (Plasser, 2002; Swanson 
& Mancini, 1996). The increased media focus on individual political actors is usually 
considered to be one of these modern communication trends which have developed 
across the world due to changes which the societies have gone through (e.g. 
weakening of cleavages, rise of politically self sufficient citizens, technological 
development of media, deregulation of media market etc.). However, this hypothesis 
likewise does not seem to explain the de-personalisation trends observed in Croatia. 
On the contrary, it seems that the more changes the country underwent, the less 
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focus its media put on the political leaders and the more prominence was given to 
the parties. Specifically, as the post-communist country moved towards the 
consolidation phase of the transition process, liberalized its media market and built 
its civic society, the media have not put more focus on individual political actors, as 
would be expected according to modernization theory, but rather less. This calls into 
question not only the ability to apply modernization theory beyond the Western 
world, but also the explanation of what are considered to be modern trends of 
political communication. Personalisation is usually considered to be one of those, 
alongside tabloidisation, rise of infotainment, professionalisation of journalists and 
campaigning etc. (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). However, as the example of Croatia 
shows, it is not only that tabloidized media do not have to practice person-centred 
media reporting, but that party-centred reporting and decreased leaders’ media 
visibility might also be considered as new trends in political communication. Given 
that this type of reporting is usually considered to be superior to personalized 
reporting, at least by the supporters of the party democracy (Langer, 2011; Manin, 
1997), it seems that the post-communist country’s media reporting trends resemble 
those that advocates of party democracy would like to see in established Western 
democracies. Ironically perhaps, if we consider that Western countries and their 
media systems were thought of as role models for new post-communist 
democracies (Gross, 2004; Lauk, 2009), these young democracies might in their 
consolidated phases actually be role-models for their older counterparts.  
Finally, the hypothesis suggested in this thesis, that of continuation of 
communist media reporting practices in the post-communist era, is as incapable of 
explaining the de-personalisation trends as “Americanization” and “modernization”. 
In spite of what can be seen as a favourable context for the continuation of 
communist practice of person-centred reporting, post-communist media content 
transformed from person-centred to party-centred. Although it is difficult to 
generalize based on this case study, there is a possibility that the development of 
trends in post-communist reporting might be better explained by a process of 
“democratization” rather than any other theory. The fsQCA reported in the previous 
chapter showed that, based on examined variables, lower degrees of person-
centred reporting in the late post-communist period were associated with the 
autonomous media and Prime Ministers who ruled in parliamentary systems. All 
these factors can be seen as related to the democratization processes. In the 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society the degree of media freedom 
rose, and institutional settings to de-centralize and de-personalize power were 
introduced in order to prevent a rise of another all-powerful leader, as was Tito, and 
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to an extent Tuđman in the early post-communist period. Hence, the rise in media 
independence and institutional changes by which Prime Ministers became head 
executives can be seen as both processes related to democratization, and de-
personalisation of media reporting. Although it is only possible to speculate about 
the causal connection between democratization and de-personalisation of reporting 
at this point, the “democratization” theory in comparison to Americanization and 
modernization theory does seem to be the most plausible explanation of how the de-
personalizing trend developed in Croatia.  
Therefore, it can be concluded, based on the Croatian case study, that 
existing theories that aim to explain modern trends in political communication might 
not have the same explanatory power when tested in the context of post-communist 
countries. Rather, the development of political communication trends in these 
societies should perhaps be looked at through the prism of “democratization”, 
although further comparative research among post-communist countries is needed 
to determine whether this theory might be applicable more generally in the post-
communist context.  
 
8.1.1. Croatia and the UK compared: Post-communist media as a role model? 
Although the differences between trends observed by scholars in various 
Western countries and trends found in this case study seem straightforward, caution 
is needed when using other scholars’ data for comparative analysis due to 
differences in conceptual and methodological approaches to personalisation. These 
other studies (i.e. Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Langer, 2011; Rahat & Sheafer, 
2007; Wilke & Reinemann, 2001) conceptualized personalisation as a focus on 
individual political actors in media reporting, sometimes relative to the focus put on 
their parties. Hence, they seem well suited for comparison with the data gathered in 
this project for the person-centred media reporting. These studies have also all used 
the content analysis method and focused on the examination of daily newspapers in 
the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. However, 
their sampling methods vary and their coding procedures are often scarcely 
described. Therefore, in the words of Maier and Adam (2010: 226) who analyzed the 
state of the field, it “becomes extremely difficult to judge whether differences found 
between countries are real or a methodological artifact”.  
In order to test whether the degrees of person-centred media reporting and 
the de-personalisation trends observed over time in Yugoslavia and Croatia are 
indeed extraordinary and contradict the existing scholarship on personalisation, the 
findings from this study will be compared with those from Langer's (2011) study of 
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personalisation in the UK. Several researchers has shown that the UK media has 
over the past few decades increased their focus on individual political actors 
(Boumans et al., 2013; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Langer, 2011; den Harder, 
2013). Hence the UK seems a good example of a Western society that is claimed to 
have been experiencing a trend towards personalisation in media reporting.  
Langer’s (2011) data seems best suited for comparison with data from this 
thesis for several reasons. Firstly, both Langer’s study and this project used content 
analysis of newspaper articles for determining the degree of political leaders’ 
mediated visibility. While Langer focused on the mediated visibility of British Prime 
Ministers (i.e. British heads of the executive), this project examined the media’s 
focus on all Yugoslav and Croatian leaders that had executive powers. Hence, in 
order to make the data from this study more comparable to Langer’s data, only 
information related to Yugoslav and Croatian heads of the executive is used for 
comparison. Secondly, the time-frames of the two analyses overlap to a great 
extent. Langer analyzed mediated visibility of leaders in the UK from 1945 to 2009, 
while this study focused on the period 1974 to 2013. Thirdly, the sampling methods 
of the two studies resemble each other to an extent. Langer aimed to analyze 
mediated visibility of political leaders in normal coverage so she focused on articles 
mentioning leaders published in two consecutive weeks in November during a 
leader’s first three years in office. In this study sampling was also done during the 
first three years of a leader’s rule, but both intensive and normal coverage was 
targeted. Hence, in order for the data to be as comparable as possible, only the 
articles published during normal periods (one week in March during second and 
third year in office) are included in the cross-national comparison. However, since 
the variable which coded for the mention of leader’s party had to be coded in intense 
political coverage18, the leader to party ratio indicator from this project will be based 
on the articles published during the intense periods. Finally, Langer used some of 
the same indicators as were used in this project for determining the degree of the 
person-centred media reporting, namely the average number of articles mentioning 
the leader per week, the percentage of articles that refer to the leader in relation to 
all published articles, and the ratio of the leader to party mentions. Given that the 
same variables were analyzed in the same way in both projects, the comparison of 
the UK and Yugoslav/Croatian data should result in reliable and valid findings.  
                                                 
18
 Party mentions had to be coded only in the intense coverage (election campaign period) because in 
the post-2000 period the Presidents had to resign from all party duties once elected so it was 
impossible to research leader to party mentions in the normal coverage (second and third year in 
office).  
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It should also be noted that Langer’s data for the UK has been updated with 
the information gathered for David Cameron who came to power in 2010. The data 
related to Cameron was collected during a pilot study done for this thesis. Langer’s 
method was used to analyze the mediated visibility of David Cameron in The Times 
in two consecutive weeks in November during his first and second year in office. 
Since the analysis was carried out in early 2012 it was not possible to analyze the 
first three years in office. Given that coding for variables designed to capture the 
degree of the person-centred media reporting was quite straightforward (the articles 
were coded only for the presence or absence of reference to Cameron and his 
party), the reliability of findings related to Cameron’s media visibility should be quite 
high.  
In sum, data from Langer's (2011) study and this one are compared 
according to two indicators of the person-centred media reporting: the average 
number of articles mentioning the head of the executive per week (Figure 19), and 
the ratio of head of the executive to party mentions in examined newspapers (Figure 
20). In both comparisons the data from The Times which represents the UK media 
has been compared to the data from all three examined Yugoslav/Croatian 
newspapers, namely the state-owned quality paper Vjesnik, half-tabloid Večernji list 
which was privatized at the beginning of the 2000s, and the privately owned tabloid 
24sata. Also, the UK data has been presented from the 1970s so that it covers the 
same time-period as the Yugoslav/Croatian data. Consequently, several conclusions 
can be drawn from these comparative analyses.  
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Figure 19. Average number of articles mentioning the head of the executive per week 
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Figure 20. Ratio of articles mentioning heads of the executive to articles mentioning 
their party 
 
Firstly, it appears as though the hypothesis that the post-communist country 
experienced different trends in the person-centred media reporting than the Western 
one is warranted. Both indicators show that since the 1970s the political leaders 
became more media prominent in the UK media, specifically The Times, and that 
these leaders have over time became more media visible than their parties, which is 
the opposite trend to that found in the case study of Yugoslavia and Croatia. In other 
words, while the example of The Times suggests that the UK experienced a 
personalisation trend in media reporting, the analysis of Croatian newspapers points 
to the fact that this media has undergone a process of de-personalisation in media 
reporting during the period of democratic transition. Although Langer (2011: 79) 
concluded that “parties continue to play a crucial material and symbolic role in 
British politics” given that the increase in the mediated visibility of the British Prime 
Ministers relative to their parties was not drastic, the comparison with a post-
communist country reveals that the parties in the UK have a decreasingly important 
place in public discourse, while in the post-communist context they might be gaining 
relevance by increased visibility in the mediated public sphere. 
Secondly, there seems to be a difference between the Western and the 
communist style of reporting, at least as far as the focus on political leaders is 
concerned. Specifically, both indicators show that the communist papers have put 
more emphasis on their leader in media content than did The Times at the beginning 
of the 1970s. British Prime Minister Edward Heath who was in power in the first half 
of the 1970s was on average mentioned in The Times 35 times a week, while 
communist leader Josip Broz Tito was mentioned in Večernji list 38 times, and in 
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Vjesnik 57 times a week. Similarly, Heath’s Conservative party was more media 
visible than him, with a 0,7 leader-to-party ratio in The Times. On the other hand, 
Tito was more visible in both communist papers than The League of Communist of 
Yugoslavia. The ratio of leader-to-party mentions in Večernji list was 1,2, and in 
Vjesnik 1,5. The results of this comparison run counter to Galtung and Ruge's 
(1965) expectations of the news values in Western and communist countries. They 
speculated that Western countries would pursue a more person-centred style of 
reporting, while a communist press would put more focus on structures and 
collectives. However, the comparison presented above revealed the opposite – that 
the Yugoslav communist press used a more person-centred reporting style than did 
that in the UK. This finding then seems better grounded in the theories related to 
communist leadership cults and Western scholarship on personalisation. 
Specifically, as the fsQCA showed in the previous chapter, Tito’s high media 
prominence in communism was explicitly connected with a deferential journalistic 
culture in which journalists were instructed to communicate information about him 
via mass media. This can be seen as one of the techniques of communist cult 
building (Apor et al., 2004; Lauk, 2008; Plamper, 2004; Rees, 2004). On the other 
hand, the personalisation scholarship suggests that (Western) media were in the 
past focused on issues and collectives, while nowadays this has changed towards 
more emphasis on the individual (Langer, 2011; Maier & Adam, 2010; McAllister, 
2007; Poguntke & Webb, 2005), and this seems to partly explain why the UK media 
did not focus as much on political leaders several decades ago.  
Thirdly, it seems that post-communist media reporting could be far less 
person-centred than is usually considered in the existing literature. For example, 
Lewis (2000) claimed that the post-communist politics revolve around individuals, 
while Örnebring (2012: 500) declared that “many trends present in ‘Western’ political 
systems are even more pronounced in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe”, 
personalisation being one of them. However, as the comparison of the Croatian and 
the UK media reporting shows, UK newspaper was pursuing a more person-centred 
approach to reporting in the majority of the post-1990 period. Specifically, while the 
media visibility of Croatian parties increased in the post-communist period in all 
newspapers, the parties’ visibility in the UK decreased to the point that Brown and 
Cameron’s ratios of leader-to-party mentions were similar to those of Tito in 
Yugoslav papers in the 1970s. In addition, even the Croatian tabloid has not put as 
much focus on the leader as did The Times in comparison to the emphasis on the 
party from the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, in the post-1990 period The Times 
has continually been publishing more articles about British leaders than any of the 
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examined Croatian newspapers have published about their heads of the executive. 
In the post-2000 period The Times was mentioning the head of the executive in 
more articles per week than did the Yugoslav communist media in the 1970s. The 
biggest differences can be observed in the 2010s when The Times was publishing 
on average 71 article about Cameron per week, while Večernji list was mentioning 
Milanović in less than half as many (n=31) and Vjesnik almost five times fewer than 
The Times (n=15).   
It might be tempting to ascribe the differences between the UK and Croatian 
newspapers’ reporting to their format and type. Specifically, it might be expected 
that The Times has, as a quality paper, focused most on reporting politics, and 
consequently perhaps, political leaders. However, two facts suggest that the 
differences in observed trends should not be seen as a result of the newspapers’ 
format and type. Firstly, a quality paper was analyzed in the Yugoslav/Croatian case 
as well, and its degree of person-centred reporting and trends over time are 
significantly different from those observed in The Times. Hence, the comparison of 
only quality papers also points to the fact politicians have become increasingly 
visible in the UK media, while their visibility has decreased in the Croatian media. 
Secondly, all the Croatian newspapers, the quality paper, half-tabloid and the 
tabloid, have experienced the same trend. Hence, the de-personalisation trend is 
not characteristic only of a specific newspaper type, but of Croatian print media in 
general. Therefore, the differences between the development of person-centred 
reporting in the UK and Yugoslavia/Croatia should not be seen as stemming from 
differences in analyzed materials.  
In sum, the comparison of person-centred media reporting in post-communist 
Croatia and the UK points to the fact that the de-personalisation of media reporting 
found during the transitional process from the communist to a post-communist 
system can indeed be seen as an extraordinary trend in modern political 
communication. In addition, generalizations about the Western influence on 
European post-communist countries and the centrality of individual political actors to 
these societies should be made with care given that the evidence from this case 
suggests that post-communist media reporting can actually be less focused on 
individuals than that in an established Western democracy. Also, given that it is 
often thought that the increased emphasis on individual political actors at the 
expense of issues and collective political actors is detrimental to democratic 
processes, post-communist countries might represent a good testing ground for an 
investigation of personalisation effects. Specifically, if increased focus on individuals 
is said to be harmful to the quality of democracy (Langer, 2011), then decreased 
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focus on individuals and increased media visibility of political parties might be 
beneficial to the democratic processes, especially in young democracies. Hence, 
post-communist countries, such as Croatia, might constitute a promising testing 
ground to investigate whether de-personalisation of media reporting can improve the 
quality of democracy and democratic processes in any way.  
 
8.2.  Mediation of leaders’ private lives 
 
While it seems important that party-centred media reporting could be seen as 
the new trend in political communication, the de-personalisation of media reporting 
evident in the decreasing focus on individual political actors does not say anything 
about the content of references to leaders. In other words, although the degree of 
leaders’ mediated visibility is decreasing, what can be seen as a positive 
development by advocates of party democracy, the content of mediated information 
needs to be taken into account in order to make judgments about the quality of this 
communication. As was argued in Chapter 2, when it comes to mediated information 
about political leaders, the biggest concern is the type of information that is 
communicated. Specifically, the question that is most frequently raised is the extent 
to which this information is related to a leader’s private persona, given that this type 
of mediated information may trivialize political communication and decrease the 
quality of public discourse (Franklin, 2004; Garzia, 2011; Langer, 2011; Meyer, 
2002). Consequently, this part of the chapter compares trends in the mediation of 
leaders’ private lives detected in the case study of a communist and post-communist 
country, with the trends observed in Western democracies. By making this 
comparison it is possible to establish whether the personalisation of media reporting 
in a post-communist context can be seen to run counter to mainstream 
personalisation scholarship, and whether there is indeed merit in the claim that post-
communist media reporting can be considered a role-model for supporters of 
rational political debates in mediated discourse.  
As reported in Chapter 5, the most significant change in the type of leaders’ 
mediated information in Yugoslavia/Croatia was the rise in the number of references 
to their private and political/private personae. In other words, the data show that the 
leaders’ private personae have been increasingly media visible in the post-
communist period, and they have mostly been politicized, i.e. the private information 
has been explicitly connected with leaders’ political personae, and not just 
publicized. For example, it was claimed that President Josipović and Prime Minister 
Milanović go to church as public officials although they are personally not religious 
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(Večernji list, 2.12.2011.), and that Prime Minister Kosor will be incapable of 
reforming the country since she is afraid to make changes to her appearance 
(Večernji list, 3.7.2009.). This seems in line with mainstream personalisation 
scholarship which suggests that the media have over the past few decades 
increasingly focused on the leaders’ private life and qualities (Langer, 2011; Maier & 
Adam, 2010; Stanyer, 2013; Van Aelst et al., 2011), although the empirical evidence 
is at best ambiguous.  
Langer (2011) analyzed the references to British Prime Ministers’ family life, 
appearance, lifestyle, upbringing and religion in The Times from 1945 to 2009 and 
found that there was a clear increase in the amount of attention the media paid to 
British leaders’ private lives. Den Harder (2013) came to the same conclusion by 
analyzing political interviews in The Times from 1990 to 2010, and he also found 
evidence that the same trend can be observed in France and Netherlands. 
However, he did not specify what qualifies as a “mention” of a leader’s private life in 
his analysis. The increase in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives in the UK 
and France was also observed by Stanyer (2013) who looked at the number of 
references to leaders’ birthdays, spouses and holidays in the national press, but 
also to the number of books published about the leaders’ private life in the 1990s 
and 2000s. He reported that alongside the UK and France, there was also an 
increase in the media visibility of leaders’ private lives in the US, and to some extent 
in Australia. On the other hand, in Italy and Spain the trends were visible but very 
weak, while in Germany there was actually a decreasing trend. That is to say, in 
Germany the number of mediated references to leaders’ private life has decreased 
since the 1990s. Similarly, Rahat and Sheafer (2007) reported that they have not 
found an increase in the mediated visibility of Israel’s politicians’ private lives and 
qualities from 1949 to 2003 in the daily newspapers, but they do not explain what 
they counted as references to politicians’ private lives and qualities.  
To sum up, it appears as though there is evidence that in some Western 
countries, such as the US, the UK, France and Netherlands, the media have 
focused more on politicians’ private lives in the past few decades. But there are also 
countries in which there was little or no change in the media visibility of leaders’ 
private lives, and also those, such as Germany, in which there was a decrease in 
the amount of references to leaders’ private matters. This division between countries 
in which the media is more likely to report leaders’ private personae and those in 
which leaders’ private matters are not as media visible was also observed by 
Stanyer and Wring (2004), at a time when very little empirical evidence existed on 
the topic. They claimed that there are “laissez-faire media cultures” in which the 
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media does not refrain from reporting politicians’ private personae, and those “more 
conservative” media cultures in which journalists are less willing to report politicians’ 
private lives (ibid., 6). Given that this thesis has revealed that a post-communist 
country experienced an increase in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private spheres 
it appears as though Croatian media culture resembles more a laissez-faire type 
than a conservative one, at least in its consolidated period. Hence, while it was 
shown in the example of Croatian media reporting that a young European 
democracy does not need to follow Western trends, the same can not be said about 
the trends related to the content of mediated information about leaders. On the 
contrary, it seems that Croatian post-communist democracy is experiencing the 
same trends as some established democracies, such as the UK, the US, France or 
Netherlands.   
One of the implications of this is that the theories of “Americanization” and 
modernization of political communication could shed some light on why and how 
trends in the mediation of leaders’ private lives in a young post-communist 
democracy developed. They were deemed unlikely to have significant explanatory 
power in the case of the rise of the party-centred media reporting, but it seems they 
might help explain the trend related to the private persona-centred media reporting.  
If we look at “Americanization” theory, it might be argued that the increase in 
the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives in Croatia was possibly a trend 
imported from the US, or some other Western country, simply because in these 
countries this trend developed earlier. The existing evidence seems to suggest that 
the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives grew in the US from the end of the 
1980s when George Bush Snr came to power, while in France and the UK the start 
of this trend can be traced to the 1990s (Langer, 2011; Stanyer, 2013). On the other 
hand, the mediation of Croatian head executives’ private lives was not a significant 
feature of media reporting until the 2000s, peaking with Prime Minister Kosor in the 
2010s. Hence, this trend developed in Croatia almost a decade later, so the media 
might have been imitating the West when it started to put more focus on leaders’ 
private lives. Also, as was already mentioned, it is sometimes suggested that 
American style of reporting had a significant influence on the trends in some 
European post-communist countries (Slavko Splichal, 2001; Voltmer & Schmitt-
Beck, 2002). Although Croatian media did not imitate the person-centred style of 
reporting, they might have done so with the disclosure of politicians’ private matters. 
There is some evidence that Croatian newspapers imitated some of the reporting 
practices from Western countries. For example, Malović claims that the daily 
Večernji list has copied some of the practices of British Daily Mirror, especially its 
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graphic design and news presentation style (2003 in Kanižaj, 2006). Similarly, there 
is evidence that some Croatian political actors have imitated American practices of 
political advertising. Kunac et al. (2013: 75) argue that the two major political parties 
have in the 2011 General elections “uncritically adopted style of advertising from 
other countries, especially the US”. Hence, imitation of American communication 
practices does not seem to be strange to Croatian political communication actors. 
Consequently, the development of the discussed trend in a new democracy may 
perhaps be better explained by a “shopping model” according to which some 
modern trends, but not all, are imported and perhaps adapted to suit national 
contexts (Plasser, 2002: 18), while other communication practices are developed by 
the process of modernization.   
Indeed, there are indications that modernization theory might also be well 
suited to explain the rise of the examined trend in post-communist Croatia. In other 
words, the changes and developments in the country itself might have led to higher 
media visibility of leaders’ private lives. The fsQCA revealed that the highest degree 
of private persona-centred media reporting, noted in the 2010s, was explicitly 
connected to the autonomous journalistic culture and large television reach, among 
other factors. Hence, the increased media visibility of leaders’ private lives seems to 
be associated with the changes in the degree of media freedom and technological 
development of media, which are changes that can be understood as forming part of 
the modernization process19. Another reason for ascribing this trend in the post-
communist context to modernization rather than Americanization is that there may 
be different reasons for publishing details of leaders’ private persona. Western 
journalists justify their intrusion into politicians’ private lives by claiming that they are 
“providing information that allows the public to make judgments about politicians’ 
authenticity, trustworthiness and competence to govern” (Stanyer & Wring, 2004: 6; 
see also Stanyer, 2013; Thompson, 2000). At the same time, post-communist 
journalists are said to publish kompromat, i.e. compromising materials about 
politicians that may or may not be true, as instructed or paid for by competing 
political elites (Ledeneva, 2006; Örnebring, 2012). Hence, the motivation for 
disclosing leaders’ private information seems different in the West from that in post-
communist countries, so the origins of the same trend might be different as well.  
In addition, given that there was hardly any mediated information about the 
communist leader’s private life, and the amount of the mediated information grew 
                                                 
19
 Other such changes, like the deregulation of media market, tabloidization of news and relaxing of 
libel laws, were also tested by fsQCA, but the analysis did not found them explicitly connected with 
higher media exposure of leaders’ private personae. 
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significantly in the post-communist period, the hypothesis about the continuation of 
communist style of reporting is not plausible. Also, the “democratization” thesis 
(which was suggested as a possible explanation for the decrease in the person-
centred reporting) likewise does not seem to have any explanatory power with 
regard to the mediation of leaders’ private personae. Hence, according to the 
available evidence, the modernization theory and/or the “shopping model” seem as 
the most appropriate theories that may explain the development of the private 
persona-centred reporting in the examined post-communist context.  
However, at this point it is important to note that the differences between the 
most plausible theories that may explain different personalisation trends also point 
to the fact that it is indeed necessary to look at personalisation as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon since different dimensions can lead to quite different 
developments. While the move from person-centred to party-centred media 
reporting might have been seen as a positive development, at least for advocates of 
party democracy, and this kind of reporting a role-model for Western media that 
pursue person-centred reporting, the same can not be said of the rise in the 
mediation of post-communist leaders’ private personae. It can be argued here that 
the Croatian media cannot be seen as role-models since they are increasingly 
focusing on leaders’ private matters, which is usually seen as trivializing political 
communication and decreasing the quality of public discourse (Franklin, 2004; 
Langer, 2011; Meyer, 2002). Furthermore, developments in this post-communist 
context can be seen as even more harmful for the quality of information in public 
discourse since the number of articles mentioning leaders is decreasing, while the 
number of articles which focus on their private personae is increasing. On the other 
hand, in Western societies private information about leaders can be seen as 
supplementing, rather than replacing, political information, since the amount of 
mediated information about leaders is in general on the increase (Langer, 2011). 
Only those who consider all types of information about leaders important for public 
debates and voting could consider the developments in my case study as 
contributing to the quality of political communication. However, if a significant 
amount of the mediated information about post-communist leaders’ private lives is 
manufactured, as the literature on kompromat suggests, than there is no positive 
side to the increase in the media visibility of post-communist leaders’ private 
personae.  
 
8.2.1. Croatia and the UK compared: Similarity with differences 
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Although it seems that the examined post-communist country experiences 
similar trends in the mediation of leaders’ private lives as some established 
democracies, caution is needed when comparing data due to differences in the 
ways in which scholars conceptualize leaders’ private life or private persona and 
methodological approaches to the analysis of this topic (Van Aelst et al., 2011). 
Hence, although all studies mentioned in the previous section focused on the 
mediation of politicians’ private lives, and they all applied content analysis to daily 
newspapers, their sampling methods differ and there are also important variations in 
the ways in which they define and conceptualize what constitutes the leaders’ 
private life. Furthermore, in some of the studies there was no explanation as to what 
was coded as a reference to a leader’s private life, or as some call it personal life, or 
qualities (e.g. in Rahat & Sheafer, 2007; den Harder, 2013).  
In order to test whether the observed similarity in the trend of mediated 
leaders’ private lives between the post-communist country and some Western 
democracies is real and not a methodological artifact, the data from this project will 
again be compared to the data from Langer's (2011) study of the personalisation in 
the UK. However, unlike the comparison of data related to the person-centred media 
reporting, the comparison of the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives is more 
complicated due to differences in the conceptualization of a leader’s private life. 
Whereas Langer coded for references to family life, appearance, lifestyle, upbringing 
and religion (ibid., 84), in my project seven more life areas were added for analysis – 
love life, finance, health, relationships, education, feelings and work. However, given 
that each of these life areas was coded separately in the analysis of Yugoslav and 
Croatian newspapers it is possible to construct a private life index that would include 
only life areas that Langer’s index also contains. Hence, for one of the 
Yugoslav/Croatian newspapers both indexes that capture all areas coded for in this 
project and that which contains only areas included in Langer’s analysis will be 
presented. However, in spite of some similarities in the conceptualization of private 
life, it is possible that some media references were not coded in the same way. For 
example, Langer might have coded references to education as a reference to 
upbringing, or a mention of leaders’ love life might have been in Langer’s study 
coded as a reference to family life. Hence, the two indexes might give a hint, rather 
than proof, of how well an index designed to capture Western references to private 
lives captures references to leaders’ private lives in a communist and a post-
communist context. Furthermore, this might reveal some cultural differences in what 
might be from media reporting considered as one’s private life. In other words, there 
might be some private life areas that post-communist media mentions and Western 
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ones do not. Finally, while Langer coded only for references to private life, in this 
project the distinction was made between private information which was only 
“publicized”, and that which was also “politicized”. For example, if the reference to a 
leader contains information that he/she went to church, this was coded as a 
reference to one’s private life. However, if the private information was in any way 
connected to a leader’s political persona, such as in the reference that he/she went 
to church as public official although he/she is personally not religious, then this was 
coded as a reference to a leader’s political/private persona. Given that both private 
and political/private references contain information of leaders’ private lives, and in 
order to make the data from this thesis comparable to that from Langer’s study, a 
joint index was made which captures both articles in which a leader’s private and 
political/private life are mentioned. As in Langer’s study, if an article contains 
references to more than one private life area, it was counted only once (ibid., 84). 
Given all the differences between the research designs and the modifications of 
data presentation, in order for the two studies to be as comparable as possible, this 
comparison should be primarily looked at as an illustration of the similarities and 
differences in the mediation of leaders’ private lives’ trends between a communist, 
post-communist and Western context. It should not be seen as a proper empirical 
cross-national comparison given that it might lack academic rigor due to possible 
inconsistencies in conceptualizations and coding. However, the comparison of 
Yugoslav/Croatian and British data does point to some interesting conclusions, even 
when the limitations of this comparison are taken into account.  
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Figure 21. Percentage of articles that mention the head of the executive that refer to 
his/her private life 
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Firstly, as it appears based on the data presented in Figure 21, in the 1970s 
the extent to which communist media reported leader’s private information was quite 
similar to the attention that British leaders’ private lives got in The Times. 
Specifically, the communist quality paper Vjesnik did not mention Tito’s private life at 
all, while the half-tabloid Večernji list reported his private life to a similar extent as 
The Times reported Heath’s and Thatcher’s. Hence, it might be suggested that both 
the Western media and communist media, which later transformed into post-
communist media, started from the same or a similar starting point. Furthermore, 
although it may be expected that the low media visibility of the leaders’ private lives 
in a communist and a Western country in the 1970s should stem from different 
reasons, the evidence suggest otherwise. According to the literature on communist 
media and communist leadership cults, due to strong political influence of 
communist political elite over the media (Lauk, 2008; Plamper, 2004), it could be 
expected that communist leader’s private life was off limits to media due to political 
censorship. However, according to the analysis in the previous chapter, deferential 
media were not explicitly connected to low media exposure of Tito’s private 
personae. On the contrary, the factors that were associated with the mediation of his 
private life were quite similar to those in Western countries, such as a weak tabloid 
and commercial media sector, strong libel laws, and a leader being a long standing 
political figure before taking office. Stanyer's (2013: 61-71) fsQCA revealed that 
Thatcher’s private life was not particularly media visible because she was an 
ideologically extreme Prime Minister in a parliamentary system, who was born in the 
pre-boomer generation and did not need to bond personally with voters because she 
was known to them due to her political activities long before she took office (ibid). 
Therefore, some conditions associated with low media prominence of Tito’s and 
Thatcher’s private lives are actually similar, which points to the fact that Western 
and communist media reporting were not significantly different with regard to either 
the extent to which leaders’ private lives were reported, or to the factors that were 
associated with this; or at least this is what can be concluded based on fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analyses in this and Stanyer’s project.  
 Secondly, UK newspaper has been publishing more information about British 
leaders’ private lives than the Croatian media. This seems particularly important if 
we consider the fact that the UK analysis was conducted with the case of The 
Times, a quality paper, which is believed to be less prone to publishing this kind of 
information than the UK tabloids (den Harder, 2013; Langer, 2011). The Croatian 
quality paper, Vjesnik, has in all periods published fewer articles mentioning the 
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leaders’ private lives than The Times, which is also true in most cases for the 
Croatian half-tabloid, Večernji list. The case of the Croatian tabloid is most complex. 
As might be expected due to its format and the fact that the data shows that since 
the 2000s the mediation of leaders’ private personae was on the rise in Croatia, 
24sata was at the beginning of the 2010s publishing the most private information 
about political leaders, even more than The Times did about Cameron. However, 
this is also the only paper which shows a linear negative trend, meaning that 24sata 
did not publish any private information about the latest Croatian Prime Minister 
Milanović. In addition, fsQCA reported in previous chapter did not find the 
tabloidization of news to be connected with higher degrees of mediated leaders’ 
private personae in a post-communist system. Hence, it can be suggested that the 
tabloidisation of news media may not be as significant a factor in determining the 
media visibility of leaders’ private lives in all contexts as it is in the Western 
countries. Specifically, Stanyer (2013) argues that the fact that Tony Blair’s and 
Gordon Brown’s private lives were quite media prominent is associated with a strong 
tabloid sector in Britain, alongside the low levels of party membership, and some 
personal characteristics of these leaders.   
 Thirdly, it really does appear as though the Croatian media are following the 
same trends in the mediation of leaders’ private lives as those Western ones that 
increased their focus on leaders’ private matters in the past few decades. However, 
trends in all Croatian newspapers are less strong than that observed in The Times. 
While the positive trend since the 1970s for The Times is quite strong (r=0,71), 
meaning that there was almost a constant increase in the amount of attention to 
leaders’ private lives, the differences between Croatian leaders in media visibility of 
their private lives are greater. The half-tabloid Večernji list shows the strongest 
positive trend over time (r=0,48), but it is still not as strong as in the UK. The quality 
paper’s trend is quite weak (r=0,36), while the tabloid somewhat unexpectedly had a 
linear negative trend (r=-1). Hence, while the UK, alongside the US, France and 
Netherlands, might be an example of a country in which there was a significant 
increase in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives over the past few decades, 
this comparison showed that a new democracy might follow or develop the same 
trend, but perhaps not to the same extent as in the above mentioned established 
democracies. Even the Croatian half-tabloid that had an almost linear positive trend 
in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives in the post-2000 period did not 
reach the level of exposure of leaders’ private lives in The Times, although it did 
come close. Hence, while the trend in a country such as the UK seems stable and 
enduring, the example of the young European post-communist democracy shows 
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that this country too can experience the same trend, but that it is more volatile and 
unstable.   
According to Stanyer's (2013) analysis, similar developments can also be 
found in Spain and Italy. In these countries the media reporting of leaders’ private 
lives has also increased over time, but not significantly, and there are many 
differences between leaders in the extent to which their private matters were media 
visible. Furthermore, conditions identified as having an explicit connection to lower 
degrees of private persona-centred media reporting in this project are somewhat 
similar to Stanyer’s explanations of why Prime Ministers in Spain and Italy 
experience the same trends. Specifically, some conditions that were connected with 
low media prominence of Spanish and Italian Prime Minister’s private lives were a 
weak tabloid sector and leaders who were not new to high politics, which was also 
found important in this study, alongside other factors. Hence, it seems that there are 
important similarities in the factors associated with private persona-centred media 
reporting in Croatia, Spain and Italy. This seems to be another piece of evidence 
showing that Croatia's media system shares many characteristics with the 
Mediterranean model, as defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Analysis of the 
Croatian media system, according to Hallin and Manicini's media system 
dimensions, has shown that it is, and historically has been, part of the 
Mediterranean model, especially due to its high degree of clientelism and political 
parallelism (Zrinjka Peruško, 2013). Similarly, a comparative analysis of post-
communist media systems has shown that many of them, such as Lithuanian, 
Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian, are quite similar to the Mediterranean model 
(Peruško et al., 2013). Hence, it might be possible that a slow increase in the 
mediated visibility of political leaders' private lives is another characteristic of the 
Mediterranean media system model, but a further comparative research is needed 
to shed more light on this speculation.  
 And fourthly, it seems that there are cultural differences in the parts of the 
leaders’ private lives that are reported in different contexts. Taking the example of 
Vjesnik, the private life index designed to capture private life areas from the UK 
study (Figure 21, Vjesnik 2) differs from the private life index which captures all 
references to Yugoslav/Croatian leaders’ private lives in the same newspaper 
(Figure 21, Vjesnik 1). Specifically, if the values for Vjesnik 1 and Vjesnik 2 in Figure 
21 are compared it becomes evident that if Langer’s index was applied in the 
analysis of Yugoslav/Croatian media, some of the references to leaders’ private 
lives would be missed. One of the possible explanations for this is that Langer’s 
index is flawed and should be supplemented with other life areas in order to be able 
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to better capture media references to leaders’ private lives. However, the pilot study 
of David Cameron’s media portrayal in The Times, in which both Langer’s private life 
index and that used in this project were applied, showed that Langer’s private life 
index is well suited for the analysis of the mediated visibility of British leaders’ 
private lives. Specifically, almost all references to Cameron’s private life in The 
Times were able to be coded as one of the life areas from Langer’s study. Hence, 
Langer’s private life index seems appropriate for analysis of mediated leaders’ 
private lives in the UK, but it fails to capture all references to leaders’ private lives in 
the examined post-communist setting. A more plausible explanation is that there are 
important cultural differences in the parts of leaders’ private lives that the media in 
different contexts report.  
This also has an important implication for methodological approaches to 
cross-national studies of the mediated visibility of political leaders’ private lives. For 
example, Stanyer (2013) in his cross-national study of the mediated visibility of 
leaders’ private lives looked for references to leaders’ birthdays, spouses and 
holidays in national press. However, what he found should perhaps be better 
interpreted as the cross-national media’s emphasis on these three leaders’ life areas 
than on their private lives, since there may be significant differences in what the 
media reports about their leaders’ private lives. Van Aelst et al. (2011) argue that a 
simple private life index, consisting of only several life areas as that in Stanyer’s 
study (2013), is better suited for comparative analyses because it is more practical 
and easier to ensure reliability in coding in the case of multiple coders. This might be 
true, but researchers should keep in mind that by including only several life areas in 
their indexes, they run the risk of missing the cultural variations in what is from 
media reporting seen as one’s private life and also coming to flawed conclusions 
about the degree to which media in a certain country reports on a leader’s private 
life.  
 
8.3.  Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter has been to compare the trends related to the 
personalisation of media reporting found in the analysis of Yugoslav and Croatian 
newspapers with those detected in other national contexts. Hence, the question was 
how similar or different are the developments in leaders’ mediated visibility in the 
observed communist and post-communist context and those in other countries 
where similar research has been carried out? And also, what are the most plausible 
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theories that might explain the trends in the personalisation of media reporting found 
in this case study? Several conclusions can be drawn. 
 Firstly, once again it was showed that it is important to distinguish between 
different dimensions of personalisation. In other words, the cross-national 
comparisons of person-centred media reporting and the degree of the mediated 
visibility of leaders’ private lives resulted in different findings which have distinct 
implications. If the distinction was not made between the personalisation as a focus 
on an individual as opposed to a collective political actor, and personalisation as a 
focus on a leaders’ persona, i.e. his private or political life and qualities, the specific 
contribution of the trends observed in Yugoslavia and Croatia for the personalisation 
and political communication scholarship would not be as clear. Specifically, while 
the comparative analyses showed that Croatian media experience similar trends to 
those observed in some established democracies when it comes to the mediation of 
leaders’ private lives, the comparative approach to person-centred media reporting 
revealed the distinctiveness of the Yugoslav/Croatian case.  
 Secondly, the comparison of the data related to the person-centred media 
reporting from Yugoslavia and Croatia with that from Western countries, and with 
the UK in particular, showed that the trends observed in the post-communist context 
are counter to the existing personalisation scholarship and that they run in the 
opposite direction from trends found in Western countries. While in countries such 
as the UK, the US, and France, the media have over the past few decades 
increased their focus on individual political actors at the expense of collectives, in 
the post-communist context a strong de-personalisation trend was observed, 
meaning that the visibility of parties grew relative to that of their leaders. Hence, it 
was suggested that the de-personalisation of media reporting manifested in the 
greater focus on collective political actors, as compared to individual ones, might 
represent a new trend in political communication, with post-communist countries 
perhaps being among the first ones to experience this trend. This might be an 
especially plausible hypothesis if the development of the de-personalisation trend in 
the post-communist context can be best explained by “democratization” theory. 
Since the theories of Americanization and modernization do not seem to be able to 
explain the de-personalisation trend in the post-communist context, it was 
suggested that the explanation for this trend should be looked for in the process of 
democratization, the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system and all 
the changes that come with it, the de-centralisation of power, liberalization of media 
markets, development of the civil society etc. However, further comparative 
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research in other European post-communist countries would be needed to confirm 
this hypothesis.  
 Thirdly, the comparison of the trends related to the mediated visibility of 
leaders’ private lives detected in the Yugoslav/Croatian case and those from 
Western countries, again especially the UK, revealed that the young democracy’s 
media experienced the same trends as those Western countries in which there was 
an increase in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives. However, the trend 
observed in this project was not as strong, and the visibility of leaders’ private lives 
is not as pronounced, as in the countries which can be seen as leading this trend, 
namely the US, the UK, France and Netherlands. Rather, the trend found in Croatia 
seems to resemble more the trends detected in countries such as Italy and Spain 
(Stanyer, 2013), where the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives has grown in 
the past few decades, but the trend is weak and there are significant differences 
between leaders in the amount of attention given to their private lives in the media. 
Hence, it could be speculated that countries that share characteristics of a 
Mediterranean media system might experience similar trends in the mediatization of 
leaders’ private lives. However, more comparative research is needed to confirm 
this speculation and shed more light on the hypothesis that a slow increase in the 
mediated visibility of politicians’ private lives is another characteristic of a 
Mediterranean media system.  
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9. Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined the ways in which the personalisation of mediated 
political communication developed in a communist and post-communist context and 
established the similarities and differences between the development of this 
phenomenon in a communist non-democratic system, post-communist new 
democracy and an established Western democracy. I hypothesized that the 
personalisation of political communication has different causes, trends and effects in 
a communist and post-communist system, than in Western democracies with which 
most of personalisation scholarship deals. Establishing whether this hypothesis is 
valid was considered important for two main reasons. Firstly, because the existing 
literature seemed to suggest that personalized political communication may have 
graver consequences for democratic and societal processes in communist and post-
communist societies, than in established Western ones. Hence, it was important to 
examine the extent to which mediated political communication in these societies is 
personalized in order to determine whether there are any grounds to fear that 
personalized political communication may actually lead to any of the negative 
consequences associated with it. Secondly, if the hypothesis was confirmed it would 
mean that existing personalisation scholarship is limited and needs to be expanded 
with theories that would account for the ways in which personalized political 
communication develops in non-Western systems.   
In order to be able to determine the extent to which political leaders were 
visible in mediated political communication, and the ways in which their mediated 
images were constructed, the personalisation of political communication was 
conceptualized as having two main dimensions: person- and persona-centred. 
Person-centred political communication is manifested in the emphasis that political 
communication actors put on individual political actors at the expense of political 
collectives, such as parties and governments. In other words, by examining this 
dimension of personalisation it is possible to establish the degree to which political 
leaders were given primacy over collective political actors, the factors that led to this 
communication of power balance, and the effects that the promotion of individuals 
instead of collectives can have on democratic and societal processes. Persona-
centred political communication is manifested in the emphasis that political 
communication actors put on politicians personae, i.e. their lives and qualities, both 
political and private. I argued that by conceptualizing this second dimension in such 
a wide way, by encompassing all information communicated about a politician’s life 
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and qualities, we can gain a more accurate and nuanced understanding of how 
leaders’ mediated images are being constructed. In addition, this dimension is seen 
as consisting of two sub-dimensions, political persona-centred and private persona-
centred political communication. The political persona-centred dimension is 
concerned with the emphasis that is put on a politician’s life areas and qualities 
primarily related to his/her role in politics. The private persona-centred dimension is 
manifested in the focus that is put on a politician’s life areas and qualities that are 
primarily connected to those roles usually considered to form part of one’s private 
sphere, i.e. father/mother, husband/wife, football fan, music enthusiast, religious 
person etc.  Hence, by examining persona-centred political communication it is 
possible to establish the elements on which leaders’ media images were created, 
the role that the communication of private information played in the construction of 
their images, the factors that contributed to the extent to which their lives and 
qualities, and specific parts of their personae, were media visible, and the effects 
that communicating information about politicians’ lives and qualities has for the 
quality of public discourse and political communication actors’ behaviour.   
 Although the effects of personalized political communication were beyond 
the scope of this thesis, they were discussed in theoretical terms in order to 
establish the cross-cultural similarities and differences in the possible consequences 
of person- and persona-centred political communication. It was argued that the 
assumed effects of personalisation in the context of established Western 
democracies are often discussed, but rarely proven, while there is little or no 
scholarly discussion, as well as empirical evidence, related to personalisation effects 
in the context of communist and post-communist societies. Consequently, in order to 
establish possible consequences of personalized political communication in these 
contexts the thesis drew on literature related to communist leadership cults and 
transitional studies. Close examination of the effects that different dimensions of 
personalisation are speculated to have in contexts of Western, communist and post-
communist societies revealed that there are some similarities in the possible 
consequences, but also important differences that have not previously been 
acknowledged. For example, person-centred political communication in Western 
democracies might weaken political parties, while in post-communist countries it is 
more likely that it might inhibit the development of strong parties. In communist 
system the focus on individual instead of collective political actors could have 
prevented institutions from gaining power and legitimacy and in that way generated 
low respect for rules set by these institutions and increased the emphasis on 
personal loyalties. Furthermore, a possible consequence of a persona-centred 
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political communication in the Western context might be the revelation of a 
politician’s hypocrisy, while in a post-communist context it is more likely that the 
emphasis on leaders’ personae might inhibit the development of a programmatic 
party system. In a communist system the communication of information about 
leaders’ personae might have been used to deceive and manipulate the public, 
since it is argued that a leader’s persona, as it was presented to the public, was to a 
large extent manufactured. Hence, as suggested in Chapter 2, the two dimensions 
of personalisation of political communication can be seen as having different effects, 
with important cross-cultural variations.  
 While the assumed effects of personalisation were only theoretically 
addressed, the causes and development of trends related to two dimensions of 
personalisation were also empirically investigated. In Chapters 3 and 4 the factors 
that might have contributed to the development of this phenomenon in the three 
contexts were discussed, with an aim of establishing whether, if at all, these 
contexts are favourable for development of personalized political communication. 
Also, these discussions aimed to identify possible causes of personalisation in 
established Western, communist and post-communist systems. Given that there 
was, again, little or no literature that would reveal how and why this phenomenon 
developed in communist and post-communist societies, the literature concerning 
communist leadership cults and transitional studies was used to draw inferences 
about the potential causes and development of personalized political communication 
in these contexts. Based on this literature it was hypothesized that mediated political 
communication in communism was personalized to a high extent, with significant 
emphasis being put on the leader and his persona. It was argued that the focus on 
the leader was due to the practices of communist leadership cult building. 
Specifically, it was expected that the communist leader was the most visible and 
important political actor in mediated political communication. Also, that his life and 
qualities were communicated to a large extent, almost exclusively in a political 
context, since the leader was to embody country’s history, beliefs and values. 
According to the literature concerned with democratic transitions, which promotes 
the idea that post-communist politics revolves around political leaders rather than 
weak parties, it was hypothesized that this person- and persona-centred mediated 
political communication continued in the post-communist period.  
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9.1.  The empirical evidence 
 
 According to the content analyses of Yugoslav newspapers and Yugoslav 
leader Josip Broz Tito’s statements that were reported in them, the theories 
promoted by the leadership cult literature can be seen as partly confirmed. 
Specifically, both the analysis of media reporting and Tito’s mediated statements 
showed that Tito was, as an individual, the most prominent political actor in 
communist mediated political communication. This means that the hypothesis that 
the political leader was at the centre of mediated political communication and 
considered to be the most important political actor in a communist system is valid. 
Also, the analyses showed that both the media and Tito communicated almost 
exclusively political information about his persona, which is in line with theories 
suggesting that communist leaders were presented to the public as political beings 
whose lives are completely centred on their political roles. However, although it was 
hypothesized that communist leader’s persona will also feature very prominently in 
mediated political communication, this proved not to be entirely true. Specifically, 
while Tito was reported as communicating information about himself more than all 
post-communist head executives, his persona was referred to in the fewest number 
of articles in which he was mentioned, compared to other head executives. Hence, 
the theory that building a leader’s cult was based on reporting plenty of information 
about his life and qualities has not been proven by this study, but rather this analysis 
revealed that mentioning a leader, but not his persona, was one of the cult building 
practices in communist Yugoslavia. Specifically, it appears as thought the cult of Tito 
as an omnipresent, all knowing and loved leader was created by reporting people’s 
messages to him and associating his name with things/places/events.    
 Furthermore, the suggestion that communist personalized mediated political 
communication would continue in the post-communist period was also only partly 
proven. The person-centred media reporting in the early post-communist period 
shows remarkable similarity to that in communism, but this is where most similarities 
end. In other words, the head executive under communism was visible in media 
reporting and portrayed in a similar way compared to political collectives, as was the 
head executive in the early post-communist period. However, there are no 
significant similarities in the extent to which communist and post-communist leaders 
were reported as communicating information about themselves and their parties. 
Also, the study revealed that there are other significant differences in the ways in 
which political communication actors personalized their communication during the 
democratic transition from a communist to a post-communist system, as well as in 
 231
the ways in which the distinctive dimensions of personalisation were manifested 
over time in the media reporting and leaders’ mediated communication. Specifically, 
while the focus on individual political actors decreased in the media reporting over 
time, the media visibility of leaders’ personae, especially private personae, has 
increased, although not drastically. On the other hand, no significant trends were 
observed with regard to the ways in which political leaders were reported as 
personalizing their communication over time. Hence, it seems that the 
personalisation in leaders’ mediated communication was largely leader-specific.  
After establishing how the personalisation of mediated political 
communication developed in the transition from a communist to a post-communist 
system, this project aimed to establish what caused these trends. Although fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis is presented as a method able to reveal causal 
connections between variables (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004a; Stanyer, 2013), closer 
examination of this method pointed to the fact that the methodological tools are not 
yet perfected. It was argued that fsQCA brings researchers closer to identifying the 
combinations of factors that are associated with lower and higher degree of 
personalisation, but is not able to determine relationships of cause and effect. 
Hence, the question of what caused personalized mediated political communication 
in a communist and post-communist system remained unanswered. However, the 
fsQCA did reveal the combinations of conditions that were in examined contexts 
associated with lower and higher degree of personalisation. It was established that 
there is no single factor which can be seen as associated with personalisation in 
either media reporting or leaders’ mediated communication. Rather, the analysis of 
conditions that are explicitly connected with person-, persona- and private persona-
centred reporting and leaders’ mediated communication revealed a very complex 
picture since there were usually several combinations of conditions connected to the 
same degree of personalisation. In addition, this analysis showed that all 
dimensions and degrees of personalisation are associated with both politically- and 
media-related factors, which is in line with similar studies which also found that 
personalisation is a complex phenomenon connected with a range of political and 
media factors (e.g. Downey & Stanyer, 2010; Stanyer, 2013).  
In sum, no single conclusion can be reached about the personalisation of 
mediated political communication causes and trends over time during the period of 
democratic transition from a communist to a post-communist system. Rather, the 
picture that all these analyses reveal is a very complex one – different political 
communication actors can be seen as personalizing their communication in different 
ways, the two dimensions show different trends over time, and the combinations of 
 232
factors associated with a specific dimension of personalisation and political 
communication actors vary significantly.  
However, if we narrow the focus to personalisation in the way media report, 
the findings are more revealing. Specifically, the comparison of the personalisation 
in media reporting in Yugoslavia and Croatia with that in other Western countries, 
especially the UK, revealed two important points.  
Firstly, that there are significant differences between the developments of the 
person-centred media reporting in the (post)communist system and Western 
countries. Specifically, while the evidence from established Western democracies 
suggests that leaders have over time became more media visible than their parties, 
an opposite trend was observed in a country that went from a communist to a post-
communist system. The theory of continuation of personalisation practices from a 
communist to a post-communist system, which was suggested as a possible 
alternative theory to those usually reproduced with regard to the ways in which 
political communication trends develop across the world (i.e. Americanization, 
modernization), seems plausible only for the explanation of person-centred media 
reporting in the early post-communist period. However, given the strong de-
personalisation trend found during the transition period, it was suggested that a 
“democratization” theory might be better suited for explaining the decreasing media 
visibility of leaders and greater media prominence of political parties. The 
“democratization” theory seems particularly plausible with regard to the de-
personalisation trend since the fsQCA revealed that the low degree of person-
centred media reporting in the post-2000 period is associated with the growth in 
journalistic autonomy and the introduction of a parliamentary system by which the 
power in the country was de-centralized. Both of these factors can be seen as 
related to the overall process of democratization.  
And secondly, that there are some similarities in the ways in which leaders’ 
private lives are mediated between the (post)communist country and established 
Western democracies. The degree to which post-communist leaders’ private lives 
were media visible is not as high as in the UK and the US, countries seen as leading 
this trend. There was still, though, an increase over time noted in the media visibility 
of post-communist leaders’ private lives. The ways in which the media report about 
post-communist leaders’ private lives is more similar to that observed in Italy and 
Spain. There are also some similarities in the conditions that were found to be 
explicitly connected with this trend in Croatia, Italy and Spain. The analyses of the 
Croatian media system point to the fact that it belongs to the Mediterranean media 
system model, just as Italy and Spain. Hence, it was speculated that the slow 
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increase in the mediated visibility of leaders’ private lives might be another 
characteristic of this media system model. In short, although there are some 
similarities in the ways in which this personalisation trend manifests in a new post-
communist democracy and Western ones, Croatia should be seen as experiencing 
this trend, albeit to a limited extent, in a similar manner to those countries who have 
adopted the Mediterranean media system model.  
An obvious limitation of this study is that it is a case study and its findings 
can not be easily generalized, not even across communist and post-communist 
systems. Although the analysis of reporting about Yugoslav leader Tito and his 
reported statements seemed ideal for investigating theories advocated in the 
leadership cult theory, Yugoslavia may not be seen as an ideal representative of a 
European communist country. Unlike many other European communist countries 
Yugoslavia was not a Soviet satellite, importing Western media products, such as 
movies, television shows and music were common to its media system, its media 
outlets were mostly funded from subscriptions, licence fees and advertising from as 
early as 1950s, the entertainment content was earlier than in most other European 
communist countries introduced in media output (Mihelj, 2011; Robinson, 1977; 
Tworzecki, 2012) etc. It is unclear how important these differences are with regard 
to the ways in which personalisation trends developed in Yugoslavia and other 
European communist countries, but they should be kept in mind. Similarly, although 
European post-communist countries share many characteristics, especially with 
regard to its media and political systems, there are also plenty of differences among 
them, particularly with regard to the speed with which they democratized and 
developed (Gross & Jakubowicz, 2013). For example, while in the early post-
communist period it was argued that these countries share a post-communist media 
system model, in recent years some countries’ media system models are 
considered to be representative of the Mediterranean model, while others became 
more similar to Central European ones (Peruško et al., 2013). Again, it is only 
possible to speculate how, if at all, these differences might impact on the 
development of personalized political communication in these countries, but they 
should be considered before generalizing data from one of the post-communist 
countries.  
Another limitation of this study is that it focused on reporting in the print 
media. Daily newspapers were chosen because they were the only ready available 
primary source for this analysis. Given the differences in developments of print and 
broadcast media in both communist and post-communist systems, it is possible that 
the analysis of broadcast media might have produced somewhat different results.  
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Finally, since this study focused on the analysis of media texts, it was not 
possible to determine what media and political actors wanted to achieve with their 
communication, if there was any strategy on their part at all. Also, it was not possible 
to establish how the audiences received the mediated information.  
 
9.2.  Implications of the study 
 
In spite of these limitations, this thesis served its purpose as an exploratory 
study that aimed to examine whether there are any similarities and differences in the 
ways in which personalisation of mediated political communication develops in 
Western and non-Western contexts. Consequently, there are several theoretical 
implications of this study for the field of political communication, but also for 
transitional studies.  
Firstly, this thesis showed that there may be distinctive effects, not previously 
discussed, that the personalisation of political communication might have in 
communist and post-communist contexts. How, if at all, personalized political 
communication affects societal and democratic processes, and the behaviour of 
political communication actors, is largely unknown, not only in communist and post-
communist societies, but also in Western ones. Once research on the effects of 
personalized political communication is on the agenda, knowing the cross-
dimensional and cross-cultural effects that personalisation might produce will make 
it easier for researchers to know what to focus on and how to design their studies. 
The detailed discussion of what kind of impact distinctive dimensions of 
personalisation of political communication might have in different cultural contexts, 
as reported in Chapter 2, might contribute to this research development, and also 
further our understanding of the role of personalized political communication in 
various societies.  
Secondly, several possible politically- and media-related factors that might 
influence the personalisation of political communication, in established Western, 
communist and post-communist contexts, were identified in the theoretical overview. 
The value of this discussion lay in identifying not only context-specific factors that 
might cause personalized political communication, but also in establishing which 
factors have the greatest potential to contribute to a specific dimension of 
personalisation, i.e. person-, persona- and private persona-centred political 
communication. Until recently there was little differentiation between factors that can 
cause different dimensions of personalisation. Hence, the theoretical discussion of 
the conditions that might contribute to different dimensions of personalisation in a 
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cross-cultural context (Chapters 3 and 4) is a step forward towards a more nuanced 
and accurate contextualisation of personalisation trends in different contexts.  
Some of the factors which were identified as potentially relevant for the 
development of personalisation in communist and post-communist context were 
confirmed as being connected to personalized political communication in Yugoslavia 
and Croatia. Hence, factors such as a deferential journalistic culture, the degree of 
authoritarianism in the society and the positions that political leaders hold in the 
systems they head, may be considered as new, not previously acknowledged, 
conditions that are associated with personalized mediated political communication. 
These can also be tested in future research that aims to explore the ways in which 
personalisation trends developed in communist and post-communist contexts, and 
perhaps also those similar to them, such as other authoritarian and post-
authoritarian systems.  
Thirdly, a strong de-personalisation trend related to person-centred media 
reporting found in this study points to the fact that scholarship concerned with 
mediation of political leadership has limitations. Hence, it should be expanded by 
theories which would explain how and why the trend manifested in the decreasing 
focus on political leaders and increasing emphasis on political parties develops. Two 
theories that might help explain trends in the personalisation in media reporting in a 
(post)communist context, suggested in this thesis, are the theory of continuation and 
democratization. Specifically, the theory of continuation might help explain why 
transitional societies in their early periods continue with some communication 
practices from the old system, in spite of all the changes that the society undergoes. 
The theory of democratization puts the emphasis on the relevance of 
transformations that transitional societies go through. It suggests that the changes in 
areas such as institutional designs, media systems, party systems and society, 
which are usually associated with the process of democratization, may also be 
connected to the changes in communication practices of political communication 
actors.  
Finally, the conceptual model which distinguishes between the person- and 
persona-centred political communication was very useful in pinpointing specific 
effects, causes and trends of political communication. It allowed for a nuanced 
approach to studying and understanding this topic and could be applied in future 
research. Given that in recent years there is a growing interest in the mediation of 
leaders’ private matters, I believe that the persona-centred dimension of 
personalisation, as conceptualized in this project, might be particularly helpful in 
establishing how and why private information about leaders is mediated, and also 
 236
how important might be the increase in the amount of mediated private information. 
By comparing the degree to which leaders’ political and private persona is media 
visible this thesis provided more informed conclusions about the relevance of private 
information in mediated discourse. Hence, by conceptualizing persona-centred 
dimension as consisting of all references to a leader’s political and private life and 
qualities, it is possible to better understand how important the mediation of a 
leader’s private persona is in relation to his/her political persona.  
  
9.3.  Future research 
 
Given that it was confirmed that there indeed are some distinctive elements 
of personalisation in a communist and post-communist context, this study 
establishes the ground for future research in this field.  
Specifically, a comparative study examining the personalisation of political 
communication in European post-communist countries might reveal whether the 
trends observed in this study are a more general characteristic of post-communist 
political communication. It would be particularly interesting to investigate whether 
the decrease in the person-centred media reporting can also be observed in other 
post-communist countries, since it was suggested that the process of 
democratization might be connected with this de-personalisation trend.  
Furthermore, given that some similarities were observed between the ways 
in which the mediation of leaders’ private personae developed over time in Croatia, 
Italy and Spain, and also that there are certain similarities in the conditions 
connected to this trend in these countries, it might be interesting to examine whether 
the slow, but consistent, increase in the media visibility of politicians’ private 
personae might be considered as a dimension of a Mediterranean media system 
model.  
In addition, given the trends observed in Croatia, it appears this context 
might be a good testing ground for the analysis of personalisation effects. Since it is 
usually assumed that person-centred political communication is detrimental to 
political processes, the investigation of the consequences, if there are any, of the 
de-personalisation trend found in Croatia, might show whether the de-
personalisation of political communication can have some positive effects. These 
might be the increase in the trust in institutions, political parties or politicians, higher 
respect for rules etc.  
Finally, a reception study which would examine how audiences received 
mediated information might be an interesting spin-off of this project. It would be 
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particularly revealing to investigate how the audiences in communism de-coded the 
mediated information about the leader, since it is often assumed that communist 
audiences were quite passive, although there is some research suggesting they 
have actively de-coded information from the media. Answers to questions such as: 
What the communist public thought of their leader? How would they have described 
him? What they knew about his private life? And, what role the media played in how 
they perceived him?, would reveal how effective were communist cult building 
practices, and how important it was how the leader was portrayed in the media. The 
answers to similar questions in the post-communist context would also be quite 
revealing. They could shed light on the role that the media plays in the lives of post-
communist audiences and how, if at all, their perceptions of leaders and other 
political actors, are shaped by the mediated information. 
In sum, this thesis has helped re-design the existing personalisation theory 
by pointing to the fact that the personalized mediated discourse is not only a recent 
development of established Western democracies. It showed that an authoritarian 
society, specifically a communist country, can be seen as experiencing an even 
more extreme form of personalisation than can be found in some Western countries. 
It also demonstrated that the trend towards greater emphasis on political leaders in 
political communication, on which the personalisation theory from a Western 
perspective is based on, is not the only way in which the personalized political 
communication can develop. Specifically, the biggest contribution of this thesis is in 
discovering a de-personalisation trend which points to the fact that personalisation 
theory needs to acknowledge the complexity of ways in which the personalisation 
phenomenon can develop in different contexts.  
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Appendix 1. Coding sheet (Chapter 5: Personalisation in media reporting) 
 
NB: The unit of analysis is the article 
 
1. Article ID 
 
2. Newspapers: 
1. Večernji list 
2. Vjesnik 
3. 24 sata 
 
3. Year 
 
4. Week number (from 1 to 3) 
 
5. Leader: Does the article mention the leader? 
0. No 
1. Josip Broz Tito 
2. Franjo Tuđman 
3. Nikica Valentić 
4. Zlatko Mateša 
5. Ivica Račan 
6. Stjepan Mesić 
7. Ivo Sanader 
8. Jadranka Kosor 
9. Ivo Josipović 
10. Zoran Milanović 
 
6. Party: Does the article mention the leader’s party and/or some other party official? 
N.B. Code only for week 1 articles. 
0. No 
1. Yes, only the party 
2. Yes, the party and some other party official 
 
7. Main topic: 
1. Political news (National/International/Local political news, economy etc.) 
2. Non-political news (Arts, Fashion, Celebrity, Sports etc.) 
99. Others/Mixed (no topic is predominant)  
 
 From here onwards only for articles that DO mention the leader 
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8. Context: What is the pre-dominant context in which leader’s persona is presented? 
N.B. Any reference to leader’s life or qualities as they are defined below counts as a 
reference to the leader’s persona.  
0. No reference: there is no mention of the leader’s political or private life, nor 
personal qualities (skills and traits) 
1. Political context: leader’s life and qualities are mentioned with relation to the leader 
as a person who is performing political roles (candidate, party leader, prime minister 
etc.) 
2. Private: leader’s life and qualities are mentioned with relation to the leader as a 
person who is performing private roles (parent, spouse, sports partner, art lover, 
religious person etc.)  
3. Political/Private: his/her private persona is explicitly connected to his/her role as 
politician (e.g. he is a devoted father that likes reading to his children before going to 
bed, so he leaves government office every day by 9pm) 
 
9. Comment: How does the article comment on leader’s persona?  
0. No reference 
1. Positively: the article praises leader's persona 
2. Yes, negatively: the article criticizes leader's persona 
3. Yes, neutrally: the article does not make a judgment or it contains both praise and 
criticism. 
 
10. Salience: How salient is/are the reference(s) to the leader's persona in relation to 
the entire article? 
0. No reference to the leader's persona 
1. Main Story: the article is essentially focused on the leader's persona (as defined by 
the variables below) 
2. Medium: the leader's persona is not the main story, nor the centre of the narrative, 
but is still a relatively significant element within it 
3. Minor: the leader's persona is mentioned only in passing (i.e. not more than a 
couple of sentences) and does NOT play an important role in the article as a whole 
 
Leader's political and private life 
 
11. Work: Does the article mention leader's work? 
N.B. code negative (0) if it refers to what he/she should do or should have done, and not 
what he/she is actually doing (e.g. Tuđman should meet with economic advisors); if the 
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reference to work also connected with some other life area (finance, religion, family etc.) 
code positively (1) for that other variable, and negatively (0) here 
0. No: the leader is just mentioned and/or there is no reference to his/her activities 
while performing a job (e.g. Tito’s deputy, Kosor’s minister; Tuđman’s party, 
Milanović’s popularity);  
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to the leader activities in the government, public 
office, party etc. (e.g. holding meetings, negotiating with unions, proposing policies, 
commenting political issues etc.) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to the leader’s professional life outside politics, 
past working experiences outside politics (e.g. he/she was importing pornographic 
magazines) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: it refers to the leader’s work in both political and 
private context, and/or his/her private job is explicitly connected to his/her role as 
politician (e.g. leader’s past professional experience outside politics qualified him/her 
for a political position, s/he was importing pornographic magazines so s/he is not fit 
to be a political leader); if the article makes the connection between leader’s political 
job and some other area of private persona (see below), code positively (3) for that 
other variable.  
 
12. Youth: Does the article mention leader's childhood or upbringing? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to political experiences during his/her childhood 
and youth (e.g. went to party meetings in his youth) 
2. Yes, in a private context:  it refers to experiences during his/her childhood and 
youth (e.g. grew in a small village/large city) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s childhood and 
upbringing in both political and private context, or there is a clear connection made 
between his/her childhood and upbringing in private context and his/her political role 
(e.g. grew in a large city, so can not understand the problems of rural areas) 
 
13. Education: Does the article mention leader's education? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to political experiences during his/her education 
(e.g. became a party member in college) 
2. Yes, in a private context:  it refers to private experiences during his/her education 
(e.g. studied at University of Vienna) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s education in 
both political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between 
his/her education in private context and his/her political role (e.g. he lied about going 
to college, so can not be trusted in politics) 
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14. Family: Does the article mention member/s of the leader’s family or his/her family 
life? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: the article refers to leader's family in the context of 
protocol activities (foreign dignitaries, charity, etc) or their professional activities 
without references to his/her private life 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her family life, including his/her role as 
father/mother, partner, son/daughter, etc. (e.g. references to family activities, their 
emotional support, how they met their partners, wedding anniversaries etc.) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s family in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her 
family in private context and his/her political role (e.g. he is a caring father, so he will 
care about his constituents too) 
 
15. Love life: Does the article mention leader’s love life? 
N.B The article refers to a leader’s personal relationship (emotional, sexual) with his/her 
spouse or some other partner. If the article refers to a leader and the partner in a context of 
family, code for variable “family”.  
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: the article refers to leader's love life in the political 
context (e.g. the sex scandal is hurting his political career) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her love life activities as a private person 
(e.g. he was always good with women, she never had a long-term relationship) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s love life in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her 
love life in private context and his/her political role (e.g. he cheated on his wife, so 
he can not be expected to be reliable politician) 
 
16. Appearance: Does the article mention leader's appearance? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to his/her style of dress, attractiveness, fitness, 
youthfulness, etc in relation to his political position (e.g. has a presidential posture, 
too young to rule) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her style of dress, attractiveness, fitness, 
youthfulness, etc. in relation to him/her as a private person (e.g. s/he is physically 
attractive for opposite sex, fashionable) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s appearance in 
both political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between 
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his/her appearance in private context and his/her political role (e.g. he/she looks 
good in blue, but wears it mostly because it is the party’s color) 
 
17. Life-style: Does the article mention leader's life-style? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to his/her likes and dislikes, social activities etc. 
in the role of a politician  (e.g. sleeps only a few hours because of office duties; likes 
to have fresh flowers in the office; prefers to fly with official state jet; attended 
football game as official; official celebrations of birthdays etc.) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her likes and dislikes, hobbies, recreational 
or social activities in free time (e.g. food, sports, readings, music, etc).  
4. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s life-style in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her life-
style in private context and his/her political role (e.g. holidays in Spain, so 
undermines the development of national tourism) 
 
18. Religion: Does the article mention leader's religion? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to his/her official visits to religious/groups place, 
meeting religious dignitaries as a political official etc.  
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her religious affiliation, beliefs, or religious 
activities (e.g. church going) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s relation to 
religion in both political and private context, or there is a clear connection made 
between religion in private context and his/her political role (e.g. although personally 
does not believe in God, went to church as a official) 
 
19. Feelings: Does the article mention leader's feelings? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to how the leader feels or to his/her mood about 
his political life or politics in general  (e.g. outraged by public sector strike) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to how the leader feels or to his/her mood about 
his/her private life (e.g. happy for his son’s birth) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s feelings in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her 
private feelings and his/her political role (e.g. sad because his father died, but could 
not take time off because had to get back to work) 
 
20. Personal relationships: Does the article mention leader's personal relationships 
outside family and love life? 
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0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to the leader’s political relationship with other 
officials (e.g. good friend with some other Head of State, in conflict with coalition 
partner) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to the leader’s private relationships (e.g. has 
dinner with friends from University) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s relationship in 
both political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between 
his/her private relationship and his/her political role (e.g. he/she left friend in need, 
so not reliable in politics; he had a private dinner with colleagues from the party) 
21. Health: Does the article mention leader's health? 
N.B. if the articles comments on how he/she maintains his/her good health by exercising, 
meditating, not smoking etc. code for life-style; if it mentions how he/she looks like in good 
shape, code for appearance 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to the official statements about his/her health 
conditions (e.g. had annual health check; cancelled official trip because ill) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to leader’s health issues not related to his/her 
ability to perform political duties (e.g. was home sick all weekend; had vaccine 
against flu) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s health in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her 
health and his/her political role (e.g. went for a treatment in the US, so does not trust 
national health service; had vaccine against flu and advises citizens to do the same) 
 
22. Finance: Does the article mention leader's finance? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: it refers to his/her financial dealings in the role of a 
politician (e.g. ordered too expensive new official car) 
2. Yes, in a private context: it refers to his/her private financial dealings (e.g. has 
three bank loans) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the article refers to the leader’s finances in both 
political and private context, or there is a clear connection made between his/her 
finances and his/her political role (e.g. has three bank loans, so how can s/he be 
trusted to manage state finances when s/he can’t his/her own) 
 
Leader’s qualities (traits and skills) 
 
23. Context: What is the dominant context in which leader’s qualities are presented? 
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N.B. Leader’s qualities include openness, intellect, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
assertiveness, niceness, emotional stability and temper, people skills, data analysis skills 
and skills in using things and tools (definitions below).  
0. No reference 
1. Political: leader’s qualities are mentioned with relation to the leader as a person 
who is performing political roles (candidate, party leader, prime minister etc.)  
2. Private: leader’s qualities are mentioned with relation to the leader as a person who 
is performing private roles (parent, spouse, sports partner, art lover, religious person 
etc.)  
3. Political/Private: his/her private qualities are explicitly connected to his/her role as 
politician (e.g. he is a devoted father so he will be a devoted leader) 
 
 
Specific traits and skills 
 
24. Openness: Does the article refer to leader’s openness (e.g. original, inventive, open 
minded, tolerant, progressive, modern, reformer, rebellious) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. ready to listen opinions of opposing party) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. daughter can choose whichever college)  
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of openness is explicitly 
connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he was raised as a tolerant person, so it 
may influence his policies towards national minorities) 
 
25. Intellect: Does the article refer to leader’s intellect (e.g. intelligent, sharp, wise, 
rational, logical, intellectual, well read, well-informed) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g.  does not have the capacity to understand policy) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. does not know the author of Sherlock Holmes)  
3. Yes, in a political/private context his/her private quality of intellect is explicitly 
connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he was very sharp from early age, so he 
will be sharp in politics too) 
 
26. Conscientiousness: Does the article refer to leader’s conscientiousness (e.g. 
disciplined, organized, efficient, competent, reliable, hard-working, persistent) or its 
opposite? 
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NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. keeps his/her office very organized) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. s/he is disciplined in diet) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of conscientiousness is 
explicitly connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he is a poor father, so how can 
he be a competent political leader) 
 
27. Extroversion: Does the article refer to leader’s extroversion (e.g. adventurous, 
uninhibited, spontaneous, lively, full of energy, not restrained, optimistic, talkative, eloquent, 
sociable, warm) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. enthusiastic to reform a policy) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. has a lot of friends) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of extroversion is explicitly 
connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. she spontaneously bought 3 pairs of 
shoes, so let’s hope she won’t spontaneously sell 3 public companies) 
 
28. Assertiveness: Does the article refer to leader’s assertiveness (e.g. confident, bold, 
courageous, dominant, tough, independent, bossy, authoritative) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. has everything under control in the party) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. his wife makes all the house-related decisions) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of assertiveness is 
explicitly connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he can’t even make decisions at 
home, so how can he make them in the name of the public) 
 
29. Niceness: Does the article refer to leader’s agreeableness/niceness (e.g. helpful, 
not selfish, considerate, kind, good manners, emphatic, sympathetic, peaceful, forgiving, 
modest, trusting, straightforward) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. fulfills promises from campaign) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. modest about sports achievements) 
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3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of niceness is explicitly 
connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he lied to his wife, so how can we trust 
him not to lie to us) 
 
30. Emotional stability: Does the article refer to leader’s emotional stability or temper 
(e.g. calm, relaxed, handles stress well, emotionally stable, mature, even tempered, patient, 
cool blooded, serene) or its opposite? 
NB: it can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with other 
words. 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. good reactions to stressful events) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. often tense so has to go to a massage) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of emotional stability or 
temper is explicitly connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. she gets crazy if 
looses a tennis match, so how will she handle the need to compromise in politics) 
 
31. People skills: Does the article refer to leader’s PEOPLE skills (e.g. communication, 
public speaking, conflict management, debating, explaining, motivating, negotiating etc.) or 
the lack of thereof? 
NB: code yes if the article refers explicitly to leader having these skills OR when there is an 
evaluation of how s/he has done these actions (e.g. if it states that leader is skilled in 
negotiating or that he has successfully finished negotiations, code yes; if it states that he is 
negotiating with a union, code no) 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. good speaker, motivates and inspires people) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. known to make good jokes) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of people skills is explicitly 
connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he can’t explain to his children why they 
need to go to sleep, so he also can’t explain the cuts to the unions) 
 
32. Data analysis skills: Does the article refer to leader’s INFORMATION gathering and 
processing skills (e.g. problem solving, getting things right, forecasting, estimating, 
developing plans, setting objectives, analyzing) or the lack of thereof? 
NB: code yes if the article refers explicitly to leader having these skills OR when there is an 
evaluation of how s/he has done these actions (e.g. if it states that leader is not skilled in 
problem solving or that he has successfully solved a problem code yes; if it states that he is 
trying to solve a problem, code no) 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. his forecasts are always right) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. bad in forecasting sports results) 
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3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of data analysis is 
explicitly connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. she met all the objectives she 
set for herself, so she will do the same in politics) 
  
33. Things and tools skills: Does the article refer to leader’s skills in the use of 
THINGS AND TOOLS (e.g. using technology, driving, playing music, speaking foreign 
languages etc.) or the lack of thereof? 
NB: code yes if the article refers explicitly to leader having these skills OR when there is an 
evaluation of how s/he has done these actions (e.g. if it states that leader is not skilled in 
playing musical instruments or that s/he plays guitar well, code yes; if it states that he played 
guitar, code no) 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context (e.g. he is good in using social media to communicate 
politics) 
2. Yes, in a private context (e.g. she plays guitar very well) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: his/her private quality of using things and tools 
is explicitly connected to his/her role as politician (e.g. he is bad in driving, so the 
government needs to hire him a personal chauffer) 
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Appendix 2. Inter-coder reliability (ICR) scores for Chapter 5 (Personalisation 
in media reporting) 
 
Variable 
number 
Variable name n (cases 
double coded) 
Agree (M) ICR (2M/N1+N2) 
1 Article ID N/A N/A N/A 
2 Newspapers 300 300 1 
3 Year 300 300 1 
4 Week number 300 300 1 
5 Leader 300 300 1 
6 Party 300 300 1 
7 Main topic 300 284 0.95 
8 Context 300 256 0.85 
9 Comment 300 278 0.93 
10 Salience 300 290 0.97 
11 Work 300 265 0.88 
12 Youth 300 297 0.99 
13 Education 300 298 0.99 
14 Family 300 291 0.97 
15 Love life 300 298 0.99 
16 Appearance 300 288 0.96 
17 Life-style 300 248 0.82 
18 Religion 300 289 0.96 
19 Feelings 300 285 0.95 
20 Relationships 300 272 0.90 
21 Health 300 299 0.99 
22 Finance 300 297 0.99 
23 Context qualities 300 283 0.94 
24 Openness 300 288 0.96 
25 Intellect 300 295 0.98 
26 Conscientiousness 300 288 0.96 
27 Extroversion 300 299 0.99 
28 Assertiveness 300 285 0.95 
29 Niceness 300 281 0.93 
30 Emotional stability 300 297 0.99 
31 People skills 300 272 0.90 
32 Data analysis skills 300 298 0.99 
33 Things and tools skills 300 299 0.99 
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Appendix 3. Coding sheet (Chapter 6: Personalisation in leaders’ mediated 
communication) 
 
NB: The unit of analysis is the leader’s statement 
 
1. Statement ID 
 
2. Newspapers: 
4. Večernji list 
5. Vjesnik 
6. 24 sata 
 
3. Year 
 
4. Week number (from 1 to 3) 
 
5. Leader: Who is the author of the statement? 
1. Josip Broz Tito 
2. Franjo Tuđman 
3. Nikica Valentić 
4. Zlatko Mateša 
5. Ivica Račan 
6. Stjepan Mesić 
7. Ivo Sanader 
8. Jadranka Kosor 
9. Ivo Josipović 
10. Zoran Milanović 
 
6. Main topic: What is in the focus of the statement? 
1. National political issues (including parliamentary and presidential elections) 
2. International political issues (including relationships with former Yugoslav republics 
and European Union) 
3. Local political issues 
4. Party issues 
5. Economy 
6. Arts and culture 
7. Celebrity and entertainment 
8. Sports 
99. Other 
 
 250
7. Party: Does the leader mention his/her party? 
NB: Code only for statements made in week 1 
0. No 
1. Yes 
 
8. Persona: Does the leader refer to his/her persona? 
N.B. Any reference to life and/or qualities as they are defined below counts as a reference to 
persona. 
0. No reference  
1. Yes, his/her own: the leader is referring to his/her own political or private life, or 
personal qualities 
 
9. Context: What is the dominant context in which the leader refers to his/her 
persona? 
N.B. Any reference to leader’s life or qualities as they are defined below counts as a 
reference to the persona.  
4. No reference: there is no mention of leader’s political or private life, nor personal 
qualities (skills and traits) 
5. Political context: the leader mentions his life and qualities with relation to him/her 
as a person performing a political role (candidate, party leader, prime minister etc.) 
6. Private: the leader mentions his life and qualities with relation to him/her as a 
person performing a private role (parent, spouse, sports partner, art lover, religious 
person etc.)  
7. Political/Private: the leader’s private persona is explicitly connected to his/her role 
as a politician (e.g. he is a devoted father that likes reading to his children before 
going to bed, so he leaves government office every day by 9pm) 
 
10. Salience: How salient is/are the reference(s) to the persona in relation to the entire 
statement? 
4. No reference to the persona 
5. Main focus: the statement is essentially focused on the leader's persona (as 
defined by the variables below) 
6. Medium: the persona is not the main focus, nor the centre of the narrative, but is still 
a relatively significant element within it 
7. Minor: the leader's persona is mentioned only in passing and does NOT play an 
important role in the article as a whole 
 
Professional and private life 
 
11. Work: Does the leader refer to his/her work? 
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N.B. if the reference to work is also connected with some other life area (finance, religion, 
family etc.) code positively (1) for that other variable, and negatively (0) here 
3. No: there is no reference to the leader’s activities while performing a job 
4. Yes, in a political context: the leader refers to his/her activities in the government, 
public office, party etc. (e.g. holding meetings, negotiating with unions, proposing 
policies, commenting political issues etc.) 
5. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to his/her professional life outside 
politics, past working experiences outside politics (e.g. I am a University professor) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the leader refers to his/her work in both political 
and private context, or he/she explicitly connects a private job to his/her role as 
politician (e.g. I have run an oil company, so I’ll be able to run a government as well). 
If the connection between the political job and some other area of private persona 
(see below) is made in the statement, code positively (3) for that other variable.  
 
12. Youth: Does the leader refer to his/her childhood or upbringing? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to political experiences during childhood 
and youth (e.g. I went to party meetings when I was young) 
6. Yes, in a private context:  he/she refers to private experiences during childhood 
and youth (e.g. I grew in a small village/large city) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: the leader refers to his/her youth in both political 
and private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between youth in private 
context and his/her political role (e.g. I grew up in a village, so I can understand the 
problems of rural areas) 
 
13. Education: Does the leader refer to his/her education? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to political experiences during formal 
education (e.g. I became a party member while still in college) 
2. Yes, in a private context:  he/she refers to private experiences during formal 
education (e.g. I went to public school because I could not afford a private one) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: the leader refers to his/her formal education in 
both political and private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between 
education in private context and his/her political role (e.g. I went to public school, so 
I know how to change them for the better) 
 
14. Family: Does the leader refer to his/her family or family life? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to family in the context of protocol 
activities (foreign dignitaries, charity, etc)  
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6. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to his/her family life in a role of 
father/mother, partner, son/daughter, etc. (e.g. I was very attached to my father) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to family in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between family life in private 
context and his/her political role (e.g. my father was a worker, so I also fight for 
workers’ rights) 
 
15. Love Life: Does the leader refer to his/her love life? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to love life in the political context 
2. Yes, in a private context: he/she refers to love life activities as a private person 
(e.g. I never had luck with women) 
3. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to love life in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between love life in private 
context and his/her political role (e.g. I never cheated on my wife, so I’ll never cheat 
the voters) 
 
16. Appearance: Does the leader refer to his/her appearance? 
5. No 
6. Yes, in a political context: the leader refers to style of dress, attractiveness, 
fitness, youthfulness, etc. in relation to his/her political position (e.g. I am young 
enough to last in politics) 
7. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to style of dress, attractiveness, fitness, 
youthfulness, etc. in relation to him/her as a private person (e.g. I am fashionable) 
8. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to appearance in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between appearance in private 
context and his/her political role (e.g. I don’t look good in blue, but I wear it because 
it is my party’s color) 
 
17. Lifestyle: Does the leader refer to his/her lifestyle? 
0. No 
1. Yes, in a political context: the leader refers to his/her likes and dislikes, social 
activities etc. in the role of a politician  (e.g. I sleep only a few hours because of 
office duties) 
2. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to his/her likes and dislikes, hobbies, 
recreational or social activities in free time (e.g. I love watching football in free time) 
9. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to life-style in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between life-style in private 
context and his/her political role (e.g. I holiday in my country because I want to help 
my country’s tourism development) 
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18. Religion: Does the leader refer to his/her religion? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to official visits to religious/groups place, 
meeting religious dignitaries as a political official etc. (e.g. I met with the pope in 
Vatican) 
6. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to his/her religious affiliation, beliefs, or 
religious activities (e.g. I go to church every Sunday) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: the leader refers to religion in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between religion in private 
context and political role (e.g. I am a Christian, so I won’t have trouble saying “so 
help me God” in the presidential oath) 
 
19. Feelings: Does the leader refer to his/her feelings? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: the leader expresses how he/she feels or to his/her 
mood about political life or politics in general  (e.g. I am outraged by public sector 
strike) 
6. Yes, in a private context: the leader expresses how he/she feels or to his/her mood 
about private life (e.g. I am happy for my son’s birth) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to feelings in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between private feelings and 
his/her political role (e.g. I am sad because my father died, but I will not take time off 
because state business can not wait) 
 
20. Personal relationships: Does the leader refer to his/her personal relationships? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to political relationship with other officials 
(e.g. I am a good friend with the German chancellor) 
6. Yes, in a private context: he/she refers to private relationships (e.g. I had dinner 
with friends from University) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to relationship in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between private relationship 
and his/her political role (e.g. my friends do not have an impact on my political 
decisions) 
 
21. Health: Does the leader refer to his/her health? 
N.B. if he/she comments on how he/she maintains his/her good health by exercising, 
meditating, not smoking etc. code for lifestyle; if he/she mentions how he/she looks healthy, 
code for appearance 
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4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to the official statements about health 
conditions (e.g. I had my annual health check) 
6. Yes, in a private context: the leader refers to health issues not related to his/her 
ability to perform political duties (e.g. I was home sick all weekend; I had the vaccine 
against flu) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to health in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between health and his/her 
political role (e.g. I had vaccine against flu and I advise citizens to do the same) 
 
22. Finance: Does the leader refer to his/her finance? 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context: he/she refers to financial dealings in the role of a 
politician (e.g. the new official car I’ve ordered is not too expensive) 
6. Yes, in a private context: he/she refers to private financial dealings (e.g. I have a 
mortgage on my house) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to finances in both political and 
private context, or he/she makes a clear connection between finances and his/her 
political role (e.g. I am successfully paying of three bank loans, so I will be able to re-
program country’s debt) 
 
Personal qualities (traits and skills) 
 
23. Context: What is the pre-dominant context in which the leader refers to his/her 
personal qualities? 
N.B. Leader’s qualities include openness, intellect, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
assertiveness, niceness, emotional stability and temper, people skills, data analysis skills 
and skills in using things and tools (definitions below).  
4. No reference 
5. Political: the leader pre-dominantly refers to qualities with relation to his/her political 
roles (candidate, party leader, prime minister etc.)  
6. Private: the leader pre-dominantly refers to qualities with relation to his/her private 
roles (parent, spouse, sports partner, art lover, religious person etc.)  
7. Political/Private: he/she refers equally to political and private qualities, or he/she 
explicitly connects private qualities to his/her role as politician (e.g. I am a devoted 
father so I will also be a devoted leader) 
 
Specific traits and skills 
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24. Openness: Does the leader refer to his/her openness (e.g. original, inventive, open 
minded, tolerant, progressive, modern, reformer, rebellious) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I always listen to everyone’s opinion) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I’ve always let my children choose their own path)  
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to openness in both political and 
private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of openness to his/her 
role as politician (e.g. I was raised as a tolerant person, so I respect all  minorities) 
 
25. Intellect: Does the leader refer to his/her or someone else’s intellect (e.g. intelligent, 
sharp, wise, rational, logical, intellectual, well read, well-informed) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g.  I have the capacity to understand policies) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I was never good in games based on logic)  
7. Yes, in a political/private context he/she refers to intellect in both political and 
private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of intellect to his/her role 
as politician (e.g. I was sharp from early age, so I will be sharp in politics too) 
 
26. Conscientiousness: Does the leader refer to his/her conscientiousness (e.g. 
disciplined, organized, efficient, competent, reliable, hard-working, persistent) or its 
opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I keep my office very organized) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I am disciplined in diet) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to conscientiousness in both 
political and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of 
conscientiousness to his/her role as politician (e.g. I don’t have trouble disciplining 
my children, so I won’t have problem disciplining the government) 
 
27. Extroversion: Does the leader refer to his/her extroversion (e.g. adventurous, 
uninhibited, spontaneous, lively, full of energy, not restrained, optimistic, talkative, eloquent, 
sociable, warm) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
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4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I am always enthusiastic to reform policies) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I have a lot of friends) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to extroversion in both political 
and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of extroversion to 
his/her role as politician (e.g. I never spontaneously bought shoes, so I won’t 
spontaneously sell public companies) 
 
28. Assertiveness: Does the leader refer to his/her assertiveness (e.g. confident, bold, 
courageous, dominant, tough, independent, bossy, authoritative) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I am not running my party as a dictator) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. my wife makes all the house-related decisions) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to assertiveness in both political 
and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of assertiveness to 
his/her role as politician (e.g. my wife and my party taught me how to compromise) 
 
29. Niceness: Does the leader refer to his/her agreeableness/niceness (e.g. helpful, not 
selfish, considerate, kind, good manners, emphatic, sympathetic, peaceful, forgiving, 
modest, trusting, straightforward) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I always fulfill campaign promises) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I don’t want to brag about my sports achievements) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to niceness in both political and 
private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of niceness to his/her 
role as politician (e.g. I don’t lie to my children and I won’t lie to voters either) 
 
30. Emotional stability: Does the leader refer to his/her emotional stability or temper 
(e.g. calm, relaxed, handles stress well, emotionally stable, mature, even tempered, patient, 
cool blooded, serene) or its opposite? 
NB: he/she can refer explicitly to these adjectives OR manifestly convey the meaning with 
other words. 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I am cool-headed when I need to make tough 
decisions) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I don’t like waiting for my wife to get ready) 
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7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to emotional stability or temper in 
both political and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private quality of 
emotional stability or temper to his/her role as politician (e.g. If I can patiently listen 
to my mother in law, I can patiently listen to Unions too) 
 
31. People skills: Does the leader refer to his/her PEOPLE skills (e.g. communication, 
public speaking, conflict management, debating, explaining, motivating, negotiating etc.) or 
the lack of thereof? 
NB: code yes if he/she refers explicitly to having these skills OR when he/she makes an 
evaluation of how he/she has done these actions (e.g. if the leader says that he/she is skilled 
in negotiating or that he has successfully finished negotiations, code yes; if he says that 
he/she is negotiating with a union, code no) 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I’ve always know how to motivate people to do their 
job better) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I am know for making good jokes ) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to people skills in both political 
and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private people skill to his/her role 
as politician (e.g. if I can explain to my kids why they need to go to sleep, I will be 
able to explain the cuts to the unions) 
 
32. Data analysis skills: Does the leader refer to his/her INFORMATION gathering and 
processing skills (e.g. problem solving, getting things right, forecasting, estimating, 
developing plans, setting objectives, analyzing) or the lack of thereof? 
NB: code yes if he/she refers explicitly to someone having these skills OR when he/she 
makes an evaluation of how someone has done these actions (e.g. if the leader says that 
he/she is skilled in problem solving or that she has successfully solved a problem code yes; 
if he/she states that is trying to solve a problem, code no) 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. my forecasts in economy are always correct) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I am bad in forecasting sports results) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to data analysis skills in both 
political and private context, or he/she explicitly connects private data analysis skills 
to his/her role as politician (e.g. I can’t forecast a football game, but I can the 
economy growth) 
  
33. Things and tools skills: Does the leader refer to his/her skills in the use of THINGS 
AND TOOLS (e.g. using technology, driving, playing music, speaking foreign languages etc.) 
or the lack of thereof? 
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NB: code yes if he/she refers explicitly to someone having these skills OR when he/she 
makes an evaluation of how someone has done these actions (e.g. if the leader says that 
he/she is skilled in playing musical instruments or that he/she plays guitar well, code yes; if it 
says that he/she played guitar, code no) 
4. No 
5. Yes, in a political context (e.g. I am skilled in using social media to communicate 
politics) 
6. Yes, in a private context (e.g. I play guitar very well) 
7. Yes, in a political/private context: he/she refers to skills in using things and tools 
in both political and private context, or he/she explicitly connects someone’s private 
skills in using things and tools to his/her role as politician (e.g. I am bad in driving, so 
the government needs to hire me a personal chauffer) 
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Appendix 4. Inter-coder reliability (ICR) Scores for Chapter 6 (Personalisation 
in leaders’ mediated communication) 
 
Variable 
number 
Variable name n (cases 
double coded) 
Agree (M) ICR (2M/N1+N2) 
1 Statement ID N/A N/A N/A 
2 Newspapers 70 300 1 
3 Year 70 300 1 
4 Week number 70 300 1 
5 Leader 70 300 1 
6 Main Topic 70 64 0.91 
7 Party 70 70 1 
8 Persona 70 68 0.97 
9 Context 70 58 0.83 
10 Salience 70 63 0.90 
11 Work 70 62 0.89 
12 Youth 70 70 1 
13 Education 70 70 1 
14 Family 70 65 0.93 
15 Love life 70 70 1 
16 Appearance 70 68 0.97 
17 Lifestyle 70 60 0.86 
18 Religion 70 67 0.96 
19 Feelings 70 65 0.93 
20 Relationships 70 67 0.96 
21 Health 70 70 1 
22 Finance 70 68 0.97 
23 Context qualities 70 68 0.97 
24 Openness 70 69 0.98 
25 Intellect 70 70 1 
26 Conscientiousness 70 65 0.93 
27 Extroversion 70 70 1 
28 Assertiveness 70 67 0.96 
29 Niceness 70 66 0.94 
30 Emotional stability 70 70 1 
31 People skills 70 69 0.98 
32 Data analysis skills 70 70 1 
33 Things and tools skills 70 69 0.98 
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Appendix 5. Details of outcome and causal conditions’ calibrations for 
Chapter 7 (Explaining personalisation(s)) 
 
All outcomes were calibrated using a six-value fuzzy set in which each leader was 
allocated one of the following values: 0 = full non-member; 0,2 = mostly but not fully out; 0,4 
= more or less out; 0,6= more or less in; 0,8 = mostly but not fully in; and 1 = full member of 
the set. The benchmarks for calibration of these outcomes were decided by taking into 
account the extent to which both the media and political actors personalized their 
communication. 
Specifically, to explain the degree of person-centred media reporting and leaders’ 
communication, a six-value fuzzy set is used with each leader being allocated a membership 
score according to the degree they were visible in the media and the degree to which they 
put the focus on themselves instead of on their parties. The membership of the set of 
politicians who were reported in a person-centred way was calibrated using the ratio of 
leader to party mentions gathered by content analysis of newspaper articles, while the 
membership of the set of politicians who pursued person-centred communication was 
calibrated using the ratios of leader to party mentions gathered by content analysis of 
leaders’ statements. Given that ratios greater than 1 indicate that the communication was 
person-centred, ratio of 1 was set as a cross-over point. The score for full membership was 
set at 2; scores for mostly but not fully in were 1,5 to 2; for more or less in, 1 to 1,4; for more 
or less out, 0,7 to 0,9; for mostly but not fully out 0,5 to 0,6; while the threshold for full non-
membership was set at 0,5.  
 A six-value fuzzy set is also used to calibrate the membership of the set of politicians 
who were reported in a persona-centred way and the membership of the set of politicians 
who pursued persona-centred communication. The scores for the first set were based on the 
percentage of articles mentioning leader that refer to his/her persona, and the scores for the 
second set were based on the percentage of leader’s statements in which he/she mentioned 
his/her persona, as was reported in previous chapters. The persona-centred media reporting 
varied only between 70,6 and 84,1%, but the persona-centred leaders’ communication 
varied significantly more, between 23,1 and 72,4%. Consequently, it was important to make 
distinctions between relevant and irrelevant variation, what Ragin (2008a) argues is one of 
the main aims of calibration. Hence, it was decided that if a leader’s persona was mentioned 
in approximately half of the sample, the communication is considered persona-centred, but 
only if it was mentioned in a large majority of statements is it highly persona-centred (full 
member of the set). Specifically, the threshold for full membership was set at 75%; scores for 
mostly but not fully in were 65 to 74%; for more or less in, 52 to 64%; for more or less out, 39 
to 51%; for mostly but not fully out, 26 to 38%; while the threshold for full non-membership 
was set at 25%.  
 Membership of the set of politicians whose private personae were highly media 
visible was based on the percentage of articles mentioning the leader in which the main 
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emphasis was on his/her private and/or political/private personae. Similarly, the membership 
of the set of politicians who pursued a private persona-centred communication was based on 
the percentage of leaders’ statements in which he/she put most focus on his/her private and 
political/private personae. The scores for private persona-centred media reporting ranged 
from 0,6 to 17,6%, while for private persona-centred leaders’ communication from 0 to 
13,8%. Again, it was important to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation. It was 
decided that the cross-over point will be set at 9% given that Prime Minister Kosor 
emphasized her private life in 9% of her mediated statements and it was important that she 
was considered more or less in the set membership since she was reported as a second 
most willing leader and the most willing head executive to talk about her private matters. 
Consequently, scores between 12 and 14 were considered mostly but not fully in; the 
threshold for full membership was set at 15, and for full non-membership at 2. Leaders 
scoring between 6 to 8 were considered more or less out of the set membership, while those 
scoring between 3 and 5 as mostly but not fully out.  
The membership of the set of politicians working in a presidential political system 
was calibrated based on the information from Easter (1997) and Ilišin (2001) and leaders 
who worked in a presidential system or dictatorship were considered full members, those in 
a semi-presidential system were allocated a cross-over point of 0.5, while those working in a 
parliamentary system were considered non-members.  
The membership of the set of politicians who were elected by majoritarian systems 
was calibrated based on data from Šiber (2007) and Kasapović (2001). Since two of the 
examined leaders have been appointed, not elected, the issue of appointments also needed 
to be taken into account. Given that it can be observed from the cases examined that the 
media reported appointed leaders in a more person-centred way and that these leaders also 
focused more on themselves than on their parties, appointed leaders were considered full 
members of the set. Those elected by majoritarian system were considered mostly but not 
fully in; the cross-over point was set for those elected by a combined system; those elected 
by proportional system with open lists were considered mostly but not fully out; while those 
elected by proportional system with closed list were considered full non-members.  
The calibration of set „low party identification“ was mostly based on information 
gathered in the longitudinal field survey of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, 
conducted before every General Elections in Croatia since 1990. Benchmarks for calibration 
were the same as in Stanyer's (2013) analysis. Specifically, leaders were considered full 
members if less than 2% of all voters identified with their party before elections in which they 
came to power or during their time in office. Those whose party’s identification stood 
between 3 and 5% were considered mostly but not fully in; if the party identification was 
between 6 and 8% they were considered more or less in; for scores between 9 and 13 more 
or less out; for scores between 14 and 19 mostly but not fully out; while the threshold for full 
non-membership was set at 20%. Since the same type of information was not found for the 
communist leader Tito, the decision to consider him a full non-member of the set was based 
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on the knowledge that during his rule Yugoslav people expressed “a highly stable 60 to 65 
percent of apparent support for the regime” (Welsh, 1980: 122).  
The „centrist political leaders“ variable was, as in Stanyer (2013) calibrated based on 
the data from the Comparative Manifestos Project Data20 in which for every election political 
parties are placed on a left-right continuum, with -100 value representing extreme right and 
+100 value extreme left. The same standards as in Stanyer (ibid.) were used. Accordingly, 
the threshold for full membership was set at +5 to -5, and for full non-membership at +51 and 
-51. Those leaders’ whose parties scored between +6 to +12 and -6 to -12 were considered 
mostly but not fully in; those scoring +13 to +20 and -13 to -20 were more or less in; for 
scores +21 to +35 and -21 to -35 more or less out; and those scoring +36 to 50 and -36 to -
50 mostly but not fully out. The communist leader Tito was considered a full non-member of 
the set given that communist parties are regarded as being on the extreme left side of the 
political spectrum (Vassalla & Wilcox, 2006).  
The causal condition “short time spent in politics before election/appointment” was 
based on the examination of how long a leader held high political office (member of the 
government or party leader) before the year in which his prominence was analyzed in this 
project. The variable was calibrated using the same thresholds as in Stanyer (2013). 
Specifically, the threshold for full membership was set at 2 years and for full non-
membership at 20 years. For mostly but not fully in scores were 3 to 5 years; for more or less 
in, 6 to 8 years; for more or less out, 9 to 13 years; and for mostly but not fully out, 14 to 19 
years.  
The final causal condition calibrated according to Stanyer’s (ibid.) standards is “weak 
statutory protection of private lives”. Leaders were considered full members if they had no 
statutory protection of privacy or recourse to law, and full non members if they had these 
rights. In addition, if there was no statutory protection of privacy and/or more limited recourse 
to the law they were considered mostly but not fully in; if there was no statutory protection 
but it was possible to use other legal means they were more or less in; those with no 
statutory protection and limited recourse to other legal means were more or less out; while 
those with no statutory protection and more limited recourse to other legal means were 
considered mostly but not fully out.  
The variable “weak statutory protection against libel” was calibrated using the data 
reported by Badrov (2007), with those leaders protected against libel only by civil law being 
considered full members of the set, the cross-over point was set at libel being a criminal 
offense but not punishable by imprisonment, while if the libel was a criminal offense 
punishable by imprisonment, these leaders were considered full nonmembers.  
The causal condition “high level of authoritarianism in the society” was calibrated 
calibrated mostly using data from the longitudinal field survey carried before elections since 
1990 by the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb. Leaders were considered full members 
of the set if more than half of voters declared themselves as preferring a strong leader over 
                                                 
20
 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ 
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democratic governance (more than 50%)21, and full non-members if less than 10% of voters 
were authoritarian. For mostly but not fully in the scores were between 40 and 49%; for more 
or less in, 30 to 39%; for more or less out, 20 to 29%; and for mostly but not fully out, 10 to 
19%. The communist leader Tito was considered a full member of the set since research into 
the authoritarianism of the Yugoslav society found that the level of authoritarianism was 
“extremely high” (Šiber, 1989: 139).  
The “nondeferential media” was calibrated based on the average percentage of 
articles mentioning leaders that portrayed them in a positive light that was gathered by the 
content analysis of newspapers articles done for this thesis. Given that across the three 
examined papers the amount of positive coverage ranged from 4 to 56%, it was decided that 
full non-members of the set will be positively portrayed in more than every other article, i.e. in 
more than 50% of all articles. Those who were positively portrayed in 40 to 49% of articles 
were considered mostly but not fully out; for more or less out scores were between 30 and 
39%; for more or less in, 20 to 29%; for mostly but not fully in, 10 to 19%.   
The “high media independence from political influences” variable was calibrated 
based on the political affiliation of the Croatian Radiotelevision’s Director General. The 
leader during whose rule this public service broadcaster’s Director General was a party 
member was considered a full non-member, those leaders during whose rule the DG was a 
known party supporter or party affiliated but not party member were at the cross-over point, 
while leaders during whose rule the DG was not affiliated to any party were considered full 
members of the set.  
The causal condition “high degree of private media ownership” was calibrated based 
on the ratio of state and/or public national television stations to privately owned national 
television channels. Specifically, if leaders worked in a media system in which only state 
and/or public service broadcasters operated, they were considered full non-members. If 
there were more state and/or PSB channels than privately owned ones, the leader was 
considered more out than in the set; the cross-over point was set when there was equal 
number of both types of television channels; if there were more privately owned than state 
and/or PSBs, the leader was considered more in than out of the set; and if all national 
television channels were privately owned the leader was considered a full member of the set.  
The variable “high degree of advertising in the media” was based on the data 
collected during the content analyses for this project. Specifically, in each analyzed year, the 
number of commercial ads in the Monday edition of each newspaper was noted and the 
average number of ads published daily across newspapers during leader’s first three years 
in office was calculated. In sum, the average number of ads published daily across analyzed 
newspapers ranges from 9 to 40, but the real number of ads per paper ranged from 0 to 86, 
with the tabloid being almost exclusively the one who had more than 50 ads per edition. 
                                                 
21
 The specific question in surveys was: Sometimes it is challenging for a democracy to function. Some think that we 
need strong leaders that will take care of things; others feel that democracy is the best solution even when things 
are not functioning well. What is your opinion? 1. Strong leaders are needed; 2. Democracy is always the best 
solution; 3. I don't know, I'm not sure.  
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Hence, the score for full membership was set at 50; for mostly but not fully in, 40 to 49; for 
more or less in; 30 to 39; for more or less out, 20 to 29; for mostly but not fully out, 10 to 19; 
while leaders during whose rule the newspapers on average published less than 10 ads per 
day were considered full non-members of the set.   
Two measures were used for determining the membership in the set “strong tabloid 
sector”, the average daily percentage of non-political content across newspapers and 
average daily number of celebrity pages in the newspapers. This data was gathered in a 
similar way to that for the degree of advertising in the media. Specifically, for each analyzed 
year the percentage of newspaper that was not politically-related (i.e. lifestyle, celebrity 
pages, guides, entertainment etc.) in a Monday edition of each newspaper was noted. The 
average percentage of non-political content across newspapers was calculated for each 
leader and it ranged from 45 to 60%. Each leader was awarded a score between 1 and 3 
according to the average daily percentage of non-political content published during their first 
three years in office (40-49%=1; 50-59%=2; more than 60%=3). In addition, the number of 
celebrity-related pages per newspaper, defined as those pages that pre-dominantly 
contained articles focused on famous people, in the Monday editions was also noted. The 
average daily number of these pages across all examined newspapers ranged from 0 to 5 
per leader. This average number of celebrity-pages was added to the non-political content 
score to form an overall score, which ranged from 2 to 8, with a mean of 4 which was set as 
a cross-over point. In addition, leaders scoring between 5 and 6 were considered more in 
than out of the set; those scoring above 7, full members of the set; for more out than in the 
scores were 3 to 4; while the threshold for full non-membership was set at 2. 
 The “large television reach” variable” was calibrated based on the data from 
Robinson (1977) and the Croatian Bureau of Statistics22. The percentage of households that 
owned a television was based on the information from the year when the leader came to 
power, or if that information was not available, from any other year in which the leader was in 
power in the decade that was analyzed. Leaders during whose rule less than third of the 
society had access to television were considered full non-members of the set, while those 
during whose rule the television was owned by 89 to 100% of households were considered 
full members. For mostly but not fully in the scores were set between 76 to 88% of 
households; for more or less in; 63 to 75; for more or less out, 50 to 62; and for mostly but 
not fully out, 35 to 49%. 
 
                                                 
22
 Data for 1994: Crkvenčić-Bojić (1996); data for 1998: http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/publication/2002/13-2-1h2002.htm; 
data for 2000: http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/publication/2003/13-2-1h2003.htm; data for 2003: 
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/Publication/2005/13-2-1_1h2005.htm; data for 2009: 
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2010/14-01-01_01_2010.htm; data for 2010: 
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/14-01-01_01_2011.htm; data for 2011: 
http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2012/SI-1484.pdf (all accessed 12 April 2014) 
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Calibration of politically-related conditions/outcomes: 
 
Calibration of media-related conditions/outcomes: 
leader 
Non-
deferent 
media1 
Media 
independence1 
Autonomous 
journalistic 
culture2 
Private media 
ownership1  
High degree 
of advertising1 
Commercial 
media 
system2 
Strong 
tabloid 
sector 
High 
TV 
reach 
TV 
debate 
MEDIA 
person-
centred 
comm. 
MEDIA 
persona-
centred 
comm. 
MEDIA 
private 
persona-
centred 
comm. 
Tito 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,4 0 0,6 0,8 0 
Tudman 0,6 0 0,6 0 0,4 0,4 0 0,8 0 0,4 0,8 0,2 
Valentic 0,8 0 0,8 0 0,4 0,4 0 0,8 0 0,4 0,8 0,8 
Matesa 0,8 0 0,8 0 0,2 0,2 0 0,8 0 0 1 0 
Racan 0,8 1 1 0,25 0,2 0,25 0 1 0 0,2 0,8 0 
Mesic 0,8 1 1 0,25 0,2 0,25 0,3 1 0 1 1 0,2 
Sanader 1 1 1 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,3 1 0 0,2 1 0,2 
Kosor 0,8 1 1 0,5 0,6 0,6 1 1 0 0,4 1 0,4 
Josipovic 0,8 0,5 0,8 0,75 0,6 0,75 1 1 1 0,8 1 1 
Milanovic 1 0,5 1 0,75 0,8 0,8 0,7 1 0 0,2 1 0,2 
 
leader 
Presidential 
system President 
Party 
leader HOE 
Majorita-
rian system Centrist 
Low 
party ID 
High 
authorit. 
LEADERS 
person-
centred 
comm. 
LEADERS 
persona-
centred 
comm. 
LEADERS 
private-
persona 
centred 
comm. Boomer 
Fewest 
year in 
politics 
Weak 
privacy 
protecti
on 
Weak 
libel 
laws 
Tito 1 1 1 1 0,75 0 0 1 1 0,6 0 0 0,8 0,4 0 
Tudman 0,5 1 1 1 0,75 0,4 0 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 0 1 0 0 
Valentic 0,5 0 0 0 1 0,4 0 0,2 1 0 0,2 1 1 0 0 
Matesa 0,5 0 0 0 0,5 0,2 0 0,4 0 0,2 0 1 1 0 0 
Racan 0 0 1 1 0 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0 0 0,4 0 0 
Mesic 0 1 0 0 0,75 1 1 0,4 1 0,8 0,2 0 0,4 0 0 
Sanader 0 0 1 1 0 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,4 0 1 0,4 0 0 
Kosor 0 0 1 1 1 0,8 0,4 0,6 1 0,6 0,6 1 0,6 0 0,5 
Josipovic 0 1 0 0 0,75 0,6 0,2 0,6 1 0,8 0,8 1 1 0 0,5 
Milanovic 0 0 1 1 0 0,6 0,2 0,6 1 0,2 0 1 0,8 0 0,5 
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List of conditions tested for each outcome: 
 
Outcome 
Person-centred 
media reporting 
Persona-centred 
media reporting 
Private persona-
centred media 
reporting 
Person-centred 
leaders’ 
communication 
Persona-centred 
leaders’ 
communication 
Private persona-
centred leaders’ 
communication 
Conditions 
Person-centred 
leaders’ 
communication 
Persona-centred 
leaders’ 
communication 
Private persona-
centred leaders’ 
communication 
Person-centred 
media reporting 
Persona-centred 
media reporting 
Private persona-
centred media 
reporting 
 
Autonomous 
journalistic culture 
Autonomous 
journalistic culture 
Autonomous 
journalistic culture 
Autonomous 
journalistic culture TV reach 
Commercialized 
media system 
 
Commercialized 
media system 
Commercialized 
media system 
Commercialized 
media system 
Party leader President TV reach 
 Party leader TV reach TV reach Centrist Years in politics Tabloid sector 
 President TV debate Tabloid sector Party ID Centrist President 
 HOE President President Political system Boomer Years in politics 
 Political system HOE Years in politics Electoral system Party ID Centrist 
 Electoral system  Libel law Authoritarianism Electoral system Boomer 
   Privacy law   Party ID 
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